Clergymen were among those in America who were coming under the strongest pressure to support a nuclear freeze. I wanted to reach them, as well as other Americans who—like my daughter Patti—were being told the path to peace was via a freeze on the development and deployment of nuclear weapons that, if implemented, would leave the Soviets in a position of nuclear superiority over us and amount to an act of unilateral disarmament on the part of the United States and NATO.
Although a lot of liberal pundits jumped on my speech at Orlando and said it showed I was a rhetorical hip-shooter who was recklessly and unconsciously provoking the Soviets into war, I made the “Evil Empire” speech and others like it with malice aforethought; I wanted to remind the Soviets we knew what they were up to.
Here are a few paragraphs from that speech:
During my first press conference as president, in answer to a direct question, I pointed out that, as good Marxist-Leninists, the Soviet leaders have openly and publicly declared that the only morality they recognize is that which will further their cause, which is world revolution. I think I should point out I was only quoting Lenin, their guiding spirit, who said in 1920 that they repudiate all morality that proceeds from supernatural ideas—that’s their name for religion—or ideas that are outside class conceptions. Morality is entirely subordinate to the interests of class war. And everything is moral that is necessary for the annihilation of the old, exploiting social order and for uniting the proletariat.
Well, I think the refusal of many influential people to accept this elementary fact of Soviet doctrine illustrates a historical reluctance to see totalitarian powers for what they are. We saw this phenomenon in the 1930s. We see it too often today.
This doesn’t mean we should isolate ourselves and refuse to seek an understanding with them. I intend to do everything I can to persuade them of our peaceful intent, to remind them that it was the West that refused to use its nuclear monopoly in the forties and fifties for territorial gain and which now proposes a fifty-percent cut in strategic ballistic missiles and the elimination of an entire class of land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles.
At the same time, however, they must be made to understand we will never compromise our principles and standards. We will never give away our freedom. We will never abandon our belief in God. And we will never stop searching for a genuine peace. But we can assure none of these things America stands for through the so-called nuclear freeze solutions proposed by some. The truth is that a freeze now would be a very dangerous fraud, for that is merely the illusion of peace. The reality is that we must find peace through strength.
I would agree to a freeze if only we could freeze the Soviets’ global desires. A freeze at current levels of weapons would remove any incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously in Geneva and virtually end our chances to achieve the major arms reductions which we have proposed. Instead, they would achieve their objectives through the freeze. A freeze would reward the Soviet Union for its enormous and unparalleled military buildup. It would prevent the essential and long overdue modernization of United States and allied defenses and would leave our aging forces increasingly vulnerable. And an honest freeze would require extensive prior negotiations on the systems and numbers to be limited and on the measures to ensure effective verification and compliance. And the kind of a freeze that has been suggested would be virtually impossible to verify. Such a major effort would divert us completely from our current negotiations on achieving substantial reductions. . . .
Let us pray for the salvation of all those who live in [the] totalitarian darkness—pray they will discover the joy of knowing God. But until they do, let us be aware that while they preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on the earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world. . . .
If history teaches anything, it teaches that simpleminded appeasement or wishful thinking about our adversaries is folly. It means the betrayal of our past, the squandering of our freedom. So, I urge you to speak out against those who would place the United States in a position of military and moral inferiority. . . . In your discussions of the nuclear freeze proposals, I urge you to beware the temptation of pride—the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil. . . .
I believe we shall rise to the challenge. I believe that Communism is another sad, bizarre chapter in history whose last pages even now are being written. . . .
As I’ve said, I wanted to let Andropov know we recognized the Soviets for what they were. Frankly, I think it worked, even though some people—including Nancy—tried persuading me to lower the temperature of my rhetoric. I told Nancy I had a reason for saying those things: I wanted the Russians to know I understood their system and what it stood for.
As I was going around the country speaking about the realities of Soviet policy, the arms reduction negotiations in Geneva were getting nowhere fast. Paul Nitze, our brilliant chief negotiator, said he believed, as I did, that the Soviets wouldn’t budge on removing the SS-20 missiles aimed at Europe unless and until we deployed our INF missiles.
Our policy in Geneva continued to be based firmly on this premise. Two weeks after the “Evil Empire” speech, after the Joint Chiefs of Staff returned to me with their collective judgment that development of a shield against nuclear missiles might be feasible, I decided to make public my dream and move ahead with the Strategic Defense Initiative by laying down a challenge to our scientists to solve the formidable technological problems it posed. Here are excerpts from my diary that spring:
March 22
Another day that shouldn’t happen. On my desk was a draft of the speech on defense to be delivered tomorrow night on TV. This was one hassled over by N.S.C., State and Defense. Finally I had a crack at it. I did a lot of rewriting. Much of it was to change bureaucratese into people talk. But all day there were meetings, with Congress with our volunteer leaders from the business world, unscheduled meetings having to do with problems and finally a trip to the Capitol Club. . . . During the day speaking to our Congressional Republican leadership and blasted the Dem. budget with the press in attendance. It was a good pitch exposing the ridiculous irresponsibility of the phony budget.
