I made my speech early on in the proceedings over a working lunch. I said that the way to dispel fears was to make clear what we did not mean when we were talking about political union. We did not mean that there would be a loss of national identity. Nor did we mean giving up separate heads of state, either the monarchies to which six of us were devoted or the presidencies which the other six member states favoured. We did not intend to suppress national parliaments; the European Parliament must have no role at the expense of national parliaments. We did not intend to change countries’ electoral systems. We would not be altering the role of the Council of Ministers. Political union must not mean any greater centralization of powers in Europe at the expense of national governments and parliaments. There must be no weakening of the role of NATO and no attempt to turn foreign policy co-operation into a restriction on the rights of states to conduct their own foreign policy.
To deliver a ten-minute speech with one’s tongue in one’s cheek is as much a physical as a rhetorical achievement. For of course this was precisely the route which political union, if taken seriously, would go.
At the end of June we were back in Dublin again. The Community Foreign ministers had been told to go away and produce a paper on political union for the European Council’s consideration. I hoped that I had at least put down a marker against the sort of proposals which were likely to come before us at some future stage. But I was in no position to stop an IGC being called.
Of the two, it was EMU rather than political union which posed the more immediate threat. What was so frustrating was that others who shared my views had a variety of reasons for not expressing them and preferring to let me receive the criticism for doing so. The weaker economies would have been devastated by a single currency, but they hoped to receive sufficient subsidies to make their acquiescence worthwhile.
To get away from the often parochial atmosphere of the European Councils to a meeting of the G7 was always a relief. That at Houston in July was the first chaired by President Bush, who was by now imposing very much his own style on the US Administration. These economic summits were by no means just ‘economic’ any longer: nor could they be when the economic and political world order was changing so radically and rapidly. In the forefront of all our minds was what needed to happen to ensure order, stability and tolerable prosperity in the lands of the crumbling USSR. But no less important was that at the G7 I could argue much more effectively for free trade and recruit allies for my cause than I could within the narrower framework of the Community.
I now strongly supported Brian Mulroney who argued that the biggest losers if the GATT failed would be the less developed countries. I also reminded those present of the huge amounts still being spent by the European Community, the United States and Japan on agricultural support. In fact, the section of the Houston communiqué which dealt with trade constituted the best and toughest statement ever made by the major economies on the subject. The tragedy was that the European Community’s commitment to trade liberalization was only skin deep, as subsequent events were to show.
I flew into Rome at midday on Saturday 27 October knowing that this would be a difficult occasion. I did not realize how difficult. This time the excuse for holding an ‘informal’ Council before the formal Council in December was allegedly to take stock of preparations for the forthcoming CSCE summit and to discuss relations with the Soviet Union. In fact, the Italians wanted to pre-empt the outcome of the two IGCs on EMU and political union.
As always with the Italians, it was difficult throughout to distinguish confusion from guile: but plenty of both was evident. In his ‘bidding letter’ to the Council Sig. Andreotti made no mention of the need to discuss the GATT Uruguay round trade negotiation. I wrote back insisting that if the Community Trade and Agriculture ministers had not reached agreement on the Community offer on agriculture beforehand we must discuss the matter at Rome because time was running out.
More of a clue to the Italians’ intentions was perhaps given by the Italian Foreign minister’s letter which went so far as to suggest a provision for future transfer of powers from member states to the Community without treaty amendment. The Italians gave out that they would be taking a moderate line, not pressing for a specific date for the start of Stage 2 of EMU and noting that Britain’s hard ecu proposal must be taken seriously. A long and often contradictory list of proposals on political union had been drawn up by the presidency, including plans for a common foreign policy, extended Community competence, more majority voting, greater powers for the European Parliament and other matters. The precise purpose of this paper remained unclear. What I did not know was that behind the scenes the Italians had agreed with a proposal emanating from Germany and endorsed by Christian Democrat leaders from several European countries at an earlier caucus meeting that the GATT should not be discussed at the Council. Had there been such a discussion, of course, they would have found it more difficult to portray me as the odd one out and themselves as sea-green internationalists.
Chancellor Kohl had spoken publicly of the need to set deadlines for the work of the IGCs and for Stage 2 of EMU. But on the eve of the Rome Council he took a surprisingly soft line with Douglas Hurd, now Foreign Secretary, about his intentions. Herr Kohl suggested that perhaps the conclusions of the special Council could say something about a ‘consensus building around the idea’ of a specified starting date for Stage 2. But Douglas recorded his impression that the German Chancellor was not set on seeking even this much, and that he might be open to persuasion to drop references to any date. Moreover, Chancellor Kohl said that he did not oppose discussion of GATT in Rome. What he would not get into was negotiation of the Community position. He said that he recognized the importance of the Community’s offer on agriculture in the GATT and accepted that December was a real deadline for the Uruguay round. He also recognized that Germany would have to compromise. He would be prepared to say tough things to the German farmers in due course – but not yet. Apparently he implied to Douglas that there could be a trade-off. If I was prepared to help him during the discussion of the GATT, he might be able to help me during the discussion on the EMU IGC. This, of course, turned out to be far from his real position.
