Most actions taken by the new “Restored” legislature of “Virginia” related to financial and military affairs for this “Reorganized Government of Virginia.” Late in the session, House Bill No. 21, giving legislative approval for creation of a separate new state under certain specific terms and conditions, was introduced and debated. The Reconstituted House eventually voted against the bill, while the Restored Senate chose to table the proposed legislation.42
It was hardly an overwhelming show of support for the idea of allowing a permanent separation by a portion of Virginia from the rest of the Old Dominion. The extra session at Wheeling concluded on July 26, 1861. However, all of the legislators except one [George Arnold of Lewis County] returned on August 6, 1861 as delegates to the Second Session of the Second Wheeling Convention.43
Delegates of the Second Wheeling Convention reassembled on August 6, 1861. They passed a number of resolutions, including an ordinance to nullify proceedings of the Richmond Convention in April 1861 that had produced Virginia’s Ordinance of Secession. The Convention also assumed that resolution and all other actions of the Richmond Convention were “illegal, inoperative, null, void, and without force or effect.”44
This was a clear effort at nullification, albeit on the state level, a doctrine whose validity was denied by President Lincoln himself, as well as such predecessors as Andrew Jackson in 1832. It was indicative of the expediencies and double standards at work. Nullification and secession were rightfully inappropriate for a state vis a vis the United States of America, but allowable as expedient for a segment of a state in “war time.” Yet Lincoln and Congress always insisted the Civil War was a rebellion and not legally a war. So went the reasoning in Washington.
The Wheeling Convention formed a Committee on a Division of the State. That occurred despite earlier votes in the newly constituted ‘Restored’ legislature tabling or opposing a separation from Virginia.45 The convention appeared to be circumventing or usurping the powers of the “Restored” Legislature and Government of “Virginia.”
On August 13, after a week of deliberations, the Committee on a Division of the State formulated and presented to the convention a dismemberment ordinance. Delegates debated boundaries of the proposed state for five days, without input from the regular Virginia state government in Richmond or the counties in question. They then referred the question to another committee.46
On August 20, this committee proposed that the new state, which no w was slated to be named Kanawha, would consist of thirty-nine counties. Seven other counties (Berkeley, Greenbrier, Hampshire, Hardy, Jefferson, Morgan and Pocahontas) were to be added, making it forty-six counties, if the majority of voters in those counties approved. The convention offered no provision for a preliminary plebiscite to affirm the decision in the first thirty-nine counties. Their consent to inclusion in the proposed new state was presumed by virtue of those counties being represented in Wheeling.47
The Wheeling Convention adopted the committee’s recommendations by a vote of fifty to twenty-eight, about two to one, but far from unanimous. Affirmation by voters in all counties of the proposed state in regard to the broader issues of separation from the rest of Virginia and separate statehood was scheduled for October 24, 1861.48
“You have taken the initiative in the creation of a new State,” convention president Arthur Boreman remarked in adjourning the convention. “This is a step of vital importance.” He continued: “I hope, and I pray God it may be successful; that it may not engender strife in our midst, nor bring upon us difficulties from abroad, but that its most ardent advocates may realize their fondest hopes of its complete success.” From there, it went to the people. However, it did not go to all the people of the State of Virginia. Rather, it was submitted only to the people of the western counties.49
On October 24, 1861, voters from the thirty-nine counties of the proposed new state of Kanawha (plus voters in Hampshire and Hardy counties, but not the other five under consideration) went to the polls to determine the fate of the proposal for a new state. Considering the importance of the vote, turnout was surprisingly low. Moreover, the vote occurred in only forty one, not forty six, counties. Only about thirty-seven percent of eligible voters chose to cast ballots.50 Perhaps they recognized a fait accompli; perhaps they were ambivalent; perhaps they opposed separation from Virginia but were intimidated when it came to standing publicly against the proposal. Still, given its import, participation was low.
When the ballots were counted, 18,408 votes were cast in favor of the new state, while only 781 were opposed. At this election, voters also elected delegates to represent them in a new constitutional convention to design the framework of government for the new state of, as it was still then proposed to be named, Kanawha.51
On November 26, 1861, delegates met in Wheeling to create a Constitution for the new state. This was the [West Virginia] Constitutional Convention. Issues included the name of the new state, setting its boundaries, and the issue of slavery.52
Although voters had approved creation of the new state of “Kanawha,” many delegates were opposed to the name. Opposition was based on the existence of a county and river already named Kanawha or Kanawa. Newly minted U.S. Senator Waitman T. Willey, who was in attendance, provoked laughter when he observed that some of his constituents might find ‘Kanawah’ [or any of its variations] difficult to spell. Willey then added, “I have no objection to any name that is convenient, though I will say that in this case I think the rose would smell sweeter by some other name.”53
The comments and issue hardly merited such levity, however. The country was engaged in a bloody civil war. Nevertheless, there was a lengthy debate regarding the best name for the new state. A number of delegates spoke strongly either in favor of or against inclusion of the word “Virginia” in the new state name, but “West Virginia” eventually was selected.
