Flash Point

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Flash Point Page 18

by Kenneth Andrus


  “What would the PLAN have to gain by pulling off another dumb stunt like they did with that other fishing boat?”

  “Not much. If the Chinese didn’t do it, who did?”

  “The Vietnamese.”

  “That’s just plain nuts.”

  “I’m not so sure. The Vietnamese can’t be pleased that Beijing and Manila have begun exploratory talks on joint seismic surveys. If you were in their seat, what would you do?”

  “I’d be looking for a way to stir up trouble.”

  “Exactly. And remember, the Vietnamese and PLA navies both have patrol boats based on the design of the Russian Tarantul class corvette.”

  “I hadn’t thought about disguising their ship, Skipper. They just might be able to pull that off. Want me to work this with intel? Run a sanity check on your theory?”

  “Yeah, that’d be good start.”

  “As long as we’re on the subject of stirring the pot, aren’t we looking at basing agreements for Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang?”

  “Yup, Admiral Cortez is scheduled to make a visit to Hanoi in the next week or two to lay the groundwork.”

  “I’m starting to get a bad feeling here, Skipper. It wouldn’t take much to get in a fight we don’t want. We’ve already had the P-8s.”

  “It may come to that if we don’t play our cards right. The spark could be the PRC’s new ‘Law of Littoral Imperatives.’”

  “Never heard of it.”

  “Came up in yesterday’s morning brief. It codifies the changes in Chinese naval doctrine we’ve seen over the past year. Just a sec, I’ve got something.”

  Rohrbaugh pulled open a desk drawer and leafed through a series of green hanging folders. “Here it is. You’ll love this:

  ‘To ensure that the descendants of the Chinese nation will prosper and flourish in the coming millennium, it’s imperative that we vigorously develop and use the oceans. To protect and defend the rights and interests of the reefs and islands within Chinese waters is a sacred mission.’”

  “That’s a load, Skipper.”

  “I’d say, but the folks at State and the Pentagon got really spooled up over the next section. The PLA pushed through the wording over the objections of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Chinese are claiming all of the South and East China Seas. Every reef and island of strategic importance.”

  “That’s just priceless.”

  “Actually, Mac, you’ve got it right. The PLAN has now defined a national imperative linking its mission to the economic wellbeing of the country.”

  “If that’s the case, Skipper, then I’m placing my money for the OV-10 and fishing-boat incidents on the Chinese. They’re sending a message to everyone in the region to stand clear.”

  “Valid point.”

  “Sir, the piece I don’t care much for is the East China Sea. They’ve fired a shot across Japan’s bow.”

  “They have, indeed. Time will tell how that piece shakes out. There’s already a lot of bad blood between them. And speaking of bad blood, did you happen to catch the article in yesterday’s Star Advertiser about the abuse the Japanese national soccer team took in Beijing? Made a Yankees-Red Sox game look like a picnic. Japanese team needed an armed escort to get out of the stadium.”

  “Poor form. What was it all about?”

  “The Chinese are totally pissed about a new Japanese schoolbook.”

  “You’re kidding. Right?”

  “Straight up, Mac. The book minimized the atrocities the Imperial Japanese Army committed during World War II. Got the Koreans all worked up, too. Both countries are demanding a formal apology from Tokyo and demanding the textbook be withdrawn.”

  “So now the pot is being stirred up north. Seems to me, the linchpin to containing the Chinese may be collaborating with the Vietnamese.”

  “Hanoi could be the key. There’re a couple of scenarios unfolding. Depending on what shakes out, we’d be wise to look south for a containment strategy.”

  “What? South Vietnam? Again?”

  “One of our scenarios is predicated on the PLA making a move against Japan. Either a grab for the Senkakus or Tokyo’s new oil exploration rigs in the East China Sea. If that were Beijing’s intent, it would make sense for them to create a diversion in the south.”

  Mackenzie’s eyes drifted to the intelligence folder. “And if they continue to deploy anti-ship missiles to the Spratlys?”

  “It will get ugly.”

  “Do we have anything in the works with the Vietnamese?”

  “Funny you should say that.”

  Mackenzie stiffened. “What’s up, Commander?”

