On Thursday 8 April Al Haig arrived in London for the first stage of his long and tiring diplomatic shuttle. I had an extremely accurate account from Nico Henderson of the propositions Mr Haig was likely to advance. We made it quite clear to him – and he accepted that this was the line we would take – that he was not being received in London as a mediator but as a friend and ally, here to discuss ways in which the United States could most effectively support us in our efforts to secure Argentine withdrawal from the Falklands. His team included Ed Streator from the US Embassy in London, General Vernon Walters, Mr Haig’s special assistant – a powerful personality and someone I particularly liked and respected – and Thomas Enders who dealt with South American Affairs in the State Department. I was joined by Francis, John, Terry Lewin, Sir Antony Acland (head of the Foreign Office) and Clive Whitmore (my principal private secretary). The discussions were lively and direct, to use the diplomatic jargon: there was too much at stake for me to allow them to be anything else.
It was apparent from the beginning that, whatever might be said publicly, Al Haig and his colleagues had come to mediate. The Argentine Foreign minister had indicated that they might accept Soviet assistance, which made the Americans extremely uncomfortable. In Al Haig’s judgement the next seventy-two hours would be the best time for negotiation as far as the Argentinians were concerned. He told us that he had decided to visit Britain first because he did not wish to go to Buenos Aires without a full understanding of our approach.
I told Mr Haig that the issue was far wider than a dispute between the United Kingdom and Argentina. The use of force to seize disputed territory set a dangerous precedent. In that sense, the Falklands mattered to many countries – to Germany, for example, because of West Berlin, to France because of its colonial possessions, to Guyana, a large part of whose territory was claimed by Venezuela.
It became increasingly clear to me that Mr Haig was anxious not only to avoid what he described as ‘a priori judgements about sovereignty’ but that he was aiming at something other than the British administration which I was publicly pledged to restore. The whole of his approach rested on trying to persuade the two sides to accept some kind of neutral ‘interim administration’ after Argentine withdrawal to run the islands while their long-term future was decided.
But Mr Haig agreed a common line with us. We would both say to the press that we wanted UNSCR 502 to be implemented as quickly as possible and had discussed how the United States could help. He had heard the British view of the situation and knew how strongly we felt, but he should not give the slightest impression that our position had changed in any way or that we were showing any flexibility.
In fact, Mr Haig may have looked back on our friendly disagreements in London with something like nostalgia when he got to Buenos Aires and began trying to negotiate with the Argentine Junta. It became evident that the Junta itself was deeply divided, and both General Galtieri and the Foreign minister, Sr Costa Mendez, seemed to alter their position from hour to hour. At one stage Mr Haig thought that he had won concessions, but as he was about to leave for England on Easter Sunday, 11 April – indeed, as he was boarding the aeroplane – Sr Costa Mendez handed him a paper which appeared to abrogate the concessions which, rightly or wrongly, he believed he had won.
By Easter Monday the first ships of the task force had begun arriving at Ascension Island, halfway to the Falklands. The American team returned to London on the morning of that day, 12 April.
Al Haig began by giving an oral account of his talks in Buenos Aires. He said that he had detected differences of view between the three Argentinian Armed Services. The navy were looking for a fight. However, the air force did not want a war, and the army were somewhere in between. He had worked out a set of proposals which he thought the Argentinians might be brought eventually to accept. There were seven main elements:
First, both Britain and Argentina would agree to withdraw from the islands and a specified surrounding area within a two-week period.
Second, no further military forces were to be introduced and forces withdrawn were to return to normal duties. The Argentinians had wanted an undertaking from us to keep our task force out of the South Atlantic altogether, but Al Haig said that he had told them that this was impossible and believed that they might be satisfied if the agreement provided for British units to return to normal duties.
Third, there would be a Commission, in place of the Governor, made up of United States, British and Argentine representatives who would act together (whether by unanimity or majority was not specified) to ensure compliance with the agreement. For that purpose they would each need to have observers. Each member of the Commission could fly his flag at headquarters.
Fourth, economic and financial sanctions against Argentina would be lifted.
Fifth, the traditional local administration of the islands would be restored, including the re-establishment of the Executive and Legislative Councils, to which Argentine representatives from the tiny Argentine population in the Falklands would be added. The Argentinians were adamantly opposed to the return of our Governor.
Sixth, the Commission would promote travel, trade and communications between the islands and Argentina, but the British Government would have a veto on its operations.
Finally, negotiations on a lasting settlement would be pursued ‘consistently with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter’. The United States had apparently insisted on this because of the references in it to the right of self-determination. It seemed that the Argentinians would only have been prepared to agree to this part of the proposals if they contained a date for the conclusion of negotiations, which was suggested as 31 December 1982.
