By June we began once more to gain the upper hand. The utmost exertions were being made to improve the organisation of our convoy escorts and develop new weapons and devices. The chief needs were for more and faster escorts with greater fuel endurance, for more long-range aircraft, and above all for good Radar. Shore-based aircraft alone were not enough, and every convoy needed ship-borne aeroplanes to detect any U-boat within striking distance in daylight, and by forcing it to dive prevent it making contact, or making a report which would draw others to the scene. Fighter aircraft discharged from catapults mounted in ordinary merchant ships, as well as in converted ships manned by the Royal Navy, soon met the thrust of the Focke-Wulf. The fighter pilot, having been tossed like a falcon against his prey, had at first to rely for his life on being retrieved from the sea by one of the escorts. The Focke-Wolf gradually became the hunted rather than the hunter. Hitler’s invasion of Russia compelled him to re-deploy his machines in strength, and from an April peak of nearly three hundred thousand tons, our losses had dwindled by mid-summer to about a fifth.
The President now made another important move. He decided to establish a base in Iceland. It was agreed that United States forces should relieve the British garrison. They reached Iceland on July 7, and this island was included in the defence system of the Western Hemisphere. Thereafter American convoys escorted by American warships ran regularly to Reykjavik, and although the United States were still not at war they admitted foreign ships to the protection of their convoys.
At the height of this struggle I made one of the most important and fortunate appointments of my war administration. In 1930, when I was out of office, I accepted for the first and only time in my life a directorship. It was in one of the subsidiary companies of Lord Inchcape’s far-spreading organisation of the Peninsular and Oriental shipping lines. For eight years I regularly attended the monthly board meetings, and discharged my duties with care. At these meetings I gradually became aware of a very remarkable man. He presided over thirty or forty companies, of which the one with which I was connected was a small unit. I soon perceived that Frederick Leathers was the central brain and controlling power of this combination. He knew everything and commanded absolute confidence. Year after year I watched him from my small position at close quarters. I said to myself, “If ever there is another war, here is a man who will play the same kind of part as the great business leaders who served under me at the Ministry of Munitions in 1917 and 1918.”
Leathers volunteered his services to the Ministry of Shipping on the outbreak in 1939. We did not come much into contact while I was at the Admiralty, because his functions were specialised and subordinate. But now in 1941, in the stresses of the Battle of the Atlantic, and with the need for combining the management of our shipping with all the movements of our supplies by rail and road from our harried ports, he came more and more into my mind. On May 8 I turned to him. After much discussion I remodelled the Ministries of Shipping and Transport into one integral machine. I placed Leathers at its head. To give him the necessary authority I created the office of Minister of War Transport. I was always shy of bringing people into high ministerial positions in the House of Commons if they had not been brought up there for a good many years. Experienced Members out of office may badger the new-comer, and he will always be unduly worried by the speeches he has to prepare and deliver. I therefore made a submission to the Crown that a peerage should be conferred upon the new Minister.
Henceforward to the end of the war Lord Leathers remained in complete control of the Ministry of War Transport, and his reputation grew with every one of the four years that passed. He won the confidence of the Chiefs of Staff and of all departments at home, and established intimate and excellent relations with the leading Americans in this vital sphere. With none was he more closely in harmony than with Mr. Lewis Douglas, of the United States Shipping Board, and later Ambassador in London. Leathers was an immense help to me in the conduct of the war. It was very rarely that he was unable to accomplish the hard tasks I set. Several times when all staff and departmental processes had failed to solve the problems of moving an extra division or transhipping it from British to American ships, or of meeting some other need, I made a personal appeal to him, and the difficulties seemed to disappear as if by magic.
