6
A group of men sat at the long, green-baize-covered table in the Cabinet Room of Number 10, Downing Street, listening to the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, Sir Jeffery Powell, give his latest report. Next to him sat the Prime Minister, William Maxwell, and across the table sat the Minister of Defence, Michael Trafford; Foreign Secretary, David Regis, and Commander-in-Chief, Fleet Admiral Sir Robert Engels.
“… In conclusion, gentlemen, this situation poses a serious threat,” ended Sir Jeffery, removing his glasses and looking intently at each of the others at the table.
A long silence prevailed before the Prime Minister cleared his throat, looking perplexed at the nation’s spy chief. “How reliable is this new intelligence?”
“Experience tells us – very.”
Another tense silence.
“If what you’re saying is true, Sir Jeffery, we must act swiftly,” said the PM, breaking the silence. “It seems to me we have little choice. Al-Qaeda won’t give a damn about hitting targets here or in America – all they want is to rule the world at any price. But would the North Koreans risk the sort of retaliation we would deal them if they were planning to do that?” he questioned, his clear blue eyes conveying dignity and compassion. He had a reputation for a no-nonsense, pragmatic approach.
“The regime is under pressure over the nuclear issue, despite Kim Jong-Un’s promises,” said Michael Trafford. His heavily hooded brown eyes stared hard at the PM. “The U.S. has cut aid considerably as we all know. Acute shortage of foreign aid is slowly strangling what little economy they have left. The population is starving. I believe they might well take the risk.”
Sir Jeffery responded. “According to the North Korean being held in Seoul, the delivery of the sub and its missiles has taken place; he doesn’t know to whom, nor does he know to where. I’m inclined to believe that, knowing the Korean interrogation methods.”
“The Americans and ourselves monitor all Russian and Chinese-manufactured submarines capable of firing missiles,” said Engels, a short, dapper man with dark hair greying at the temples. He stood out in his immaculate naval uniform in contrast to the others in sober suits.
“Who else has nuclear submarine capabilities?” asked Trafford.
“Ourselves of course; the Americans, Russia, India, China and the French,” answered Engels. “China has three in her fleet, France four and Russia a total of fourteen at the last count. We endeavour to keep track of all foreign submarines, especially nuclear,” he concluded.
“Unfortunately,” snapped Trafford, “we don’t know which. This go-between negotiates only delivery dates and payout terms; he’s obviously not in the loop for detail, otherwise we would at least know the payload, nuclear or bio. More importantly we would know the target. For all we know, this sub with its clutch of missiles could be on its way to our shores as we speak. An experienced crew would be needed too, capable of operating the sub and the missile systems.” He looked intently at the PM. “We need to interrogate this man ourselves – and quick. Tell the South Koreans to hand him over.”
“Easier said than done, Michael,” the PM replied. “They would want to know how we found out about this man. No matter what diplomatic strings we pull it will take weeks, if not months, to get him out. We do not have the time. Besides, I would not put it past the South Koreans to eliminate him just to avoid extradition to us.” He looked at the intelligence chief for confirmation, which he got.
Trafford nodded his acceptance.
“Can we account for all of the subs?” questioned David Regis, a tall, grey-haired, distinguished-looking man.
“Not all Russian subs,” Engels replied. “Several are out, but we have a good idea of their whereabouts. Those at home bases are regularly monitored by ourselves and the Americans. Anyhow, I understand all were out before the deal referred to in this report was made.”
“How long is the normal stay time at a home base?” Regis questioned.
“Depends on a number of things; not least of which would be their maintenance programs,” Engels answered. “The newer subs – maybe two or three months; the older ones, six months or more. The Russians have had three of their Delta III’s in covered pens in Rybachiy, on the Kamchatka Peninsula, for over a year now. They are either undergoing repairs or in the process of being decommissioned. This is not unusual; they are gradually building their fleet.”
“How many Delta III’s are still in service?” Regis asked.
“Five altogether,” Engels shot back. “We know that the K449, K496 and K433 are penned at Rybachiy – K223 and K211 are out on active duty in the north Pacific.”
“Could it be one of those last two?” the PM asked.
“I doubt it. The Americans have been monitoring their movements for the last six months, patrolling the Alaskan coastline between their return to base for provisions. The latest report we have indicates they are still up there.”
“The three in Rybachiy,” Regis pressed. “Are they the longest Russian nuclear subs to have stayed in the base at any one time?”
“Yes, confirmed by satellite.”
“How can the satellites verify, if the subs are in covered pens?” Regis pressed.
“As Rybachiy is Russia’s largest nuclear sub base and home to the Pacific Fleet, it’s kept under surveillance by the Americans, who share the results with us.”
“Do they use a geo sat?”
“No; orbital – once every twelve hours.”
Regis nodded and looked at the others. “One of the Deltas could have slipped away between orbits.”
“Do we have signatures of the three?” questioned Trafford.
“We do,” replied the admiral, then he turned to the PM. “Every engine makes a specific noise, which is referred to by all navies as a ‘signature’. We and the Americans have a data base covering every other known submarine in service, including Russian, to keep track of where they are in the oceans and to log movements of particular types of submarines. This base is constantly updated whenever the opportunity arises, especially during the cat and mouse games played out in the oceans around the world.”
