30.Emphasizing his group’s long and close ties with al-Qaeda, Hekmatyar told a Pakistani television interviewer in January 2007 that his fighters had been among those who helped bin Laden and his lieutenants to escape from Tora Bora in December 2001. See “Rebel: We Aided Bin Laden Escape,” Associated Press, January 11, 2007. For the best account of the disaster the U.S. generals inflicted on U.S. national security by letting bin Laden escape, see Gary Bernsten and Ralph Pezzulo, Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and al-Qaeda: A Personal Account by CIA’s Key Field Commander (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2006).
31.In Woodward’s nearly four-hundred-page book one of the few hints that the Bush administration even momentarily focused on solving the border problem using U.S. resources comes on page 237: “There was some talk [at an October 7, 2001, meeting of NSC principals] of sealing the border.” Woodward writes that the NSC concluded that “it seemed an impossible idea, not practical given the hundreds of miles of mountainous and rough terrain, some of the most formidable in the world.” Well, there is no denying that closing that border was a hard job, but if the NSC did not believe the best military in the world could close the border and trap bin Laden, why did it decide that the task could be safely allotted to the poorly armed and trained and generally anti-U.S. Pakistani border forces? The ingrained tendency of U.S. officials to look for proxies to do U.S. dirty work prevailed again, and so bin Laden remains alive and free as this is written. In addition, an effort to close the border to snare bin Laden would have required large amounts of U.S. military manpower and so would have played havoc with the plans of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld (the dean of the RMA’ers) and would have proven that his concept of “military transformation” ensured only that America had the wrong weapons and not enough soldiers and Marines to do the job. See Woodward, Bush at War, 237.
32.For excellent discussions of the U.S.-vs.-al-Qaeda combat at Shahi Kowt and elsewhere in Afghanistan, see Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: Berkeley Books, 2005), and Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle, Penn.: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002).
33.By not abandoning the Cold War practice of finding foreigners to do America’s dirty work, we have blithely assumed that Musharraf’s Pakistan is an American proxy, with national-security interests that mirror those of the United States. The truth is that virtually none of the many things Musharraf has done to assist the United States in Afghanistan have been in Pakistan’s national interest. Indeed, by supporting the installation of Karzai’s pro-India, minimally Pashtun regime, Musharraf weakened security on his country’s western border, and by sending the Pakistani army into the Pashtun regions, he diverted nearly a corps-size military organization from the Indian border and brought his country to the brink of civil war. He even tolerated Washington’s clearly destabilizing demand that former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto—whose government was manned by kleptomaniacs of epic avarice—be allowed to return to the country and reinvolve herself in Pakistan’s political mix. Musharraf’s accommodation of Washington’s wishes vis. Mrs. Bhutto brought such chaos to the country’s politics that he had to declare a near-martial-law “state of emergency” in early November 2007. History will show, I believe, that America has seldom if ever had an ally more willing than President Musharraf’s Pakistan to take actions to further U.S. interests, actions that in no way served its own. Musharraf, however, drew the line at risking complete political collapse in Pakistan; he was not going to play the role of Taliban leader Mullah Omar, the only national leader in memory who knowingly sacrificed his country for a friend. In future years, when America’s defeat in Afghanistan is apparent, and if he survives, Musharraf will be able to reflect on his relationship with President Bush and lament (as President Lincoln said about his relationship with General George McClellan), “Poor George…I did all I could for him, but he could do nothing for himself.”
34.Holt, Into the Land of Bones, 19–20, 76–77.
Chapter 4. Iraq—America Bled White by History Unlearned
1.Bernard Lewis, “License to Kill: Osama bin Laden’s Declaration of Jihad,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 6 (November–December 1998), 14–19.
2.See, for example, Osama bin Laden, “Message to Our Brothers in Iraq,” Al-Jazirah Satellite Television, February 11, 2003.