Throughout these critical months the two German battle-cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau remained poised in Brest. At any moment it seemed that they might again break out into the Atlantic. It was due to the Royal Air Force that they continued inactive. Repeated air attacks were made on them in port, with such good effect that they remained idle throughout the year. The enemy’s concern soon became to get them home; but even this they were unable to do until 1942. We shall see in due course the extent to which the Navy and the R.A.F. Coastal Command succeeded; how we became the masters of the outlets; how the Heinkel 111’s were shot down by our fighters, and the U-boats choked in the very seas in which they sought to choke us, until once again with shining weapons we swept the approaches to the Isle.
CHAPTER XVIII
YUGOSLAVIA AND GREECE
NOW the moment had come when the irrevocable decision must be taken whether or not to send the Army of the Nile to Greece. This grave step was required not only to help Greece in her peril and torment, but to form against the impending German attack a Balkan Front comprising Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, with effects upon Soviet Russia which could not be measured by us. These would certainly have been all-important if the Soviet leaders had realised what was coming upon them. It was not what we could send ourselves that could decide the Balkan issue. Our limited hope was to stir and organise united action. If at the wave of our wand Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey would all act together, it seemed to us that Hitler might either let the Balkans off for the time being or become so heavily engaged with our combined forces as to create a major front in that theatre. We did not then know that he was already deeply set upon his gigantic invasion of Russia. If we had we should have felt more confidence in the success of our policy. We should have seen that he risked falling between two stools, and might easily impair his supreme undertaking for the sake of a Balkan preliminary. This is what actually happened, but we could not know at the time. Some may think we builded rightly; at least we builded better than we knew. It was our aim to animate and combine Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. Our duty so far as possible was to aid the Greeks. For all these purposes our four divisions in the Delta were well placed.
On March 1 the German Army began to move into Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Army mobilised and took up positions along the Greek frontier. A general southward movement of the German forces was in progress, aided in every way by the Bulgarians. On the following day Mr. Eden and General Dill resumed their military conversations in Athens. As the result of these Mr. Eden sent a very serious message, and a marked change came over our views in London. Admiral Cunningham, though convinced our policy was right, left us in no doubt as to the considerable naval risks in the Mediterranean which were involved. The Chiefs of Staff recorded the various factors developing unfavourably against our Balkan policy, and particularly against sending an army to Greece. “The hazards of the enterprise,” they reported, “have considerably increased.” They did not however feel that they could as yet question the military advice of those on the spot, who described the position as not by any means hopeless.
14*
After reflecting alone at Chequers on the Sunday night upon the trend of discussion in the War Cabinet that morning, I sent the following message to Mr. Eden, who had now left Athens for Cairo. This certainly struck a different note on my part. But I take full responsibility for the eventual decision, because I am sure I could have stopped it all if I had been convinced. It is so much easier to stop than to do.
… We have done our best to promote Balkan combination against Germany. We must be careful not to urge Greece against her better judgment into a hopeless resistance alone when we have only hand-fuls of troops which can rea
ch the scene in time. Grave Imperial issues are raised by committing New Zealand and Australian troops to an enterprise which, as you say, has become even more hazardous.… We must liberate Greeks from feeling bound to reject a German ultimatum. If on their own they resolve to fight, we must to some extent share their ordeal. But rapid German advance will probably prevent any appreciable British Imperial forces from being engaged.
Loss of Greece and Balkans by no means a major catastrophe for us, provided Turkey remains honest neutral. We could take Rhodes and consider plans for a descent on Sicily or Tripoli. We are advised from many quarters that our ignominious ejection from Greece would do us more harm in Spain and Vichy than the fact of submission of Balkans, which with our scanty forces alone we have never been expected to prevent.…
Attached to this was the grave commentary of the Chiefs of Staff.
As soon as my warning telegram was read by our ambassador in Athens he showed lively distress. “How,” he telegraphed to the Foreign Secretary, “can we possibly abandon the King of Greece after the assurances given him by the Commander-in-Chief and Chief of the Imperial General Staff as to reasonable chances of success? This seems to me quite unthinkable. We shall be pilloried by the Greeks and the world in general as going back on our word. There is no question of ‘liberating the Greeks from feeling bound to reject the ultimatum’. They have decided to fight Germany alone if necessary. The question is whether we help or abandon them.”
