by David Nasaw
Though Goldman reported enthusiastically on this “Iraq plan,” he and Brandeis had to have recognized how difficult, if not impossible, it would be to implement. Given the economic and political realities of 1939, it was the height of folly to believe that the British, the French, or the Americans would extend $100 million loans with no possible hope of repayment to resettle Arabs in Iraq. And even should the money be raised, how was Roosevelt or anyone else going to determine which Arabs had “entered Palestine since 1917” and should be resettled? And what were the chances that the British or the local Arab leaders would allow such a transfer to proceed?
Still, the mere mention of an unworkable plan with no timetable for execution and only the vaguest commitment from the president that he “might tackle the job” when he was “relieved from the pressure of other affairs” was, for Goldman, “evidence of his interest in Zionism.” Even Hull, who had done everything he could to absent himself and his government from intervening on Palestine, was still regarded by Goldman as “unquestionably a friend of ours.” Goldman admitted that there were working for Hull in the State Department a number of “secretaries and under-secretaries and under-under-secretaries [who] have not escaped the virus anti-Semiticus.” He did not place the American ambassador in this category, though he reported to Weizmann that “Kennedy has given us much concern.”48
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On May 8, the London newspapers reported that Kennedy “had fallen out of favor with President Roosevelt” and was going to be replaced by Myron Taylor, former president of U.S. Steel and currently the American representative to the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. On July 12, Drew Pearson and Robert Allen stated that Kennedy’s replacement would be either Joe Davies, the current ambassador to Belgium, or Harry Woodring, the secretary of war.49
British journalist Claud Cockburn, in his antiappeasement newsletter, The Week, claimed, on the contrary, that though Kennedy should have been fired for being a Cliveden set sycophant, Roosevelt had decided for mysterious reasons to keep him on. Roosevelt, Cockburn wrote, had given his ambassador “a very severe dressing down” in December. Since then, Kennedy’s “activities [had] become more remarkable than ever. He has for instance gone to the length of informing members of the British Government that they ‘need not worry’ about anything that Mr. Roosevelt may say, for the reason that (1) ‘It will be my friends that are in the White House in 1940.’ (2) ‘Roosevelt is run by the Jews and all the anti-fascist sentiment in the United States is really created by the Jews, who control the press.’”50
Harold Ickes gave Cockburn’s article to the president. The New Republic, in an editorial titled “Whose Ambassador Is Mr. Kennedy?,” repeated his accusations verbatim, then concluded that although “we do not know whether these charges are true,” if they were “even 10 percent true, Mr. Kennedy should come home.”51
There was nothing Kennedy could do to rebut the rumors. Issuing formal denials would only have kept them current. When Boake Carter asked if he knew the basis for the reports that he was going to be recalled, he replied that he did not. Still, he could not deny that resignation had not crossed his mind. “Confidentially, I had hoped to get back after the end of July and possibly spend some part of a vacation at Cape Cod. Look over the situation and find out whether, from the point of view of the United States, I could safely discuss with the President my resignation. This, of course, pre-supposes a quiet condition here and a belief that Hitler would consider attending a round table conference. If this is not possible, of course, I see no prospect of returning to private life, because I would never forgive myself if I got out and something happened that would seemingly require my presence in London. While the situation does not seem acute, there is enough unrest and uncertainty at the moment to indicate that my job is still here.”52
The Germans were poised to move on Danzig; the Japanese had blockaded Tientsin, a British protectorate in China. The Chamberlain government was checkmated on two continents. As Kennedy told Walter Lippmann, who met with him during his trip to London in June, Hitler had “every reason to go to war and is able to win. The British fleet is valueless. The German submarines can cut off shipping in the Atlantic. Franco is surrounded . . . Poland has no munitions. Russia is useless. Rumania can’t fight. And the Japanese will attack in the East. . . . All Englishmen . . . in their hearts know this to be true, but a small group of brilliant people has created a public feeling which makes it impossible for the government to take a sensible course.”53
