The wild flare-up which ensued involved my own battle headquarters.… The exchanges of fire between my forces and the New Zealanders reached an extraordinary pitch of intensity. Soon my headquarters were surrounded by burning vehicles, making them the target for continuous enemy fire at close range. I had enough of this after a while, and ordered the troops with the staff to move back south-eastwards. The confusion reigning on that night can scarcely be imagined.*
Thus the New Zealanders broke clear, and the whole division was reunited in a high state of discipline and ardour near the Alamein position, eighty miles away. So little were they disorganised that they were used forthwith to stiffen its defences.
The remainder of the Eighth Army were also brought back to safety, though with difficulty. The troops were amazed rather than depressed, but with the advantage of short communications, and with Alexandria only forty miles away, reorganisation did not take long. Auchinleck, once in direct command, seemed a different man from the thoughtful strategist with one eye on the decisive battle and the other on the vague and remote dangers in Syria and Persia. He sought at once to regain the tactical initiative. As early as July 2 he made the first of a series of counter-attacks which continued until the middle of the month. These challenged Rommel’s precarious ascendancy. I sent my encouragement, on the morrow of the Vote of Censure debate, which had been an accompaniment to the cannonade.
In fact Rommel’s communications were strained to the utmost limit and his troops exhausted. Only a dozen German tanks were still fit for action, and the superiority of the British Air Force, especially in fighters, was again becoming dominant. Rommel reported on July 4 that he was suspending his attacks and going over to the defensive for a while in order to regroup and replenish his forces. He was still confident however of taking Egypt, and his opinion was shared by Mussolini and by Hitler. The Fuehrer indeed, without reference either to the Italians or to his own naval command, postponed the attack on Malta until the conquest of Egypt was complete.
Auchinleck’s counter-attacks pressed Rommel very hard for the first fortnight of July. He then took up the challenge, and from July 15 to July 20 renewed his attempts to break the British line. On the 21st he had to report that he was checked: “The crisis still exists.” On the 26th he was contemplating withdrawal to the frontier. He complained that he had received little in the way of replenishments; he was short of men, tanks, and artillery; the British Air Force was extremely active. And so the battle swayed back and forth until the end of the month, by which time both sides had fought themselves to a standstill. The Eighth Army under Auchinleck had weathered the storm, and in its stubborn stand had taken seven thousand prisoners. Egypt was still safe.
It was at this juncture, when I was politically at my weakest and without a gleam of military success, that I had to procure from the United States the decision which, for good or ill, dominated the next two years of the war. This was the abandonment of all plans for crossing the Channel in 1942 and the occupation of French North Africa in the autumn or winter by a large Anglo-American expedition.
I had made a careful study of the President’s mind and its reactions for some time past, and I was sure that he was powerfully attracted by the North African plan. This had always been my aim, as was set forth in my papers of December 1941. Everyone in our British circle was by now convinced that a Channel crossing in 1942 would fail, and no military man on either side of the ocean was prepared to recommend such a plan or to take responsibility for it. I stated the case with whatever force I could command and in the plainest terms in an important telegram to the President, which was dated July 8:
No responsible British general, admiral, or air marshal is prepared to recommend “Sledgehammer”* as a practicable operation in 1942. The Chiefs of Staff have reported, “The conditions which would make ‘Sledgehammer’ a sound, sensible enterprise are very unlikely to occur”. They are now sending their paper to your Chiefs of Staff.
2. The taking up of the shipping is being proceeded with by us for camouflage purposes, though it involves a loss in British imports of perhaps 250,000 tons. But far more serious is the fact that, according to Mountbatten, if we interrupt the training of the troops we should, apart from the loss of landing-craft, etc., delay [our main invasion of France] for at least two or three months, even if the enterprise were unsuccessful and the troops had to be withdrawn after a short stay.