The War Cabinet thereupon resolved to take no decision till we had a reply to all this from Mr. Eden. His answer arrived next day. The material portion ran as follows:
“… Collapse of Greece without further effort on our part to save her by intervention on land, after the Libyan victories had, as all the world knows, made forces available, would be the greatest calamity. Yugoslavia would then certainly be lost; nor can we feel confident that even Turkey would have the strength to remain steadfast if the Germans and Italians were established in Greece without effort on our part to resist them. No doubt our prestige will suffer if we are ignominiously ejected, but in any event to have fought and suffered in Greece would be less damaging to us than to have left Greece to her fate.… In the existing situation we are all agreed that the course advocated should be followed and help given to Greece.”
Accompanied by the Chiefs of Staff, I brought the issue before the War Cabinet, who were fully apprised of everything as it happened, for final decision. In spite of the fact that we could not send more aircraft than were already ordered and on the way, there was no hesitation or division among us. Personally I felt that the men on the spot had been searchingly tested. There was no doubt that their hands had not been forced in any way by political pressure from home. Smuts, with all his wisdom, and from his separate angle of thought and fresh eye, had concurred. Nor could anyone suggest that we had thrust ourselves upon Greece against her wishes. No one had been over-persuaded. Certainly we had with us the highest expert authority, acting in full freedom and with all knowledge of the men and the scene. My colleagues, who were toughened by the many risks we had run successfully, had independently reached the same conclusions. Mr. Menzies, on whom a special burden rested, was full of courage. There was a strong glow for action. The Cabinet was short; the decision final; the answer brief:
“Chiefs of Staff [have] advised that, in view of steadfastly expressed opinion of Commanders-in-Chief on the spot, of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and commanders of the forces to be employed, it would be right to go on. Cabinet decided to authorise you to proceed with the operation, and by so doing Cabinet accepts for itself the fullest responsibility.* We will communicate with Australian and New Zealand Governments accordingly.”
The fate of Yugoslavia must now be described. The whole defence of Salonika depended on her coming in, and it was vital to know what she would do. On March 2, Mr. Campbell, our Ambassador at Belgrade, met Mr. Eden in Athens. He said that the Yugoslavs were frightened of Germany and unsettled internally by political difficulties. There was a chance however that if they knew our plans for aiding Greece they might be ready to help. On the 5th the Foreign Secretary sent Mr. Campbell back to Belgrade with a confidential letter to the Regent, Prince Paul. In this he portrayed Yugoslavia’s fate at German hands, and said that Greece and Turkey intended to fight if attacked. In such a case Yugoslavia must join us. The Regent was to be told verbally that the British had decided to help Greece with land and air forces as strongly and quickly as possible, and that if a Yugoslav Staff officer could be sent to Athens we would include him in our discussions.
In this atmosphere much turned on the Regent’s attitude. Prince Paul was an amiable, artistic personage, but the prestige of the monarchy had long been on the wane and he now carried the policy of neutrality to its limits. He dreaded particularly that any move by Yugoslavia or her neighbours might provoke the Germans into a southward advance into the Balkans. He declined a proposed visit from Mr. Eden. Fear reigned. The Ministers and the leading politicians did not dare to speak their minds. There was one exception. An Air Force general named Simovic represented the nationalist elements among the Officer Corps of the armed forces. Since December his office had become a clandestine centre of opposition to German penetration into the Balkans and to the inertia of the Yugoslav Government.
On March 4 Prince Paul left Belgrade on a secret visit to Berchtesgaden, and under dire pressure undertook verbally that Yugoslavia would follow the example of Bulgaria. On his return, at a meeting of the Royal Council and in separate discussion with political and military leaders, he found opposing views. Debate was violent, but the German ultimatum was real. General Simovic, when summoned to the White Palace, Prince Paul’s residence on the hills above Belgrade, was firm against capitulation. Serbia would not accept such a decision, and the dynasty would be endangered. But Prince Paul had already in effect committed his country.
