The Second World War

by Winston S. Churchill

  I decided at once to take him with me on the voyage. I told him our train would leave at ten. It was then nearly nine. Wingate had arrived just as he was after three days’ flight from the actual front, and with no clothes but what he stood up in. He was of course quite ready to go, but expressed regret that he would not be able to see his wife, who was in Scotland and had not even heard of his arrival. However, the resources of my Private Office were equal to the occasion. Mrs. Wingate was aroused at her home by the police and taken to Edinburgh in order to join our train on its way through and to go with us to Quebec. She had no idea of what it was all about until, in the early hours of the morning, she actually met her husband on a platform at Waverley Station. They had a very happy voyage together.

  As I knew how much the President liked meeting young, heroic figures, I had also invited Wing-Commander Guy Gibson, fresh from leading the attack which had destroyed the Möhne and Eder Dams. These supplied the industries of the Ruhr, and fed a wide area of fields, rivers, and canals. A special type of mine had been invented for their destruction, but it had to be dropped at night from a height of no more than sixty feet. After months of continuous and concentrated practice sixteen Lancasters of No. 617 Squadron of the Royal Air Force attacked on the night of May 16. Half were lost, but Gibson had stayed to the end, circling under fierce fire over the target to direct his squadron. He now wore a remarkable set of decorations—the Victoria Cross, a Distinguished Service Order and bar, and a Distinguished Flying Cross and bar—but no other ribbons. This was unique.

  My wife came with me, and my daughter Mary, now a subaltern in an anti-aircraft battery, was my aide-de-camp. We sailed on August 5, this time for Halifax, in Nova Scotia, instead of New York.

  The Queen Mary drove on through the waves, and we lived in the utmost comfort on board her, with a diet of pre-war times. As usual on these voyages, we worked all day long. Our large cipher staff, with attendant cruisers to dispatch outgoing messages, kept us in touch with events from hour to hour. Each day I studied with the Chiefs of Staff the various aspects of the problems we were to discuss with our American friends. The most important of these was of course “Overlord”.

  One morning on our voyage, at my request, Brigadier K. G. McLean, with two other officers from General Morgan’s staff, came to me as I lay in my bed in the spacious cabin, and, after they had set up a largescale map, explained in a tense and cogent tale the plan which had been prepared for the cross-Channel descent upon France. The reader is perhaps familiar with all the arguments of 1941 and 1942 upon this burning question in all its variants, but this was the first time that I had heard the whole coherent plan presented in precise detail both of numbers and tonnage as the result of prolonged study by officers of both nations.

  The choice narrowed to the Pas de Calais or Normandy. The former gave us the best air cover, but here the defences were the most formidable, and although it promised a shorter sea voyage this advantage was only apparent. While Dover and Folkestone are much closer to Calais and Boulogne than the Isle of Wight is to Normandy, their harbours were far too small to support an invasion. Most of our ships would have had to sail from ports along the whole south coast of England and from the Thames estuary, and so cross a lot of salt water in any case. General Morgan and his advisers recommended the Normandy coast, which from the first had been advocated by Mount-batten. There can be no doubt now that this decision was sound. Normandy gave us the greatest hope. The defences were not so strong as in the Pas de Calais. The seas and beaches were on the whole suitable, and were to some extent sheltered from the westerly gales by the Cotentin peninsula. The hinterland favoured the rapid deployment of large forces, and was sufficiently remote from the main strength of the enemy. The port of Cherbourg could be isolated and captured early in the operation. Brest could be outflanked and taken later.

  All the coast between Havre and Cherbourg was of course defended with concrete forts and pill-boxes, but as there was no harbour capable of sustaining a large army in this fifty-mile half-moon of sandy beaches it was thought that the Germans would not assemble large forces in immediate support of the sea-front. Their High Command had no doubt said to themselves, “This is a good sector for raids up to ten or twenty thousand men, but unless Cherbourg is taken in working order no army in any way equal to the task of an invasion can be landed or supplied. It is a coast for a raid, but not for wider operations.” If only there were harbours which could nourish great armies, here was the front on which to strike.

  Of course, as the reader will have seen, I was well abreast of all the thought about landing-craft and tank landing-craft. I had also long been a partisan of piers with their heads floating out in the sea. Much work had since been done on them, following a minute which in the course of our discussions I had issued to Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Chief of Combined Operations, as long ago as May 30, 1942.

  They must float up and down with the tide. The anchor problem must be mastered. The ships must have a side-flap cut in them, and a drawbridge long enough to overreach the moorings of the piers. Let me have the best solution worked out. Don’t argue the matter. The difficulties will argue for themselves.

  Thought later moved to the creation of a large area of sheltered water protected by a breakwater based on blockships brought to the scene by their own power and then sunk in a prearranged position. This idea originated with Commodore J. Hughes-Hallett in June 1943, while he was serving as Naval Chief of Staff in General Morgan’s organisation. Imagination, contrivance, and experiment had been ceaseless, and now in August 1943 there was a complete project for making two full-scale temporary harbours which could be towed over and brought into action within a few days of the original landing. These synthetic harbours were called “Mulberries”, a code-name which certainly did not reveal their character or purpose.

