More than 500 Hezbollah arms caches are thought to exist in southern Lebanon alone.63 Without the largesse of weapons and matériel shipped into Beirut from Damascus and Tehran, Hezbollah might not have “prevailed” in its quest to achieve ascendancy within Lebanon itself. The group boasts a diverse armory that allows it to function as a guerilla group or a small-scale conventional army. Besides small arms proficiency, Hezbollah is comfortable with explosives—both smaller, improvised explosive devices or large truck bombs. In southern Lebanon, insurgents would detonate homemade claymore mines containing nails and antipersonnel ball bearings to great effect, a tactic that was adopted by Shia insurgents in Iraq.64 In addition to what looks like a typical weapon inventory for insurgents, Hezbollah has obtained plenty of “toys,” such as global positioning systems, advanced aircraft analysis and design software, stun guns, nitrogen cutters, naval equipment, ultrasonic dog repelling equipment, and laser range finders.65
While most insurgent groups learn how to use guerilla techniques, not many evolve into forces fully capable of fighting as a conventional military able to master so many different kinds of weapons. In its July 2006 battle with Israel, Hezbollah skillfully employed a bevy of weapons systems, including: small arms (AK-47s, M-16s, and M-4 carbine rifles), short range (0–25 km) surface-to-surface rockets (122 millimeter katyusha), mid-range (>25 km) surface-to-surface rockets (“extended-range katyushas, Fajr-3, Uragan, Fajr-5, Khaibar-1, and Zelzal-2), shore-to-ship missiles (C-701, C-802 Noor), unmanned aerial vehicles (Mirsad-1), and antitank missiles (RPG-29, AT-13 Metsis-M, AT-4 Spigot, AT-3 Sagger, TOW, AT-5 Spandrel, AT-14 Kornet-E).66 Most of these weapons were made in Russia, Syria, and China. Mimicking Israel’s worst kept secret regarding its nuclear weapons, Hezbollah currently maintains a policy of “strategic ambiguity” about its antiaircraft capabilities, declining to confirm or deny the possession of advanced Scud missiles in its replenished arsenal.67
Intelligence
In Hezbollah’s ongoing conflict with Israel, its intelligence network proved to be one of its most valuable assets, especially as the organization evolved over time. In southern Lebanon, the group developed an informal intelligence gathering network that complemented its official intelligence apparatus, modeled after the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). Hezbollah’s intelligence network was critical to its success against Israel in four main ways: operations security (OPSEC), infiltration and subversion, surveillance and reconnaissance, and psychological operations (PSYOP).
Through meticulous intelligence gathering and a sophisticated PSYOP campaign, Hezbollah waged a war of attrition using “persuasion, communication, and the shaping of perception,” in addition to a range of guerilla tactics aimed at wearing down the Israelis.68 In a direct attempt to attenuate Israel Defense Forces (IDF) morale and influence both Israeli government policymakers and the Israeli public, al-Manar ran a series titled “Who Is Next?” in reference to the daily segments showing soldiers being killed, while some footage revealed IDF troops retreating from Hezbollah attacks.69 Hezbollah encouraged beleaguered South Lebanese Army (SLA) fighters to abandon their units and used them as “a source of invaluable military, political, and psychological information” in its effort to persuade Israel to withdraw.70 By the late 1990s, SLA field intelligence operatives were selling maps to Hezbollah insurgents that detailed IDF positions and routes to navigate minefields, in addition to information about SLA operations.71
The bulk of Hezbollah’s intelligence responsibilities were directed by Imad Mughniyeh, who served as a bodyguard to Fadlallah and spent his early years with a specialized unit known as Fatah Force 17. Mugniyeh was a major player in Hezbollah’s Special Security Apparatus (SSA). The SSA was comprised of the central security apparatus, the preventative security apparatus, and an overseas security apparatus. Mughniyeh relied on subversion to attack the Israelis from within, sowing seeds of doubt throughout the ranks of the SLA, crippling its ability to operate effectively within Lebanon.
