The Air Estimates of March 1934 totalled only twenty millions, and contained provision for four new squadrons, or an increase in our first-line air strength from 850 to 890. The financial cost involved in the first year was £130,000.
On this I said in the House of Commons:
We are, it is admitted, the fifth air Power only—if that. We are but half the strength of France, our nearest neighbour. Germany is arming fast and no one is going to stop her. That seems quite clear. No one proposes a preventive war to stop Germany breaking the Treaty of Versailles. She is going to arm; she is doing it; she has been doing it.… There is time for us to take the necessary measures, but it is the measures we want. We want the measures to achieve parity. No nation playing the part we play and aspire to play in the world has a right to be in a position where it can be blackmailed.…
I called upon Mr. Baldwin, as the man who possessed the power, for action. His was the power, and his the responsibility.
In the course of his reply Mr. Baldwin said:
If all our efforts for an agreement fail, and if it is not possible to obtain this equality in such matters as I have indicated, then any Government of this country—a National Government more than any, and this Government—will see to it that in air strength and air power this country shall no longer be in a position inferior to any country within striking distance of its shores.
Here was a most solemn and definite pledge, given at a time when it could almost certainly have been made good by vigorous action on a large scale. Nevertheless, when on July 20 the Government brought forward some belated and inadequate proposals for strengthening the Royal Air Force by 41 squadrons, or about 820 machines, only to be completed in five years, the Labour Party, supported by the Liberals, moved a Vote of Censure upon them in the House of Commons. Mr. Attlee, as he then was, speaking in their name, said: “We deny the need for increased air armaments.… We deny the proposition that an increased British Air Force will make for the peace of the world, and we reject altogether the claim to parity.” The Liberal Party, supported this Censure Motion, and their Leader, Sir Herbert Samuel, said: “What is the case in regard to Germany? Nothing we have so far seen or heard would suggest that our present Air Force is not adequate to meet any peril at the present time from this quarter.”
When we remember that this was language used after careful deliberation by the responsible heads of parties, the danger of our country becomes apparent. This was the formative time when by extreme exertions we could have preserved the air strength on which our independence of action was founded. If Great Britain and France had each maintained quantitative parity with Germany they would together have been double as strong, and Hitler’s career of violence might have been nipped in the bud without the loss of a single life. Thereafter it was too late. We cannot doubt the sincerity of the Leaders of the Socialist and Liberal Parties. They were completely wrong and mistaken, and they bear their share of the burden before history. It is indeed astonishing that the Socialist Party should have endeavoured in after years to claim superior foresight and should have reproached their opponents with failing to provide for national safety.
I now enjoyed for once the advantage of being able to urge rearmament in the guise of a defender of the Government. I therefore received an unusually friendly hearing from the Conservative Party.
I do not suppose there has ever been such a pacifist-minded Government. There is the Prime Minister [Mr. Ramsay MacDonald] who in the war proved in the most extreme manner and with very great courage his convictions and the sacrifices he would make for what he believed was the cause of pacifism. The Lord President of the Council [Mr. Baldwin] is chiefly associated in the public mind with the repetition of the prayer “Give peace in our time”. One would have supposed that when Ministers like these come forward and say that they feel it their duty to ask for some small increase in the means they have of guaranteeing the public safety, it would weigh with the Opposition and would be considered as a proof of the reality of the danger from which they seek to protect us.… We are a rich and easy prey. No country is so vulnerable, and no country would better repay pillage than our own.… With our enormous metropolis here, the greatest target in the world, a kind of tremendous, fat, valuable cow tied up to attract the beast of prey, we are in a position in which we have never been before, and in which no other country is at the present time.
Let us remember this: our weakness does not only involve ourselves; our weakness involves also the stability of Europe.
I then proceeded to argue that Germany was already approaching air parity with Britain:
I first assert that Germany has already, in violation of the Treaty, created a military Air Force which is now nearly two-thirds as strong as our present home defence Air Force. That is the first statement which I put before the Government for their consideration. The second is that Germany is rapidly increasing this Air Force, not only by large sums of money which figure in her estimates, but also by public subscriptions—very often almost forced subscriptions—which are in progress and have been in progress for some time all over Germany. By the end of 1935 the German Air Force will be nearly equal in numbers and efficiency to our home defence Air Force at that date even if the Government’s present proposals are carried out.
The third statement is that if Germany continues this expansion and if we continue to carry out our scheme, then some time in 1936 Germany will be definitely and substantially stronger in the air than Great Britain. Fourthly, and this is the point which is causing anxiety, once they have got that lead we may never be able to overtake them … If the Government have to admit at any time in the next few years that the German air forces are stronger than our own, then they will be held, and I think rightly held, to have failed in their prime duty to the country.…
The Labour Party’s Vote of Censure was of course defeated by a large majority, and I have no doubt that the nation, had it been appealed to with proper preparation on these issues, would equally have sustained the measures necessary for national safety.
