Still, joining the political process was not without its cost to the Party of God. In exchange for entrance into Lebanese politics, Hezbollah agreed to alter its objectives to achieve its domestic political goals. This included pursuing a more moderate political agenda, honoring the post-Taif confessional system, softening its rhetoric, and working with the majority government parties on a range of issues.155 The most obvious concession Hezbollah made was to abandon its aspirations of remaking Lebanon into an Islamic republic ruled by sharia law. A further price to pay for achieving status as an opposition party within the government was the agreement not to use violence for domestic political purposes. Hezbollah’s continued resistance against Israel in the zone of occupation was officially recognized as legitimate by the Lebanese government, a point insisted upon by Hezbollah’s Syrian overlords.
CHAPTER 5
Hamas: Guns and Glory in Gaza
BACKGROUND
The Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya), or Hamas, emerged in 1987 as a Palestinian offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan). Hamas was initially welcomed by the Israelis as a counterbalance to Yasser Arafat’s PLO,1 a group that promoted an ideology of aggressive Palestinian nationalism, more worrisome to Tel Aviv throughout the 1970s and 1980s.2 Perhaps most known for its reliance on suicide bombings, Hamas featured as a violent agitator in both the First Intifada (December 1987–September 1993) and Second Intifada (September 2000–February 2005) against Israel. In 2007, in what has been dubbed the “Battle of Gaza,” Hamas clashed with Fatah in a conflict that saw hundreds of Palestinians killed. More recently, Israel has launched several major offensives against Hamas, including Operations Cast Lead during the Gaza War of 2008–2009, Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012, and in 2014 saw the sustained bombing of Gaza during Operation Protective Edge, aimed at destroying Hamas’s network of tunnels below its territory.
Hamas relies on support from Iran, especially since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011, which displaced key members of Hamas’s leadership structure that had been headquartered in Damascus at the invitation of Bashar al-Assad, despite that country’s own fraught history with the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas raises funds through a variety of efforts, but most lucrative to the group are donations to charities linked to the organization as well as sponsorship from Tehran, which supplies Hamas with money, weapons, training, and equipment.
HOW HAMAS FUNDED ITS ACTIVITIES
By far, Hamas’s most sophisticated avenue of raising funds is through the use of charities, while its most lucrative method of financing is external state sponsorship from Iran (this has changed over time, as the group’s primary sponsor used to be Saudi Arabia). As Matt Levitt has recognized, Hamas charities and service organizations “provide cover for raising, laundering, and transferring funds, facilitate the group’s propaganda and recruitment efforts, provide employment to its operatives, and serve as a logistical support network for its terrorist operations.”3 By 2015, Hamas’s fund-raising network has achieved global reach, with the group establishing illicit funding schemes throughout the Middle East, Western Europe, North America, and beyond.
Gray Economy
Hamas’s extensive network of charities is directly related to the concept of Da’wa, which is reflected in the group’s efforts aimed at constructing an Islamic social welfare infrastructure.4 While most of the group’s financing emanates from the Gulf, the FBI believes that Hamas relies on the United States for a portion of its fund-raising base, in addition to constructing a logistical, propaganda, and military infrastructure in America. In order to avoid laws in the United States aimed at combating Hamas’s financial support, the group’s sympathizers routinely raised money for Hamas initiatives that made no mention of or has no association with the group’s name.5 Over the years, Hamas has utilized an array of front companies to conceal and launder money which is then used for planning and conducting attacks, as well as for myriad organizational requirements, which have only grown in importance since the group decided to reconsider its stance on participating in elections.
Diaspora Support
Because the Palestinians have lived a somewhat nomadic existence over the past half century, the diaspora is represented throughout the Middle East and Persian Gulf and further abroad from Western Europe to Latin America.6 Like Hezbollah and Gamaa al-Islamiyah, Hamas has taken advantage of the Muslim diaspora in South America’s semi-lawless tri-border area, a region known for money laundering, drug trafficking, and a host of other illicit and unsavory activities.7 Closer to home, in Palestine and Lebanon, Palestinians in refugee camps support a range of Islamist groups, from Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine to Hezbollah and Jamaa al-Islamiyya in Lebanon.8 Historically, Palestinian expatriates and Muslim donors living abroad have provided Hamas with funding and support.