As an insurgent force, Hezbollah dedicated its intelligence manpower to surveillance and reconnaissance, constantly watching IDF troops and movements, while simultaneously trying to avoid the ubiquitous eye of Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and other high-tech equipment like ground surveillance radar, infrared sensors, and motion detectors. Hezbollah also sent militants to conduct auxiliary reconnaissance missions inside Israel in preparation for potential attacks.72 Hezbollah is widely known to have developed a robust knowledge of critical infrastructure targets inside Israel, including a network of gas and electricity installations throughout the country.73
Operations security is an internal security mechanism that requires a high level of intelligence capabilities to function effectively. The goal is to obfuscate the identities of the individuals and plans for a single or a series of attacks. Iran’s MOIS worked with Hezbollah’s SSA on the most important aspects of operational security. Among these were assisting insurgents with concealing their identity while traveling abroad, procuring a host of critical resources (weapons, fake identity papers, money), and connecting insurgents with various “fixers” who acted as local liaisons.74
If COIN force intelligence can infiltrate or “flip” members of the insurgents’ inner circle, it can strike a mighty blow at the resolve of the insurgents. To prevent this, Hezbollah has worked to form an “iron-clad security matrix,” whose foundation is an encyclopedic collection of materials on all past, present, and new members of the group’s internal security branch.75 Rules are enforced by the ruthless Engagement and Coordination Unit, led at one time by Wafic Safa, a participant in the negotiations surrounding several prisoner exchanges with Israel.76
Hezbollah’s intelligence capabilities matured as the insurgency progressed, despite Israel’s earnest attempts to defeat the insurgents through military force. Hezbollah’s ability to innovate on the battlefield is a direct byproduct of its vast and sophisticated intelligence-gathering network.77 With Syrian and Iranian assistance, Hezbollah has transformed itself from a poorly-organized militia into a functioning army with the ability to attack with an array of weapons, from plastic explosives to antitank missiles. Counterintelligence became one of the organization’s strongpoints, as members of its internal security forces grew into experts at identifying and removing infiltrators and ensuring secrecy within the group. In a nod to Israel’s SIGINT capabilities, the insurgents eschewed even encrypted phone calls.78 Focusing on subversion and infiltration, the group has at times even utilized Israeli uniforms and ammunition.79
Sanctuary, Safe Haven, and Operational Space
On July 18, 2012, a bus bombing in Bulgaria killed seven people, including five Israeli tourists. Hezbollah has been implicated in the attack in Burgas, a Black Sea resort town. The attack in Bulgaria is reflective of a wider trend—Hezbollah attacks outside of the Middle East, with other attempts occurring in Cyprus, Greece, and Thailand.80 Perhaps even more troubling, the al-Quds Force, which is an elite unit within Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, has been working closely with Hezbollah even as it has planned its own attacks on diplomatic personnel in both India and the United States. Still, Hezbollah’s transnational activities are nothing new. Indeed, the group has maintained a vast overseas network of operatives and associates, spanning the globe from South America to West Africa.
Following the deadly truck bombings in Argentina in 1992 and 1994, respectively, the tri-border area in South America where Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil converge received far greater scrutiny.81 This veritable “no-man’s land” was long known as a place where Hezbollah operatives conducted business.82 Following the attacks in Argentina, many Hezbollah members left South America and resettled in West Africa.83 This region of Africa, long an ungoverned chunk of territory in its own right, is home to hundreds of thousands of Lebanese Shia Muslims, who provided Hezbollah members with a natural constituency and even some familial connections.84
In addition to the long established connections and net
works of Lebanese traders in the region, West Africa is an ideal place for terrorists, insurgents, and criminals to engage in illicit activities without too much concern for law enforcement. The countries of West Africa are characterized by weak governments, little oversight, high levels of corruption, and porous borders. Formerly Liberia and currently Guinea-Bissau have been run as criminal states.