“From now on, all Russian subs encountered are to be regarded as hostile, especially if the signature of any of the three now in Rybachiy is confirmed,” said the PM firmly.
“Take out a Russian and we could start a war,” said Regis.
“They didn’t when America sunk K-129,” said Engels.
“Was that the rogue Russian sub that was supposedly going to launch missiles at Pearl Harbour?” questioned the PM.
“Yes, sir, according to unofficial channels.”
“Presumably they didn’t retaliate then because they were the perpetrators,” the PM offered. “Here, if that sub was sold to the Koreans, the Russians are doing the same thing, only indirectly. They would have nothing to gain and everything to lose if we managed to disable. I would gamble, with our island at stake, that Dimitriev would not risk starting a Third World War on that basis.”
“We could expect some kind of a move against us. It’s more than speculation the Russians sunk the USS Scorpion off the Azores in retaliation,” said the admiral.
“If the Deltas are waiting to be scrapped,” said Trafford, “and knowing the Russian Navy’s currently streamlining their Pacific sub fleet, I would not rule out an ‘under the table’ deal by regional controllers. We know the consolidation is causing hardship to redundant crews; it leaves men idle, who need to feed families.” The minister of defence paused to collect his thoughts and looked at the PM. “A call to President Dimitriev might clarify things.”
“Forget that,” shot the PM. “Dimitriev will give nothing away. They may now call themselves a democratic Russian Federation, but the mentality of the old Soviet Union is still firmly in place, believe me. Besides, I would have to explain why. Not only would that make the Russians fully aware of our situation, but it would also give them the excuse to increase their submarine activity. Not to mention surface ships in
the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans which could put serious pressure on our own naval resources in those areas and, I might add, compromise our own efforts to locate and disable this submarine.”
The commander-in-chief, Engels, agreed.
Then, as if an afterthought, the PM added, “Dimitriev probably would not be too unhappy to see London blown away or, for that matter, any American city.”
Trafford came back, ignoring that last comment, “But, if a sub has been illegally sold to the North Koreans by rogue elements of the Russian Navy’s eastern high command, the Kremlin would also like to locate and destroy, I’m sure, to avoid the consequences, should the sub’s, and thus al-Qaeda’s, intentions succeed. Having them search for their own sub could be a help more than a hindrance. We have to stop that sub by whatever means available, even if it means enlisting the help of the Russians.”
“Supposing, of course, it is Russian,” said Regis. “It could conceivably be French or Indian.”
The admiral replied, “Every one of the Indian and French nuclear subs is accounted for. There is absolutely no question these two countries would sell to another nation without ours and the Americans’ prior knowledge and agreement. They are our firm allies. The Chinese are a possibility; they have three currently – all brand new. However, I would guess it unlikely that China would give one to a poor neighbour. Relationships between the two are not what you would call cordial right now.”
Engels excused himself and left the room to return a short while later.
“Apart from Seoul, none of our stations report the sale or loss of a nuclear sub by any of the nations you have mentioned,” said Sir Jeffery to both the foreign and defence ministers.
A brief silence.
“Assuming the sub is now in terrorist hands, would a Russian crew be retained?” the PM asked.
“Good point,” said Trafford. “We have to assume at this stage the crew will remain Russian, maybe assisted by Muslims. It will make it more difficult to hunt down; they know their subs well, but if a Russian crew is short of what it should be, that will test efficiency for sure.”
“Assuming, of course, that they have not been totally replaced by a Korean or Muslim crew,” the PM chimed.
“We know selected Iranian and North Korean naval personnel have been involved in Chinese and French nuclear sub training programmes. I doubt the Koreans could man a Delta, but it’s possible that fundamentalist Iranians could form a crew,” said the admiral.
“Anything from ROI or SOSUS?” Trafford asked.
“The last report displayed nothing outside the normal traffic, but I’ll check again and contact the Americans too.”
“ROI, SOSUS?” questioned the PM, staring at the admiral.
“Radar Ocean Imaging, sir. Radar on satellites able to detect subs underwater by the subtle changes of the waves over its path. SOSUS is the U.S. underwater global Sound Surveillance System used in antisubmarine warfare.”
The PM gave Engels a sheepish look. “What about our own Skysight satellites?”
“The Far East has yet to be covered,” Engels replied.
Silence descended again. Prime Minister Maxwell leaned forward, placing both his elbows on the table, seemingly deep in thought. Then, after several seconds, he glanced around the seated figures.
“Could she be fully armed?” he asked quietly.
“Our stats tell us she’s capable of carrying a dozen torpedoes, and sixteen Stingrays,” Engels replied.
“If fitted with MIRV warheads, each with three 200 kilotons apiece, only a few would be needed to potentially wipe out our island,” said Regis.
“Only if she got close enough to release them,” countered Engels.
“How close is close in your opinion, admiral?” the PM asked.
“Anywhere around one hundred miles. We would need most of the entire navy to patrol our coastline and the approaches. We certainly can’t do that without seriously affecting current commitments.”
