Soon after Rashid Ali appealed to the Fuehrer for armed support against us in Iraq, Admiral Darlan negotiated a preliminary agreement with the Germans about Syria. Three-quarters of the war material assembled under the control of the Italian Armistice Commission was to be transported to Iraq and the German Air Force granted landing facilities. General Dentz, the Vichy High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief, was ordered to comply, and by the end of May about a hundred German and twenty Italian aircraft landed on Syrian airfields.
From the outset of these new dangers General Wavell showed himself most reluctant to assume more burdens. In Syria all he could manage was a single brigade group. He said he would make preparations and do what he could to create the impression of a large force being prepared for action from Palestine, which might have some effect on the Iraqi Government, but anything he could send would be both inadequate and too late. It would leave Palestine most dangerously weak, and incitement to rebellion there was already taking place. “I have consistently warned you,” he telegraphed, “that no assistance could be given to Iraq from Palestine in present circumstances, and have always advised that a commitment in Iraq should be avoided.… My forces are stretched to the limit everywhere, and I simply cannot afford to risk part of them on what cannot produce any effect.”
General Auchinleck, on the other hand, continued to offer reinforcements for Iraq up to five infantry brigades and ancillary troops if shipping could be provided. We were gratified by his forward mood. General Wavell only obeyed under protest. “I feel it my duty to warn you in the gravest possible terms,” he cabled on May 5, “that I consider the prolongation of fighting in Iraq will seriously endanger the defence of Palestine and Egypt. The political repercussions will be incalculable, and may result in what I have spent nearly two years trying to avoid, namely, serious internal trouble in our bases. I therefore urge again most strongly that a settlement should be negotiated as early as possible.”
I was not content with this, and, supported by the Chiefs of Staff, I brought the issue before the Defence Committee when it met at noon next day. There was a resolute temper. The following orders were sent to General Wavell at their direction:
“… Settlement by negotiation cannot be entertained except on the basis of a climb down by Iraqis, with safeguard against future Axis designs on Iraq. Realities of the situation are that Rashid Ali has all along been hand-in-glove with Axis Powers, and was merely waiting until they could support him before exposing his hand. Our arrival at Basra forced him to go off at half-cock before the Axis was ready. Thus there is an excellent chance of restoring the situation by bold action, if it is not delayed.
“Chiefs of Staff have therefore advised Defence Committee that they are prepared to accept responsibility for dispatch of the force specified in your telegram at the earliest possible moment. Defence Committee direct that Air Vice-Marshal Smart should be informed that he will be given assistance, and that in the meanwhile it is his duty to defend Habbaniya to the last. Subject to the security of Egypt being maintained, maximum air support possible should be given to operations in Iraq.”
Meanwhile the squadrons of the Habbaniya Flying School, together with Wellington bombers from Shaiba, at the head of the Persian Gulf, attacked the Iraqi troops on the plateau. They replied by shelling the cantonment, their aircraft joining in with bombs and machine-guns. Over forty of our men were killed or wounded in the first day, and twenty-two aircraft destroyed or disabled. Despite the hazards of taking off under close artillery fire, our airmen persevered. No enemy infantry assault developed, and gradually their batteries were mastered. It was found that the enemy gunners would not stand to their pieces under air attack, or even if our aircraft were to be seen overhead. Full advantage was taken of their nervousness, and after the second day we were able to turn a proportion of our air effort against the Iraqi Air Force and their bases. On the nights of May 3 and 4 patrols moved out to raid the enemy lines, and by the 5th, after four days of attack from the Royal Air Force, the enemy had had enough. That night they withdrew from the plateau. They were followed up, and a very successful action yielded 400 prisoners, a dozen guns, sixty machine-guns, and ten armoured cars. A reinforcing column was caught on the road and destroyed by our aircraft. By May 7 the siege was over, and on the 18th the advance-guard of the relieving force arrived from Palestine.