3. In the event of a lodgment being effected and maintained it would have to be nourished, and the bomber effort on Germany would have to be greatly curtailed. All our energies would be involved in defending the bridgehead. The possibility of mounting a large-scale operation in 1943 would be marred, if not ruined. All our resources would be absorbed piecemeal on the very narrow front which alone is open. It may therefore be said that premature action in 1942, while probably ending in disaster, would decisively injure the prospect of well-organised large-scale action in 1943.
4. I am sure myself that French North Africa [“Gymnast”] is by far the best chance for effecting relief to the Russian front in 1942. This has all along been in harmony with your ideas. In fact, it is your commanding idea. Here is the true Second Front of 1942. I have consulted the Cabinet and Defence Committee, and we all agree. Here is the safest and most fruitful stroke that can be delivered this autumn.
5. We of course can aid in every way, by transfer of either American or British landing forces from the United Kingdom to “Gymnast”, and with landing-craft, shipping, etc. You can, if you choose, put the punch in partly from here and the rest direct across the Atlantic.
6. It must be clearly understood that we cannot count upon an invitation or a guarantee from Vichy. But any resistance would not be comparable to that which would be offered by the German Army in the Pas de Calais. Indeed, it might be only token resistance. The stronger you are, the less resistance there would be and the more to overcome it. This is a political more than a military issue. It seems to me that we ought not to throw away the sole great strategic stroke open to us in the Western theatre during this cardinal year.
7. Besides the above we are studying very hard the possibility of an operation in Northern Norway, or, if this should prove impracticable, elsewhere in Norway. The difficulties are great owing to the danger of shore-based aircraft attack upon our ships. We are having frightful difficulties about the Russian convoys. All the more is it necessary to try to clear the way and maintain the contact with Russia.
But before the final decision for action could be obtained there was a pause. Strong tensions grew in the supreme American war direction. General Marshall was divided from Admiral King as between Europe and the Pacific. Neither was inclined to the North African venture. In this deadlock the President’s liking for North Africa grew steadily stronger. Field-Marshal Dill’s qualities had won him the confidence of all the rival schools of thought, and his tact preserved their goodwill. The President was conscious of the strength of the arguments against “Sledgehammer”. If he placed it in the forefront of his communications to us, it was to convince General Marshall that it would have every chance. But if no one would touch it, what then? There was the wave of American Staff opinion which argued, “If nothing can be done this year in Europe let us concentrate on Japan, and thus bring the United States Army and Navy thought together and unite General Marshall with Admiral King.”
The President withstood and brushed aside this fatal trend of thought. He was convinced that the United States Army must fight against the Germans in 1942. Where then could this be but in French North Africa? “This was,” says Mr. Stimson, “his secret war baby.” The movement of the force of the argument and of the President’s mind to this conclusion was remorseless.
On Saturday, July 18, General Marshall, Admiral King, and Harry Hopkins landed at Prest wick, and travelled by train to London. Here they went into immediate conference with the American Service Chiefs now established in the capital, Eisenhower, Clark, Stark, and Spaatz. The debate on “Sledgehammer”
was renewed. Opinion among the American leaders was still strongly in favour of pressing on exclusively with this operation. Only the President himself seemed to have been impressed by my arguments. He had drafted for the delegation the most massive and masterly document on war policy that I ever saw from his hand.*
MEMORANDUM FOR HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS, GENERAL MARSHALL, AND ADMIRAL KING
Subject: Instructions for London Conference, July 1942
16 July 42
1. You will proceed immediately to London as my personal representatives for the purpose of consultation with appropriate British authorities on the conduct of the war.
2. The military and naval strategic changes have been so great since Mr. Churchill’s visit to Washington that it became necessary to reach immediate agreement on joint operational plans between the British and ourselves along two lines:
(a) Definite plans for the balance of 1942.
(b) Tentative plans for the year 1943, which of course will be subject to change in the light of occurrences in 1942, but which should be initiated at this time in all cases involving preparation in 1942 for operations in 1943.
3. (a) The common aim of the United Nations must be the defeat of the Axis Powers. There cannot be compromise on this point.
(b) We should concentrate our efforts and avoid dispersion.
