The Second World War

by Winston S. Churchill

  12 + s.w.w.

  A vehement controversy, conducted with no little asperity, arose in the German Staffs about the width of the front and the number of points to be attacked. The Army demanded a series of landings along the whole English southern coast from Dover to Lyme Regis, west of Portland. They also desired an ancillary landing north of Dover at Ramsgate. The German Naval Staff now stated that the most suitable area for the safe crossing of the English Channel was between the North Foreland and the western end of the Isle of Wight. On this the Army Staff developed a plan for a landing of 100,000 men, followed almost immediately by 160,000 more at various points from Dover westward to Lyme Bay. Colonel-General Halder, Chief of the Army Staff, declared that it was necessary to land at least four divisions in the Brighton area. He also required landings in the area Deal-Ramsgate; at least thirteen divisions must be deployed, as far as possible simultaneously, at points along the whole front. In addition, the Luftwaffe demanded shipping to transport fifty-two anti-aircraft batteries with the first wave.

  The Chief of the Naval Staff however made it clear that nothing like so large or rapid a movement was possible. He could not physically undertake to escort a landing fleet across the whole width of the area mentioned. All he had meant was that within these limits the Army should pick the best place. The Navy had not enough strength, even with air supremacy, to protect more than one passage at a time, and they thought the narrowest parts of the Straits of Dover the least difficult. To carry the whole of the 160,000 men of the second wave and their equipment in a single operation would require two million tons of shipping. Even if this fantastic requirement could have been met, such quantities of shipping could not have been accommodated in the area of embarkation. Only the first échelons could be thrown across for the formation of narrow bridgeheads, and at least two days would be needed to land the second échelons of these divisions, to say nothing of the second six divisions which were thought indispensable. He further pointed out that a broad-front landing would mean three to five and a half hours’ difference in the times of high water at the various points selected. Either therefore unfavourable tide conditions must be accepted at some places, or simultaneous landings renounced. This objection must have been very difficult to answer.

  Much valuable time had been consumed in these exchanges of memoranda. It was not until August 7 that the first verbal discussion took place between General Halder and the Chief of the Naval Staff. At this meeting Halder said: “I utterly reject the Navy’s proposals. From the Army view-point I regard it as complete suicide. I might just as well put the troops that have been landed straight through the sausage-machine.” The Naval Chief of Staff rejoined that he must equally reject the landing on a broad front, as that would lead only to a sacrifice of the troops on the passage over. In the end a compromise decision was given by Hitler which satisfied neither the Army nor the Navy. A Supreme Command Directive, issued on August 27, decided that “the Army operations must allow for the facts regarding available shipping space and security of the crossing and disembarkation.” All landings in the Deal-Ramsgate area were abandoned, but the front was extended from Folkestone to Bognor. Thus it was nearly the end of August before even this measure of agreement was reached; and of course everything was subject to victory being gained in the air battle, which had now been raging for six weeks.

  On the basis of the frontage at last fixed the final plan was made. The military command was entrusted to Rundstedt, but shortage of shipping reduced his force to thirteen divisions with twelve in reserve. The Sixteenth Army, from ports between Rotterdam and Boulogne, were to land in the neighbourhood of Hythe, Rye, Hastings, and Eastbourne, the Ninth Army, from ports between Boulogne and Havre, attacking between Brighton and Worthing. Dover was to be captured from the landward side; then both armies would advance to the covering line of Canterbury-Ashford-Mayfield-Arundel. In all, eleven divisions were to be landed in the first waves. A week after the landing it was hoped, optimistically, to advance yet farther, to Gravesend, Reigate, Petersfield, Portsmouth. In reserve lay the Sixth Army, with divisions ready to reinforce, or, if circumstances allowed, to extend the frontage of attack to Weymouth. There was indeed no lack of fierce and well-armed troops, but they required shipping and safe conveyance.

  On the Naval Staff fell the heaviest initial task. Germany had about 1,200,000 tons of seagoing shipping available to meet all her needs. To embark the invasion force would require more than half this amount, and would involve great economic disturbance. By the beginning of September the Naval Staff were able to report that the following had been requisitioned:

  168 transports (of 700,000 tons)

  1,910 barges

  419 tugs and trawlers

  1,600 motor-boats

  All this Armada had to be manned, and brought to the assembly ports by sea and canal. When on September 1 the great southward flow of invasion shipping began it was watched, reported, and violently assailed by the Royal Air Force along the whole front from Antwerp to Havre. The German Naval Staff recorded: “The enemy’s continuous fighting defence off the coast, his concentration of bombers on the ‘Sea Lion’ embarkation ports, and his coastal reconnaissance activities indicate that he is now expecting an immediate landing.”

  And again: “The English bombers, however, and the minelaying forces of the British Air Force … are still at full operational strength, and it must be confirmed that the activity of the British forces has undoubtedly been successful even if no decisive hindrance has yet been caused to German transport movement.”