15*
By now the Iraqis were not the only enemy. The first German aircraft were established on Mosul airfield on May 13, and thenceforward the principal task of the R.A.F. was to attack them and prevent their being supplied by railway from Syria. After a few days we succeeded in crushing them. Later an Italian fighter squadron appeared, but accomplished nothing. The German officer charged with co-ordinating the action of the Axis air squadrons with the Iraqi forces, a son of Field-Marshal Blomberg, landed at Baghdad with a bullet in his head, thanks to misjudged firing by his allies. His successor, though more fortunate in his landing, could do nothing and all chance of useful Axis intervention passed away.
Our forward troops reached the outskirts of Baghdad on May 30. Although they were weak in numbers and there was an Iraqi division in the city, their presence was too much for Rashid Ali and his companions, who thereupon fled to Persia, accompanied by the German and Italian Ministers and the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem. An armistice was signed next day, the Regent was reinstated, a new Government took office, and we soon occupied all the important points in the country.
Thus the German plan for raising rebellion in Iraq and mastering cheaply this wide area was frustrated on a small margin. They had of course at their disposal an airborne force which would have given them at this time Syria, Iraq, and Persia, with their precious oil-fields. Hitler’s hand might have reached out very far towards India, and beckoned to Japan. He had chosen however, as we have seen, to employ and expend his prime air organism in another direction. He certainly cast away the opportunity of taking a great prize for little cost in the Middle East.
The bitter need to forestall the Germans in Syria also compelled us to press Wavell hard. He said he hoped he would not be burdened with a campaign in Syria unless it was absolutely essential. The Chiefs of Staff replied that there was no option but to improvise the largest force he could without prejudice to the security of the Western Desert, and on May 21—at the moment of the German attack on Crete—he instructed General Maitland Wilson to prepare for an advance.
Aided by Free French troops, it began on June 8, and at first met little opposition. No one could tell how much Vichy would fight. Although we could hardly achieve surprise, it was thought by some that the enemy would offer only a token resistance. But when they realised how weak we were they took heart and reacted vigorously, if only for the honour of their arms. After a week’s fighting it was clear to Wavell that reinforcements were necessary. He was able to scrape up more troops, including a portion of the force which had captured Baghdad. Damascus was captured by the Australians on the 21st, after three days of severe fighting. Their advance was helped by a daring and costly raid by Number 11 Commando, which was landed from the sea behind the enemy lines. General Dentz realised that his limit was reached. He still had about 24,000 men, but he could not hope to offer continued resistance. Barely one-fifth of his air force remained. At 8.30 a.m. on July 12 Vichy envoys arrived to sue for an armistice. This was granted, a convention was signed, and Syria passed into Allied occupation. Our casualties in killed and wounded were over 4,600; those of the enemy about 6,500. One distasteful incident remained. British prisoners taken during the fighting had been hurriedly shipped off to Vichy France, whence they would certainly have passed into German keeping. When this was discovered and no redress was offered, General Dentz and other highly placed officers were taken into custody as hostages. This had the desired effect, and our men were returned.
The successful campaigns in Syria and Iraq greatly improved our strategical position in the Middle East. It closed the door to any further attempt at enemy penetration eastwar
ds from the Mediterranean, moved our defence of the Suez Canal northwards by 250 miles, and relieved Turkey of anxiety for her southern frontier. She could now be assured of aid from a friendly Power if she were attacked. The battle in Crete, which cost us so dear, ruined the striking power of the German airborne corps. The Iraq revolt was finally crushed, and with pitifully small and improvised forces we regained mastery of the wide regions involved. The occupation and conquest of Syria, which was undertaken to meet a desperate need, ended, as it proved for ever, the German advance towards the Persian Gulf and India. If, under all the temptations of prudence, the War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff had not made every post a winning-post, and imposed their will on all commanders, we should have been left only with the losses sustained in Crete, without gathering the rewards which followed from the hard and glorious fighting there. If General Wavell, though exhausted, had broken under the intense strain to which he was subjected by events and by our orders, the whole future of the war and of Turkey might have been fatefully altered. There is always much to be said for not attempting more than you can do and for making a certainty of what you try. But this principle, like others in life and war, has its exceptions.