3.In one of those only-in-historically-ignorant-America moments, the Clinton administration was confident that it had pulled the rug out from under bin Laden and negated this issue when most U.S. forces were moved from Saudi Arabia to Kuwait and Qatar. If administration officials had known a bit of Islamic history, they would have known that the Prophet Muhammad had said that all infidels should be evicted from the Arabian Peninsula, not from Saudi Arabia, as the latter had not yet been founded in the seventh century. So on this issue Washington managed to pull its own hair over its own eyes, spending large sums to relocate U.S. forces but leaving bin Laden’s grievance as relevant as ever.
4.Jeff Stein, “Can You Tell a Shia from a Sunni?” New York Times, October 18, 2006.
5.Ibid.
6.Ibid. Not wanting to be outconfused by a member of the House Intelligence Committee he chairs, Representative Silvester Reyes (D-Texas) told reporters he believed al-Qaeda was “predominantly, probably Shia,” and added that “it is hard to keep things in perspective and in categories.” See “Queries Vex New Chair of Intelligence,” Reuters, December 12, 2006.
7.Robert D. Kaplan, Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos (New York: Vintage Books, 2002), 39.
8.Stephen Hayes, The Connection: How al-Qaeda’s Collaboration with Saddam Hussein Has Endangered America (New York: HarperCollins, 2004).
9.After grossly exaggerating the terrorist potential of Iraq, the Bush administration has not said nearly enough about the genuine terrorist threat posed by Iran inside the United States. Yes, the White House and the American Enterprise Institute are always warning that Tehran sponsors terrorism, but they focus on Iran’s terrorist activities in the Middle East and against Israel. They seldom mention the continental United States as a target. Why? Because Washington does not want to admit that the real terrorist threat posed by Iran and its Lebanese Hezbollah partner is inside the United States. Iran’s intelligence service and Hezbollah’s cadre have built terror-supporting infrastructures inside the United States and across Canada over the past twenty years, thanks to the U.S. governing elite’s refusal to enforce immigration laws and impose border controls. U.S. law-enforcement agencies know Iran and Hezbollah are here, but they have no precise handle on total numbers or locations. It is extremely unlikely that either Iran or Hezbollah would stage an unprovoked terrorist attack inside the United States—both have the fatal handicap of having known return addresses—but if Washington attacks Iran, all bets would be off.
10.Not long after destroying the Iraqi bulwark against the westward movement of Sunni jihadists, Washington, with bipartisan congressional support, took a strong step toward accelerating the fall of the Syrian anti-Islamist bulwark by forcing Bashir al-Assad to withdraw Syrian military and intelligence forces from Lebanon. Washington’s public humiliation of al-Assad emboldened his domestic Islamist militants, while the Syrian withdrawal inaugurated—with the key summer 2006 assistance of the Israeli Defense Force—the disintegration of Lebanon’s political stability that we are now witnessing. The White House and the Congress both deserve thank-you notes from bin Laden for their successful efforts on al-Qaeda’s behalf.
11.See Scheuer, Imperial Hubris, 7, 229–30.
12.While there is nothing funny about the Bush administration not destroying al-Qaeda–related WMD experiments when that option was available, al-Zarqawi’s chemical-weapons team once found themselves in an unusual position. They had designated a horse to be used as the subject for one of their experiments and walked him into one of the camp’s buildings. The Islamists stood the horse in a large metal tub and t
hen applied the chemical substance being tested. The experiment worked like a charm, and the horse quickly died. Now, however, Allah’s would-be chemical warriors had the horse lying dead in a metal tub. Obviously, he could not exit the way he entered. This caused some consternation, and the now-contaminated horse eventually had to be removed piece by piece.