During the night of March 20 at a Cabinet meeting, the Yugoslav Government decided to adhere to the Tripartite Pact. Three ministers however resigned on this issue. On March 24 the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs crept out of Belgrade from a suburban railway station on the Vienna train. Next day they signed the pact with Hitler in Vienna, and the ceremony was broadcast over the Belgrade radio. Rumours of imminent disaster swept through the cafés and conclaves of the Yugoslav capital.
Direct action, if the Government capitulated to Germany, had been discussed for some months in the small circle of officers round Simovic. When during March 26 the news of the return from Vienna of the Yugoslav Ministers began to circulate in Belgrade the conspirators decided to act. Few revolutions have gone more smoothly. There was no bloodshed. Certain senior officers were placed under arrest. The Prime Minister was brought by the police to Simovic’s headquarters and obliged to sign a letter of resignation. Prince Paul was informed that Simovic had taken over the Government in the name of the King, and that the Council of Regency had been dissolved. He was escorted to the office of General Simovic. Together with the other two regents, he then signed the act of abdication. He was allowed a few hours to collect his effects, and, together with his family, he left the country that night for Greece.
The plan had been made and executed by a close band of Serb nationalist officers who had identified themselves with the true public mood. Their action let loose an outburst of popular enthusiasm. The streets of Belgrade were soon thronged with Serbs, chanting, “Rather war than the pact; rather death than slavery.” There was dancing in the squares; English and French flags appeared everywhere; the Serb national anthem was sung with wild defiance by valiant, helpless multitudes. On March 28 King Peter, who by climbing down a rain-pipe had made his own escape from Regency tutelage, attended divine service in Belgrade Cathedral, amid fervent acclamation. The German Minister was publicly insulted, and the crowd spat on his car. The military exploit had roused a surge of national vitality. A people paralysed in action, hitherto ill-governed and ill-led, long haunted by the sense o
f being ensnared, flung their reckless, heroic defiance at the tyrant and conqueror in the moment of his greatest power.
Hitler was stung to the quick. He had a burst of that convulsive anger which momentarily blotted out thought and sometimes impelled him on his most dire adventures. In a passion he summoned the German High Command. Goering, Keitel, and Jodl were present, and Ribbentrop arrived later. Hitler said that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor in the coming action against Greece, and even more in the “Barbarossa” undertaking against Russia later on. He deemed it fortunate that the Yugoslavs had revealed their temper before “Barbarossa” was launched. Yugoslavia must be destroyed “militarily and as a national unit.” The blow must be carried out with unmerciful harshness. The night was spent by the generals in drafting the operation orders. Keitel confirms our view that the greatest danger to Germany was “an attack upon the Italian army from the rear.” “The decision to attack Yugoslavia meant completely upsetting all military movements and arrangements made up to that time. The invasion of Greece had to be completely readjusted. New forces had to be brought through Hungary from the north. All had to be improvised.”
Hungary was directly and immediately affected. Although the main German thrust against the Yugoslavs would clearly come through Roumania, all lines of communication led through Hungarian territory. Almost the first reaction of the German Government to the events in Belgrade was to send the Hungarian Minister in Berlin by air to Budapest with an urgent message to the Hungarian Regent, Admiral Horthy:
Yugoslavia will be annihilated, for she has just renounced publicly the policy of understanding with the Axis. The greater part of the German armed forces must pass through Hungary. But the principal attack will not be made on the Hungarian sector. Here the Hungarian Army should intervene, and, in return for its co-operation, Hungary will be able to reoccupy all those former territories which she had been forced at one time to cede to Yugoslavia. The matter is urgent. An immediate and affirmative reply is requested.*
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