  “I’ve been tagged to go to Vietnam with a military liaison team. We’re tasked with developing the framework for a Joint Forces Agreement.”

  Mackenzie covered his surprise. “Got a departure date?”

  “The week after next. The team is going in-country following Admiral Cortez’s trip. I don’t have the specifics. There’s a kickoff briefing scheduled for this afternoon. I’ll have a better handle on what’s going on after that.”

  “Pretty short-fused. This going to impact the work we’re doing on the OPLAN?”

  “This mission is tailored to fit.”

  “I’d think the ideal scenario would be for us to set up basing agreements with the Philippines, Japan, and Vietnam so we’re positioned to strike from three different directions.”

  “You’re on target, Mac. Manila is already working their options. While they’re pursuing cooperative agreements with Beijing in fisheries and seismic studies, they’re hedging their bets by keeping the door open to us.”

  “Balikatan?”

  “Correct. The Early Bird had an interesting article several weeks ago excerpted from the Manila Times. Should be in my Philippine file.

  Several of our guys deployed to Fort Magsaysay for the exercise and worked with the AFPs Special Operations Command. They traded notes with a Special Warfare officer who led the rescue operation of that hijacked fishing boat a couple of months ago. Kept his head under fire and got his people out. Name was Torres.”

  “Sounds like one of us. I’d like to meet him.”

  “We may get the chance. Got it. ‘Balikatan Starts, New Venues Added.’”

  “Don’t keep me in suspense, Skipper.”

  “The press picked up on the inclusion of Palawan and Batanes and went after the AFP Chief of Staff. He responded with a ‘No comment.’”

  “Nothing to get worked up about.”

  “True, but the general shot himself in the foot.”

  “Oh, great.”

  “Yeah. When pressed, he added the emphasis of this year’s exercise is to explore the range of possibilities of the Mutual Defense Treaty and Status of Forces Agreements.”

  “Nothing new there.”

  “Ah, don’t be so quick to jump to conclusions, Mac. On the surface there isn’t. But it does give the PLA a read on where PACOM is headed.”

  “How’s that?”

  “First off, the general noted the tie-in to the Mutual Defense Treaty and Status of Forces Agreements. I can tell you the Filipinos are focused on the security of their Malampaya and Reed Bank natural gas fields. And, keep this in mind. Because of the wording of our existing treaty, the fishing boat incident didn’t trigger our involvement. That said, the open question is whether the defense of those gas fields would fall under the Mutual Defense Treaty. He stated this issue was not discussed in the exercise-planning sessions.”

  “Using your theory, the treaty probably was. Now, what about Batanes? I’ve never heard of the place.”

  “I had to look it up. It’s a province north of Luzon. From a tactical perspective, it’s ideal. We’ll be able to stage clandestine ops once the infrastructure’s in place.”

  “That being worked?”

  “Yup, exercise Balikatan’s Civic Action Programs provided cover for the Seabees. Usual stuff. Roads, couple of schoolhouses, medical clinic.”

  “Constructed for dual use, I
suppose.”

  “Our intentions are always altruistic.”

  “Warms my heart, sir.”

  “You’ve always had such a gentle touch, Mac. By the way, the general also happened to roll this little grenade into the room before being hustled off the stage.”

  “Oh, Lord.” Mackenzie said, bracing for the next piece.

  “He said that Batanes was chosen as a venue because of its strategic location just two-hundred fifty kilometers from Taiwan and because it has served as a refueling station for U.S. forces.”

  “Damn, Skipper. Talk about poking a stick at a sleeping dog. The last thing we want is to get Taiwan mixed up in this. All hell could break loose.”

  “Admiral Lawson and the Secretary of Defense rolled over hard right when they read the excepts of the general’s press conference. Went all the way to the White House.”

  Rohrbaugh grabbed his cover. “I’ve gotta shove off for the morning lineup. Go ahead and pull our files after you talk with Intel. I’ll fill you in when I get back.”

  “Aye, aye, Commander. Good hunting.”

  “Yeah, right.”