  Yet, despite delays and damage, the German Navy completed the first part of its task. The 10 per cent. margin for accidents and losses it had provided was fully expended. What survived however did not fall short of the minimum it had planned to have for the first stage.

  Both Navy and Army now cast their burden on the German Air Force. All this plan of the corridor, with its balustrades of minefields to be laid and maintained under the German Air Force canopy against the overwhelming superiority of the British flotillas and small craft, depended upon the defeat of the British Air Force and the complete mastery of the air by Germany over the Channel and South-East England, and not only over the crossing but over the landing-points. Both the older services passed the buck to Reichsmarschall Goering.

  Goering was by no means unwilling to accept this responsibility, because he believed that the German Air Force, with its large numerical superiority, would, after some weeks of hard fighting, beat down the British air defence, destroy their airfields in Kent and Sussex, and establish a complete domination of the Channel. But apart from this he felt assured that the bombing of England, and particularly of London, would reduce the decadent, peace-loving British to a condition in which they would sue for peace, more especially if the threat of invasion grew steadily upon their horizon. The German Admiralty were by no means convinced; indeed their misgivings were profound. They considered “Sea Lion” should be launched only in the last resort, and in July they had recommended the postponement of the operation till the spring of 1941, unless the unrestricted air attack and the unlimited U-boat warfare should “cause the enemy to negotiate with the Fuehrer on his own terms”. But Feldmarschall Keitel and General Jodl were glad to find the Air Supreme Commander so confident.

  These were great days for Nazi Germany. Hitler had danced his jig of joy before enforcing the humiliation of the French Armistice at Compiègne. The German Army marched triumphantly through the Arc de Triomphe and down the Champs Elysées. What was there they could not do? Why hesitate to play out a winning hand? Thus each of the three services involved in the operation “Sea Lion” worked upon the hopeful factors in their own theme and left the ugly side to their companions.

  As the days passed doubts and delays appeared and multiplied. Hitler’s directive of July 16 had laid down that all preparations were to be completed by the middle of August. All three services saw that this was impossible. And at the end of July Hitler accepted September 15 as
the earliest D-Day, reserving his decision for action until the results of the projected intensified air battle could be known.

  On August 30 the Naval Staff reported that owing to British counter-action against the invasion fleet preparations could not be completed by September 15. At their request D-Day was postponed to September 21, with a proviso often days’ previous warning. This meant that the preliminary order had to be issued on September 11. On September 10 the Naval Staff again reported their various difficulties from the weather, which is always tiresome, and from British counter-bombing. They pointed out that although the necessary naval preparations could in fact be completed by the 21st, the stipulated operational condition of undisputed air superiority over the Channel had not been achieved. On the 11th therefore Hitler postponed the preliminary order by three days, thus setting back the earliest D-Day to the 24th; on the 14th he further put it off. On the 17th the postponement became indefinite, and for good reason, in their view as in ours.

  On September 7 the information before us showed that the westerly and southerly movement of barges and small ships to ports between Ostend and Havre was in progress, and as these assembly harbours were under heavy British air attack it was not likely the ships would be brought to them until shortly before the actual attempt. The striking strength of the German Air Force between Amsterdam and Brest had been increased by the transfer of one hundred and sixty bomber aircraft from Norway; and short-range dive-bomber units were observed on the forward airfields in the Pas de Calais area. Four Germans captured a few days earlier after landing from a rowing-boat on the south-east coast had confessed to being spies, and said that they were to be ready at any time during the next fortnight to report the movement of British reserve formations in the area Ipswich-London-Reading-Oxford. Moon and tide conditions between the 8th and 10th of September were favourable for invasion on the south-east coast. On this the Chiefs of Staff concluded that the possibility of invasion had become imminent and that the defence forces should stand by at immediate notice.

  There was however at that time no machinery at General Headquarters, Home Forces, by which the existing eight hours’ notice for readiness could be brought to “readiness for immediate action” by intermediate stages. The code-word “Cromwell”, which meant “invasion imminent”, was therefore issued by Home Forces at 8 p.m., September 7, to the Eastern and Southern Commands, implying action stations for the forward coastal divisions. It was also sent to all formations in the London area and to the IVth and VIIth Corps in G.H.Q. Reserve. It was repeated for information to all other commands in the United Kingdom. On this, in some parts of the country, the Home Guard commanders, acting on their own initiative, called out the Home Guard by ringing the church bells. Neither I nor the Chiefs of Staff were aware that the decisive code-word “Cromwell” had been used, and the next morning instructions were given to devise intermediate stages by which vigilance could be increased on future occasions without declaring an invasion imminent. As may be imagined, this incident caused a great deal of talk and stir, but no mention of it was made in the newspapers or in Parliament. It served as a useful tonic and rehearsal for all concerned.