Members of Hamas’s Political Bureau have received financial support from Palestinian and Muslim communities in both Britain and the United States.9 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, an alleged Hamas conspirator named Jamal Akal was arrested and accused of receiving training in Gaza to conduct attacks in North America. Akal was instructed by Hamas leadership to rely on the Palestinian diaspora in Canada to help fund his attack, which would require purchasing a weapon and paying for his expenses while he monitored his targets before eventually attacking.10 Still, the Palestinian diaspora scattered throughout the Middle East remains among the most potent and willing to assist the group, especially with financial support. In an online chat room in late 2001, Rantissi provided an account number for an account at the Arab Bank in Gaza to an individual claiming to be from Bahrain and interested in contributing to the Palestinian jihad.11
Charities
A panoply of charities either supports Hamas directly and explicitly or supports a wide range of radical Islamic charities that extend to include Hamas. Money funneled through charities supports a range of critical Hamas functions, including aid to the families of Hamas operatives that are imprisoned, wounded, or killed; the administrative expenses related to the charity offices’ infrastructures; provision of social welfare services; and the other day-to-day minutiae that goes with running a complex politico-military organization.
Charities linked to Hamas have been implicated in terrorist attacks abroad, including in Europe. Charities connected to Hamas have been identified in countries including the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, and France, with lesser donations coming from charities in Asia and Africa.12 In 1993, Hamas operative and Human Relief International employee Mohammad Sa’d Darwishy al-Shazy plotted terror attacks in Croatia against Jewish targets; Hamas militants have been linked to the Philippines for association with Al-Qaida front organizations operating in Manila. The group also has roots in Romania, especially on university campuses.13
Hamas does not discriminate between the amounts of donations it accepts. In addition to the millions flowing from wealthy donors and external state actors, Hamas collects donations at the grassroots level, often distributing collection boxes to commercial businesses and mosques. Between 1992 and 2001, the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLFRD) collected $57 million and transferred over $6.8 million to Palestinian charities. Transfers to Hamas were around $900,000 in 1997 and as much as $2.4 million by 2000.14 In 2001, The Holy Land Foundation allegedly funded Hamas activities to the tune of $13 million, although the organization was shut down by U.S. officials shortly thereafter.15 That same year, Yassin, founder of the Islamic Center, revealed that Hamas offered payments of between $2 and $3 million to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers.16
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, United States counterterrorism and law enforcement authorities adopted a hard-line with any organizations suspected of involvement with terrorism, whether or not those organizations or terrorist groups directly targeted the United States. Hamas-linked charities received increasing scrutiny. In 2002, a jury in Chicago found the HLFRD an
d Quranic Literacy Institute liable for the death of David Boim, who was shot by Hamas militants while waiting for a bus in Jerusalem in 1996.17 In February 2006, the U.S. Treasury blocked the assets of an NGO in Ohio, KindHearts, which was accused of supporting Hamas financially.18
Fraud
Hamas, like Al-Qaida, Hezbollah and other militant Islamist groups, has engaged in fraud to raise money for its activities, although revenue raised through fraudulent schemes remains a fairly insignificant portion of its overall operating budget. At various points, Hamas raised money through credit card fraud, cigarette tax fraud, food stamp fraud, and the sale of fraudulent documents.19 And fund-raising through fraud is not merely relegated to low-ranking members and hangers-on. Following his rather unceremonious exit from Jordan in the late 1990s, Khaled Meshall, a top Hamas commander, was charged with multiple offenses, including fraud.20