  Chapter 26

  CAMP H. M. SMITH

  HEADQUARTERS U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

  13:00 MONDAY 24 MARCH

  Mike Rohrbaugh cast his eyes over the parallel rows of tables. He picked a seat near the front, pushed the adjacent chairs away to make more elbow room and dropped into a seat.

  A series of events had occurred throughout the morning that accounted for the sour look on his face. He had cut his run short because of a sore hamstring, Kate had left for the mainland to visit her mom for two weeks, and he never did get his cup of coffee.

  Underlying his discontent, he couldn’t shake his sense of unease about the emerging trend of Chinese activity in the Spratlys. He heard the sound of footsteps and looked up to see an Air Force officer position himself behind the lectern.

  “Good afternoon, gentlemen, I’m Major Frank Dowling with the J-31 shop. My brief will lay the groundwork to address the specific aspects of your mission to Vietnam. I’ll focus on the strategic ramifications of recent developments in the South China Sea, not the tactical implications. That’s your job, to integrate our strategic objectives into your CONOPs and OPLANs.

  “Admiral Cortez is developing a balanced plan to address the immediate threat in the South China Sea and the long-term challenges presented by the PLA. The CONOP will define PACOM’s mission to shape the security environment, develop flexible deterrent options, and the supporting infrastructure to execute them. And if it comes to confrontation, gentlemen, let there be no doubt we will dominate the battlefield.”

  Rohrbaugh grimaced. Man, stow the rah-rah. He looked around the room to get a read on the other officers. Nothing. He shrugged and turned his attention back to the brief.

  “Keeping these points in mind,” Dowling said, “let’s take a look at the trend we’ve seen over the past six months. The PLA has continued to solidify and expand the capabilities of their existing bases. They have done so while establishing additional garrisons in the eastern Spratly Islands. As you see on this slide, their installation on Mischief Reef is within the two-hundred-mile EEZ of the Philippines.”

  Rohrbaugh looked up from his doodles to see what Dowling was referring to.

  Downing pointed to another island. “They may occupy Nanshan Island, located due north of Mischief Reef. The island’s only 580 meters long, but it has a small airstrip.”

  “Excuse me, Major,” Rohrbaugh said. “A question.”

  “Rohrbaugh, isn’t it?”

  Rohrbaugh kept his face impassive. How’d he know my name? “Yes, PacFleet Special Ops. We identified Nanshan as a staging point if we target Mischief Reef. Do you have any hard intel?”

  “Not at this time.”

  That’s all he needed to know. “Thank you.”

  “Commander Rohrbaugh highlights a valid point. As it stands, the PLA will soon dominate our lines of approach. This is a good segue to my next point. Let me jump ahead a couple of slides. I want to touch on the documents underpinning the PLA’s strategic planning.

  “Your briefing pack includes copies of the salient points of Beijing’s Law of Territorial Seas and Contiguous Zones and the recently promulgated Law of Littoral Imperatives. Besides providing the justification to implement measures aimed at neutralizing the forces of the Pacific Command and the Japanese Self Defense Force, these laws brush aside the national interests of the ASEAN member states.”

  Dowling paused. “Questions?”

  None were forthcoming. “Suffice it to say, the intent of these Chinese laws is to codify their claim to the South China Sea and justify their use of force. We must not lose sight of the fact the PRC has adopted a strategic doctrine of power projection and sea control. The key point in our analysis of possible outcomes is Beijing has demonstrated a willingness to resort to armed intervention when it is in their interest to do so.”

  Rohrbaugh shifted in his seat and lifted his hand. “Such as the latest incident over Johnson Reef?”

  “Exactly, Commander,” Dowling responded, welcoming the opportunity to abandon his power point. “And, I’d add, the previous hostage incident.”

  Rohrbaugh kept his mouth shut. He didn’t share Dowling’s certainty about Chinese culpability in the fishing boat incident, but this was not the place or time for a debate on the merits of his ideas.

  Dowling flipped through several pages of notes. “In a counterpoint to the PRC’s ambitions in the region, the Vietnamese are pursuing development of their own offshore oil deposits. Washington is monitoring the situation because of the proximity of an American-Vietnamese joint venture. The American company is a start-up named Horizon Offshore Exploration.”

