The Second World War

by Winston S. Churchill

  On May 11 we arrived off Staten Island. Harry Hopkins was there to meet us, and we immediately entrained for Washington. The President was on the platform to greet me, and whisked me off to my old rooms at the White House. The next afternoon, May 12, at 2.30 p.m., we all met in his oval study to survey and lay out our work at the conference.

  Mr. Roosevelt asked me to open the discussion. According to the record, the essence of my thought was as follows:

  “… We should never forget that there were 185 German divisions on the Russian front. We had destroyed the German army in Africa, but soon we should not be in contact with them anywhere. The Russian effort was prodigious, and placed us in their debt. The best way of taking the weight off the Russian front in 1943 would be to get, or knock, Italy out of the war, thus forcing the Germans to send a large number of troops to hold down the Balkans. … We had a large army and the Metropolitan Fighter Air Force in Great Britain. We had our finest and most experienced troops in the Mediterranean. The British alone had thirteen divisions in North-West Africa. Supposing that Sicily was completed by the end of August, what should these troops do between that time and the date [in 1944], seven or eight months later, when the cross-Channel operation might first be mounted? They could not possibly stand idle, and so long a period of apparent inaction would have a serious effect on Russia, who was bearing such a disproportionate weight.”

  Mr. Roosevelt agreed that to relieve Russia we must engage the Germans. But he questioned the occupation of Italy, which would release German troops to fight elsewhere. He thought that the best way of forcing Germany to fight would be to launch an operation across the Channel.

  I replied that as we were now agreed we could not do this till 1944, it seemed imperative to use our great armies to attack Italy. I did not think that an occupation of the whole peninsula would be necessary. If Italy collapsed the United Nations would occupy the ports and airfields needed for further operations into the Balkans and Southern Europe. An Italian Government could control the country, subject to Allied supervision. All these grave issues were now to be thrashed out by our combined Staffs and their experts.

  At first the differences seemed insuperable and it looked like a hopeless breach. During this period leakages from high American officers were made to Democratic and Republican senators, leading to a debate in the Senate. By patience and perseverance our difficulties were gradually overcome. The fact that the President and I were living side by side seeing each other at all hours, that we were known to be in close agreement, and that the President intended to decide himself on the ultimate issues—all this, together with the priceless work of Hopkins, exercised throughout a mollifying and also a dominating influence on the course of Staff discussions. After a serious crisis of opinions, side by side with the most agreeable personal relations between the professional men, an almost complete agreement was reached about invading Sicily.

  But although so much had gone well, I was extremely concerned that no definite recommendations had been made by the Combined Staffs to follow up the conquest of Sicily by the invasion of Italy. I knew that the American Staff’s mind had been turned to Sardinia. They thought that this should be the sole remaining objective for the mighty forces which were gathered in the Mediterranean during the whole of the rest of 1943. On every ground, military and political, I deplored this prospect. The Russians were fighting every day on their enormous front, and their blood flowed in a torrent. Were we then to keep over a million and a half fine troops, and all their terrific air and naval power, idle for nearly a year?

  The President had not seemed ready to press his advisers to become more precise about invading Italy, but as this was the main purpose for which I had crossed the Atlantic I could not let the matter rest. Hopkins said to me privately, “If you wish to carry your point you will have to stay here another week, and even then there is no certainty.” I was deeply distressed at this, and on May 25 appealed personally to the President to let General Marshall come to Algiers with me. I explained to the conference that I should feel awkward in discussing these matters with General Eisenhower without the presence of a United States representative on the highest level. If decisions were taken it might subsequently be thought that I had exerted an undue influence. I was accordingly very gratified to hear that General Marshall would accompany me, and I was sure that it would now be possible to arrange for a report to be sent back to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their consideration.

  Early the next day, General Marshall, the C.I.G.S., Ismay, and the rest of my party took off from the Potomac River in a flying-boat. We had some very agreeable talks during the long flight, and took advantage of our leisure to clear away some accumulation of papers. As we approached Gibraltar we looked around for our escort. There was no escort. Everyone’s attention was attracted by an unknown aircraft, which we thought at first was taking an interest in us. As it came no closer we concluded it was a Spaniard; but they all seemed quite concerned about it till it disappeared. On alighting, at about 5 p.m., we were met by the Governor. It was too late to continue our journey to Algiers that night, and he conveyed us to the Convent, where he resides, the nuns having been removed two centuries ago.

  We did not leave Gibraltar for Algiers until the following afternoon. There was therefore an opportunity to show General Marshall the Rock, and we all made a few hours’ pilgrimage, and inspected the new distillery which assured the fortress a permanent supply of fresh water, and various important guns, some hospitals, and a large number of troops. I finally went below to see the Governor’s special pet, the new Rock gallery, cut deep in the rock, with its battery of eight quick-firing guns commanding the isthmus and the neutral ground between Britain and Spain. An immense amount of work had been put into this, and it certainly seemed, as we walked along it, that whatever perils Gibraltar might have to fear attack from the mainland was no longer one of them. The Governor’s pride in his achievement was shared by his British visitors. It was not until we said good-bye upon the flying-boat that General Marshall somewhat hesitatingly observed, “I admired your gallery, but we had one like it at Corregidor. The Japanese fired their artillery at the rock several hundred feet above it, and in two or three days blocked it off with an immense bank of rubble.” I was grateful to him for his warning, but the Governor seemed thunderstruck. All the smiles vanished from his face.

