‘The first patrols found False Crest and Nose clear. They then moved along the Jessami track [which rounded the Spur] and found a roadblock and several bunkers 100 yards east of False Crest, and another on the west near Kohima. Basha was found to be strongly defended by a series of bunker positions estimated to be held by thirty Japs. A patrol to Ring [400 yards south of the Spur] reported this also held by thirty Japs, well dug in.’
On the second night the patrols brought back the same information, except that the number of Japs on Basha had increased to forty. During the third night, the patrols brought back the same story, so it now seemed clear that neither False Crest nor Nose was occupied, but that Basha and Ring were. In other words the top and bottom features were occupied, while the two middle features were not.
Having this information, Horsford now worked out his plan, which was that at 1945 hours a company led by Nixon would move along the reconnoitred track to seize and hold False Crest. When this was done he would report by radio: ‘In position and consolidating; no Japs around.’ Patrols would go on to Nose, to make sure that it was still unoccupied; then on orders a second company would occupy it. Later, when these two forward companies were dug in and firmly established, a third company, with artillery and tank support, would attack Basha soon after first light. The assault companies were to carry extra ammunition, and rations and water, and defence stores were to be carried by men acting as porters. There was also a Gurkha signaller with each company, whose job was to reel out telephone cable as he went along. Horsford says: ‘The cable was connected to one terminal of a field telephone which the signaller carried; to the other terminal was connected an earth wire which ran down to the signaller’s leg and was connected to a steel spike on to the man’s boot, so that when he stuck his spike into the ground the circuit was completed and the company commander could talk to me at any time. This is how I got progress reports.’
By the 29th, when everything was ready for the operation, its importance had grown immensely. The previous day, as it will be remembered, Church Knoll had defied the second series of attacks by the Punjabis; and in three days’ time, according to the orders from Stopford, the 7th Division must begin its march south. With the whole 2nd Division temporarily exhausted, and the Queens and the Punjabis still recovering from their heavy mauling, the weight of responsibility on Horsford, his few British officers, and the young Gurkhas under their command, was enormous. But seldom can responsibility have been placed in better hands.
At 1945 hours Nixon fell in his company and they moved down into the valley below Treasury Hill. Here they followed a track in single file, and climbed up to the Jessami road which ran across their front. Here he waited quietly, then began the business of infiltrating on to False Crest quietly and methodically, with each man knowing exactly what was expected of him. First, two Gurkhas crept up on to the objective to make sure that it was still free of Japs. They were followed by a section which went on to occupy a position at the northern extremity of the feature. After them, in quick succession, came the rest of the platoon, then the whole company, which moved up to form a defensive position with all-round defense. To simplify matters, as the operation had to be carried out swiftly in pitch dark, the company commander had worked out a simple clock plan: one platoon occupying from 10 o’clock to 2 o’clock, the second from 2 to 6, and the third from 6 to 10. As soon as the troops were on the ground, Nixon went round with his gunner, adjusted the perimeter where necessary, and arranged a Defensive Fire plan. Wiring was started at once, but not digging because of the noise.
While Nixon’s company was so engaged, he sent out a patrol as arranged to Nose, to make sure it was still unoccupied, and this patrol arrived in time to meet the commander of the next company which was concentrated just to the south of False Crest. This company then infiltrated on to Nose and carried out the same drill as Nixon’s men had done. Patrols to Basha reported that it was still held, and this information was passed to Captain Carr, who brought his company forward just before dawn, ready to attack it. Everything was ready now; and the Japs still had no knowledge whatever of the Gurkhas in their midst.
The artillery concentration came down from 25-pounders, mediums, 3.7 howitzers, and tanks. Then, at an agreed time it switched and the company of Gurkhas advanced some fifty yards behind the barrage. The tanks began firing super-quick high explosive shells to clear the jungle and, a minute later, changed to armour-piercing shells. As the Gurkhas made their way up the hill the tanks then changed to their Browning machine-guns and fired overhead ‘to keep the Japs’ heads down’. Once the Gurkhas began nearing the bunkers, the tanks changed back to armour-piercing shells which they fired with great accuracy, only ten yards ahead of the leading files. By a prearranged plan, the men in these were wearing white towels on their backs so that the tank commanders could see them.