  Having traced the German invasion preparations steadily mounting to a climax, we have seen how the early mood of triumph changed gradually to one of doubt and finally to complete loss of confidence in the outcome. During the fateful months of July and August we see the Naval Commander, Raeder, endeavouring to teach his military and air colleagues about the grave difficulties attending large-scale amphibious war. He realised his own weakness and the lack of time for adequate preparation, and sought to impose limits on the grandiose plans advanced by Halder for landing immense forces simultaneously over a wide front. Meanwhile Goering with soaring ambition was determined to achieve spectacular victory with his Air Force alone and was disinclined to play the humbler rôle of working to a combined plan for the systematic reduction of opposing sea and air forces in the invasion area.

  It is apparent from the records that the German High Command were very far from being a co-ordinated team working together with a common purpose and with a proper understanding of each other’s capabilities and limitations. Each wished to be the brightest star in the firmament. Friction was apparent from the outset, and so long as Halder could thrust responsibility on to Raeder he did little to bring his own plans into line with practical possibilities. Intervention by the Fuehrer was necessary, but seems to have done little to improve the relations between the services. In Germany the prestige of the Army was paramount and the military leaders regarded their naval colleagues with some condescension. It is impossible to resist the conclusion that the German Army was reluctant to place itself in the hands of its sister service in a major operation. When questioned after the war about these plans, General Jodl impatiently remarked, “Our arrangements were much the same as those of Julius Cæsar”. Here speaks the authentic German soldier in relation to the sea affair, having little conception of the problems involved in landing and deploying large military forces on a defended coast exposed to all the hazards of the sea.

  In Britain, whatever our shortcomings, we understood the sea affair very thoroughly. For centuries it has been in our blood, and its traditions stir not only our sailors but the whole race. It was this above all things which enabled us to regard the menace of invasion with a steady gaze. The system of control of operations by the three Chiefs of Staff concerted under a Minister of Defence produced a standard of team-work, mutual understanding, and ready co-operation unrivalled in the past. When in course of time our opportunity came to undertake great invasions from the sea it was upon a foundation of solid achievement in preparation for the task and with a full understanding of the technical needs of such vast and hazardous undertakings. Had the Germans possessed in 1940 well-trained amphibious forces equipped with all the apparatus of modern amphibious war their task would still have been a forlorn hope in the face of our sea- and air-power. In fact they had neither the tools nor the training.

  The more the German High Command and the Fuehrer looked at the venture the less they liked it. We could not of course know each other’s moods and valuations: but with every week from the middle of July to the middle of September the unknown identity of views upon the problem between the German and British Admiralties, between the German Supreme Command and the British Chiefs of Staff, and also between the Fuehrer and the author of this book, became more definitely pronounced. If we could have agreed equally well about other matters there need have been no war. It was of course common ground between us that all depended upon the battle in the air. The question was how this would end between the combatants; and in addition the Germans wondered whether the British people would stand up to the air bombardment, the effect of which in these days was greatly exaggerated, or whether they would crumple and force His Majesty’s Government to capitulate. About this Reichsmarschall Goering had high hopes, and we had no fears.

  CHAPTER XII

  THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

  OUR fate now depended upon victory in the air. The German leaders had recognised that all their plans for the invasion of Britain depended on winning air supremacy above the Channel and the chosen landing-places on our south coast. The preparation of the embarkation ports, the assembly of the transports, the mine-sweeping of the passages, and the laying of the new minefields were impossible without protection from British air attack. For the actual crossing and landings complete mastery of the air over the transports and the beaches was the decisive condition. The result therefore turned upon the destruction of the Royal Air Force and the system of airfields between London and the sea. We now know that Hitler said to Admiral Raeder on July 31: “If after eight days of intensive air war the Luftwaffe has not achieved considerable destruction of the enemy’s Air Force, harbours, and naval forces, the operation will have to be put off till May 1941.” This was the battle that had now to be fought.

  I did not myself at all shrink mentally from the impending trial of streng
th. I had told Parliament on June 4: “The great French Army was very largely, for the time being, cast back and disturbed by the onrush of a few thousand armoured vehicles. May it not also be that the cause of civilisation itself will be defended by the skill and devotion of a few thousand airmen?” And to Smuts, on June 9: “I see only one sure way through now—to wit, that Hitler should attack this country, and in so doing break his air weapon.” The occasion had now arrived.

  Admirable accounts have been written of the struggle between the British and German Air Forces which constitutes the Battle of Britain. We have now also access to the views of the German High Command and to their inner reactions in the various phases. It appears that the German losses in some of the principal combats were a good deal less than we thought at the time, and that reports on both sides were materially exaggerated. But the main features and the outline of this famous conflict, upon which the life of Britain and the freedom of the world depended, are not in dispute.