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In late July, before leaving London for his summer holiday, the ambassador called on Chamberlain and Halifax. The prime minister, Kennedy cabled Hull, was “fairly optimistic about the outlook for the next 30 days.” Halifax was not. “He said he had no definite information, but in the next breath asked me how long it would take me to get back. I told him about 5 hours and he said he would keep my office informed and would call on me to come back if he saw the situation tightening.”54
Since he had arrived in London, Kennedy’s fears had multiplied one on another. “I am leaving tomorrow for a holiday,” he wrote Roosevelt on July 20, “and before I go, I would like to write you about what I regard as the makings of the worst economic conditions the world has ever seen. As you know, I have been constantly bearish for the last two or three years and I see nothing tonight that makes me change my opinion, but, on the contrary, I feel more pessimistic than ever.” Even should war be averted, the economic crisis in Europe would continue to worsen, prolonging the depression in America. Agricultural prices were falling, the precursor to general depression, the European nations remained deeply in debt, their economies steadily weakening, “the Japanese financial picture is a frightfully bad one . . . the Chinese financial picture is only kept alive with the help of the United States and Great Britain.” All that Kennedy could recommend was that the United States do what it could to conserve its “financial position at least for one more year.” There should be no new social expenditures and no legislation that would frighten the business community. He ended his letter by apologizing for “writing about something that is none of my business,” implying, of course, that it should be. By harping on Washington’s failure to push itself and the world out of depression, he was not very subtly auditioning to replace Morgenthau at the Treasury Department or, as an alternative, asking to be given more responsibilities in Europe.55
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Kennedy’s original plan had been to vacation in the United States that summer. But with the situation in Europe so unsettled, he had decided to return to the South of France. Arthur Krock, always on the alert to do his friend and patron a favor, dedicated his July 18, 1939, column to the topic “Why Ambassador Kennedy Is Not Coming Home.” Kennedy, Krock declared, wanted “to come home.” He was overworked, weary of being the object of a “propaganda campaign directed against him by the ‘young New Dealers,’” concerned that his five youngest children had been “too long separated from the way of life in their native country,” and burdened by the tremendous “expenses of his post” and the obligation “to disconnect himself from important sources of income.” He had, in fact, according to Krock, decided that at the conclusion of the king and queen’s triumphant visit to America, “which he had suggested and in great part planned,” he would resign his post. He had changed his mind only because Roosevelt, increasingly reliant on his reports from London, had urged him to stay in place. Kennedy had reluctantly “agreed to await the events of the Summer and early Fall before returning to his private affairs in the United States which, he feels, acutely call for personal attention.”56
Kennedy was pleased with Krock’s column, and pleased even more when the president, who disliked and intensely distrusted Krock, sent him a personal note. “I suppose you know of the latest ‘Krock’ in the Times about you, and I think you begin to agree with me that that particular gentleman, with his distorted ideas of how to be helpful, has done you more harm in
the past few years than all of your enemies put together.” While Krock had insisted in his column that the rumors about “White House disfavor” and Kennedy “being dragged toward the doghouse” were false, by raising them again, he had, Roosevelt declared, done the ambassador a disservice. Roosevelt claimed he had “tried to correct the impression by telling several people the other day that I have complete confidence in you, that you have never mentioned leaving London, that you are doing a good job there, and that in these critical days I count on your carrying on.” He concluded by asking Kennedy to “drop me a line to tell me your inside thoughts about the present situation.” This, of course, was precisely what Kennedy wanted to hear.57
His response to the president was heartfelt but somewhat treacly. “Your letter made me happy—not only what you said but the whole tone of it.” As far as his “inside thoughts” were concerned, most of them had been included in his dispatches and his recent letters. “But, in the mood of your letter, I should like to add some personal observations and comments. The chief thing I have noticed in the South of France, on the part of caddies, waiters and residents, is a very strong anti-Semitic feeling. Beyond that, and a general sense of wary waiting for almost anything to happen, I can contribute nothing to an understanding of the international state of affairs.” Still, because the president had asked for his “inside thoughts about the present situation,” Kennedy seized upon the occasion to return, like a homing pigeon, to his favorite theme.