Then a snag came. There was a cloud-burst, and Horsford, not being able to see the towels, thought his men were late and ordered the tanks to fire for another five minutes. In fact, the Gurkhas were dead on time and were crouching only a few feet behind the shell-bursts. The result was that a good many of the Japs were still huddled down in the bunkers when the Gurkhas came at them and dozens were bayoneted, grenaded, or dealt with by kukris. Twenty or more rolled out of their bunkers and fled.
After this initial success, the Gurkhas were held up by a string of six inter-supporting bunkers on the crest of Basha, so decided to dig in below them. The action had gone magnificently, not a man being killed, and only twelve slightly wounded. Horsford now came forward with his headquarters and the rest of the battalion, and for the rest of the day the men dug themselves in. It wasn’t a pleasant job, as the Japs harassed them with mortars and discharger grenades, and later, after dark, put in a number of counter-attacks. These did not dislodge anyone; and during the 31st the Gurkhas went on ‘bunker-busting and raiding’. Here the pole-charges came in useful. Captain Green was shown how to use a Lifebuoy flame-thrower entirely by touch in the dark—the battalion had never seen them before—and next morning sallied forth to use it. Unfortunately he couldn’t get the flame to ignite and the apparatus merely squirted liquid. Crouched beside him, with bullets singing over their heads, his Gurkha assistant tried putting a match to the jet, but with no success. Green therefore threw the Lifebuoy away and called for another. This one worked, and Green moved forward to deal with a bunker, only to be shot at by another bunker further along, as Woodward of the Worcestershires had been. He received three bullets in the leg and his Gurkha was killed. As he was lying in the open it seemed that nothing could save him, but Subedar Narjang Ghale dashed out into the open, tied up his wounds, and carried him for nearly a hundred yards under heavy fire. For this action Narjang was awarded the Military Cross—but the flamethrowers weren’t used again. Fortunately, by other means, not always less spectacular, the Gurkhas were able to reduce sixteen bunkers.
On the 1st June, three Sherman tanks were able to move along the Jessami track, then move up to join Horsford and his men. By then Horsford had been invited to attack Hunter’s Hill, but the ground between it and his own position was so bare that it was impossible to poke his head out of the trench without getting shot at. So he asked the tank commander to take him on reconnaissance in order to look at the ground through the periscope. The tank commander agreed, though later regretted it, as the tank received several direct hits from artillery and mortar shells. Luckily they had no effect, but then the tank shot down a steep slope, much to the delight of the Gurkhas who were watching, and it took a long time to get it out. However, having seen something of the ground, Horsford told Loftus Tottenham he wasn’t prepared to carry out a direct attack on the feature ‘because I knew it would cause too many casualties’. It was therefore agreed that the objective should be pounded by artillery, tanks, and aircraft, until (so it was hoped) the Japs had had enough. Horsford was keen to take the position, however, if he could do so in his own way, and observed it carefully. On the night of the 1st
June he kept sending out patrols, and when daylight came on the 2nd it seemed that there were very few Japs left on it. He therefore asked for an artillery concentration, then sent a company up the slope as hard as they could go. In a matter of minutes the objective, which had been disputed so long and had cost so many lives, was in the hands of the Gurkhas. They had completed everything demanded of them exactly to schedule, for the battalion due to relieve them chose this moment to appear.
*
By now the Queens had been on Church Knoll for twenty-four hours. With the rest of the Brigade they had been due for relief on the 1st June, but Loftus Tottenham was anxious to take all his objectives before handing over, and laid on an attack on the morning ofthat day. After an artillery concentration, and with supporting fire from the tanks, a platoon went into action, but were mortared off. However, at 1030 hours heavy rain and mist came down and the Queens went on to the feature again, and this time were able to dig in. The courageous, costly, and decisive role of 33rd Indian Brigade in the battle of Kohima was over.