Hamas members also pursued a number of rackets and schemes to raise money in the United States that would then be sent back to the group’s leadership in Gaza. In June 2005, two Dearborn-area men, Ahmad and Musa Jebril, were convicted of mortgage fraud charges after defrauding six banks for $250,000 and dozens of people of up to $400,000.21 Following the conviction, the Jebrils and another associate were charged with attempting to bribe a member of the jury overseeing their trial.22
Legal Businesses
Similar to the charities and fraud-based money generating activities perpetrated by Hamas, the group’s legal businesses and front companies are also global in nature. In the tri-border area of South America, Hamas is known to operate through multiple front companies designed to conceal its involvement in a host of illicit revenue generating activities and to launder the proceeds from various fraud schemes and tax evasion efforts.23 In the United States, top executives of a Richardson, Texas-based Internet company named Infocom were indicted by a federal grand jury on December 18, 2002 for conspiracy to conceal financial transactions for Mousa Abu Marzook, a well-known Hamas commander.24 Another well-known Hamas front company was the Sunuqrut Global Group,25 a company owned by Mazen Sunuqrut, a Hamas activist, while still others included the Beit el-Mal Holding company, a public investment company in East Jerusalem; the Al Tadhoman Charitable Association, which owns part of the Yasfa dairy company and the Nablus Mall; the Al-Zakah Committee of Jenin, which runs a local hospital,26 and the Al-Nubani furniture store, owned at one time by Ahmad Mohammad Abdallah al-Sharuf.27
Money Laundering
The extent of Hamas’s network of charities, religious organizations, and front companies allows Hamas to launder money that is earned in both the gray and dark economies. Active conflict zones are ideal places for money laundering to occur through charities, because these kinds of organizations do not seem out of place in these areas and the flow of money is one directional. The Rammallah-al-Bireh zakat committee laundered and transferred funds raised in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar through banks, hawalas, and businesses associated with Hamas.28 When Saddam Hussein offered $25,000 to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers, the money was channeled from Baghdad through banks in Jordan and Ramallah.29 As discussed above, the Sunuqrut Group was accused of laundering money on behalf of Hamas, as was the Al Ajouli money changing firm.30 In the aftermath of 9/11, the Al-Aqsa Islamic Bank had its assets frozen after being accused of financing Hamas terrorism.31 In the mid-2000s, there was serious concern that the Commercial Bank of Syria, state-owned and headquartered in Damascus, was laundering money on behalf of Hamas and several other radical militant groups.32 More recently, in early 2012, Israel’s Shin Bet conducted a probe that connected Chinese banks to the transference of money by Hamas prisoners.33
Dark Economy
While it is difficult to discern exactly what percentage of Hamas’s funds come via the dark economy versus how much the group earns from the gray economy, in addition to receiving significant amounts of external state support over time, first from Saudi Arabia and more recently from Iran, it is well known that Hamas currently has a robust criminal enterprise that helps fund the organization. As with other criminal groups operating in Latin America’s tri-border region, Hamas has insinuated itself into a comfortable position in the area, cemented ties and expanded its network of illicit activities and contacts. While its transnational criminal activities are not as impressive as that of Hezbollah, over the past decade Hamas militants have expanded its criminal portfolio to include a diverse range of income generating activities.