March 23
The big thing today was the 8 p.m. TV speech on all networks about national security. We’ve been working on the speech for about 72 hours and right down to the deadline. We had a group in for dinner at the W.H. I didn’t join them except before dinner a few words of welcome. Nancy and I then dined early upstairs. The group included several former sectys. of state, national security advisors, distinguished nuclear scientists, the chiefs of staff, etc. I did the speech from the Oval Office at 8 and then joined the party for coffee. I guess it was okay, they all praised it to the sky and seemed to think it would be a source of debate for some time to come. I did the bulk of the speech on why our arms buildup was necessary and then finished with a call to the science community to join me in research starting now to develop defensive weapons that would render nuclear missiles obsolete. I made no optimistic forecasts—said it might take 20 years or more but we had to do it. I felt good.
March 24
. . . the reports are in on last night’s speech. The biggest return—phone calls, wires, etc., on any speech so far and running heavily in my favor. . . .
March 25
Meeting with speech writers—gave them an idea for Saturday radio; it worked out pretty good. A poll taken before the speech shows I’ve gained on job approval with regard to the economy, but the drum beat of anti-defense propaganda has reduced my rating on foreign affairs. I’ll be interested to see how that holds for a poll after the speech. Did a press availability in the press room. It went wel
l, so the press on TV almost ignored it entirely. . . .
April 6
Learned George Shultz is upset. Thinks N.S.C. is undercutting him on plans he and I discussed for “quiet diplomacy” approach to the Soviets [which led to the release of the Pentecostalist families in Moscow, but] we had a meeting later in day with George and cleared things up I think. Some of the N.S.C. staff are too hard line and don’t think any approach should be made to the Soviets. I think I’m hard line and will never appease. But I do want to try to let them see there is a better world if they’ll show by deed they want to get along with the free world.
I suspect the Soviet leadership found it difficult to comprehend why an American president would be so concerned about public opinion when I sent word through Dobrynin that we might be amenable on the grain agreement if they allowed the Pentecostalists to emigrate: The last thing that leaders of a totalitarian country worry about is public opinion. But Dobrynin knew a great deal about Americans, and I suspect he must have told them that if an American president had said what I’d said, they could expect a positive response. I never told anyone about my conversation with Dobrynin—I didn’t know when I might want to try the same approach through quiet diplomacy again.
Later that summer, a second group of Pentecostalists was permitted to leave the embassy and the Soviet Union. In the overall scheme of U.S.-Soviet relations, allowing a handful of Christian believers to leave the Soviet Union was a small event. But in the context of the times I thought it was a hope-giving development, the first time the Soviets had responded to us with a deed instead of words. As I’d learn, though, I was overly optimistic if I thought the Russians were going to change overnight.
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ALTHOUGH I DON’T THINK I was ever able to convince the American people of the seriousness of the threat we faced from Marxist guerrillas in Central America, I think I succeeded in making my point when I took my case to the public regarding the need to press ahead with modernizing our military forces—Americans valued, above all, the security of their nation. During my speech to the country on March 23, I revealed some recently declassified information about the enormous Soviet arms buildup and previously secret photos documenting the expansion of Soviet military facilities on Cuba. “I know that all of you want peace, and so do I,” I said. “I know too that many of you seriously believe that a nuclear freeze would further the cause of peace. But a freeze now would make us less, not more, secure and would raise, not reduce, the risks of war. . . .” I didn’t want the United States to be in an arms race, I said, but the Soviet Union had put us in one and our survival as a nation was at stake. After appealing to the American people to tell their congressmen they were behind the military modernization program, I revealed my dream for the Strategic Defense Initiative:
Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope. It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive. Let us turn to the very strengths in technology that spawned our great industrial base and that have given us the quality of life we enjoy today.
What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?
I know this is a formidable, technical task, one that may not be accomplished before the end of this century. Yet, current technology has attained a level of sophistication where it’s reasonable for us to begin the effort. It will take years, probably decades of effort on many fronts. There will be failures and setbacks, just as there will be successes and breakthroughs. And as we proceed, we must remain constant in preserving the nuclear deterrent and maintaining a solid capability for flexible response. But isn’t it worth every investment necessary to free the world from the threat of nuclear war?
