Disaster at Stalingrad

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Disaster at Stalingrad Page 7

by Peter G. Tsouras


  The first war where Englander fought Deutscher was an obscenity. I know. I fought them. Hard as nails. Stout Aryan fighting men. You know, in the thirties before we came to power, I met one of their parliamentary leaders, a young man named Harold Macmillan. We discovered that we had been directly opposite each other in France. I sketched the map of the area and he agreed I was spot on. I related to him how stupid it was for us to have fought each other and told him of just such an example why it was so. At the end of 1914, when both sides started digging in, one of our West Saxon regiments was directly across from a British regiment from Wessex. We tried to tell them that it was absurd for the same tribesmen, West Saxons all, to be fighting each other. Even then the English were set on being unreasonable. But I tell you that, once I have sorted out Stalin, the English will come hat in hand to us and throw Churchill to the wolves.

  At last he paused and put away his memories. Gehlen noticed that two hours had passed. Hitler stood up to indicate that their meeting was over. He extended his hand to the SS man. ‘Your timing was perfect, Heydrich. I am leaving on 1 June to establish my headquarters in Ukraine with Army Group South.’ As the two left, Hitler said to him, ‘You have done such a good job with the Czechs, I had thought to appoint you to get the French in hand, but now after this Enigma business, I think I have something even more important in mind for you.’ He almost added to the end of the sentence the words ‘my son’.

  Heydrich flew back to Berlin with Dönitz a well satisfied man. He would spend the night in the capital completely unaware of how satisfied he should have been. Had he remained in Prague, he most likely would have been dead. Two soldiers from the Czech army in exile in Britain were waiting to kill him. The British had sent them because Heydrich had been far too successful in exploiting Czech industry to support the German war effort. It should have been easy. Heydrich took the same route like clockwork every day. Only, that day, he had been at the Wolfsschanze. They would not get a second chance. In the coming days Heydrich would not often be in Prague, and the two Czechs were quickly betrayed.

  Mountains of southern Chechnya, 30 May 1942

  Khasan and Hussein Israilov watched the white parachutes descending through the moonlight into the mountain valley. Shadowy figures emerged from the woods to run over to the men who were just landing. Before long the visitors were standing in front of the brothers. ‘Welcome to Chechnya,’ Khasan said as he offered his hand and introduced himself and his brother. His visitors were two officers of the German Abwehr, the Wehrmacht’s military intelligence arm. They had an interesting proposal.

  The Chechens were of great interest to the Abwehr. They were a possible open sore for the Soviets, and an abscess in the Caucasus would be of great help in upcoming operations. The Chechens were a particularly virulent pathogen. They were a warrior people with a broad cruel streak and had been converted to Islam in the seventeenth century. They had tormented the Georgians to the south and the Russians to the north before Tsar Nicholas I decided to crush them. It took thirty years against a determined resistance led by the legendary Shamil finally to succeed at the cost of thousands of lives and only by chopping down all the forests of Chechnya to deprive the insurgents of cover.

  The Abwehr had discovered that Khasan had begun an insurgency to free his people from the grip of Soviet power. The example of the drubbing the Finns had given the Red Army early in the Winter War of 1939-40 had inspired him:

  …to become the leader of a war of liberation of my own people… The valiant Finns are now proving that the Great Enslaver Empire is powerless against a small but freedom-loving people. In the Caucasus you will find your second Finland, and after us will follow other oppressed peoples.14

  The war of liberation had begun in February 1942. Khasan had 5,000 men under his command and had extended operations even into neighbouring Dagestan. News of his insurrection had caused the immediate desertion of almost 70,000 Chechens in the Red Army.

  The Abwehr’s interest in Chechnya coincided nicely with the fact that near the capital of Grozny was one of the major oilfields of the Soviet Union. Israilov was no fool; the German interest was transparent, but he made it clear to the Abwehr agents that he did not intend to exchange one master for another. The Germans assured him he had nothing to worry about.