I myself lunched with President Mitterrand at our embassy residence in Rome on the Saturday. He could not have been more friendly or amenable. I said that I was very disturbed at the Community’s failure to agree a negotiating position on agriculture for the GATT negotiations. I understood that agreement had very nearly been reached after some sixteen hours of negotiations at the meeting of Agriculture and Trade ministers the previous day but had been blocked by the French. President Mitterrand said that this was all very difficult, that agriculture must not be looked at in isolation and that Europe – or more exactly France – should not be expected to make all the concessions at the GATT talks. He asked me when I proposed to raise the issue at the Council. I said that I would bring it up right at the beginning. I would demand that the Council make clear that the Community would table proposals within the next few days. Failure to do so would be a signal to the world that Europe was protectionist. President Mitterrand interjected that of course the Community was protectionist: that was the point of it.
The French President did, however, agree with me – or so he claimed – about the political union proposals. Indeed, he was highly critical of some of M. Delors’s remarks and had no time at all for the European Parliament. He claimed that France, like Britain, wanted a common currency, not a single currency. This was not true. But let me be charitable – there may have been some confusion in translation. In any case, I detected no wish to force me into a corner.
I was too well versed in the ways of the Community to take all this bonhomie at face value. But even I was unprepared for the way things went once the Council formally opened. Sig. Andreotti made clear right at the beginning that there was no intention of discussing the GATT. I spoke briefly and took them to task for ignoring this crucial issue at such a t
ime. I had hoped that someone other than me would intervene. But only Ruud Lubbers did and he raised a mild protest. No one else was prepared to speak up for these imminent and crucial negotiations.
Then M. Delors reported on his recent meeting with Mr Gorbachev. To my surprise, he proposed that the Council should issue a statement saying that the outer border of the Soviet Union must remain intact. I waited. But no one spoke. I just could not leave matters like this. I said that this was not for us in the Community to decide but for the peoples and Government of the Soviet Union. I pointed out that the Baltic States had in any case been illegally seized and incorporated in the USSR. In effect, we were denying them their claim to independence. M. Delors said that he had received an assurance from Mr Gorbachev that the Baltic States would be freed. I came back at him, saying that we had heard this sort of reassurance before from the Soviets; and, in any case, what about the other nations of the Soviet Union who might wish to leave it as well? At this point first Sr González, then President Mitterrand and finally Chancellor Kohl intervened on my side and this ill-judged initiative foundered.
But the atmosphere went from bad to worse. The others were determined to insert in the communiqué provisions on political union, none of which I was prepared to accept. I said that I would not pre-empt the debate in the IGC and had a unilateral observation to this effect incorporated in the text. They also insisted on following the German proposal that Stage 2 of monetary union should begin on 1 January 1994. I would not accept this either. I had inserted in the communiqué the sentence:
The United Kingdom, while ready to move beyond Stage 1 through the creation of a new monetary institution and a common Community currency, believes that decisions on the substance of that move should precede decisions on its timing.
They were not interested in compromise. My objections were heard in stony silence. I now had no support. I just had to say no.
In three years the European Community had gone from practical discussions about restoring order to the Community’s finances to grandiose schemes of monetary and political union with firm timetables but no agreed substance – all without open, principled public debate on these questions either nationally or in European forums. Now at Rome the ultimate battle for the future of the Community had been joined. But I would have to return to London to win another battle on which the outcome in Europe would depend – that for the soul of the Parliamentary Conservative Party.
* The WEU was formed in 1948, principally for the purpose of military co-operation between Britain, France and the Benelux countries. Germany and Italy joined it in the 1950s. The WEU predated NATO, which has entirely overshadowed it.
CHAPTER THIRTY-EIGHT
The World Turned Right Side Up
The fall of communism in eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany and the debate about the future of NATO 1987–1990
I HAD BREATHED A SIGH OF RELIEF when George Bush defeated his Democrat opponent in the US presidential election, for I felt that it ensured continuity. But with the new team’s arrival in the White House I found myself dealing with an Administration which saw Germany as its main European partner in leadership, which encouraged the integration of Europe without seeming to understand fully what it meant and which sometimes seemed to underestimate the need for a strong nuclear defence. I felt I could not always rely as before on American co-operation. This was of great importance at such a time. For by now – 1989 – the cracks in the eastern European communist system were widening into crevices and soon, wing by wing, the whole edifice fell away.
This welcome revolution of freedom which swept eastern Europe raised great strategic issues, above all in the West’s relations with the Soviet Union. (Indeed, what now was ‘the West’?) But I also saw at once that it had profound implications for the balance of power in Europe, where a reunified Germany would be dominant. There was a new and different kind of ‘German Question’ which had to be addressed openly and formally: I did so.
