Eighth, they believe that all the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and more permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.
The profound and far-reaching importance of what came to be called the “Atlantic Charter” was apparent. The fact alone of the United States, still technically neutral, joining with a belligerent Power in making such a declaration was astonishing. The inclusion in it of a reference to “the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny” (this was based on a phrase appearing in my original draft) amounted to a challenge which in ordinary times would have implied warlike action. Finally, not the least striking feature was the realism of the last paragraph, where there was a plain and bold intimation that after the war the United States would join with us in policing the world until the establishment of a better order.
Continuous conferences also took place between the naval and military chiefs and a wide measure of agreement was reached between them. The menace from the Far East was much in our minds. For several months the British and American Governments had been acting towards Japan in close accord. At the end of July the Japanese had completed their military occupation of Indo-China. By this naked act of aggression their forces were poised to strike at the British in Malaya, at the Americans in the Philippines, and at the Dutch in the East Indies. On July 24 the President asked the Japanese Government that, as a prelude to a general settlement, Indo-China should be neutralised and the Japanese troops withdrawn. To add point to these proposals an executive order was issued freezing all Japanese assets in the United States. This brought all trade to a standstill. The British Government took simultaneous action, and two days later the Dutch followed. The adherence of the Dutch meant that Japan was deprived at a stroke of her vital oil supplies.
The return voyage to Iceland was uneventful, although at one point it became necessary to alter course owing to the reported presence of U-boats near by. Our escort included two United States destroyers, in one of which was Ensign Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jnr., the President’s son. On the 15th we met a combined homeward-bound convoy of seventy-three ships, all in good order and perfect station after a fortunate passage across the Atlantic. It was a heartening sight, and the merchant ships too were glad to look at the Prince of Wales.
We reached the island on Saturday morning, August 16, and anchored at Hvals Fiord, from which we travelled to Reykjavik in a destroyer. On arrival at the port I received a remarkably warm and vociferous welcome from a large crowd, whose friendly greetings were repeated whenever our presence was recognised during our stay, culminating in scenes of great enthusiasm on our departure in the afternoon, to the accompaniment of such cheers and hand-clapping as have, I was assured, seldom been heard in the streets of Reykjavik.
After a short visit to the Althingishus, to pay respects to the Regent and the members of the Icelandic Cabinet, I proceeded to a joint review of the British and American forces. There was a long march past in threes, during which the tune “United States Marines” bit so deeply into my memory that I could not get it out of my head. I found time to see the new airfields we were making, and also to visit the wonderful hot springs and the glasshouses they are made to serve. I thought immediately that they should also be used to heat Reykjavik and tried to further this plan even during the war. I am glad that it has now been carried out. I took the salute with the President’s son standing beside me, and the parade provided another remarkable demonstration of Anglo-American solidarity.
On return to Hvals Fiord I visited the Ramillies, and addressed representatives of the crews of the British and American ships in the anchorage, including the destroyers Hecla and Churchill. As darkness fell after this long and very tiring ordeal we sailed for Scapa where we arrived without further incident early on the 18th, and I reached London on the following day.
CHAPTER III
PERSIA AND THE DESERT
THE need to pass munitions and supplies of all kinds to the Soviet Government, and the extreme difficulties of the Arctic route, together with future strategic possibilities, made it eminently desirable to open the fullest communication with Russia through Persia. I was not without some anxiety about embarking on yet another new campaign in the Middle East, but the arguments were compulsive. The Persian oilfields were a prime war factor, and if Russia were defeated we would have to be ready to occupy them ourselves. And then there was the threat to India. The suppression of the revolt in Iraq and and the Anglo-French occupation of Syria, achieved as they were by narrow margins, had blotted out Hitler’s Oriental plan, but if the Russians foundered he might try again. An active and numerous German mission had installed itself in Teheran, and German prestige stood high. On the eve of my voyage to Placentia I had set up a special committee to co-ordinate the planning of an operation against Persia, and during my absence at sea they reported to me by telegram the results of their work, which had meanwhile been approved by the War Cabinet. It was clear that the Persians would not expel the German agents and residents from their country, and that we should have to resort to force. On August 13 Mr. Eden received M. Maisky at the Foreign Office, and the terms of our respective Notes to Teheran were agreed. A joint Anglo-Soviet Note of August 17 met with an unsatisfactory reply, and the date for the entry of British and Russian forces into Persia was fixed for the 25th.
In four days it was all over. The Abadan refinery was captured by an infantry brigade, which embarked at Basra and landed at dawn on August 25. The majority of the Persian forces were surprised but escaped in lorries. Some street fighting took place and a few Persian naval craft were seized. At the same time we captured the port of Khurramshahr from the landward side, and a force was sent north towards Ahwaz. As our troops were approaching Ahwaz news of the Shah’s “Cease fire” order was received, and the Persian general ordered his troops back to barracks. In the north the oilfields were easily secured. Our casualties were 22 killed and 42 wounded.