  CHAPTER 4

  Race to the Don

  Headquarters, Army Group South, Poltava, Ukraine, 2 June 1942

  Hitler was in the best of moods at the conference with his generals. Within a few weeks they had given him two great victories at Kerch and on the Donets that had netted over 400,000 prisoners and huge amounts of booty. He eagerly greeted his senior commanders in Army Group South: army group commander Fedor von Bock, Paulus (6th Army), Colonel General Ewald von Kleist (1st Panzer Army), Colonel General Hermann Hoth (4th Panzer Army), Manstein (11 th Army), and Colonel General Richard Ruoff (17th Army).

  In all of their discussions, he kept the focus on the objective of the Caucasus and its vital oilfields. The city of Stalingrad was hardly mentioned at all. Paulus’s and Hoth’s armies plus the allied contingents were to drive from the Don to the Volga. It would be on these wide open steppes that the great battles of encirclement would be conducted as they had been in 1941, destroying the last of the Stavka reserves. Despite this intended crushing of Soviet armies, the operation’s essential mission was to guard the flank of the 1st Panzer and 17th Armies before they plunged into the Caucasus. These operations were to be consecutive rather than concurrent. Hitler spoke of bringing Manstein’s 11th Army north as soon as it captured Sevastopol. The start date for Operation Blue was set for 28 June.

  At that point Manstein thought it the right time to make a suggestion:

  Mein Führer, the drive into the Caucasus will put a premium on mountain troops. I fear our own Gebirgsjäger will not be enough for such endless mountains. The Romanian Mountain Corps in my army have given a good account of themselves. They would be very useful in the Caucasus and reduce the strain on our men as would the Italian Alpini Corps.

  Hitler had been so pleased with Manstein’s victory at Kerch that he waved his approval. He was in such a good frame of mind that he went on to share his vision with Manstein.

  I have dreamed such dreams, Manstein. I have seen our panzers pouring down through the Caucasus into ancient Persia to pass by the tomb of Cyrus the Great and the ruins of Persepolis where Alexander consigned Persian glory to the flames. I have seen them reach the Persian Gulf and then strike eastward across Afghanistan to India itself to seize as war booty for the Reich the jewel in the British crown.1

  Manstein was not the sort to suffer fools gladly, but he was disciplined enough to know when to hold his tongue. India, indeed. In his mind he ran over the logistics required. If Hitler ever got the German Army to India it would be only in midst of an opiate dream.2

  Trondheim, Norway, 2 June 1942

  As his aircraft was preparing to return him to Berlin, Dönitz kept thinking how impressed he had been with Admiral Otto Schniewind’s argument. The acting commander of the 1st Battlegroup, Tirpitz and Hipper, had put before the head of the Kriegsmarine a daring and aggressive plan on his visit to Trondheim two days ago.

  I propose nothing less than a major fleet action, Herr Grossadmiral. We have in Norway now seven major ships, and we have been reinforced with more destroyers and E-boats. I don’t believe the Allies will invade Norway. Rather they will do all in their power to help the Russians now that the spring offensive has begun. My objective is the total destruction of their next convoy, this PQ-17.

  Dönitz was more than a little surprised. Schniewind’s superiors had been far more hesitant to commit to such a major action. It took courage to go against them as well as urging a fleet action on the chief of the Kriegsmarine, a submariner to the core. However, as devoted to the U-boat mission as he was, Dönitz was anything but parochial. In fact, Schniewind and he were not far apart.

  ‘Schniewind, hear me out. I have been working along just such lines.�
�� It was Schniewind’s turn to be surprised.

  Already the orders are being prepared to transfer three U-boat flotillas from France to Norway to reinforce our effort against the convoys. That should more than double the number of boats available to cooperate in this attack. I have the Führer’s blessing to move strongly against the convoys. He has agreed to order the Luftwaffe to be more forthcoming in its support as well.

  With that he struck the table with his fist:

  We must strike with every asset we have. We must deliver such a decisive and crushing blow that they will never dare send another convoy to Russia.

  Brest, 5 June 1942

  A sour rumour was running through the U-boat crews in the eight U-boat flotillas based in French ports that half of them would be transferred to Norway to join the three already there.3 The crews were not happy. It was harrowing enough to serve in a U-boat without having to look forward to returning to a frozen, unfriendly Norwegian port. Every man had a French girlfriend or was a welcomed patron at the local brothels now that there was no other traffic moving through the ports. The U-boat men did a collective shudder as the rumour swept through their boats.