Since the mid-1980s, Hezbollah has enjoyed a diverse funding stream that includes both state-sponsored largesse and organized criminal activities. This diversity of funding is one of the main reasons why the group has established itself as a major force in Lebanon and a regional player across the wider Middle East. Syria and Iran have provided Hezbollah with a wide range of resources, including sanctuary, intelligence, training, organizational aid, financing, and weapons. The Lebanese diaspora communities throughout West Africa have also given Hezbollah financial support and a transnational intelligence gathering capability.
Since the implosion of the Syrian state and as a result of the austere economic sanctions levied against Iran for its continuing nuclear program, Hezbollah has been forced to look abroad for funding, particularly to the group’s extensive network in West Africa. “The Party of God” maintains a significant presence in several West African nations, including Cote D’Ivoire, Senegal, Benin, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Within these communities, Hezbollah members engage in an array of criminal activities, ranging from narcotics trafficking to gem smuggling to fund-raising to fraud and extortion.
Training
When it emerged in the early 1980s, Hezbollah was nothing more than an inchoate collection of Shia militants that had broken off from similar organization like Amal and the al-Da’wa party.85 To help the organization develop, guidance was provided by the al-Quds (Jerusalem) Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).86 A group of 1500 Guards were dispatched to Lebanon to provide matériel support and train Shia militias in areas of recruitment, ideological inculcation, and military training.87 These lessons also included how to conduct effective reconnaissance, gather intelligence, and suicide bombing tactics.88 The training provided to Hezbollah by the IRGC not only drastically improved Hezbollah’s operational capacity, but it also allowed Hezbollah to reach a level of expertise where its members could then train other terrorist groups, to include Hamas and the PIJ.
The IRGC contingent sent to train Hezbollah’s aspiring insurgents trained the militants in a range of guerilla tactics and also taught some members how to properly utilize sophisticated weapons systems, including the BGM-71 TOW missile.89 In the Bekaa region, 20 Iranian training officers of the IRGC, each a specialist in a different aspect of guerilla warfare, bestowed upon the Hezbollah members their knowledge of infiltration techniques, explosives, hit-and-run ambush style tactics, and range of counterintelligence methods.90
The main point about the training provided by the IRGC is that “Hezbollah members did not need to develop their own learning process; lessons were simply handed to them.”91 This meant that Hezbollah’s learning curve would not be as steep as it was for other insurgent groups and in effect, the insurgents would not be forced to struggle through difficult setbacks before reaching a high level of efficiency.92
Part of the reason why the IRGC’s training worked so effectively was because the Iranian trainers and the Hezbollah fighters would assess each mission after it was conducted. Studying after action reports is critical in warfare because when possible, it allows combat units to figure out what went wrong and what went right and then take the steps necessary to fix their mistakes. “Some of the more battle-hardened and seasoned fighters assessed each mission with their Iranian advisers to bolster the degree of surprise and effectiveness in preparation” for the next attack, according to Magnus Ranstorp.93 The Iranian-led training camps throughout Lebanon became a “matrix of crucial guidance” and centers of learning that taught tactical agility and innovation.94
Organizational Capabilities
During its entire existence, Hezbollah has only been led by two individuals—Abbas al Musawi (assassinated by Israel in February 1992) and Hassan Nasrallah. To be fair, Iran retains a generous amount of influence with the Hezbollah leadership and the Islamic Republic’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is still revered as Hezbollah’s “official” marji al-taqlid, or source of emulation. Other highly respected and learned Shia religious scholars including Iraq’s Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Lebanon’s Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah also hold sway within the inner circles of Hezbollah. Yet, even as current Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah settles into his role as an “international celebrity,” and thus muscles his way into gaining more autonomy from Tehran, the Iranian leadership continues to be a major part of the story of Hezbollah.95