  The whole project was majestic. On the beaches themselves would be the great piers, with their seaward ends afloat and sheltered. At these piers coasters and landing-craft would be able to discharge at all states of the tide. To protect them against the wanton winds and waves breakwaters would be spread in a great arc to seaward, enclosing a large area of sheltered water. Thus sheltered, deep-draught ships could lie at anchor and discharge, and all types of landing-craft could ply freely to and from the beaches. These breakwaters would be composed of sunken concrete structures and blockships. I have described the similar structures which I thought might in the First World War have been used to create artificial harbours in the Heligoland Bight. Now they were to form a principal part of the great plan.

  Further discussions on succeeding days led into more technical detail. The Channel tides have a play of more than twenty feet, with corresponding scours along the beaches. The weather is always uncertain, and winds and gales may whip up in a few hours irresistible forces against frail human structures. The fools or knaves who had chalked “Second Front Now” on our walls for the past two years had not had their minds burdened by such problems. I had long pondered upon them.

  I was now convinced of the enormous advantages of attacking the Havre-Cherbourg sector, provided these unexpected harbours could be brought into being from the first and thus render possible the landing and sustained advance of armies of a million rising to two million men, with all their immense modern equipment and impedimenta. This would mean being able to unload at least 12,000 tons a day.

  Three dominating assumptions were made both by the framers of the plan and the British Chiefs of Staff. With these I was in entire agreement, and, as will be seen later, they were approved by the Americans and accepted by the Russians.

  1. That there must be a substantial reduction in the strength of the German fighter aircraft in North-West Europe before the assault took place.

  2. That there should be not more than twelve mobile German divisions in Northern France at the time the operation was launched, and that it must not be possible for the Germans to build up more than fifteen divisions in the succeeding two months.


  3. That the problem of beach maintenance of large forces in the tidal waters of the English Channel over a prolonged period must be overcome. To ensure this it was essential that we should be able to construct at least two effective synthetic harbours.

  I was very well satisfied with the prospect of having the whole of this story presented to the President with my full support. At least it would convince the American authorities that we were not insincere about “Overlord” and had not grudged thought or time in preparation. I arranged to assemble in Quebec the best experts in such matters from London and Washington. Together they could pool resources and find the best answers to the many technical problems.

  I also had many discussions with the Chiefs of Staff on our affairs in the Indian and Far Eastern theatres. We had none too good a tale to tell. A division had advanced at the end of 1942 down the Arakan coast of Burma to recapture the port of Akyab. Though strengthened until a complete corps was engaged, the operation had failed, and our troops were forced back over the Indian frontier.

  23*

  Although there was much to be said in explanation, I felt that the whole question of the British High Command against Japan must come under review. New methods and new men were needed. I had long felt that it was a bad arrangement for the Commander-in-Chief of India to command the operations in Burma in addition to his other farreaching responsibilities. It seemed to me that the vigorous prosecution of large-scale operations against the Japanese in South-East Asia necessitated the creation of a separate Supreme Allied Command. The Chiefs of Staff were in complete agreement, and prepared a memorandum on these lines for discussion with their American colleagues in Quebec. There remained the question of the commander of this new theatre, and we were in no doubt that he should be British. Of the various names that were put forward, I was sure in my own mind that Admiral Mountbatten had superior qualifications for this great command, and I determined to make this proposal to the President at the first opportunity. The appointment of an officer of the substantive rank of Captain R.N. to the Supreme Command of one of the main theatres of the war was an unusual step; but, having carefully prepared the ground beforehand, I was not surprised when the President cordially agreed.

  It is astonishing how quickly a voyage can pass if one has enough to do to occupy every waking minute. I had looked forward to an interval of rest and a change from the perpetual clatter of the war. But as we approached our destination the holiday seemed to be over before it had begun.

  Halifax was reached on August 9. The great ship drew in to the landing jetty and we went straight to our train. In spite of all precautions about secrecy, large crowds were assembled. As my wife and I sat in our saloon at the end of the train the people gathered round and gave us welcome. Before we started I made them sing The Maple Leaf and O Canada! I feared they did not know Rule, Britannia, though I am sure they would have enjoyed it if we had had a band. After about twenty minutes of hand-shakings, photographs, and autographs we left for Quebec. On August 17 the President and Harry Hopkins arrived and Eden and Brendan Bracken flew in from England. As the delegations gathered news of Italian peace moves came out to us, and it was under the impression of Italy’s approaching surrender that our talks were held.