It is not possible to tell this story without recording the milestones which we passed on our long journey from security to the jaws of Death. Looking back, I am astonished at the length of time that was granted to us. It would have been possible in 1933, or even in 1934, for Britain to have created an air-power which would have imposed the necessary restraints upon Hitler’s ambition, or would perhaps have enabled the military leaders of Germany to control his violent acts. More than five whole years had yet to run before we were to be confronted with the supreme ordeal. Had we acted even now with reasonable prudence and healthy energy, it might never have come to pass. Based upon superior air-power, Britain and France could safely have invoked the aid of the League of Nations, and all the States of Europe would have gathered behind them. For the first time the League would have had an Instrument of Authority.
When the winter session opened on November 28, 1934, I moved in the name of some of my friends* an Amendment to the Address, declaring that “the strength of our national defences and especially of our air defences is no longer adequate to secure the peace, safety, and freedom of Your Majesty’s faithful subjects”. The House was packed and very ready to listen. After using all the arguments which emphasised the heavy danger to us and to the world, I came to precise facts:
“I assert, first, that Germany already, at this moment, has a military Air Force.… and that this … is rapidly approaching equality with our own. Secondly, … the German military Air Force will this time next year be in fact at least as strong as our own, and it may be even stronger. Thirdly, … by the end of 1936, that is, one year further on, and two years from now, the German military Air Force will be nearly 50 per cent. stronger, and in 1937 nearly double.”
Mr. Baldwin, who followed me at once, faced this issue squarely, and, on the case made out by his Air Ministry advisers, met me with direct contradiction:
“It is not the case that Germany is rapidly approaching equalit
y with us.… Germany is actively engaged in the production of service aircraft, but her real strength is not 50 per cent. of our strength in Europe to-day. As for the position this time next year … so far from the German military Air Force being at least as strong as, and probably stronger than, our own, we estimate that we shall have a margin in Europe alone of nearly 50 per cent. I cannot look farther forward than the next two years. Mr. Churchill speaks of what may happen in 1937. Such investigations as I have been able to make lead me to believe that his figures are considerably exaggerated.”
This sweeping assurance from the virtual Prime Minister soothed most of the alarmed, and silenced many of the critics. Everyone was glad to learn that my precise statements had been denied upon unimpeachable authority. I was not at all convinced. I believed that Mr. Baldwin was not being told the truth by his advisers, and anyhow that he did not know the facts.
Thus the winter months slipped away, and it was not till the spring that I again had the opportunity of raising the issue. Before doing so I gave full and precise notice to Mr. Baldwin, and when, on March 19, 1935, the Air Estimates were presented to the House, I reiterated my statement of November, and again directly challenged the assurances which he had then given. A very confident reply was made by the Under-Secretary for Air. However, at the end of March the Foreign Secretary and Mr. Eden paid a visit to Hitler in Germany, and in the course of an important conversation, the text of which is on record, they were told personally by him that the German Air Force had already reached parity with Great Britain. This fact was made public by the Government on April 3. At the beginning of May the Prime Minister wrote an article in his own organ, The Newsletter, in which he emphasised the dangers of German rearmament in terms akin to those which I had so often expressed since 1932. He used the revealing word “ambush”, which must have sprung from the anxiety of his heart. We had indeed fallen into an ambush. Mr. MacDonald himself opened the debate. After referring to the declared German intention to build a Navy beyond the Treaty and submarines in breach of it, he admitted that Hitler claimed to have reached parity with Great Britain in the air. “Whatever may be the exact interpretation of this phrase in terms of air strength, it undoubtedly indicated that the German force has been expanded to a point considerably in excess of the estimates which we were able to place before the House last year. That is a grave fact, with regard to which both the Government and the Air Ministry have taken immediate notice.”
When in due course I was called I said:
“Even now we are not taking the measures which would be in true proportion to our needs. The Government have proposed these increases. They must face the storm. They will have to encounter every form of unfair attack. Their motives will be misrepresented. They will be calumniated and called warmongers. Every kind of attack will be made upon them by many powerful, numerous, and extremely vocal forces in this country. They are going to get it anyway. Why, then, not fight for something that will give us safety? Why, then, not insist that the provision for the Air Force should be adequate, and then, however severe may be the censure and however strident the abuse which they have to face, at any rate there will be this satisfactory result—that His Majesty’s Government will be able to feel that in this, of all matters the prime responsibility of a Government, they have done their duty.”
Although the House listened to me with close attention, I felt a sensation of despair. To be so entirely convinced and vindicated in a matter of life and death to one’s country, and not to be able to make Parliament and the nation heed the warning, or bow to the proof by taking action, was an experience most painful.
