82 Mike Soraghan, “Reyes Backs Pelosi on Intel Briefings,” The Hill (May 1, 2009), p. 1.
83 See Addendum B, Congressional Record, vol. 126, part 20, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (September 17–24, 1980), esp. p. 17693.
84 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, vol. XLVII, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), p. 482.
85 Douglas Jehl, “New Spy Plan Said to Involve Satellite Systems,” New York Times (December 12, 2004), p. A1.
86 L. Britt Snider, former SSCI general counsel and CIA inspector general, as interviewed by Kibbe, “Congressional Oversight of Intelligence,” p. 27.
87 Amy B. Zegart, testimony, “Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Activities,” Hearings, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate (November 2007), p. 47.
88 A member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, John McCain, is said to have told the 9/11 Commission that if his panel spent ten minutes considering the annual intelligence budget, it had been a good year; Jonathan Weisman, “Democrats Reject Key 9/11 Panel Suggestion,” Washington Post (November 30, 2006), p. Al7, cited in Kibbe, “Congressional Oversight of Intelligence,” p. 30.
89 See David M. Barrett, “Congressional Oversight of the CIA in the Early Cold War, 1947–1963,” in Loch K. Johnson, ed., Strategic Intelligence, Vol. 5: Safeguards against the Abuse of Secret Power (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007), pp. 1–18; Loch K. Johnson, America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment.
90 On the frequency and seriousness with which intelligence officers are questioned by lawmakers in public hearings, see Loch K. Johnson, “Playing Ball with the CIA: Congress Supervises Strategic Intelligence,” in Paul E. Peterson, ed., The President, the Congress, and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994), pp. 49–73.
91 For chronicles of these failures, see Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Doubleday, 2007); and Amy Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).
92 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, “Do We Still Need the CIA? The State Dept. Can Do the Job,” New York Times (May 19, 1991), p. E17.
93 Quoted by Ann Davis, “GOP-Controlled Senate Expected to Give Less Scrutiny to War on Terror,” Miami Herald (November 7, 2002), p. A1.
94 Interviewed by Cynthia Nolan, Washington, DC (October 15, 2003), “More Perfect Oversight: Intelligence Oversight and Reform,” in Johnson, ed., Strategic Intelligence, Vol. 5, quote at pp. 126–7.
95 Remarks to the author by Representative Hamilton, University of Georgia, Athens, GA (April 9, 2008). See, also, Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran–Contra Affair.
96 Author's conversation with William J. Casey, Director's Dining Room, CIA Headquarters Building, Langley, VA (June 11, 1984).
97 The letter was dated April 9, 1984; Letters to the Editor, Washington Post (April 11, 1984), p. A17.
98 James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration (New York: Free Press, 2006), p. 9.
99 Richard C. Shelby, “September 11 and the Imperative of Reform in the U.S. Intelligence Community: Additional Views,” Senator Richard C. Shelby, Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Joint Inquiry Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 10, 2002), p. 135.
100 For Graham's memoir, see Bob Graham with Jeff Nussbaum, Intelligence Matters: The CIA, the FBI, Saudi Arabia, and the Failure of America's War on Terror (New York: Random House, 2004).
101 K. Guggenheim, “Tenet Defends CIA's Pre-9/11 Efforts,” Washington Post (October 17, 2002), p. A1.
102 Neil A. Lewis, “Senator Insists CIA Is Harboring Iraq Reports,” New York Times (October 4, 2002), p. A12.
103 Graham, with Nussbaum, Intelligence Matters. The Director of the CIA, John O. Brennan, had this to say about these charges on “Meet the Press” (NBC News, May 1, 2016): “The 9/11 Commission took that joint inquiry [by the Graham-Goss Committee] and those 28 pages or so, and followed through on the investigation. And they came out with a very clear judgment that there was no evidence that indicated that the Saudi government as an institution, or Saudi officials individually, had provided financial support to Al Qaeda.” Left unstated was the possibility that wealthy Saudis outside the government – with strong ties to the royal family – had provided financial support to the 9/11 terrorists.The twenty-eight pages were at last released on July 15, 2016, by HPSCI after being declassified by the Obama Administration with only a few redactions. The document revealed some contacts between the 9/11 hijackers and Saudi officials – “a catalog of meetings and suspicious coincidences,” concluded a New York Times report on the release, including evidence of checks from Saudi royals to intermediaries in contact with the terrorists. In the words of the Times account, however, the evidence was “by no means a Rosetta Stone” that clearly implicated the Saudi government in the 9/11 attacks; Mark Mazzetti, “In 9/11 Document, View of Saudi Effort to Thwart U.S. Action on Al Qaeda,” New York Times (July 16, 2016), p. A13. The twenty-eight pages could be read differently by different people, though, and Senator Graham remained a skeptic. “This [document] makes a very compelling case that the Saudis were the source of assistance to the 9/11 hijackers,” he commented – Bloomberg Business News (July 15, 2016). An expert on the subject, Simon Henderson at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, suggested that the evidence would not support the proposition that the royal family directly financed the 9/11 terrorists; however, “official Saudi money ended up in the pockets of the attackers, without a doubt”; see his “What We Know About Saudi Arabia's Role in 9/11,” Foreign Policy (July 18, 2016).