“Then we have no choice but to make sure we stop the Delta before it gets here,” said the PM firmly. “In the meantime we’ll put all our land-based anti-missile installations on full alert and put as many ships as we can sensibly muster to patrol the south and west approaches. Are we all agreed?”
The group nodded.
The PM turned to the admiral. “This sub may now be carrying missiles with nuclear or bio-warheads. What are your thoughts on how warheads could’ve been obtained and fitted?”
Engels cleared his throat. “If not supplied with the boat, only two ways really – either at sea or in a Korean naval dockyard. If at sea, she would obviously have to surface to take on board the warheads from a topside vessel and stay there until they were fitted. If this was undertaken anywhere in the western Pacific she would be exposed to the sats. The better way would be to head for a remote part of the Pacific, or even the Atlantic, not covered, and do the transfer there. As for the dockyards, the U.S. has all the North and South Korean naval yards covered. It would be difficult to make the transfer without them knowing.”
“Even under cover of heavy clouds and darkness?” questioned Trafford.
“Not a problem with the latest cloud penetration satellites and infra-reds.”
“Does anyone disagree or have anything to add to Admiral Engels’s assessment?” the PM asked.
A shaking of heads.
“Okay, let’s recap the facts,” he continued. “Intel strongly suggests a missile strike against the West by al-Qaeda is imminent using either nuclear or biological warheads. The attack will be by a Russian Delta sub purchased by the North Koreans on behalf of terrorists using a Russian crew, possibly aided by Muslim extremists. It also suggests the Koreans have provided the warheads.” He paused. “So, gentlemen, we have to locate and disable that sub in a real hurry. How do we go about this?” He looked at the admiral.
“Assuming a Delta left Rybachiy, it would need to take a route down through the Pacific, across the Indian Ocean and up into the Atlantic to make sure it kept to the more remote regions of those oceans. To go the other routes it would have to either negotiate the choke points at Drake Passage between Cape Horn and Antarctica or the GIUK gap between Greenland and Norway. Both those approaches would be expected to be crawling with allied ships.
“My thoughts are that we should leave it to the Americans to monitor the northwestern and central Pacific and bring back what we can to protect our shores. The Americans already have Battle Groups in the south Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the North and South Atlantic augmented by attack submarines. We should send an A-Class to patrol the lower latitudes of these oceans. With your approval, sir, we can implement this immediately.”
“Do the rest of you concur?” asked the PM.
Nods of agreement.
The PM shifted in his seat, eyeing those around the table.
“Okay, send the subs.” His voice held a slight tremor. “You are to make the hunting down and disabling of this rogue sub a top priority. The consequences of unleashing a missile carrying a nuclear or bio-warhead onto our shores would be nothing less than devastating; life as we know it would end. So, I’ll put it bluntly: nail it! Reputations are on the line here; make sure there are no cock-ups. Is that clear?”
Again, nods.
Trafford looked at Admiral Engels. “Have the navy conduct sweeping searches in the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea, moving to the South China Sea and then on out into the Pacific if necessary. I also recommend all shipping in and out of Korean ports, both North and South, be boarded, searched and strictly monitored right to their final destinations. We should inform the Americans and seek their help – they could also be the target. They can threaten the Koreans with retaliation and if the sub is still in their hands, it may deter them from following through. We face a very dangerous situation here; we should act immediately.”
The British Prime Minister leaned back in his chair, steepled his fingers and placed them to his lips. For several seconds he stare
d fixedly at portraits on the opposite wall.
“Do we all agree?” he asked finally.
Each nodded.
The PM turned to the foreign secretary. “David?”
“I agree with Michael,” he replied. “But we cannot overlook the possibility of an attack from a surface vessel. The North Koreans have missiles with nuclear and bio-warheads and can deliver. Boarding and searching suspect surface vessels on the high seas should be of paramount importance. Warheads may already be on their way.” He looked at the admiral. “Robert?”
“I agree. However, a blockade would stretch our resources somewhat, but no doubt we can call on our allies to assist.”
The PM’s private secretary entered the room and handed the admiral a note. He read it and looked at the PM. “It appears that several weeks ago the American listening station in the Aleutians recorded the signature of K449 in the south Barents Sea on a southerly course.”
“Exactly where?” shot Maxwell.
“From their station on Attu, the main island of the Nears, at the southern tip of the Aleutians.”
“Why were we not informed sooner?” Trafford asked.
“The Americans log all contacts and share them with us when they get round to it. That’s why I went out. I phoned the Admiralty to check if we had the latest log reports; fortunately, we did.”
“That is directly west of Rybachiy,” said Regis. “If they were heading for Korea they would go southeast through the Sea of Japan.”
“That rules out loading missiles at a Korean naval dockyard,” said Trafford. “Admiral, you could be right. If K449 is the one, then missiles may well be loaded at sea in some remote part of the Pacific. Where is anybody’s guess.”
“Admiral, do we know where all other Russian subs are at this point in time?” the PM asked.
“We do, sir; in conjunction with the Americans. K449’s position is currently unknown, along with an Akula II-class nuclear sub – K267.”
Paths of Courage Page 5