  We flew off in the early afternoon with a dozen Beaufighters circling far above us, and in the evening light reached the Algiers airfield, where Generals Eisenhower and Bedell Smith, Admiral Andrew Cunningham, General Alexander, and other friends were waiting for us. I motored straight to Admiral Cunningham’s villa, next door to General Eisenhower, which he placed at my disposal.

  I have no more pleasant memories of the war than the eight days in Algiers and Tunis. I telegraphed to Eden to come out and join me so as to make sure we saw eye to eye on the meeting we had arranged between Giraud and de Gaulle, and all our other business.

  I was determined to obtain before leaving Africa the decision to invade Italy should Sicily be taken. Brooke and I imparted our views to General Alexander, Admiral Andrew Cunningham, and Air Marshal Tedder, and later to Montgomery. All these leading figures in the recent battles were inclined to action on the greatest scale, and saw in the conquest of Italy the natural fruition of our whole series of victories from Alamein onwards. We had however to procure the agreement of our great Ally. Eisenhower was very reserved. He listened to all our arguments, and I am sure agreed with their purpose. But Marshall remained up till almost the last moment silent or cryptic.

  The circumstances of our meeting were favourable to the British. We had three times as many troops, four times as many warships, and almost as many aeroplanes available for actual operations as the Americans. We had since Alamein, not to speak of the earlier years, lost in the Mediterranean eight times as many men and three times as many ships as our Allies. But what ensured for these potent facts the fairest and most attentive consideration with t
he American leaders was that notwithstanding our immense preponderance of strength we had continued to accept General Eisenhower’s Supreme Command and to preserve for the whole campaign the character of a United States operation. The American chiefs do not like to be outdone in generosity. No people respond more spontaneously to fair play. If you treat Americans well they always want to treat you better. Nevertheless I consider that the argument which convinced the Americans was on its merits overwhelming.

  We held our first meeting at General Eisenhower’s villa in Algiers at five o’clock on May 29. General Eisenhower, as our host, presided, and had with him Marshall and Bedell Smith, as his two principals. I sat opposite to him, with Brooke, Alexander, Cunningham, Tedder, Ismay, and some others. Marshall said the United States Chiefs of Staff felt that no decision could be made about invading Italy until the result of the attack on Sicily and the situation in Russia were known. The logical approach would be to set up two forces, each with its own staff, in separate places. One force would train for an operation against Sardinia and Corsica, and the other for an operation on the mainland of Italy. When the situation was sufficiently clear to enable a choice to be made, the necessary air forces, landing-craft, etc., would be made over to the force charged with implementing the selected plan. Ike said at once that if Sicily was polished off easily he would be willing to go straight to Italy. General Alexander agreed.

  The C.I.G.S. then made his general statement. A hard struggle between the Russians and the Germans was imminent, and we should do all in our power to help. We should make the Germans disperse their strength. They were already widely stretched, and could not reduce their forces either in Russia or in France. The place where they could most conveniently do this was Italy. If the foot of Italy were found to be packed with troops we should try elsewhere. If Italy were knocked out of the war Germany would have to replace the twenty-six Italian divisions in the Balkans, and reinforce the Brenner Pass, the Riviera, and the Spanish and Italian frontiers. This dispersal was just what we needed for crossing the Channel, and we should do everything in our power to increase it.

  Eisenhower then declared that the discussion had seemed to simplify his problem. If Sicily were to succeed, say within a week, he would at once cross the Straits of Messina and establish a bridgehead. I expressed a personal view that Sicily would be finished by August 15. If so, and if the strain had not been too heavy, we should at once go for the toe of Italy, provided that not too many German divisions had been moved there. The Balkans represented a greater danger to Germany than the loss of Italy, as Turkey might react to our advantage.

  Brooke thereupon set out our whole Mediterranean strength. Deducting seven divisions to be sent home for the cross-Channel operation and two to cover British commitments to Turkey, there would be twenty-seven Allied divisions available in the Mediterranean area. With such forces in our hands it would be bad indeed if nothing happened between August or September and the following May.

  Although much lay in the balance, I was well satisfied with this opening discussion. The desire of all the leaders to go forward on the boldest lines was clear, and I felt myself that the reservations made on account of the unknowable would be settled by events in accordance with my hopes.

  We met again on the afternoon of May 31. Mr. Eden arrived in time to be present. I tried to clinch matters, and said my heart lay in an invasion of Southern Italy, but the fortunes of battle might necessitate a different course. At any rate, the alternative between Southern Italy and Sardinia involved the difference between a glorious campaign and a mere convenience. General Marshall was in no way hostile to these ideas, but did not wish for a clear-cut decision to be taken at this moment. It would be better to decide what to do after we had started the attack on Sicily. He felt it would be necessary to know something of the German reactions in order to determine whether there would be real resistance in Southern Italy; whether the Germans would withdraw to the Po, and, for example, whether they could organise and handle the Italians with any finesse; what preparations had been made in Sardinia, Corsica, or in the Balkans; what readjustments they would make on the Russian front. There were two or three different ways in which Italy might fall; a great deal could happen between now and July. He, General Eisenhower, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff were fully aware of my feelings about invading Italy, but their only desire was to select the “Post-Sicily” alternative, which would give the best results.