It must be remembered that the revolt in Iraq and the thrust to Syria was but one small sector of the immense emergency in the Middle East which lapped General Wavell on all sides simultaneously. In the same way the whole Mediterranean scene, as viewed from London, was but a secondary part of our world problem, in which the Invasion menace, the U-boat war, and the attitude of Japan were dominant features. Only the strength and cohesion of the War Cabinet, the relations of mutual respect and harmony of outlook between political and military chiefs, and the smooth working of our war machine enabled us to surmount, though sorely mauled, these trials and perils. One more operation, the battle in the Western Desert, which ranked first with me and the Chiefs of Staff, has still to be described. And this, though denied success, brought Rommel to a standstill for nearly five months.
At this time we had a spy in close touch with Rommel’s headquarters, who gave us accurate information of the fearful difficulties of Rommel’s assertive but precarious position. We knew how narrow was the margin on which he hoped to maintain himself, and also the strong and strict injunctions of the German High Command that he was not to cast away his victories by asking too much of fortune.
Wavell, who had all our information, tried on his own initiative, even in the imminent advent of Crete, to claw down Rommel before the dreaded 15th Panzer Division arrived in full strength over the long road from Tripoli, and before Benghazi was effectively opened as a short cut for enemy supply. He wished to attack even before the tanks delivered by “Tiger”—“Tiger Cubs”, as Wavell and I called them in our correspondence—could be brought into action. A small force under General Gott tried to do so, but the attempt failed, and by May 20 the opportunity of defeating Rommel before he could be reinforced had passed.
Despite preparations made in advance, the delays in unloading, refitting, and making desert-worthy the Tiger Cubs proved severe. The mechanical condition of many of the infantry tanks was found on arrival to be indifferent. Trouble soon descended. Rommel deployed the greater part of the 15th Panzer Division, and concentrated on the frontier between Capuzzo and Sidi Omar. He expected a serious attack to relieve Tobruk and was determined to recapture and hold Halfaya in order to make it more difficult. This famous pass was held by the 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards, a regiment of field artillery, and two squadrons of tanks. The enemy advanced on May 26, and that evening captured a feature to the northward which gave good observation over the whole position held by the Coldstream. Next morning after heavy shelling a concerted onslaught by at least two battalions and sixty tanks placed us in great jeopardy. Reserves were too distant to be able to intervene, and it remained only to extricate the force without more ado. This was accomplished, but losses were severe; only two of our tanks remained effective. Rommel had gained his objective, and proceeded to install himself firmly at Halfaya. As he had hoped, his occupation of this position was to prove a considerable hindrance to us three weeks later.
Preparations for our main offensive, code-named “Battleaxe”, continued actively; but there was a darker side. On May 31 Wavell reported the technical difficulties which he was having with the reforming of the 7th Armoured Division. The earliest date at which he would be able to launch “Battleaxe” was June 15. While he realised the dangers of postponement, with the risk of enemy air reinforcements and a heavy attack on Tobruk, he felt that as the forthcoming battle would be primarily a tank engagement he must give the Armoured Division every chance, and the extra days gained by waiting should “double the possibilities of success”.
I now awaited in keen hope and fear our attack in the Desert, which might change in our favour the whole course of the campaign. In disquieting contrast with our own performances earlier in the year, the Germans had brought Benghazi rapidly into use, and the bulk of their forces was probably already being maintained to a large extent through that port. We now know that the Germans had succeeded in concentrating forward a large part of their own armour without our becoming aware of it. Actually they brought rather more than 200 tanks into action against our 180.
“Battleaxe” started early on June 15. At first things went reasonably well, but on the third day, June 17, everything went wrong, and it became clear that our stroke had failed. The withdrawal of the whole force was carried out in good order, protected by our fighter aircraft. The enemy did not press the pursuit, partly no doubt because his armour was heavily attacked by R.A.F. bombers. There was probably however another reason. As we now know, Rommel’s orders were to act purely on the defensive and to build up resources for operations in the autumn. To have embroiled himself in a strong pursuit across the frontier, and suffered losses thereby, would have been in direct contravention of orders.