Kidnapping for Ransom (KFR)
While Hamas does engage in kidnapping as a tactic of asymmetric warfare and terrorism, the motive is typically the release of currently imprisoned Hamas members, rather than for financial profit. There is the Ahmed Abu Rish Brigades—a Gaza-based crew of former Fatah members with close ties to Hamas that have abducted foreigners in Gaza and announced ambitions to spread jihad beyond Israel—but overall KFR is not a primary method of Hamas fund-raising.34 Still, no matter what the motive, kidnapping is still a crime, used by Hamas more as a tool of extortion and intimidation, instead of revenue generation. Indeed, on June 25, 2006, Israeli Sergeant Gilad Shalit, a member of the IDF was kidnapped by Hamas. Shalit was exchanged in October 2011 for 1,027 Palestinians in Israeli jails. The exchange, obviously disproportionate, was hailed as a strategic victory for Hamas by Khaled Meshall.35 In June 2014, Hamas was accused in the kidnapping (and subsequent murder) of three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank. The incident was a primary factor in leading Israel to launch a 50-day siege of Gaza, partially aimed at destroying Hamas’s intricate network of underground tunnels.36
Armed Robbery and Theft
Throughout its history, Hamas has been careful not to sully its image in the minds of the Palestinian people. Since Hamas consistently criticizes the Palestinian Authority (PA) as corrupt and guilty of theft, the organization has been very weary of being portrayed as predatory toward its own constituency. While in the United States and elsewhere some Hamas members have profited from the sale of stolen goods and merchandise, including infant formula that is stolen and resold and scams involving grocery coupons, armed robbery and theft in Gaza and the West Bank have been rare. That is, until as recently as March 2011, when Hamas was accused of forcibly removing approximately $250,000 shekels from a PA-backed fund’s account.37 More recently, especially following Israel’s summer 2014 Operation Protective Edge, Hamas has been reeling. The group is desperately seeking funds to rebuild the infrastructure in Gaza, so continued disagreements with the PA could lead to similar incidents to the one that played out with the Palestine Investment Bank in 2011, when Hamas’s police force demanded the money and threatened resistance would be met with force.
Smuggling, Trafficking, and Counterfeiting
Hamas has profited from the production, smuggling, and sale of tobacco products, including genuine and counterfeit cigarettes, as well as the sale of unlicensed t-shirts and other apparel.38 In the tri-border area of Latin America, it is well-known that Hamas (perhaps emulating Hezbollah) has established partnerships with various drug trafficking organizations operating in the semi-lawless region.39 The group has also been involved with drugs in the United States, at least on the margins—a pseudoephedrine smuggling scam in the Midwest involved bank accounts tied to Hamas.40 Closer to home, Hamas’s extensive network of tunnels in Gaza have long served as a primary conduit for weapons smuggling.41 Another growing concern is the increasing lawlessness of Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, which borders the Gaza Strip. The Sinai remains an ungoverned territory, now used by jihadist organizations to smuggle weapons from looted arsenals in Libya.42
Extortion and Protection
Similar to Hamas’s view on kidnapping for ransom, criminal activities like extortion and protection are often predatory, aimed at the very communities that are seeking protection. Hamas, unlike its on-again off-again rival Fatah, has largely been unscathed by accusations of extortion and racketeering,43 although it still does collect some money from these practices.44 In September 2012, an extort
ion ring responsible for the kidnapping of an Eritrean immigrant was uncovered by Israeli police and involved Hamas members, militants from the Sinai, and four Israelis.45 Allegations from as recent as July 2014 allege that Hamas leaders, including Ismael Haniyeh, have benefited financially from a 20 percent tax imposed on all goods throughout Hamas-controlled tunnels in Gaza.46
External State Support
Prior to September 11th, 2001, Hamas received a significant amount of donations from Saudi Arabia although American pressure on the Saudis has helped to stem the flow of donations to the militant group, still, much of this has been made up from Tehran, now a major state sponsor even though Iran is a Shia nation and Hamas is a Sunni militant group.47 Before Iran ascended as Hamas’s primary sponsor, Saudi Arabia provided approximately 60 to 70 percent of the group’s budget.48 Both the Saudis and Iraqis under Saddam Hussein provided money to the families of Hamas suicide bombers—the former more than $100 million and the latter between $15 and $20 million.49 The downside to isolating a group like Hamas is that it produces a vacuum which can be filled by countries like Iran. Hamas has gone on record to make it clear that it is open to receiving assistance “from anywhere so long as it comes without conditions that would compromise their principles.”50 During one trip to Iran in the mid-2000s, Ismail Haniyeh was provided with $36 million.51
Terrorism, Inc.: The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare Page 15