At about this time also came news that Brigadier Warren’s 161st Brigade, which was operating way out on the left flank, had gained three pimples called Lock, Stock and Barrel; and the Royal West Kents had got a platoon up on Firs Hill, where the Lancashire Fusiliers had been roughly handled some weeks earlier. Suddenly the whole picture of the battle had been transformed. As the 33rd Corps Account of Operations puts it: ‘The battle… had been one of attrition against the dogged resistance of a determined enemy, capable of taking tremendous punishment. On the 2nd June he was no longer able to prolong the struggle and, somewhat demoralized, the enemy evacuated the Naga Village and withdrew east.’
Yes… Sato was pulling out. But how far back he would take up his next position, and how hard he’d fight to hold it, remained to be seen. But meanwhile the news that there was a chance to break through the ring swept through the tired, depleted battalions and miraculously they found new strength and new determination.
1 V.C.O. is short for Viceroy’s Commissioned Officer (Subadar and Jemadar). These men were roughly the Indian Army’s equivalent to the British “Warrant Officers, though their prestige and power were undoubtedly greater. Havildar is the equivalent rank of sergeant, and Naik of corporal.
12
Return to the Chindwin
Sato had decided to withdraw on the 30th, and immediately organized some suicidal rear parties, and put a rearguard of about 750 men under Miyazaki. Several pleas to Mutaguchi for permission to withdraw had brought nothing but abuse and a strongly worded order to stay where he was and keep fighting. During the past weeks, in his great despair, Sato had been signalling Major-General Tazoe, commander of the 5th Air Force Division, begging him for assistance. Finally, about the 27th, with nothing forthcoming, Sato signalled: ‘Since leaving the Chindwin we have not received one bullet from you, nor a grain of rice. We are still under attack by the enemy. Please send us food by plane. The enemy are getting regular food supplies and more troops.’ Whether Tazoe was under orders not to help, or whether his squadrons were now far too stretched to do anything, it is difficult to say. Nearly half his planes, according to some accounts, were engaged in the attack on the Chindits, and this may well have been one of the determining factors. However, whatever the reason, no supply planes arrived whatsoever, and Sato finally signalled Mutaguchi, advising him that he intended to withdraw. Mutaguchi signalled back: ‘Retreat and I will court-martial you.’ To this Sato replied: ‘Do what you please. I will bring you down with me.’ Then on the 31st, having given the order for withdrawal, Sato sent his now famous signal: ‘The tactical ability of the 15th Army staff lies below that of cadets.’ After this he closed down his radio. Some idea of the stress Sato was undergoing can be gathered from a letter he wrote home to his wife, after watching the tattered remnants of his Division begin straggling away from Kohima. He wrote: ‘I cannot see the enemy through my blinding tears.’ Ironically, at this precise moment, Mutaguchi was planning yet another attack against Palel, a bastion of the Imphal Perimeter, in which Sato’s division was to take a leading part. When he heard what Sato had done, he exclaimed: ‘He has lost the battle for me! I will never forgive him.’
Nevertheless, he still went ahead with his operation against Palel, and on the 4th June issued a Special Order of the Day:
‘After a month’s desperate and courageous fighting, we surrounded the strategic position of Kohima. In three months we had the enemy hemmed in round Imphal and the battle situation stabilized. Still all this had not been fully up to the expectations of our nation. This is indeed a most regrettable matter.
Withholding my tears and painful as it is, I shall for the time being withdraw my troops from Kohima. It is my resolve to reassemble the whole army and with one great push capture Imphal.
This forthcoming plan of operations will be the Army’s last. You must fully realize that if a decisive victory is not obtained we shall not be able to strike back again.
ON THIS ONE BATTLE RESTS THE FATE OF THE EMPIRE. Officers and men must, however, keep in mind the seriousness of the great task and create a fighting will to win. Everyone must unswervingly serve the THRONE and reach the ultimate goal so that the Son of Heaven and the Nation may be forever guarded.
MUTAGUCHI Renya.’