. . . Tonight, consistent with our obligations under the ABM [Antiballistic Missile] treaty and recognizing the need for closer consultation with our allies, I’m taking an important first step. I am directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles. This could pave the way for arms control measures to eliminate the weapons themselves. We seek neither military superiority nor political advantage. Our only purpose—one all people share—is to search for ways to reduce the danger of nuclear war.
During the spring and summer of 1983, while Yuri Andropov was pursuing the old Soviet agenda of world domination, funding rebel guerrillas, keeping an iron hand on Poland, and, in general, acting like all the other Soviet leaders of the past, the administration won a series of close votes in Congress that kept the MX program and other major elements of the military modernization program alive. And, in a new attempt at quiet diplomacy, I tried to communicate privately with Andropov, hoping, as I had with Brezhnev, to initiate the kind of personal relationship that might lead to better relations between our countries.
Although Andropov and I had exchanged formalities after the death of Brezhnev, his letters were stiff and as cold as a Siberian winter, confined to platitudes and promising “the unbending commitment of the Soviet leadership and the people of the Soviet Union to the course of peace, the elimination of the nuclear threat and development of relations based on mutual benefit and equality with all nations”—while blaming the United States entirely for the arms race.
On July 11, 1983, I sent a handwritten note to Andropov assuring him that the people of the United States were equally dedicated to the cause of peace and elimination of the nuclear threat. Then I asked, Wasn’t it time that we took the next step and began trying to implement these goals at the meetings of our arms negotiators in Geneva? “We both share an enormous responsibility for the preservation of stability in the world,” I wrote, “and I believe we can fulfill that mandate, but in order to do so, it will require a more active level of exchange than we have heretofore been able to establish. There’s much to talk about with regard to the situation in Eastern Europe and South Asia and particularly this hemisphere as well as in such areas as arms control, trade between our two countries, and other ways in which we can expand East-West contacts.”
Historically, I wrote, “our predecessors have made better progress when they communicated privately and candidly.” I wrote that if he wished to engage in such direct communication, “you will find me ready. I await your reply. Ronald Reagan.”
In early August, Andropov responded with a letter that demanded we cancel the deployment that fall of the new NATO missiles and refused to discuss the issues I’d raised in my letter, especially Soviet subversion of Third World countries. On the plus side, he expressed a willingness to communicate with me privately. Here is a portion of his letter:
Dear Mr. President:
Thank you for your personal letter, which was conveyed to me on July 21. I have considered its contents with all seriousness.
I take note with satisfaction the assurances that the U.S. Government shares a devotion to the cause of peace and the elimination of the nuclear threat and strives to build relations with other countries on the basis of mutual benefit and equal rights. The most important thing now, it seems to me, is to attempt to embody these principles in practical issues, to seek and find solutions to existing problems in the spirit of peace and cooperation. I agree with you, Mr. President, that we are obliged to remember the responsibility for maintaining peace and international security which rests on our two countries and their leaders.
Of course, in the present complex situation, it is difficult to count on simple solutions. But I think that if we were to try simply to avoid the most important and difficult issues, we would hardly be able to achieve the results to which, as I understand, we both would like to aspire. . . .
The important thing, of course, is to begin to move forward on issues of limiting and reducing nu
clear arms. It is a particularly urgent necessity to prevent a nuclear arms race in Europe, the results of which would be extremely serious. If we can achieve that, I believe that the peoples of our countries and of many other countries will be grateful to us.
We believe that a just, mutually acceptable agreement in Geneva, an agreement on the basis of equality, is still possible. In trying to reach an agreement there, we have already gone very far and have taken decisions which were most difficult for us. After all, the Soviet Union is in fact agreeing (contingent upon reaching parity in appropriate categories of aircraft) to reduce to almost a third the medium-range missiles it has in the European zone. And to reduce them without a reciprocal reduction of missiles on the part of the West. Is this understood and appreciated to a proper degree in Washington? In this regard we want nothing more than a counterbalance to the means which the British and French possess. Is this not an honest and moderate position?
I will tell you, Mr. President, the same thing I told Chancellor Kohl when I met him in Moscow: we believe that we must take advantage of the opportunity, while it exists, to reach a genuinely honest agreement which takes into account the legitimate interests of both the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries so that, instead of increasing medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, they are significantly, very significantly, reduced. That would permit an enormous improvement of the situation in Europe and in the whole world.
So long as the United States has not begun deploying its missiles in Europe, an agreement is still possible. Moreover, it is our conviction, based on a calculation of basic security factors, that there is room for flexibility on both sides. Insofar as you, too, would like movement in the negotiations—as I infer from your letter—I would be pleased to hear how you envision this in practical terms.
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