  Order followed on rumour, and for once the two said much the same thing. It was Norway alright for the 1st, 7th, and 10th Flotillas. The boats in port were to move immediately; those at sea were to move shortly after they returned to port and the men had had their well-deserved RƐtR. They were urged to make the most of it.

  Along the Donets River, 10 June 1942

  In the early morning hours of the 10th assault boats carrying elements of 6th Army’s 297th Infantry Division crossed the 60 yards of the Donets and secured the east bank. Pioneers quickly threw over a pontoon bridge. Upriver an intact bridge was seized by coup de main from its surprised Soviet guards. By morning 6th Army was pouring across the river to its start line for the coming offensive. Hitler had been concerned about 6th Army’s bridgeheads over the Donets all day, and his level of anxiety had been only barely relieved by reports of their success.

  The Berghof, Berchtesgaden, 15 June 1942

  Hitler was happy to have his short break at his mountain retreat interrupted by Dönitz. He was eager to see how he had fashioned his noose. The admiral reported to him in the great hall with its massive plate-glass windows that gave the Führer an appropriate Wagnerian background. He was unsettled to see Goring there as well:

  His podgy face, many chins, corpulent belly and splendid uniforms (cut from the finest materials to his own design), combined with the perfume he used, gave the impression of a degenerate Eastern potentate rather than the leader of the Luftwaffe and Hitler’s successor designate.4

  Hitler cordially extended his hand to the admiral. He was comfortable with Dönitz who, unlike the stiff and traditional Raeder, was a true National Socialist. Goring was equally cordial, though Dönitz realized what duplicity could lurk behind dicke Hermann’s eyes.5

  Dönitz deftly laid out the plans for Operation Rösselsprung (Knight’s Move). The full strength of the Kriegsmarine — surface ships and submarines — supported by the Luftwaffe, would strike at Convoy PQ-17 and utterly destroy it.

  The operation would begin by the deployment of several submarine flotillas to locate, shadow and harry the convoy. The chosen battleground would be east of Bear Island. As soon as air reconnaissance had located the convoy, Naval Group North in Kiel would issue the order for the surface battlegroups to put to sea. They would steam at maximum speed and converge about 100 miles northwest of North Cape about halfway to Bear Island. Luftflotte 5 was to conduct simultaneous reconnaissance sweeps 200 miles out to sea in a wide arc as well as fly fighter escort for the battle groups. Once contact was made with the convoy, the battle groups would destroy its cruiser escort. Thereafter, the merchant ships would be at their mercy either to be sunk or escorted back to Norwegian ports as German prizes. Tankers were high on the list of ships to be captured.

  Dönitz emphasized that contact with a surface force of equal or superior size was to be completely avoided. The fleet would rely on the Luftwaffe to give warning of the approach of any such force. U-boats would deploy to attack any such force.6

  Göring was the first to speak, almost eagerly. ‘I shall guarantee you that Luftflotte 5 will conduct reconnaissance to 500 kilometres [approx. 300 miles].’ Hitler nodded his approval. Dönitz glanced between them and caught the subtle body language. So the Führer did have his little talk with Goring. Heydrich had told him how much the Reichsmarschall had been embarrassed by the revelation that the British had been reading the Luftwaffe’s mail. Well, it was to the Kriegsmarine’s advantage that he now wanted to overcompensate. 7

  Now Hitler spoke:

  Yes, yes, Dönitz. I agree that contact with large British naval forces is to be absolutely avoided. But do not forget the aircraft carriers. They are a great threat to your ships. I tell you that the aircraft carriers must be located before the attack and they must be rendered harmless by our aircraft beforehand.8

  Dönitz was prepared for this:

  Mein Führer, rest assured we have given much thought to keeping the British focused elsewhere. Before the operation we shall let the British learn that Battlegroup 3 is preparing to foray into the Atlantic through the Denmark Strait.9

  The Admiralty, London, 18 June 1942

  The message from the British naval attaché in Stockholm, Henry Denham, hit the Admiralty like a bombshell. He warned that the Germans were preparing a major fleet action to destroy PQ-17. All seven major German ships, two light cruisers, three destroyers, several E-boat squadrons, six U-boat flotillas and a strongly reinforced Luftwaffe contingent would take part. It was clearly an all-out effort.