104 Front-page stories on oversight in leading newspapers are rare; but, when they occur, they help boost the public's appreciation of this important government function; see, for example, Eric Schmitt and David Rohde, “2 Reports Assail State Dept. Role on Iraq Security: Oversight is Faulted,” New York Times (October 23, 2007), p. A1.
105 Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 559.
106 Gary Hart, The Good Fight: The Education of an American Reformer (New York: Random House, 1993), p. 144.
6
National Security Intelligence
Shield and Hidden Sword of the Democracies
This volume has examined the three core dimensions of national security intelligence: organization, mission (collection and analysis, covert action, and counterintelligence), and accountability. Each is vital to the success of the democracies in their ongoing struggle against global forces anathema to the principles of a free and open society.
National security intelligence is by no means the only, or even the most important, ingredient for success in this struggle. That distinction would go to the armed might of the democracies: the possession of weaponry – firepower – capable of repelling the dark forces arrayed against freedom, be they the Barbary pirates in America's early history, autocrats and monarchs from the 1600s to the 1900s, the totalitarian threat posed by Germany, Italy, and Japan during the first half of the twentieth century, the communist challenge of the Cold War, or the terrorists of the present age.1 Important, as well, in the defense of the democracies is an effective program of public diplomacy: the soft power that exerts an attraction on the would-be democracies of the world that comes from living a life worthy of emulation through the nurturing of an unfettered media, just trials, competitive elections, and fair play in international affairs. Accompanying the basic requirement of setting a good example for other countries is the need to help the poor nations of the world develop economically, through foreign aid, joint ventures, trade agreements, and the sharing of technological know-how. Important, too, is rejecting torture, extraordinary rendition, secret prisons, and illegal or highly unsavory intelligence operations that erase the difference between the democracies and their adversaries.2
Natio
nal security intelligence, though, has a significant part to play as a shield for the democracies, and sometimes through the use of a hidden sword – covert action and counterespionage – on their behalf. It can provide information that improves the chances of victory on the battlefield against anti-democratic forces, as at Midway during the Second World War or in the recent Persian Gulf wars. It can detect moles burrowing inside the open societies, as with Ames and Hanssen in the United States (though with a more rapid detection of traitors in the future, one can hope). It can fool opponents, as with the deception operations preceding the Allied invasion of Europe at Normandy. It can offer insights that smooth the way to more effective diplomacy and more equitable trade relations. It can discover and prove human rights violations, from the horror of mass graves spotted by satellites to the reports from agents who have infiltrated human trafficking cells.
Often referred to as the “first line of defense,” national security intelligence is that and more. Beyond the eyes and ears of the democracies, it is a measure of their hearts, a test of whether open societies can stand strong against the enemies of freedom and still keep their constitutional principles intact – the accountability side of national security intelligence. This brief closing chapter offers an overview of these core dimensions and highlights the central challenges that lie ahead to ensure that the intelligence shield and sword serve as a reliable complement to armed defense, public diplomacy, and economic statecraft in the protection and advancement of democratic governments around the world.
National security intelligence as organization
The democracies have no use for an intelligence service that is splintered into separate baronies and fails to provide policymakers with the holistic “all-source fusion” of information that is so necessary for good decision-making. Nor do they want an all-powerful intelligence czar who stifles competitive intelligence and dissent, or rises above the reach of overseers. The organizational ideal is a well-integrated intelligence service with a director able to hire and fire, and to coordinate community-wide budgets and programs; but, at the same time, a spy chief who is appropriately held in check by the internal safeguards of serious-minded review by intelligence overseers in all three branches of government in the United States.
A cosmetic DNI
The America model falls far short of this ideal. Its Director of National Intelligence is weak, with limited authority over the nation's sixteen intelligence agencies – a “leader” without sufficient personnel or budget controls. Other than improving its accountability practices, no reform measure in the United States is more pressing than a more effective integration of the nation's intelligence services. This would require the establishment of a genuine DNI to replace the cardboard cutout fashioned for the nation by a misguided Congress during the failed intelligence reform movement of 2004.