History teaches that dangers are never greater than when empires break up and so I favoured caution in our defence and security policy. Decisions about our security must, I argued, be made only after careful reflection and analysis of the nature and direction of future threats. Above all, they must be determined not by the desire to make a political impression by arms control ‘initiatives’ but by the need credibly to deter aggression.
For thinking and speaking like this I was mocked as the last Cold Warrior – and an unreconstructed Germanophobe to boot. In fact, they said, I was a tiresome woman who might once have served a purpose but who just could not or would not move with the times. I could live with this caricature; there had been worse; but I also had no doubt that I was right, and that sooner or later events would prove it. And I did find my basic approach vindicated as 1990 wore on. This occurred in several ways.
First, Anglo-American relations suddenly lost their chill; indeed by the end they had hardly been warmer. The protectionism of that ‘integrated’ Europe, dominated by Germany, which the Americans had cheerfully accepted, suddenly started to arouse American fears and threaten to cost American jobs. But this change of heart was confirmed by the aggression of Saddam Hussein against Kuwait which shattered any illusion that tyranny had been everywhere defeated. Suddenly a Britain with armed forces which had the skills, and a government which had the resolve, to fight alongside America, seemed to be the real European ‘partner in leadership’.
Then again the full significance of the changes in eastern Europe began to be better understood. Having democratic states with market economies, which were just as ‘European’ as those of the existing Community, lining up as potential EC members made my vision of a looser, more open Community seem timely rather than backward. It also became clear that the courageous reforming leaders in eastern Europe looked to Britain – and to me because of my anti-socialist credentials – as a friend who genuinely wanted to help them, rather than exclude them from markets (like the French) or seek economic domination (like the Germans). These eastern European states were – and are – Britain’s natural allies.
Further east in the USSR more disturbing developments made for a reassessment of earlier euphoric judgements about the prospects for the peaceful, orderly entrenchment of democracy and free enterprise. In the Soviet Union I had won the respect both of the embattled Mr Gorbachev and of his anti-communist opponents. Events now increasingly suggested that a far-reaching political crisis in the USSR might soon be reached. The implications of this for control over nuclear weapons and indeed the whole arsenal which the Soviet military machine had accumulated could not be ignored even by the most enthusiastic western disarmers. In short, the world of the ‘new world order’ was turning out to be a dangerous and uncertain place in which the conservative virtues of hardened Cold Warriors were again in demand. And so, while domestic political pressures mounted, I found myself once more at the centre of great international events with renewed ability to influence them in Britain’s interests and in accord with my beliefs.
On Thursday 16 July 1987 I flew into Washington to see President Reagan. I had just won an election with a decisive majority, enhancing my authority in international affairs. By contrast my old friend and his Administration were reeling under the continuing ‘Irangate’ revelations. I found the President hurt and bemused by what was happening. Nothing wounds a man of integrity more than to find his basic honesty questioned. It made me very angry. I was determined to do what I could to help President Reagan ride out the storm. It was not just a matter of personal loyalty – though it was that too, of course: he also had eighteen months to serve as leader of the most powerful country in the world and it was in all our interests that his authority be undiminished. So I set about using my interviews and public statements in Washington to get across this message. For example, I told the interviewer on CBS’s Face the Nation:
Cheer up. Cheer up. Be more upbeat. America is a strong country with a great president, a great people and a great future.
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Our embassy was besieged by telephone calls of congratulation. My remarks also touched another grateful audience. On Monday evening – after I arrived back in London – I received a telephone call from the President who wanted to thank me for what I had said. He was in a Cabinet meeting and at one point he put down the receiver and told me to listen. I heard loud and long applause from the Cabinet members.
My main business in Washington, though, had been to discuss the implications for our future defence of the INF treaty which would be signed by Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev in December. I had always had mixed feelings about the INF ‘zero-option’. On the one hand, it was a great success to have forced the Soviets to withdraw their SS-20 missiles by deploying our Cruise and Pershing. But, on the other, the removal of our intermediate-range land-based missiles would have two undesirable effects. First, it threatened precisely what Helmut Schmidt had wanted to avoid when he originally urged NATO to deploy them: namely the decoupling of Europe from NATO. It could then be argued that in the last resort the United States would not use nuclear weapons to deter a conventional Warsaw Pact attack on Europe. This argument would boost the always-present tendency to German neutralism – a tendency which it had been the long-standing Soviet objective to magnify wherever possible. Second, the INF ‘zero-option’ also cast doubt on – though as I always argued it did not in fact undermine – the NATO strategy of ‘flexible response’. That strategy depended on the ability of the West to escalate its response to Soviet aggression through each stage of conventional and nuclear weapons. The removal of the intermediate-range missiles might be argued to create a gap in that capability. It followed that NATO must have other nuclear weapons, stationed on German soil, which would be a credible deterrent, and that those weapons be modernized and strengthened where necessary. It was this question – the avoidance of another ‘zero’ on Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF) – which was to divide the alliance so seriously in 1988–89.
Margaret Thatcher: The Autobiography Page 87