All arrangements with the Russians were smoothly and swiftly agreed. The principal conditions imposed on the Persian Government were the cessation of all resistance, the ejection of Germans, neutrality in the war, and the Allied use of Persian communications for the transit of war supplies to Russia. The further occupation of Persia was peacefully accomplished. British and Russian forces met in amity, and Teheran was jointly occupied on September 17, the Shah having abdicated on the previous day in favour of his gifted twenty-two-year-old son. On September 20 the new Shah, under Allied advice, restored the Constitutional Monarchy, and his father shortly afterwards went into comfortable exile and died at Johannesburg in July 1944. Most of our forces withdrew from the country, leaving only detachments to guard the communications, and Teheran was evacuated by both British and Russian troops on October 18. Thereafter our forces, under General Quinan, were engaged in preparing defences against the possible incursion of German armies from Turkey or the Caucasus, and in making administrative preparations for the large reinforcements which would arrive if that incursion seemed imminent.
The creation of a major supply route to Russia through the Persian Gulf became our prime objective. With a friendly Government in Teheran ports were enlarged, river communications developed, roads built, and railways reconstructed. Starting in September 1941, this enterprise, begun and developed by the British Army, and presently to be adopted and expanded by the United States, enabled us to send to Russia, over a period of four and a half years, five million tons of supplies. Thus ended a brief and fruitful exercise of overwhelming force against a weak and ancient state. Britain and Russia were fighting for their lives. Inter arma
silent leges. We may be glad that in our victory the independence of Persia has been preserved.
We must now return to the dominant theatre of the Mediterranean. General Auchinleck had assumed formal command of the Middle East on July 5, and I started my relations with our new Commander-in-Chief in high hopes, but an exchange of telegrams soon made it clear that there were serious divergences of views and values between us. He proposed to reinforce Cyprus as soon as possible by one division, he appreciated the need for regaining Cyrenaica, but he could not be confident that Tobruk could be held after September. He said that the features and armament of the new American tanks introduced modifications in tactical handling, and time must be allowed for these lessons to be studied. He agreed that by the end of July he would have about five hundred cruiser, Infantry, and American tanks. For any operation however 50 per cent. reserves of tanks were required, thus permitting 25 per cent. in the workshops and 25 per cent. for immediate replacement of battle casualties. This was an almost prohibitive condition. Generals only enjoy such comforts in Heaven. And those who demand them do not always get there. Auchlinleck stressed the importance of time both for individual and collective training, and the team spirit, which was essential for efficiency. He thought that the North (i.e., a German attack through Turkey, Syria, and Palestine) might become the decisive front rather than the Desert.
All this caused me sharp disappointment. The General’s early decisions were also perplexing. By long persistence I had at last succeeded in having the 50th British Division brought to Egypt. I was sensitive to the hostile propaganda which asserted that it was the British policy to fight with any other troops but our own and thus avoid the shedding of United Kingdom blood. British casualties in the Middle East, including Greece and Crete, had in fact been greater than those of all our other forces put together, but the nomenclature which was customary gave false impression of the facts. The Indian divisions, of which one-third of the infantry and the whole of the artillery were British, were not described as British-Indian divisions. The armoured divisions, which had borne the brunt of the fighting, were entirely British, but this did not appear in their names. The fact that “British” troops were rarely mentioned in any reports of the fighting gave colour to the enemy’s taunts, and provoked unfavourable comment not only in the United States but in Australia. I had looked forward to the arrival of the 50th Division as an effective means of countering these disparaging currents. General Auchinleck’s decision to pick this as the division to send to Cyprus certainly seemed unfortunate, and lent substance to the reproaches to which we were unjustly subjected. The Chiefs of Staff at home were equally astonished on military grounds that so strange a use should be made of this magnificent body of men.
A far more serious resolve by General Auchinleck was to delay all action against Rommel in the Western Desert, at first for three and eventually for more than four and a half months. The vindication of Wavell’s action of June 15, “Battleaxe”, is found in the fact that although we were somewhat worsted and withdrew to our original position the Germans were utterly unable to advance for the whole of this prolonged period. Their communications, threatened by Tobruk, were insufficient to bring them the necessary reinforcements of armour or even of artillery ammunition to enable Rommel to do more than hold on by his will-power and prestige. The feeding of his force imposed so heavy a strain upon him that its size could only grow gradually. In these circumstances he should have been engaged continuously by the British Army, which had ample road, rail, and sea communications, and was being continually strengthened at a much greater rate both in men and material.
A third misconception seemed to me to be a disproportionate concern for our northern flank. This indeed required the utmost vigilance and justified many defensive preparations and the construction of strong fortified lines in Palestine and Syria. The situation in this quarter however soon became vastly better than in June. Syria was conquered. The Iraq rebellion had been suppressed. All the key points in the desert were held by our troops. Above all, the struggle between Germany and Russia gave new confidence to Turkey. While this hung in the balance there was no chance of a German demand for the passage of her armies through Turkish territory. Persia was being brought into the Allied camp by British and Russian action. This would carry us beyond the winter. In the meanwhile the general situation favoured decisive action in the Western Desert.