Horizontal and vertical integration
An additional organizational challenge in the democracies is to carry forward the integration of their national intelligence agencies not only “horizontally” – that is, melding the training, the computers, and the sharing of findings among the intelligence services in the service of the federal government – but “vertically” as well, downward from the federal government to the states and localities. At these lower levels of governance, counterterrorist and law enforcement officials are on the front lines of likely terrorist targets: the cities and transportation facilities of the world's democracies. Yet, presently in the United States, these state and local officials are rarely provided with the timely, high-quality intelligence they need, even though tentative steps have been taken toward developing “intelligence fusion centers” in the nation's major metropolitan areas, where federal and local analysts gather to share their data and insights on potential terrorist and other criminal activities against the United States.3
Liaison relationships
Challenging, as well, is the development of better liaison connections of two kinds: the first is internal to each of the democracies, and the second is among the democracies. Internal liaison refers to the crafting of improved professional (non-political) ties between decision-makers in the policy departments and the analysts in the intelligence services who serve them with timely and relevant information and insight. Frequently, the left hand (decision-makers) lacks coordination with the right hand (information-providers in the IC). The increased placement of intelligence liaison officers inside government departments would allow them to provide their home agencies each day with an accurate, up-to-date understanding of what information needs are of highest priority among decision-makers. Otherwise, an intelligence officer risks becoming irrelevant, instead of a valuable partner in decision-making who brings to the table reliable facts and assessments.
Liaison among the democracies poses an even more difficult problem, since it must address the security and cultural barriers that are inherent in relations between nations. The principle of “foreign liaison” or “burden-sharing” is compelling, though. The world has changed in important ways that we sum up with the term “globalization” – an unparalleled integration of nations across the latitudes, brought about by new communications and transportation technologies. Along with this globalization has come the potential rapid spread of threats that can have an effect far beyond their local origins: crime from Nigeria, heroin from Afghanistan, weapons proliferation from North Korea, terrorism from the Al Qaeda mountain hideouts in Pakistan, disease from Central China and the jungles of Africa, ecological changes caused by acid rain in the regions of Europe, Asia, and the United States. What used to be someone else's problem is now everybody's problem. No single country has all the answers, all the information, or all the resources to respond to these challenges to freedom; however, by working together and sharing intelligence, as well as participating in more aggressive intelligence operations – covert action and counterespionage – against the world's dark forces, the democracies can improve their chances for success.
The United States, the United Kingdom, and other nations have shown that intelligence can be shared effectively within the framework of the United Nations and NATO.4 Further, Europe has exhibited some success in its ongoing experiment to develop a Euro intelligence service. These are hopeful signs that the secret services can help unite the democracies through intelligence-sharing, in their common quest to subdue the world's violent and anti-democratic forces – be they war-prone autocracies, drug dealers, human traffickers, environmental polluters, or terrorist organizations.
Security intelligence as a set of missions
Challenges abound for each of the three intelligence missions: collection and analysis, covert action, and counterintelligence.
Collection and analysis
Planning and Direction
Frequently, intelligence producers are left in the dark about what manner of information those in high office need to address the problems they confront in their in-boxes. The organizational remedy of improved internal liaison ties – the building of information bridges between the policy and the spy agencies – is a necessary condition for a better understanding between the two camps, but it is not sufficient. One must also have much more direct dialogue between consumers and producers of intelligence, with more frequent meetings devoted to the discussion of the nation's intelligence priorities. Valuable, as well, would be more regular informal get-togethers to nurture the ties of friendship, trust, and rapport that are essential for a smooth working relationship between decision-makers and intelligence officers – although each side must maintain its objectivity in dealing with facts and assessments related to world threats and opportunities.
Collection
Too often the techint side of tradecraft, with its dazzling machines and tangible data, attracts a preponderance of resources from budget planners – prodded by the lobbying efforts of satellite and drone manufacturers (now part of the military-industrial complex that President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned of in his “Farewell Address” of 19
59). This focus on technical intelligence often comes at the expensive of humint and osint. Yet the array of world targets demands adequate funding for each of the “ints” – the Black & Decker approach whereby all the tools in the box are put to use. The idea is to have synergistic, all-source fusion, to meet the goal of acquiring as complete a portrait of the world as possible each day, derived from all of the secret agencies employing their int specialties in close coordination with one another. Crying out for more humint resources are non-official (NOC) positions overseas, which provide a better opportunity for meeting and recruiting the non-traditional enemies of the democracies – terrorists in particular – than do embassy cocktail parties.
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