(c) Absolute co-ordinated use of British and American forces is essential.
(d) All available U.S. and British forces should be brought into action as quickly as they can be profitably used.
(e) It is of the highest importance that U.S. ground troops be brought into action against the enemy in 1942.
4. British and American material promises to Russia must be carried out in good faith. If the Persian route of delivery is used preference must be given to combat material. This aid must continue as long as delivery is possible, and Russia must be encouraged to continue resistance. Only complete collapse, which seems unthinkable, should alter this determination on our part.
5. In regard to 1942, you will carefully investigate the possibility of executing “Sledgehammer”. Such an operation would definitely sustain Russia this year. “Sledgehammer” is of such grave importance that every reason calls for accomplishment of it. You should strongly urge immediate all-out preparations for it, that it be pushed with utmost vigour, and that it be executed whether or not Russian collapse becomes imminent. In the event Russian collapse becomes probable, “Sledgehammer” becomes not merely advisable but imperative. The principal objective of “Sledgehammer” is the positive diversion of German air forces from the Russian front.
6. Only if you are completely convinced that “Sledgehammer” is impossible of execution with reasonable chance of serving its intended purpose inform me.
7. If “Sledgehammer” is finally and definitely out of the picture I want you to consider the world situation as it exists at that time, and determine upon another place for U.S. troops to fight in 1942.*
It is my present view of the world picture that:
(a) If Russia contains a large German force against her, “Roundup” [the invasion of Europe] becomes possible in 1943, and plans for “Round-up” should be immediately considered and preparations made for it.
(b) If Russia collapses and German air and ground forces are released “Round-up” may be impossible of fulfilment in 1943.
8. The Middle East should be held as strongly as possible whether Russia collapses or not. I want you to take into consideration the effect of losing the Middle East. Such loss means in series:
(1) Loss of Egypt and the Suez Canal.
(2) Loss of Syria.
(3) Loss of Mosul oil-wells.
(4) Loss of the Persian Gulf through attacks from the north and west, together with access to all Persian Gulf oil.
(5) Joining hands between Germany and Japan and the probable loss of the Indian Ocean.
(6) The very important probability of German occupation of Tunis, Algiers, Morocco, Dakar, and the cutting of the ferry route through Freetown and Liberia.
(7) Serious danger to all shipping in the South Atlantic, and serious danger to Brazil and the whole of the east coast of South America. I include in the above possibilities the use by the Germans of Spain, Portugal, and their territories.
(8) You will determine the best methods of holding the Middle East. These methods include definitely either or both of the following:
(a) Sending aid and ground forces to the Persian Gulf, to Syria, and to Egypt.
(b) A new operation in Morocco and Algeria intended to drive in against the back door of Rommel’s armies. The attitude of French colonial troops is still in doubt.*
9. I am opposed to an American all-out effort in the Pacific against Japan with the view to her defeat as quickly as possible. It is of the utmost importance that we appreciate that defeat of Japan does not defeat Germany and that American concentration against Japan this year or in 1943 increases the chance of complete German domination of Europe and Africa. On the other hand, it is obvious that defeat of Germany or the holding of Germany in 1942 or in 1943 means probable eventual defeat of Germany in the European and African theatre and in the Near East. Defeat of Germany means the defeat of Japan, probably without firing a shot or losing a life.*
10. Please remember three cardinal principles—speed of decision on plans, unity of plans, attack combined with defence but not defence alone. This affects the immediate objective of U.S. ground forces fighting against Germans in 1942.
11. I hope for total agreement within one week of your arrival.
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
Commander-in-Chief
But in spite of this last injunction, General Marshall told me on the afternoon of July 22 that he and his colleagues had reached a deadlock in their talks with the British Chiefs of Staff, and they would have to report to the President for instructions.