Although this action may seem small compared with the scale of the Mediterranean war in all its various campaigns, its failure was to me a most bitter blow. Success in the Desert would have meant the destruction of Rommel’s audacious force. Tobruk would have been relieved, and the enemy’s retreat might well have carried him back beyond Benghazi as fast as he had come. It was for this supreme object, as I judged it, that all the perils of “Tiger” had been dared. No news had reached me of the events of the 17th, and, knowing that the result must soon come in, I went down to Chartwell, which was all shut up, wishing to be alone. Here I got the reports of what had happened. I wandered about the valley disconsolately for some hours.
The reader who has followed the narrative will now be prepared in his mind for the decision which I took in the last ten days of June 1941. At home we had the feeling that Wavell was a tired man. It might well be said that we had ridden the willing horse to a standstill. The extraordinary convergence of five or six different theatres, with their ups and downs, especially downs, upon a single Commander-in-Chief constituted a strain to which few soldiers have been subjected. I was discontented with Wavell’s provision for the defence of Crete, and especially that a few more tanks had not been sent. The Chiefs of Staff had overruled him in favour of the small but most fortunate plunge into Iraq which had resulted in the relief of Habbaniya and complete local success. Finally, there was “Battleaxe”, which Wavell had undertaken in loyalty to the risks I had successfully run in sending out the Tiger Cubs. I was dissatisfied with the arrangements made by the Middle East Headquarters Staff for the reception of the Tiger Cubs, carried to his aid through the deadly Mediterranean at so much hazard and with so much luck. I admired the spirit with which he had fought this small battle, which might have been so important, and his extreme disregard of all personal risks in flying to and fro on the wide, confused field of fighting. But the operation seemed ill-concerted, especially from the failure to make a sortie from the Tobruk sally-port as an indispensable preliminary and concomitant.
Above all this there hung the fact of the beating in of the Desert
Flank by Rommel, which had undermined and overthrown all the Greek projects on which we had embarked, with all their sullen dangers and glittering prizes in what was for us the supreme sphere of the Balkan war. I am reminded of having commented: “Rommel has torn the new-won laurels from Wavell’s brow and thrown them in the sand.” This was not a true thought, but only a passing pang. Judgment upon all this can only be made in relation to the authentic documents written at the time, and no doubt also upon much other valuable evidence which the future will disclose. The fact remains that after “Battleaxe” I came to the conclusion that there should be a change.
General Auchinleck was now Commander-in-Chief in India. I had not altogether liked his attitude in the Norwegian campaign at Narvik. He had seemed to be inclined to play too much for safety and certainty, neither of which exists in war, and to be content to subordinate everything to the satisfaction of what he estimated as minimum requirements. However, I had been much impressed with his personal qualities, his presence, and high character. When after Narvik he had taken over the Southern Command I received from many quarters, official and private, testimony to the vigour and structure which he had given to that important region. His appointment as Commander-in-Chief in India had been generally acclaimed. We have seen how forthcoming he had been about sending the Indian forces to Basra, and the ardour with which he had addressed himself to the suppression of the revolt in Iraq. I had the conviction that in Auchinleck I should bring a new, fresh figure to bear the multiple strains of the Middle East, and that Wavell, on the other hand, would find in the great Indian command time to regain his strength before the new but impending challenges and opportunities arrived. I found that these views of mine encountered no resistance in our Ministerial and military circles in London. The reader must not forget that I never wielded autocratic powers, and always had to move with and focus political and professional opinion. On June 21 I telegraphed accordingly. Wavell received the decision with poise and dignity. He was at that time about to undertake a flight to Abyssinia which proved extremely dangerous. His biographer records that on reading my message he said, “The Prime Minister is quite right. There ought to be a new eye and a new hand in this theatre.”
The Second World War Page 58