While relations between Stopford and Grover had by no means reached breaking point, as those between their Japanese adversaries, they were still deteriorating. When Stopford received Grover’s orders for a new operation to try and sort out the Aradura situation, he professed himself unable to understand them, and on the 1st June went forward to suggest a plan of his own. This was to launch ‘a wide, sweeping movement to the east’ in the belief that any direct assault on the Aradura position was now of secondary importance. Leaving Grover to work out the tactical and administrative problems involved in such an operation, Stopford went on to see Frank Messervy at his headquarters, before going back to his own. Later that night Stopford heard of 33rd Brigade’s successes on Church Knoll and Hunter’s Hill, and immediately appreciated their tactical significance. The infantry could now be pushed south through the Assam Barracks area, to attack the three features on a ridge about a mile from Kohima, which now constituted the centre of the Jap line. They were called Dyer Hill, Pimple, and Big Tree Hill; and when they had been dealt with the road was open to Pfuchama, a defended village, 4,907 feet high, and Phesema, on the Imphal road, three miles south of the Aradura Spur. Once this hook had been brought off successfully, Stopford and his divisional commanders believed that the Japs would pull out of Aradura.
Once the genera] plan had been agreed with Stopford, Grover gave the job of launching this left hook to Michael West. Though his brigade was weak in numbers, it hadn’t received such a bad mauling as the others and was still in good heart. The Dorsets were now back with the Worcestershires and the Camerons, which gave the brigade an added confidence; the mutual respect and trust between these three battalions was tremendous. The initial orders for the operation were given to West on the 2nd June, but at that time 5th Brigade was still messing around on the Aradura Spur, waiting to exploit any success achieved by 4th or 6th Brigades, and it took a good twenty-four hours to get it concentrated. Meanwhile, patrols were pushed out by 268th and 114th Brigades which, on the morning of the 3rd, reported that Big Tree Hill and Dyer Hill were unoccupied. Grover immediately met Brigadier Dyer, commanding 268th Brigade, who gave him the latest information, including the news that his patrol on Big Tree Hill had run up a telephone line to keep in constant touch. Grover therefore gave orders to Michael West that he should get on to the ridge with all speed, occupying it as far west as Garage Spur, on the Imphal road.
It is worth mentioning here that it was on the 3rd June that the 2nd Division Recce Regiment, under Lieut.-Colonel J. M. K. Bradford, came down off Mount Pulebadze where they had been fighting in an isolated position for nineteen days. The Japs they had encountered, they said, ‘were big men, well clothed and equipped, and
extremely aggressive, reacting at once to all our own offensive moves’. They were probably men from Captain Watari’s battalion of the 13 8th Regiment, which the Camerons had encountered in their first action on Bunker Hill.
By the afternoon of the 3rd June, the leading unit of 5th Brigade, the Dorsets, was deployed on the lower slopes of Dyer Hill. The Bombay Grenadiers of 268th Brigade had again reported it clear, but Jock McNaught sent out his own patrol under a brilliant young officer with the improbable name of ‘Snagger’ Highett, who came back exploding: ‘Unoccupied! I was bloody well shot up from Dyer Hill, Big Tree Hill, and the Pimple!’ Whether the Grenadiers’ patrols hadn’t been where they should have, or whether the Japs were playing their old game of lying doggo, it’s impossible to say; but obviously McNaught had to proceed with caution. Just before dark he tried to push forward a company on to Dyer Hill, but it came under fire from the east end of the feature and so McNaught decided to go into a tight perimeter for the night. It poured with rain hour after hour, and the troops had no evening meal, but next morning Clive Chettle (who had distinguished himself in the tennis court battle) took his company and pushed them forward on to the crest. The Japs had evacuated the position in the night, leaving a well-prepared bunker on the reverse slope. McNaught then decided to go for his next objective, Big Tree Hill, which lay half a mile to the west. Before he could get at it, though, it was necessary to dispose of the central feature on the ridge, known as the Pimple. At 0810 hours an artillery concentration was put down on it, after which one company and the Guerrilla platoon went into the attack. Fifty yards from the top the troops came under heavy machine-gun fire, but the company commander sent a platoon to work round to its right, and this made good progress. One section reached the top of the feature, where it killed four Japs, but then the whole hill came alive and the section was forced off, as was a platoon sent to reinforce it. Eventually the company commander ordered a withdrawal and troops came down the hill, being picked off by snipers. Both Davies, the company commander, and Purser, who led the Guerrilla platoon, were killed. This was a serious loss to the battalion, already short of officers.
Kohima Page 29