Of much greater import, the issue of slavery constantly hung over the convention. On November 30, 1861, Robert Hagar of Boone County called for creation of a “free” state and proposed gradual emancipation within its boundaries. Gordon Battelle of Ohio County, a Methodist minister, proposed forbidding additional slaves from entering the state as well as gradual emancipation for slaves currently located in the new state. But while Battelle and a few others pressed for gradual emancipation, they were unable to convince a majority of delegates to support inclusion of that option in the new state constitution. The final document simply stated, “No slave shall be brought, or free person of color be permitted to come, into this State for permanent residence.” Yes; no slaves or free blacks were to be allowed.54
That was hardly a ringing endorsement for the principles of emancipation or racial equality, in contrast to growing sentiment among the dominant so-called ‘radical’ Republicans55 who controlled the United States Congress, or the opinion of President Lincoln who was moving in favor of steps to emancipate the slaves. Again, neither slaves nor free blacks would be allowed.
Yet the rhetoric as well as subsequent mythology underlying the case for West Virginia’s separation from its parent Commonwealth included reference to the region’s opposition to slavery, an institution so prevalent in the eastern areas of the state, and, more importantly, the Tidewater politicians who so strongly upheld the “peculiar institution” in the Old Dominion. Ambivalence or opposition to emancipation or racial equality did not prove to be permanent obstacles to eventual admission of West Virginia to the Union.
Determining boundaries of the new state was an equally difficult issue. The Committee on Boundary proposed that an additional thirty-two counties be added to the thirty-nine already included [or, alternatively, forty one, per the referendum; the numbers of proposed counties for the new state fluctuated continuously]. It was politically aggressive and highly unrealistic from both a political and military perspective. Debate ensued nonetheless. Some proposed counties were rejected. Reasons for rejection included those counties having large numbers of slaves, harboring secession
sentiment, or carrying excessive financial debt.56
On December 13, 1861, the convention determined that West Virginia would include the thirty-nine original counties and five additional, making forty-four, with seven more counties potentially to be added if their voters approved. The final tally in the 1860’s was fifty, not fifty one, with five additional counties later added or created from existing ones subsequent to West Virginia statehood, making the present total of fifty-five counties in the Mountain State.57 Nevertheless, the separatists from western counties of the Commonwealth of Virginia had taken several critical steps toward the creation of their rogue state.
7
ON THE BATTLEFIELD
Military events during the American Civil War had an important effect and parallel influence on politics in the emerging anti-Virginia secessionist movement in the western counties of the Old Dominion. Following a Union victory led by young General George McClellan over a small Confederate force at the Battle of Philippi on June 3, 1861 and McClellan’s subsequent occupation of northwestern Virginia, the second convention to consider separation met in Wheeling between June 11 and June 25, 1861. From that point forward, there was no Confederate military force or compulsion to prevent western Virginia’s separatist leaders from proceeding with their aspirations for their removal from Virginia.
Union military occupation of much of western Virginia was thus a critical factor in subsequent political developments and the eventually successful moves to separate many counties in the western region of Virginia and form a separate state. On October 24, 1861, residents of thirty-nine counties in western Virginia approved the formation of a new Unionist state. The accuracy and legitimacy of those election results were questionable. Union troops were stationed at many of polls to prevent Confederate sympathizers from voting. It was hardly a free, open, democratic process. But it formed the basis for what followed.
At the Constitutional Convention in Wheeling from November 1861 to February 1862, delegates selected counties for inclusion in the new state of West Virginia. Ambitious politicians ran the proceedings and sought to consolidate as much territory as possible within the new state. Many counties were included, but the majority of them were not consulted in this matter. They were, however, under Union military control or devoid of any significant C.S.A. military presence or pressure. From the initial list, most counties in the Shenandoah Valley were excluded due to their control by Confederate troops and those areas having a large number of local Confederate sympathizers.
Again, military circumstances helped dictate political actions. In the end, fifty counties were selected. All of present-day West Virginia’s counties except Mineral, Grant, Lincoln, Summers, and Mingo, which were formed after statehood, became part of the new Union’s new rogue state.
Most of the eastern and southern counties west of the Blue Ridge that were included in the new state of West Virginia did not support separate statehood. They were included by the Wheeling delegates for political, economic, and military purposes. The wishes of the citizens of those counties were largely disregarded. But the areas were under federal military influence or lacked C.S.A. military pressure.
The Blue Ridge mountain range became a geographically and historically logical eastern border for West Virginia. Counties west of that line [ironically almost identical to the 1763 Proclamation Line] were conveniently included. In addition to an historical and symbolic division between eastern and western Virginia, the line of the Blue Ridge also provided a defense against potential [albeit unlikely] Confederate invasion. That line also corresponded to the line of United States military influence and control, or the lack of Confederate military influence or interest.