It was not until May 22, 1935, that Mr. Baldwin made his celebrated confession. I am forced to cite it:
First of all, with regard to the figure I gave in November of German aeroplanes, nothing has come to my knowledge since that makes me think that figure was wrong. I believed at that time it was right. Where I was wrong was in my estimate of the future. There I was completely wrong. We were completely misled on that subject.…
I would repeat here that there is no occasion, in my view, in what we are doing, for panic. But I will say this deliberately, with all the knowledge I have of the situation, that I would not remain for one moment in any Government which took less determined steps than we are taking to-day. I think it is only due to say that there has been a great deal of criticism, both in the Press and verbally, about the Air Ministry, as though they were responsible for possibly an inadequate programme, for not having gone ahead faster, and for many other things. I only want to repeat that whatever responsibility there may be—and we are perfectly ready to meet criticism—that responsibility is not that of any single Minister, it is the responsibility of the Government as a whole, and we are all responsible and we are all to blame.
I hoped that this shocking confession would be a decisive event, and that at the least a Parliamentary Committee of all parties would be set up to report upon the facts and upon our safety. The House of Commons had a different reaction. The Labour and Liberal Oppositions, having nine months earlier moved or supported a Vote of Censure even upon the modest steps the Government had taken, were ineffectual and undecided. They were looking forward to an election against “Tory armaments”. Neither the Labour nor the Liberal spokesmen had prepared themselves for Mr. Baldwin’s disclosures and admission, and they did not attempt to adapt their speeches to this outstanding episode. Nothing they said was in the slightest degree related to the emergency in which they admitted we stood, or to the far graver facts which we now know lay behind it.
The Government majority for their part appeared captivated by Mr. Baldwin’s candour. His admission of having been utterly wrong, with all his sources of knowledge, upon a vital matter for which he was responsible was held to be redeemed by the frankness with which he declared his error and shouldered the blame. There was even a strange wave of enthusiasm for a Minister who did not hesitate to say that he was wrong. Indeed, many Conservative Members seemed angry with me for having brought their trusted leader to a plight from which only his native manliness and honesty had extricated him; but not, alas, his country.
A disaster of the first magnitude had fallen upon us. Hitler had already obtained parity with Great Britain. Henceforward he had merely to drive his factories and training-schools at full speed not only to keep his lead in the air but steadily to improve it. Henceforward all the unknown, immeasurable threats which overhung London from air attack would be a definite and compelling factor in all our decisions. Moreover, we could never catch up; or at any rate the Government never did catch up. Credit is due to them and to the Air Ministry for the high efficiency of the Royal Air Force. But the pledge that air parity would be maintained was irretrievably broken. It is true that the immediate further expansion of the German Air Force did not proceed at the same rate as in the period when they gained parity. No doubt a supreme effort had been made by them to achieve at a bound this commanding position and to assist and exploit it in their diplomacy. It gave Hitler the foundation for the successive acts of aggression which he had planned and which were now soon to take place. Very considerable efforts were made by the British Government in the next four years. The first prototypes of the ever-famous Hurricane and Spitfire fighters flew in November 1935 and March 1936 respectively. Immediate large-scale production was ordered, and they were ready in some numbers none too soon. There is no doubt that we excelled in air quality; but quantity was henceforth beyond us. The outbreak of the war found us with barely half the German numbers.
CHAPTER VII
CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE, 1935
THE years of underground burrowings, of secret or disguised preparations, were now over, and Hitler at length felt himself strong enough to make his first open challenge. On March 9, 1935, the official constitution of the German Air Force was announced, and on the 16th it was declared that the German Army would henceforth be based on national compulsory service. The laws to implement these decisions were soon promulgated,
and action had already begun in anticipation. The French Government, who were well informed of what was coming, had actually declared the consequential extension of their own military service to two years a few hours earlier on the same momentous day. The German action was an open formal affront to the treaties of peace upon which the League of Nations was founded. As long as the breaches had taken the form of evasions or calling things by other names, it was easy for the responsible victorious Powers, obsessed by pacifism and preoccupied with domestic politics, to avoid the responsibility of declaring that the Peace Treaty was being broken or repudiated. Now the issue came with blunt and brutal force. Almost on the same day the Ethiopian Government appealed to the League of Nations against the threatening demands of Italy. When, on March 24, against this background, Sir John Simon with the Lord Privy Seal, Mr. Eden, visited Berlin at Hitler’s invitation, the French Government thought the occasion ill-chosen. They had now themselves at once to face, not the reduction of their Army, so eagerly pressed upon them by Mr. MacDonald the year before, but the extension of compulsory military service from one year to two. In the prevailing state of public opinion this was a heavy task. Not only the Communists but the Socialists had voted against the measure. When M. Léon Blum said, “The workers of France will rise to resist Hitlerite aggression,” Thorez replied, amid the applause of his Soviet-bound faction, “We will not tolerate the working classes being drawn into a so-called war in defence of Democracy against Fascism.”
The United States had washed their hands of all concern with Europe, apart from wishing well to everybody, and were sure they would never have to be bothered with it again. But France, Great Britain, and also—decidedly—Italy, in spite of their discordances, felt bound to challenge this definite act of treaty-violation by Hitler. A Conference of the former principal Allies was summoned under the League of Nations at Stresa, and all these matters were brought to debate.
The Second World War Page 9