  The first plenary session was held on August 19. Highest strategic priority “as a prerequisite to ‘Overlord’ ” was given to the combined bomber offensive against Germany. The lengthy discussions upon Operation “Overlord” were then summarised in the light of the combined planning in London by General Morgan. The Chiefs of Staff now reported as follows:

  OPERATION “OVERLORD”

  This operation will be the primary United States-British ground and air effort against the Axis in Europe. (Target date, May 1, 1944.) …

  As between Operation “Overlord” and operations in the Mediterranean, where there is a shortage of resources available resources will be distributed and employed with the main object of ensuring the success of “Overlord”. Operations in the Mediterranean theatre will be carried out with the forces allotted at “Trident” [the previous Conference at Washington in May], except in so far as these may be varied by decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. …

  These paragraphs produced some discussion at our meeting. I pointed out that the success of “Overlord” depended on certain conditions being fulfilled in regard to relative strength. I emphasised that I strongly favoured “Overlord” in 1944, though I had not been in favour of trying to attack Brest or Cherbourg in 1942 or 1943. The objections which I had to the cross-Channel operation were however now removed. I thought that every effort should be made to add at least 25 per cent. to the first assault. This would mean finding more landing-craft. There were still nine months to go, and much could be done in that time. The beaches selected were good, and it would be better if at the same time a landing were to be made on the inside beaches of the Cotentin peninsula. “Above all,” I said, “the initial lodgment must be strong.”

  As the United States had the African command, it had been earlier agreed between the President and me that the commander of “Overlord” should be British, and I proposed for this purpose, with the President’s agreement, General Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, who, it may be remembered, had commanded a corps in the decisive battle on the road to Dunkirk, with both Alexander and Montgomery as his subordinates. I had informed General Brooke of this intention early in 1943. This operation was to begin with equal British and American forces, and as it was to be based on Great Britain it seemed right to make such an arrangement. However, as the year advanced and the immense plan of the invasion began to take shape I became increasingly impressed with the very great preponderance of American troops that would be employed after the original landing with equal numbers had been successful, and now at Quebec I myself took the initiative of proposing to the President that an American commander should be appointed for the expedition to France. He was gratified at this suggestion, and I dare say his mind had been moving that way. We therefore agreed that an American officer should command “Overlord” and that the Mediterranean should be entrusted to a British commander, the actual date of the change being dependent upon the progress of the war. I informed General Brooke, who had my entire confidence, of this change, and of the reasons for it. He bore the great disappointment with soldierly dignity.

  As for the Far East, the main dispute between the British and American Chiefs of Staff was on the issue that Britain demanded a full and fair place in the war against Japan from the moment when Germany was beaten. She demanded a share of the airfields, a share of the bases for the Royal Navy, and a proper assignment of duties to whatever divisions she could transport to the Far East after the Hitler business was finished. My friends on the Chiefs of Staff Committee had been pressed by me to fight this point to the utmost limit, because at this stage in the war what I most feared was that American critics would say, “England, having taken all she could from us to help her beat Hitler, stands out of the war against Japan and will leave us in the lurch.” However, at the Quebec Conference this impression was effectively removed. No decision was reached on the actual operations to be undertaken, though it was decided that the main effort should be put into offensive operations with the object of “establishing land communications with China and improving and securing the air route”. In the “overall strategic concept” of the Japan war plans were to be made to bring about the defeat of Japan within twelve months after the collapse of Germany.

  Finally there was the Mediterranean scene. On August 10 Eisenhower held a meeting of his commanders to select from a variety of proposals the means by which the campaign should be carried into Italy. He had to take special account of the enemy dispositions at that time. Eight of the sixteen German divisions in Italy were in the north under Rommel, two were near Rome, and six were farther south under Kesselring. These might be reinforced from another twenty which had been withdrawn from the Russian front to refit in France. Nothing we might gather for a lo
ng time could equal such strength, but the British and Americans had command of sea and air, and also the initiative. The assault upon which all minds were now set was a daring enterprise. It was hoped to gain the ports of Naples and Taranto, whose combined facilities were proportioned to the scale of the armies we must use. The early capture of airfields was a prime aim. Those near Rome were as yet beyond our reach, but there was an important group at Foggia adaptable for heavy bombers, and our tactical air forces sought others in the heel of Italy and Montecorvino, near Salerno.

  General Eisenhower decided to begin the assault in early September by an attack across the Straits of Messina, with subsidiary descents on the Calabrian coast. This would be the prelude to the capture of Naples (Operation “Avalanche”) by a British and an American army corps landing on the good beaches in the Gulf of Salerno. This was at the extreme range of fighter cover from the captured Sicilian airfields. As soon as possible after the landings the Allied forces would drive north to capture Naples.

  The Combined Chiefs of Staff advised the President and me to accept this plan, and to authorise the seizure of Sardinia and Corsica in second priority. We did so with alacrity; indeed, it was exactly what I had hoped and striven for. Later it was proposed to land an airborne division to capture the airfields south of Rome. This also we accepted. The circumstances in which this feature was cancelled will be recounted in due course.