13.The first two categories of Iraqi fighters, dispersed regulars and the fedayeen, were described by the Bush administration from the outset as either “remnants of Iraqi forces” or more opaquely by the Pentagon as “Former Regime Elements” or FREs. The same sort of terminology also was used in Afghanistan after the capture of the Taliban’s capital in Khandahar; thereafter the forces of the U.S.-led coalition were described as “mopping up” Taliban and al-Qaeda “remnants.” Both cases were nothing more than blatant attempts to deceive Americans about the enemies’ remaining strength, and another example of how U.S. leaders still believed in the possibility of conducting “bloodless wars.” In Iraq, U.S. decision-makers let between 400,000 and 500,000 Iraqis go home with their guns (and later kept them angry and at home by formally disbanding the Iraqi army) and earlier had permitted probably a bit more than 60,000 Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters to similarly melt away with their weapons. What the White House and the Pentagon termed “remnants” were basically the entire enemy force in both countries that had fled from a head-on confrontation with America’s unbeatable conventional military prowess to hide and fight again another day in circumstances more favorable to themselves. When both Iraqi and Afghan insurgents reemerged to engage U.S.-led forces in guerrilla-style warfare, the administration continued to misinform the American people by describing these virtually bottomless pools of military manpower as “remnants.” At one point, in fact, CIA officers were told that Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz had decreed that the term “insurgents” would not be used in the Pentagon’s intelligence analysis because it gave “legitimacy to terrorists.” Even at this late date the Cold War belief that the United States was the master of the international political ballet still prevailed; the insurgents simply could have no legitimacy in any American mind, or Muslim mind, for that matter, unless the U.S. government awarded it to them.
14.There are two classic works, one very short and one longer, on the post–Great War British disaster in Iraq, or Mesopotamia as it was then called. The shorter work is T. E. Lawrence, “Report on Mesopotamia,” Sunday Times, August 2, 1920. The longer and much more recent work is David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1989). Lawrence’s report and the sections of Fromkin’s book on Iraq (especially pages 449–54) are both unnerving and eerily familiar for the contemporary American reader. Lawrence’s report begins: “The people of England have been led in Mesopotamia into a trap from which it will be hard to escape with dignity and honor.” Sound familiar?
15.Machiavelli, Prince, 28
16.This is not to say that the Iranian and Sunni services are not involved in getting would-be mujahedin to Iraq. They certainly are, but with the open borders all around Iraq, entry to the battlefield is relatively easy. As in Afghanistan, the provision of cash, ordnance, identity and travel documents, and some paramilitary training by these services suffices. The services are going with the flow more than directing it.
17.The many routes traveled and sponsors available for the young Arabs intent on going to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight the Red Army are excellently covered in Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know. A fine and extensive firsthand account of how one European Muslim got to the Afghan arena after the Soviet retreat is Nasiri, Inside the Jihad, 3–100.
18.For the impact of prison on Ayman al-Zawahiri, see the exceptional, ground-breaking essay by Lawrence Wright, “The Man Behind Bin Laden,” New Yorker, September 16, 2002. The impact of al-Zarqawi’s prison experience is described in two articles featuring al-Zarqawi’s religious mentor, the famed Islamist scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisis; see Luqman Iskandar, “Calling for the Formation of a Global Body of Sunni Ulemas…,” Al-Arab al-Yawm, July 5, 2005, and Yasir Abu-Hilalah, “Interview with Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisis,” Al-Jazirah Satellite Television, July 5, 2005.
19.On the role of Afghan war veterans in Bangladesh and Thailand, see, for example, David Mantero, “How Extremism Came to Bangladesh,” Christian Science Monitor, September 6, 2005, and “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, not Jihad,” International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 98, May 18, 2006.
20.“92 al-Qaeda Suspects Freed in Amnesty,” Los Angeles Times, November 17, 2003.
21.“Algeria Pardons 5,065 Prisoners to Mark Muslim Feast,” www.deepikaglobal.com, January 18, 2005.
22.“Mauritania: Junta Declares General Amnesty for Political Prisoners,” Reuters, September 5, 2005.
23.Said Moumni, “One-hundred and sixty-four Detainees Belonging to the Salfia Jiahdia Group Are Pardoned,” Annahar al-Maghribiyah, November 5, 2005.
24.“Morocco Pardons 10,000 to Mark Independence,” Reuters, November 17, 2005.
25.“Saudi Arabia: Almost 400 Prisoners Released,” www.adnki.com, December 19, 2005.
26.“Algeria to Pardon or Reduce Sentences for 3,000 Terrorists,” www.evening echo.ie/news, February 2006.
27.“Over 2,000 Algerians to be Released Under Reconciliation Charter,” Radio Algiers/Channel 3, March 1, 2006.
28.“Ben Ali Frees 1,600 Tunisian Prisoners,” www.middle-east-online.com, February 27, 2006.