I replied that I fully shared the ardent desire of the President and his Service advisers “to engage the enemy in the greatest possible strength at the earliest possible moment”, but that I felt sure that, with the limited forces at our disposal, we should not be justified in attempting “Sledgehammer” in 1942 I pointed to the number of ugly possibilities looming in front of us. There might, for example, be a collapse in Russia, or the Germans might move into the Caucasus, or they might beat General Auchinleck and occupy the Nile Delta and the Suez Canal, or again they might establish themselves in North Africa and West Africa and thereby put an almost prohibitive strain on our shipping. Nevertheless, disagreement between Great Britain and America would have far greater consequences than all the above possibilities. It was therefore agreed that the American Chiefs of Staff should report to the President that the British were not prepared to go ahead with “Sledgehammer” and ask for instructions.
Mr. Roosevelt replied at once that he was not surprised at the disappointing outcome of the London talks. He agreed that it was no use continuing to press for “Sledgehammer” in the face of British opposition, and instructed his delegation to reach a decision with us on some operation which would involve American land forces being brought into action against the enemy in 1942. Thus “Sledgehammer” fell by the wayside and “Gymnast” came into its own. Marshall and King, though naturally disappointed, bowed to the decision of their Commander-in-Chief, and the greatest goodwill between us all again prevailed.
I now hastened to rechristen my favourite. “Gymnast”, and its variants, vanished from our code-names. On July 24 in an instruction from me to the Chiefs of Staff “Torch” became the new and master term. On July 25 the President cabled to Hopkins that plans for landings in North Africa to take place “not later than October 30” should go ahead at once. That evening our friends set off on their journey back to Washington.
All was therefore agreed and settled in accordance with my longconceived ideas and those of my colleagues, military and political. This was a great joy to me, especially as it came in what seemed to be the darkest hour. At every
point except one the plans I cherished were adopted. “Jupiter” alone (the Norway enterprise) I could not carry, although its merits were not disputed. I did not give up this plan yet, but in the end I failed to establish it. For months past I had sought “No ‘Sledgehammer’,” but instead the North African invasion and “Jupiter”. “Jupiter” fell by the way. But I had enough to be thankful for.
“The President”, cabled Field-Marshal Dill from Washington, “has gone to Hyde Park for short rest, but before going he issued orders for full steam ahead ‘Torch’ at the earliest possible moment. He has asked Combined Chiefs of Staff to tell him on August 4 earliest date when landing could take place. Risk of whittling to Pacific may still exist, but President entirely sound on this point.
“In the American mind ‘Round-up’ in 1943 is excluded by acceptance of ‘Torch’. We need not argue about that. A one-track mind on ‘Torch’ is what we want at present… May what you are at have the success which courage and imagination deserve.”
This message reached me at midnight on 1 August, 1942, on the Lyneham Airfield, where I was about to set forth upon a journey of which the next chapter will offer both explanation and account.
CHAPTER XIV
MY JOURNEY TO CAIRO. CHANGES IN COMMAND
THE doubts I had about the High Command in the Middle East were fed continually by the reports which I received from many quarters. It became urgently necessary for me to go there and settle the decisive questions on the spot. It was at first accepted that this journey would be by Gibraltar and Takoradi and thence across Central Africa to Cairo, involving five or even six days’ flying. However, at this juncture there arrived in England a young American pilot, Captain Vanderkloot, who had just flown from the United States in the aeroplane “Commando”, a Liberator plane from which the bomb-racks had been removed and some sort of passenger accommodation substituted. This machine was certainly capable of flying along the route prescribed with good margins in hand at all stages. Portal, the Chief of the Air Staff, saw this pilot and cross-examined him about “Commando”. Vanderkloot, who had already flown about a million miles, asked why it was necessary to fly all round by Takoradi, Kano, Fort Lamy, El Obeid, etc. He said he could make one bound from Gibraltar to Cairo, flying from Gibraltar eastwards in the afternoon, turning sharply south across Spanish or Vichy territory as dusk fell, and then proceeding eastward till he struck the Nile about Assiout, when a turn to the northwards would bring us in another hour or so to the Cairo landing-ground north-west of the Pyramids. This altered the whole picture. I could be in Cairo in two days. Portal was convinced.
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