“About my position in England my only thought was to wonder whether my experience and knowledge were not being completely wasted. After all, I recognize that in this day and age an Ambassador may be hardly more than a glorified errand boy. I do get a bit discouraged for, although I have worked harder and longer hours in this job than on any job I ever held, it seems that three quarters of my efforts are wasted because of the terrific number of things to be done which seem to have no close connection with the real job at hand.” He did not want the president to think he was ungrateful for the honor granted him or that he was ready to abandon ship. “Of this one thing, though, you may be sure. Regardless of any personal inconvenience, as long as I am of any assistance to you, I shall remain for whatever time you like. . . . When I was a youngster, my father taught me two principles: gratitude and loyalty. . . . I have tried to live up to those two principles and, to you personally, I owe a debt on both counts.” Even his complaints were softened, so grateful was he that the president had taken the time to write him.58
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Kennedy leased the Domaine de Ranguin in 1939 with what was reported to be perhaps the “finest rose garden on the Riviera.” It was here that the family would spend its last summer together. Kennedy played with his younger children, had long talks with the older ones, sunbathed, rented a yacht, played golf, and as he had the year before, took in the “leg shows” on the beaches, which he admitted to Rose were so numerous “that the old variety shows have lost their novelty and their allure.” Rose, having seen those “leg shows” the summer before, had gone shopping for bathing suits for her girls in New York that June. It had been “impossible,” she noted in her diary, “to find anything at Cannes last year. Everyone wore a little brassiere, a bare tummy and an abbreviated pair of shorts. Such a costume is O.K. for the gals there but not for the Kennedys.”59
Marlene Dietrich was back at the Hôtel du Cap, with a slightly different and enlarged entourage. “Papa Joe,” as Dietrich referred to Kennedy to distinguish him from the other Joes in her life, offered her career advice, persuading her to accept Joe Pasternak’s offer to star in a western, Destry Rides Again, alongside Jimmy Stewart. To make sure she got the best deal possible, Kennedy called Arthur Houghton in Hollywood and found a new agent for her. Kennedy was happy to be of help, though by the end of the summer, Dietrich was beginning to get on his nerves. “Every time the telephone rings,” Kennedy wrote Houghton in late August, “and Dietrich wants to speak to me, I know she wants some favor.” Kennedy’s pique might have been aroused because that summer, Dietrich—whose entourage now included her husband, Erich Maria Remarque, and a new addition, her “summer of ’39 interlude,” a woman named “Jo”—had less time for him. Fortunately, Kennedy had Amy, a beautiful young French girl who, he wrote Houghton, “caddied for me every day and she was good in every respect.”
War was coming, and there was no way to escape it or ignore it. Before leaving the hotel that August, Dietrich, her daughter remembered, asked, “‘Papa Joe—what will happen if there is a war? Do I have to take everyone with me to America, or can I leave them here?’ . . . Kennedy [who had earlier helped secure her daughter’s American citizenship papers] assured her that if and when he felt the danger of war was imminent, he would evacuate his family back to England and safety and that her family would be given the same protection as his.”60
Twenty
“THIS COUNTRY IS AT WAR WITH GERMANY”
The German official telegraphic agency and the German radio system has just announced that, ‘The German and Soviet Governments have agreed to conclude a non-aggression pact,’” the American chargé d’affaires in Germany reported on August 21.1
Kennedy flew back to London from his villa in the South of France. With the threat that the Soviet Union would intervene to defend Poland now removed, there was no impediment to a German invasion. Prime Minister Chamberlain dispatched Ambassador Nevile Henderson to Salzburg with a letter requesting that Hitler peacefully resolve through negotiations any disputes he might have with the Polish government. He also reaffirmed Britain’s determination to come to the assistance of Poland if Germany invaded. That same day, Wednesday, August 23, President Roosevelt cabled a message to the king of Italy asking that he and his government do all they could to bring Germany and Poland to the bargaining table.