29.“Yemen Frees 627 Zaidi Rebels,” www.middle-east-online.com, March 3, 2006.
30.Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Hopeful Sign as 132 Political Prisoners are Freed,” www.yubanet.com, March 3, 2006. Not surprisingly, the U.S. military announced in November 2007 that among foreign insurgents in Iraq, Libyans formed the second-largest contingent. See Richard A. Oppel Jr., “Foreign Fighters in Iraq Are Tied to U.S. Allies,” New York Times, November 22, 2007.
31.Lee Harris, “Terror in Egypt: It Isn’t Going to Stop Anytime Soon,” Weekly Standard (Internet version), April 27, 2006.
32.“5 Ex-Guantanamo Detainees Freed in Kuwait,” Associated Press, May 22, 2006.
33.“Yemen Acquits 19 Men in al-Qaeda-linked Trial,” Reuters, July 8, 2006.
34.“Seven Security Detainees Escape Saudi Jail,” Reuters, July 8, 2006.
35.“Mauritania Frees Suspected Islamist After Fourteen Months,” Reuters, July 28, 2006, and “Mauritania: Three al-Qaeda-linked Suspects Escaped from Jail,” Associated Press, April 27, 2006.
36.Morocco: Huge Amnesty Signals Historic Day,” www.africa-interactive.net/index.php? PageID=3580, March 12, 2007, and “Fighters infiltrate from Morocco to Iraq,” www.alsumaria.tv/en/print-news-1-1896.html, March 22, 2007. None of the releases described account for the large numbers of Islamist fighters—including some captured on battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan—that such regimes as Saudi Arabia and Yemen are cycling through what they describe as religious rehabilitation camps. The authorities in both countries claim that camp graduates are cured of jihadist tendencies, but there is no way to know whether these camps are anything more than part of a process that provides eyewash for Western governments prone to believe in such psychological rehabilitation and allows captured fighters to return to the wars. The Saudi regime is the highest volume rehabilitator, releasing 1,500 former al-Qaeda fighters from prison in November 2007. Perhaps not coincidentally, Saudis form the largest group of foreign insurgents in Iraq. See Eli Lake, “1,500 Qaeda Members Freed After Counseling,” New York Sun, November 27, 2007; Talal Malik, “1,500 ‘Extremists’ Released by Saudi,” www.Arabianbusiness.com, November 26, 2007; Richard A. Oppel Jr., “Foreign Fighters in Iraq Are Tied to U.S. Allies,” op cit.; “Saudi to Temporarily Release 55 Former Guantanamo Detainees; Give Them Money,” Associated Press, October 6, 2007; and Kathy Gannon, “Yemen Coddling Terrorists,” Associated Press, July 5, 2007.
37.Arab and Muslim regimes also derive an international-opinion benefit from releasing these prisoners: they win the applause of
politically influential Western human-rights groups for releasing “prisoners of conscience.” When in 2006 the Libyan regime of Colonel Qaddafi, for example, released 132 political prisoners, among them 86 Muslim Brotherhood members, the Middle East and North Africa director for Human Rights Watch Sarah Leah Whitson overflowed with praise for the Libyans. “The release of these longtime prisoners is a welcome step,” Ms. Whitson said. “It is wonderful that 132 political prisoners are free. The Libyan government should now allow these people to express their views and engage in peaceful political activity.” That Colonel Qaddafi might have released some of these men on the condition they travel to Iraq or Afghanistan to kill American soldiers seems never to have occurred to Ms. Whitson, and it probably would not have mattered to her if it did. Efforts by Washington to prevent Libya and other Arab regimes from freeing “prisoners of conscience” are not in the cards, as U.S. political leaders are cowed, as they were during the Cold War, by human-rights groups and are very unlikely to court the groups’ condemnation or their own depiction by the media as foes of religious freedom. In the case of Libya, moreover, U.S. leaders would not want to alienate the authoritarian Qaddafi regime, with which they are planning to further increase American dependence on Arab oil. For Ms. Whitson’s comments see “Libya: Hopeful Sign as 132 Political Prisoners Freed,” March 3, 2006.
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