  I said that I very passionately wanted to see Italy out of the way and Rome in our possession. I could not endure to see a great army standing idle when it might be engaged in striking Italy out of the war. Parliament and the people would become impatient if the Army were not active, and I was willing to take almost desperate steps in order to prevent such a calamity.

  An incident now occurred which, as it relates to matters which have become the subject of misunderstandings and controversy after the war, must be related. Mr. Eden, at my request, commented on the Turkish situation, and said that knocking Italy out of the war would go a long way towards bringing the Turks in. They would become much more friendly “when our troops had reached the Balkan area.” Eden and I were in full agreement on war policy, but I feared that the turn of his phrase might mislead our American friends. The record states, “The Prime Minister intervened to observe emphatically that he was not advocating sending an army into the Balkans now or in the near future.” Mr. Eden agreed that it would not be necessary to put an army into the Balkans, since the Turks would begin to show favourable reactions as soon as we were able to constitute an immediate threat to the Balkans.

  Before we separated I asked General Alexander to give his view. He did so in an extremely impressive speech. Securing a bridgehead on the Italian mainland should be part of the plan. It would be impossible for us to win a great victory unless we could exploit it by moving ahead, preferably up into Italy. All this however would be clarified as the Sicily operation moved along. It was not impossible, although it seemed unlikely, that the toe of Italy would be so strongly held as to require a complete re-staging of our operations, and we should be ready to keep moving, with no stop at all, once the attack on Sicily started. Modern warfare allowed us to forge ahead very rapidly, with radio controlling troops at a great distance and with air providing protection and support over a wide area. The going might become more difficult as we moved up the Italian mainland, but this was no argument against going as far as we could on the momentum of the Sicily drive. In war the incredible often occurred. A few months before it would have been impossible for him to believe what had actually happened to Rommel and his Afrika Korps. A few weeks since he would have found it difficult to believe that three hundred thousand Germans would collapse in a week. The enemy air forces had been swept out of the skies so completely that we could have a parade, if we chose, of all our North Africa forces on one field in Tunisia without any danger from enemy aircraft.

  He was at once supported by Admiral Cunningham, who said that if all went well in Sicily we should go directly across the Straits. Eisenhower concluded the meeting by expressing appreciation of the journey which General Marshall and I had made to clarify for him what the Combined Chiefs of Staff had done. He understood it was his responsibility to get information regarding the early phases of the invasion of Sicily and forward them to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in time for them to decide on the plan which would follow, without a break or a stop. He would send not only information but also strong recommendations, based upon the conditions of the moment. He hoped that his three top commanders (Alexander, Cunningham, and Tedder) would have an opportunity to comment more formally on these matters, although he agreed completely with what they had said thus far.

  On the two following days we travelled by plane and car to some beautiful places rendered historic by the battles of a month before. General Marshall went on a brief American tour of his own, and then travelled with General Alexander and myself, meeting all the commanders and seeing stirring sights of troops.
The sense of victory was in the air. The whole of North Africa was cleared of the enemy. A quarter of a million prisoners were cooped in our cages. Everyone was very proud and delighted. There is no doubt that people like winning very much. I addressed many thousand soldiers at Carthage in the ruins of an immense amphitheatre. Certainly the hour and setting lent themselves to oratory. I have no idea what I said, but the whole audience clapped and cheered as doubtless their predecessors of two thousand years ago had done as they watched gladiatorial combats.

  I felt that great advances had been made in our discussions and that everybody wanted to go for Italy. I therefore, in summing up at our last meeting on June 3, stated the conclusions in a most moderate form and paid my tribute to General Eisenhower.

  Eden and I flew home together by Gibraltar. As my presence in North Africa had been fully reported, the Germans were exceptionally vigilant, and this led to a tragedy which much distressed me. The regular commercial aircraft was about to start from the Lisbon airfield when a thickset man smoking a cigar walked up and was thought to be a passenger on it. The German agents therefore signalled that I was on board. Although these passenger planes had plied unmolested for many months between Portugal and England, a German war plane was instantly ordered out, and the defenceless aircraft was ruthlessly shot down. Thirteen passengers perished, and among them the well-known British actor Leslie Howard, whose grace and gifts are still preserved for us by the records of the many delightful films in which he took part. The brutality of the Germans was only matched by the stupidity of their agents. It is difficult to understand how anyone could imagine that with all the resources of Great Britain at my disposal I should have booked a passage in an unarmed and unescorted plane from Lisbon and flown home in broad daylight. We of course made a wide loop out by night from Gibraltar into the ocean, and arrived home without incident. It was a painful shock to me to learn what had happened to others in the inscrutable workings of Fate.