  What made the report so convincing was that Denham classified it A3, one of the highest grades, which meant the source was absolutely reliable and the information most probably true. That source was an officer in the Royal Swedish Navy who had given the same reliable information when Bismarck sortied in 1941. What Denham did not know was that the Swedes had tapped the landlines that the Germans ran to Norway.10

  This information forced a reappraisal of the defence of the convoy. Admiral Pound believed the risk to the convoy too great to proceed. Churchill at a conference with his senior naval commanders demanded that the convoy proceed despite the risk. ‘Risk’, he said, ‘is in the blood of the Royal Navy. What better way to finish off the Germans than with a decisive battle. Their fleet in being keeps far too many ships in home waters, ships that could better be used elsewhere, especially in the Mediterranean and Pacific.’

  Churchill was not aware of the tension between Pound and Tovey. They had been discussing the tactics to be used in defending the convoy. Tovey put the proverbial skunk up on the table.

  ‘If the Tirpitz catches up with it under favourable conditions, the convoy is sure to be destroyed. I want permission to turn the convoy around if Tirpitz makes a show of it so that the Home Fleet can protect it.’ He had in mind also that the Home Fleet, except in emergency, was forbidden to get within range of the Luftwaffe. Nor was it able to escort the convoy all the way to Russia.

  ‘No, absolutely not,’ Pound said. ‘I intend, instead, to scatter the convoy should the Tirpitz be on the prowl.’

  Tovey was aghast. ‘But that would be sheer, bloody murder.’ But the First Sea Lord was adamant.

  At the conference Pound was clearly not happy at the Prime Minister’s insistence on a decisive battle. But Churchill looked at Tovey, whose command of the Home Fleet would be tested. Churchill could sense that he had a fighting man there. ‘Bring me a clean kill. Not another Jutland. Put them all on the bottom.’11

  ‘But, Prime Minister,’ Pound said, ‘it is our policy that our capital ships should not approach within range of the enemy’s aircraft.’

  Churchill flicked the ash off his cigar, glared at Pound, and said, ‘We have an aircraft carrier that can protect the Home Fleet. How does the First Sea Lord contemplate coming to grips with the German Navy otherwise?’ />
  Pound attempted to argue that the risk was too great. He pointed out that HMS Victorious was the only aircraft carrier left to the Home Fleet and that at least two would be needed in any case. He then threw down his trump card: the naval Ultra was still blind. If anything would have given Churchill pause it was that, but clearly he had had enough. ‘Nelson would not have weighed and measured risk like a Levantine merchant haggling over six ounces of cinnamon. The policy is changed. The Home Fleet will engage and destroy the enemy.’ Pound’s days were numbered.

  San Diego Naval Base, 19 June 1942

  The figurative bomb that had exploded in the Admiralty sent splinters all the way to the USS Wasp which had just arrived on the West Coast. Immediately after the conference, Churchill had called President Roosevelt to beg for the return of the USS Wasp. That aircraft carrier had originally accompanied the USS Washington to Britain and then did vital service in defending the convoys to Malta. He had been much taken with the gallant action of that ship, and its escort of a second convoy, so that he had radioed its captain to say, ‘Many thanks to you all for the timely help. Who said a Wasp couldn’t sting twice?’

  Admiral King’s reaction was hurricane force. The battles of the Coral Sea and Midway had reduced the US Navy to only three carriers in the Pacific. The President had to take the full power of King’s wrath and threat to resign. Even FDR’s fabled charm wilted in the face of the admiral’s fury. Yet Roosevelt was a war president little short of Lincoln’s ability. The strategic scales were finely balanced. On the one hand King was absolutely correct that the Navy desperately needed the Wasp in the Pacific. On the other there was the urgent appeal of America’s hardpressed cousin to ensure the safety of the convoy that would keep Russia in the war.

 

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