  “And this has created another flash point?” the Army officer to Rohrbaugh’s left commented.

  Dowling noted the time and chose not to elaborate. He needed to corner Rohrbaugh. There was a matter of such sensitivity that his boss, a Marine Major General, wanted to personally speak to the SEAL. “This is a good stopping point. We’ll reconvene at 1345.”

  He stepped away from the podium and caught Rohrbaugh before he could make it to the head. “Excuse me, Commander. You have a moment?”

  Rohrbaugh hesitated, worried he may have overstepped. “Sure, what’s on your mind?”

  Dowling gave no indication of what he might have thought of Rohrbaugh’s concern. “The J-3 wants to speak with you after the brief.”

  “Can you tell me the subject?”

  “Afraid not.”

  “You can‘t tell me? Or you don’t know?”

  “Both.”

  “Okay.”

  Rohrbaugh knew better than to press the matter, but his curiosity was piqued. He decided he didn’t need to go to the head after all and reversed course back to the conference room.

  * * *

  Dowling reconvened the session fifteen minutes later. “There are political, security, and economic imperatives driving Tokyo, Manila, and Hanoi to reassess their relationships with the United States. Suffice it to say, the common link driving these countries is China.”

  “What about the Nationalists?” the Colonel asked.

  “With the exception of Taiwan’s nascent garrison on Ita Abu Island, they haven’t been a significant player in the Spratlys. Driving our relationship is a change in Washington’s view of our security alliance with Tokyo. That said, Seventh Fleet has begun exploratory discussions with the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force to expand the scope of exercise Annual-Ex. PACOM is also pursuing the possibility of moving up the timeline for exercise Keen Edge. Beijing’s reaction to these discussions will bear watching.”

  Rohrbaugh recalled what he’d read in yesterday’s Early Bird. The news summary contained a clipping about China’s Vice Premier canceling a scheduled meeting with the Japanese Prime Minister and returning to Beijing. The Xinua News Agency placed the blame for cutting short the diplomatic visit at the feet of the Japanese. Somet
hing to do with Japanese government officials visiting a shrine that the Chinese felt glorified Japan’s militaristic past.

  The old wounds from World War II are still festering, Rohrbaugh thought before picking up the thread of Dowling’s presentation.

  “...our main strike force elements would be tasked with neutralizing the PLA naval and air forces at their bases at Fenghuang, Yulin, Zhanjiang, and Harkou. Depending on the scope of the conflict, the Japanese navy would be called on to help contain the PLAN’s submarine force. Those submarines, especially their diesel-electric Type 636 Kilo’s, present the single greatest threat to our carrier strike groups.”

  Rohrbaugh nodded. Japan’s participation with exercises Keen Edge and Annual-Ex, would not be lost on the Chinese and the PLAN had already begun to probe the JMSDF for any weaknesses in their ASW defenses. While he pondered what role, if any, the Japanese would play in an open confrontation with the PLA, a new slide appeared:

  MISSION EXECUTION: PLA CHALLENGES

  Downing pointed. “Our analysis indicates the Chinese have encountered significant tactical issues they must overcome if they are to realize their ambitions in the South China Sea. Our intent is to exploit these.”

  Rohrbaugh grunted in agreement. Their garrisons were small and widely dispersed and the PLA would be hard pressed to counter an external threat. This fact was pounded home to the Chinese after the AFP sank two of their patrol boats. Dowling’s next point caught Rohrbaugh’s attention.

  “The other reality is Beijing’s assertion of sovereignty over the South China Sea as defined in their Law of the Territorial Seas does not have validity. Article Eight of this law pertains. It’s quoted on this slide. Please take a moment to read it.

  “The People’s Republic of China has asserted it retains the right to prevent the passage of vessels through its territorial waters and will order the eviction of foreign naval vessels. Foreign naval vessels, under this ‘law,’ must obtain Chinese permission before proceeding through the South China Sea and foreign submarines must surface and fly their country’s flag.”

  “Bullshit!” erupted a voice from the room.

  “Actually, those were Admiral Cortez’s sentiments, although he expressed them in slightly different language,” Dowling replied silencing the chuckles in the room.

 

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