At this time, I did not attempt to reply to Al Haig’s proposals point by point: I simply restated my belief in the principle of self-determination. If the Falkland Islanders chose to join Argentina, the British Government would respect their decision. But, equally, the Argentine Government should be prepared to accept an expressed wish of the islanders to remain British. The Americans then left us for ninety minutes, as we had agreed in advance, while we discussed the proposals with the other members of the War Cabinet.
Al Haig’s proposals had some attractions. If we could really get the Argentine forces off the islands by conceding what seemed a fairly powerless commission, very limited Argentine representation on each council – drawn from local residents and not nominated by the Junta – and an Argentine flag flown alongside others at Headquarters there was something to be said for these ideas. However, on closer inspection there were formidable difficulties. What security would there be for the islanders after the interim period? Clearly, the United States would have to be asked to guarantee the islands against renewed invasion. Then there were the inescapable geographical realities. The Argentinians would remain close to the Falklands; but if we had to withdraw to ‘normal areas’ where would our forces be? We must have the right to be at least as close as the Argentine forces. In spite of the general reference to the UN Charter, there was still nothing to make it clear that the islanders’ wishes must be paramount in the final negotiations. There must also be no possibility of the Argentinians steadily increasing the number of their people on the islands during the interim period so as to become the majority – a serious worry, particularly if our people started to leave, which they might well do in those circumstances.
At this point Francis Pym, John Nott and I rejoined Al Haig. I said that I was very grateful for the tremendous amount of work which he had done but that I had a number of questions. What did the Americans envisage would happen if no final settlement had been reached by 31 December 1982? The answer was not entirely clear – nor did it become clearer with the passage of time. I emphasized again the importance attached by the House of Commons to the principle of self-determination for the islanders. We would have to have some specific reference to Article 1(2) and Article 73 of the UN Charter on this matter, which enshrined the principle of self-d
etermination. We recognized, however, that Argentina would place a different gloss upon the agreement from the British Government. Al Haig accepted this.
On the matter of their flag, I told Al Haig that wherever else it flew, it must not fly over the Governor’s house. He said that for the Argentinians the governorship of the Falklands was a key issue: they wanted to keep the Governor they had appointed after the invasion on the island as a commissioner. I said that if they did that, the British Government would have to appoint Rex Hunt as our commissioner. I also raised the question of South Georgia where Britain had an absolute title. Al Haig saw no problem about this. (We regretted afterwards that we had ever put South Georgia into the first proposals. But at the time there seemed a possibility of getting the Argentines off without a battle and they had occupied the island shortly after their invasion of the Falklands themselves.)
However, the main issue was always bound to be the military one. I knew that the only reason the Argentinians were prepared to negotiate at all was because they feared our task force. I stressed that although British submarines in the proposed demilitarized zone would leave as the Argentine forces withdrew, the British task force must continue to proceed southwards, though it would not enter the demilitarized zone. This was essential: we could not afford to let the Argentinians invade a second time. One concession I might be prepared to make was that the task force could be stood off at a point no closer to the Falklands than Argentine forces were based. Anything less would be unacceptable to Parliament.
Our two teams met once more just before 6 p.m. Al Haig said that President Galtieri would not survive if after the Argentinians had committed themselves to withdrawing from the Falkland Islands in two weeks the British newspapers continued to report that the task force was proceeding south. The Americans were not asking for our fleet to be turned around: but they were asking for it to be halted once an agreement had been reached. I replied that I would not survive in the House of Commons if I stopped the task force before Argentine withdrawal had been completed. I was ready to let the troop ships proceed more slowly once an agreement had been signed. But the main task force must maintain its progress towards the Falkland Islands.
We argued until late into the evening. Argentina, starting from the Communications Agreement of 1971, wanted their citizens to have the same rights to reside on the islands, own property and so on, as the Falklanders. They wanted the commission positively to promote that state of affairs and to decide upon such matters. We fought the proposal down on the grounds that the interim administration must not change the nature of life on the islands. We finally agreed that we would pursue further negotiations on a somewhat woolly text. There were, however, some conditions which had to be made absolutely clear – the withdrawal zones, the fact that the one Argentine representative per council must be local, and that Argentinians on the islands must have the same qualifying period for voting as the Falklanders.
Just before 10 o’clock that night Al Haig telephoned me to say that Sr Costa Mendez had rung him to say that he saw no reason for the Secretary of State to go to Buenos Aires again unless any agreement about the Falkland Islands provided for the Governor to be appointed by the Argentine Government and for the Argentine flag to continue to be flown there. And if that was not possible, the Argentinians must have assurances that at the end of negotiations with Britain there would be a recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. Al Haig was shattered.
Having decided not to go on to Buenos Aires, the following morning the Americans sought another meeting with us. By this stage it was becoming obvious that the proposals the Americans had presented to us the previous day had no measure of Argentine approval. In fact, the status of all these proposals was doubtful. The more closely I questioned Al Haig on this point, the more uncertain it became. Since the proposals had not been agreed with the Argentinians, even if we accepted them, they might therefore not form the basis of a settlement.