Instead, I could not help feeling a stiffness in General Auchinleck’s attitude, which would not be helpful to the interests we all served. Books written since the war have shown how subordinate but influential portions of the Cairo Operations Staff had deplored the decision to send the Army to Greece. They did not know how fully and willingly General Wavell had accepted this policy, still less how searchingly the War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff had put the issue to him, almost inviting a negative. Wavell, it was suggested, had been led astray by the politicians, and the whole chain of disasters had followed on his compliance with their wishes. Now as a reward for his good-nature he had been removed after all his victories in the moment of defeat. I cannot doubt that in these circles of the Staff there was a strong feeling that the new Commander should not let himself be pressed into hazardous adventures, but should take his time and work on certainties. Such a mood might well have been imparted to General Auchinleck. It was clear that not much progress would be made by correspondence, and in July I invited him to come to London.
His brief visit was from many points of view helpful. He placed himself in harmonious relations with members of the War Cabinet, with the Chiefs of Staff, and with the War Office. He spent a long week-end with me at Chequers. As we got to know better this distinguished officer, upon whose qualities our fortunes were now so largely to depend, and as he became acquainted with the high circle of the British war machine and saw how easily and smoothly it worked, mutual confidence grew. On the other hand, we could not induce him to depart from his resolve to have a prolonged delay in order to prepare a set-piece offensive on November 1. This was to be called “Crusader”, and would be the largest operation we had yet launched. He certainly shook my military advisers with all the detailed argument he produced. I was myself unconvinced. But General Auchinleck’s unquestioned abilities, his powers of exposition, his high, dignified, and commanding personality, gave me the feeling that he might after all be right, and that even if wrong he was still the best man. I therefore yielded to the November date for the offensive, and turned my energies to making it a success. We were all very sorry that we could not persuade him to entrust the battle, when it should come, to General Maitland Wilson. He preferred instead General Alan Cunningham, whose reputation stood high on the morrow of the Abyssinian victories. We had to make the best of it, and that is never worth doing by halves. Thus we shared his responsibility by endorsing his decisions. I must nevertheless record my conviction that General Auchinleck’s four and a half months’ delay in engaging the enemy in the Desert was alike a mistake and a misfortune.
We now have a very full knowledge of what the German High Command thought of Rommel’s situation. They greatly admired his audacity and the incredible successes which had crowned it, but none the less they deemed him in great peril. They strictly forbade him to run any further risks until he could be strongly reinforced. Perhaps, with his prestige, he might bluff it out, in the precarious position in which he stood, until they could bring him the utmost aid in their power. His line of communications trailed back a thousand miles to Tripoli. Benghazi was a valuable short cut for a part at any rate of his supplies and fresh troops, but a toll of increasing severity had to be paid on the sea transport to both these bases. The British forces, already largely superior in numbers, were growing daily. The German tank superiority existed only in quality and organisation. They were weaker in the air. They were very short of artillery ammunition, and feared greatly to have to fire it off. Tobruk seemed a deadly threat in Rommel’s rear, from which at any moment a sortie might be made, cutting his communications
. However, while we remained motionless they could be thankful for every day that passed.
Both sides used the summer to reinforce their armies. For us the replenishment of Malta was vital. The loss of Crete deprived Admiral Cunningham’s fleet of a fuelling base near enough to bring our protecting sea-power into action. The possibilities of a seaborne assault on Malta from Italy or Sicily grew, though, as we now know, it was not until 1942 that Hitler and Mussolini approved such a plan. Enemy air bases both in Crete and Cyrenaica menaced the convoy route from Alexandria to Malta so seriously that we had to depend entirely on the West for the passage of supplies. In this task Admiral Somerville, with Force H from Gibraltar, rendered distinguished service. The route the Admiralty had judged the more dangerous became the only one open. Fortunately at this time the demands of his Russian invasion compelled Hitler to withdraw his air force from Sicily, which gave a respite to Malta and restored to us the mastery in the air over the Malta Channel. This not only helped the approach of convoys from the West but enabled us to strike harder at the transports and supply ships reinforcing Rommel.
Two considerable convoys were fought through successfully. The passage of each was a heavy naval operation. In October over 60 per cent. of Rommel’s supplies were sunk in passage. But my anxieties were not allayed, and I urged even greater efforts upon the Admiralty. I desired specially that a new surface force should be based upon Malta. The policy was accepted, though time was needed to bring it about. In October a striking force known as “Force K”, comprising the cruisers Aurora and Penelope and the destroyers Lance and Lively, was formed at Malta. All these measures played their part in the struggle which was now to begin.
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