The diplomatic efforts were cosmetic. It was generally agreed that there was only one way out of the crisis. Poland would have to agree at once to turn over Danzig and at least some segment of the Polish Corridor. By sending Henderson to Hitler and then agreeing to partake in a second, secret round of negotiations with Swedish industrialist Birger Dahlerus, Goering’s personal emissary, the Chamberlain government had set in motion the same process that had led to the Munich Agreement. Hitler played his part in the charade by agreeing to talk peace while preparing for war.
In the early evening of August 23, Kennedy visited Lord Halifax, who, he cabled to Washington, believed that the Polish government was not inclined to enter negotiations with Hitler. An hour later, Kennedy met with Chamberlain. “He said the spectre of the impending catastrophe was over him all the time. He looks very bad and is terribly depressed. I said to him, ‘How does it look?’ and he said, ‘Very bad but I have done everything that I can think of and it seems as if all my work has come to naught.’ . . . I asked him if he thought the Pope could do any good and he said no. . . . Although I talked with him for almost an hour the sum and substance of it all was sheer discouragement with the picture as it stands. . . . If the President is contemplating any action for peace, it seems to me the place to work is on Beck [Józef Beck, the Polish colonel and minister for foreign affairs who had negotiated with and remained on good terms with Hitler] and to make this effective it must happen quickly. I see no other possibility.”2
In suggesting that Roosevelt “work on Beck,” Kennedy was advising him to pressure the Polish government to peaceably cede territory to Germany, as the Czechs had. The alternative was war, which Kennedy believed had to be avoided at all costs.
At ten o’clock the following morning, Kennedy received a call from Sir Horace Wilson, one of Chamberlain’s chief advisers, who wanted to know—as did the prime minister—what the president was going to do. Kennedy promised Wilson he would be back in touch with him as soon as he heard from the White House. After lunch, Wilson called again to find out if Kennedy had reached the president. He had not, but he reported that he had an appointment to speak to the Whi
te House at eleven P.M.
At midnight, the ambassador’s call to the president was put through and answered by Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, who was sitting with the president. Kennedy “asked Welles if he understood the import of my request for President to get in touch with Poland. [Welles] said, yes, but it could not be done the way I suggested. I said I didn’t care how it was done so long as something was done and quickly.
“All right, came the President’s voice. Something will be done tonight.”3
The next morning, August 25, upon arriving at the embassy, Kennedy discovered that instead of following his advice and pressuring the Poles to negotiate with the Germans, the president had urged both Hitler and Ignacy Mos'cicki, the president of Poland, to refrain from hostilities and choose one of several methods to peaceably settle their differences. “Neither the president nor I,” Hull would later write in his memoirs, “felt any disposition to bring any pressure to bear on Poland.”4
On August 25, Hitler made what he deemed to be his final offer to Nevile Henderson. Kennedy spent all day trying, without much luck, to find out what Hitler had proposed and how the British intended to respond. He was invited to Downing Street at ten o’clock that evening, read the dispatches from Germany, and cabled Washington at midnight. The fuehrer had insisted that the Polish question be settled at once. As soon as the provocations against Germans in Poland ceased and the problems of Danzig and the Polish Corridor were resolved, Hitler declared that he would make Great Britain a comprehensive peace offer and “limit armaments, go back to peaceful pursuits, and become an artist, which is what he wanted to be. (Aside by Kennedy, he is now, but I would not care to say what kind.)” If his terms were not accepted, Hitler had declared, “it was going to be a war worse than ’14–18.”5