This fact was made painfully clear at the meeting that morning when Mr Haig handed us a document embodying five points which he described as essential to the Argentine position.
I was becoming impatient with all this. I said that it was essentially an issue of dictatorship versus democracy. The question now was whether Galtieri could be diverted from his course by economic sanctions or, as I had suspected all along, only by military force. Mr Haig replied that he had made it abundantly clear to Argentina that if conflict developed the United States would side with Britain. But did we wish to bring the negotiations to an end today? He could say publicly that he was suspending his own efforts, making it clear that this was due to Argentine intransigence. But if he did so, other less helpful people might try to intervene.
Later that day events took another bizarre turn. Al Haig told Francis Pym of the contents of a further discussion he had had on the telephone with Sr Costa Mendez. Apparently, the Argentinians had now dropped their five demands and moved a considerable way from their previous position. Mr Haig thought there was a chance of a settlement on the lines we had been discussing, if we would agree to language about decolonization, subject to the wishes of islanders, with perhaps one or two small changes in addition to make the proposals more palatable still. It was to turn out that this talk of decolonization held its own particular danger, though we agreed to look at a draft. He also urged us not to be too rigid on the question of sovereignty. He had decided to return to Washington and would decide his next step there.
It was clear from all this that Mr Haig was very anxious to keep the negotiations going. But had there been a genuine change of heart on the part of the Argentinians?
Wednesday 14 April was the day scheduled for a further Commons debate on the Falklands. It was an opportunity for me to spell out our objectives in the negotiations and to demonstrate to the outside world the united support of the House of Commons.
While the debate was still in progress, Al Haig was on the telephone. The Argentinians were complaining that the United States was not being even-handed between Argentina and Britain and in particular that it was supplying military aid to Britain. He wanted to make a statement which would allow him to return to Buenos Aires to continue the negotiations, ending with these three sentences:
Since the outset of the crisis the United States has not acceded to requests that would go beyond the scope of customary patterns of co-operation. That would continue to be its stand while peace efforts were under way. Britain’s use of US facilities on Ascension Island had been restricted accordingly.
While the debate continued, I discussed it with Francis Pym and, half an hour later, rang Al Haig.
I was very unhappy about what he wanted to say and I told him so. Of course, a good deal was being done to help us. This was occurring within those ‘customary patterns of co-operation’ which applied between allies like the United States and Britain. But to link this with the use of Ascension Island was wrong and misleading. Moreover, to make such a statement would have a very adverse reaction on UK opinion.
I went on to point out that Ascension Island was our island, indeed the Queen’s island. The Americans used it as a base – but, as the Secretary of State well knew, this was under an agreement which made it clear that sovereignty remained with us. I am glad to say that Mr Haig agreed to remove all mentions of Ascension Island from his statement.
The following day Al Haig flew to Buenos Aires for further talks. Back in London, the War Cabinet met that morning not in No. 10 but in the Ministry of Defence. We had important decisions to make. More troops were needed and had to be sent to join the task force. We had to look at the new draft we had agreed the previous day to consider. (Nothing came of it in the end.) We also had to prepare a message to the United States stressing the need for them to help enforce the agreement during that period and to ensure that when it ended the Argentinians did not attempt another invasion. I am afraid that we never got very far: the Americans were not keen to accept the role of guarantor.
; Our main task on Friday 16 April was to consider and approve the rules of engagement which would apply for transit from Ascension Island, for the 200-mile zone around South Georgia and for the purposes of South Georgia’s repossession. The rules of engagement are the means by which the politicians authorize the framework within which the military can be left to make the operational decisions. They have to satisfy the objectives for which a particular military operation is undertaken. They must also give the man on the spot reasonable freedom to react as is required and to make his decisions knowing that they will be supported by the politicians. So the rules have to be clear and to cover all possible eventualities. It was after very careful questioning and long discussion that they were approved.
I had received the day before a message from President Reagan who had been rung by Galtieri, who apparently said that he was anxious to avoid a conflict. There was no difficulty in replying to that. I told the President:
I note that General Galtieri has reaffirmed to you his desire to avoid conflict. But it seems to me – and I must state this frankly to you as a friend and ally – that he fails to draw the obvious conclusion. It was not Britain who broke the peace but Argentina. The mandatory Resolution of the Security Council, to which you and we have subscribed, requires Argentina to withdraw its troops from the Falkland Islands. That is the essential first step which must be taken to avoid conflict. When it has been taken, discussions about the future of the islands can profitably take place. Any suggestion that conflict can be avoided by a device that leaves the aggressor in occupation is surely gravely misplaced. The implications for other potential areas of tension and for small countries everywhere would be of extreme seriousness. The fundamental principles for which the free world stands would be shattered.
Margaret Thatcher: The Autobiography Page 47