One of the most controversial decisions in creating West Virginia as a separate state involved the Eastern Panhandle counties. Those were the counties located along the Virginia-Maryland border and the Potomac River. They centered on the cities of Martinsburg, Charles Town, and Harper’s Ferry. They were largely east of the Blue Ridge, more appropriately part of the Shenandoah Valley region then “western” Virginia.58
Those areas, like the rest of the lower [northern] Shenandoah Valley, supported the Confederacy [although there was a fair amount of Union support in the area around Winchester and Frederick County early in the war, in contrast to the lower, or southern, Shenandoah Valley]. But those eastern counties were strategically located and economically important. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, running through the Eastern Panhandle, was vital for the region’s economy, Union communications with the Midwest, federal troop movement, and the future of a s eparate state of West Virginia. Inclusion of those three eastern counties in the new state of West Virginia nominally removed the railroad and those counties from Virginia’s jurisdiction and Confederate control. It also enhanced West Virginia’s economic future.
Subsequent to withdrawal of Virginia’s military forces from the western regions after the Battle of Philippi and later decisions not to contest an area of questionable military value to the Confederacy, formal military hostilities in the western counties of Virginia were minimal for the rest of the Civil W ar. However, there were brutal guerilla activities. Much of those focused on local issues and old regional and clan hostilities rather than the larger military issues of the Civil War. Again, there were far fewer pro-Union or emancipationist interests in those areas than local, economic, traditional, and clan issues at stake in the western counties in the 1860’s.
After 1861, federal troops were stationed in critical areas throughout West Virginia, a.k.a. the areas of Virginia west of the Blue Ridge, largely to secure rail lines and other important features. They also provided a semblance of [not complete] military stability for the separatist movement based in Wheeling. During the Civil War, however, the “Reorganized Government of Virginia” never effectively controlled more than twenty or twenty-five counties in the region that became West Virginia.
Even where Union troops were present, maintaining law and order was inconsistent and precarious. Guerilla warfare was commonplace and violent. But there was no more major fighting between Union and Confederate regular forces. That state of affairs allowed political events leading to West Virginia statehood to proceed unimpeded by Virginian or Confederate military forces. That situation was aided by a federal troop presence that had visible effect on elections and the direction in which political events evolved in West Virginia in 1862 and 1863.
Against that military backdrop, with Confederate forces driven from the state, convention delegates in Wheeling formed the Restored, or Re organized, Government of Virginia in 1861. In a strictly political move rationalized under his war powers as commander in chief, President Lincoln immediately recognized the Restored Government as the legitimate government of Virginia. It was a crucial decision. John Carlile and Waitman T. Willey became U.S. Senators. Jacob Blair, William Brown, and Kellan Whaley became Congressmen representing pro-Union Virginia, a.k.a. the “Restored” Government of Virginia or West Virginia, in lieu of the disenfranchised senators and representatives of the original and seceded state of Virginia. Military decisions and circumstances affirmed all those political actions.
Without question, the Wheeling convention and subsequent “Restored” Government of Virginia represented and contained only several dozen western counties. As discussed previously, it was not necessarily representative of a significant majority of the people of those counties, let alone the entirety of Virginia.
That point was addressed in Salmon Chase’s December 29, 1862 letter to President Lincoln on the topic of the constitutionality of admitting West Virginia to the Union (See Appendix B). The number of counties included in the separatist movement was itself subject to change. About thirty counties in the west had opposed secession. Thirty-nine counties voted to approve a new state. Composition of the new state fluctuated, ultimately comprising fifty counties of the Commonwealth of Virginia. [The present tally of fifty-five counties resulted from post-statehood county realignments].
Al
l this occurred with Union forces in control of, or Confederate forces absent from, the areas in question. It also occurred without sanction, approval, or recognition from the constitutionally recognized government of Virginia, which, according to President Lincoln and the U.S. Congress throughout the Civil War, never left the Union in the first place. Nor were the citizens of Virginia ever asked directly through election or plebiscite to determine this crucial issue of severing a portion of their state and agreeing to its separate statehood.
Precedents for creating new states from existing ones already existed under the Constitution of 1787. New York and New Hampshire resolved a territorial dispute by acceding to the formation of Vermont. The people of Maine were allowed by Massachusetts to form a separate state. The people of those existing states determined and resolved those issues. Not so for Virginia.
The basic questions remained. Did Virginia consent to the creation of West Virginia? Did the “Restored” Government of Virginia (West Virginia) represent Virginia and its citizens? All of Virginia, all of its citizens? Regarding the issue of presidential and Congressional consent to severance of the western counties, the apparent answer was yes.
But was it? Why were Congressional seats for a “restored” Virginia [a.k.a West Virginia] not more numerous and representative of Virginia’s entire population which the “Restored Government” purported to represent? Why were there were only three new members in the House of Representatives rather than the much larger delegation that the larger population of Virginia warranted, if the “Restored Government” really represented “all” of Virginia?
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