Leadership
Unraveling the web of influence in Lebanese Hezbollah is not a straightforward process. Due to the extent of Iranian influence, it is difficult to identify whether it is Iranian mullahs who wield the most power, organic Lebanese Hezbollah party members, or revered Shia clerics from Iraq whose directives guide the course of the organization. Moreover, the legitimacy of different individuals has ebbed and flowed over the group’s 30-year existence. The grassroots appeal of Hezbollah in Lebanese society has paved the way for “disproportionate weight in the party’s decision-making process to members of the leadership who hold hard-line views on both social and political matters.”96 While certain leaders hold more austere views than others, Muhammad Ra’id, the head of Hezbollah’s Political Council and a member of the group’s Decision-Making Council, believes that Hezbollah members are best classified along a non-ideological continuum ranging from “flexibility and realism” to “less flexibility and less realism.”97
Sayeed Hassan Nasrallah was elected secretary-general of Hezbollah in 1992 and has since become not only the most recognizable face of the group, but among the most influential and prominent Islamic leaders in the entire Middle East. As secretary-general, Nasrallah has been described as “an extraordinarily shrewd leader” who has sacrificed greatly for Hezbollah, to include losing his oldest son in a battle with the IDF.98 Other caricatures of Nasrallah depict him as an “ingenious marketer” who “makes smart decisions” and holds an “almost erotic appeal” for his many followers throughout the region.99 Nasrallah is credited with guiding Hezbollah’s ideological shift over the years, which has been marked by “flexibility and adaptability,” effectively allowing the group to “expand its base of support and sink deeper roots into Lebanese society.”100 Hezbollah expert Magnus Ranstorp has closely followed Nasrallah’s ideological evolution during his tenure as secretary-general and believes that Hezbollah’s “Lebanonization process” has been a major factor in the pragmatism characterizing this transformation.101 Among the major changes that Hezbollah has undergone while under Nasrallah’s tutelage are a tighter relationship with the Asad regime in Syria and occasional cooperation with erstwhile rival Amal. But even though Nasrallah has softened many of his “hard-line views,” his reign has also overseen an increase in “resistance” activities directed against Israel.102
From his earliest days, Nasrallah has been a consistent advocate of attacking Israel. This resistance has included capturing Israeli soldiers, launching so-called “martyrdom operations,” continuing to pursue conflict in the Sheba Farms area of the Golan Heights, and most recently, the July 2006 war against Israel that brought death and destruction to both sides. His undying enmity toward Israel has not softened since one of his earliest public interviews in which he declared that “Our strategy is to build a future for ourselves through confrontation with the Zionist enemy.”103 Despite Nasrallah’s hard-line vis-à-vis Israel, this has not precluded him from adopting a softer stance in regard to Hezbollah’s participation in the Lebanese political system. Frederic Wehrey observes, “[a]lthough previously supportive of a more militant, non-participatory role for Hezbollah in the late 1980s, Nasrallah came to accept the realities of
the Lebanese political system.”104
Hezbollah’s secretary-general has repeatedly stressed that while the group would respond to Lebanon’s domestic concerns with pragmatism and flexibility, its resistance activities “would constitute Hezbollah’s non-negotiable priority, potentially in perpetuity.”105 And while Nasrallah’s open defiance has indeed earned him the status of an “international celebrity,” it has also invited a steady stream of criticism from prominent Lebanese voices. Following the July 2006 war against Israel, Gibran Tueni, the publisher of Lebanon’s leading newspaper asked: “Who authorized Nasrallah to represent all the Lebanese, to make decisions for them and to embroil them in something they do not want to be embroiled in? Did Nasrallah appoint himself secretary general of the whole Arab world?”106 But although opinion throughout Lebanon and the Arab world may remain divided on the appeal of Hezbollah’s secretary-general, he undeniably remains a symbol of strength, defiance, and resistance to the West, as evidenced by the posters seen throughout the region that bear his image along with other populist leaders like Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadenijad.107
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