The Cianos believed—naïvely, as it turned out—that after a brief layover in Germany the Nazis would facilitate their journey to Spain.80 But this stopover “was transformed from hour to hour and day to day,” Edda recalled, “first into a visit as ‘guests’ of the Führer, then . . . into a visit as ‘virtual prisoners.’”81 Galeazzo never counted on being kidnapped, according to Edda. “On the contrary, he fell— and I along with him—into a deadly trap.”*82
But bagging Ciano, whom the Nazis viewed as a Fascist turncoat, was apparently not Hitler’s biggest priority. According to Wilhelm Hoettl, an SS intelligence officer who helped plan the Cianos’ escape, the Fuehrer was more concerned with the preservation of the Duce’s genes.83 “Hitler’s orders,” he recalled, “were emphatic that ‘whatever happened, Mussolini’s blood in the veins of his grandchildren must at all costs be preserved for the future.’ His sole real interest was in these grandchildren whom he regarded as the only important members of the [Ciano] family.”84
Benito Mussolini. CREDIT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
Sunnier days: Hitler and Mussolini in Munich in the spring of 1940. CREDIT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
From left to right: Mussolini (with hand on chin), Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Hitler, and Luftwaffe chief Hermann Goering ponder the maps. CREDIT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
The Axis foreign ministers, Galeazzo Ciano (left) and Joachim von Ribbentrop, in 1940. Ciano was married to Mussolini’s daughter, Edda. CREDIT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
An informal shot of Marshal Pietro Badoglio dated October 1, 1943, just a few weeks after the rescue of Mussolini. CREDIT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
General Kurt Student, chief of Germany’s airborne forces, watches a paratrooper drill in the fall of 1943. Student was annoyed by the fact that Skorzeny received the lion’s share of the credit for rescuing Mussolini. CREDIT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
This photo of Otto Skorzeny was taken just days after the rescue of Mussolini and Skorzeny’s promotion to major. CREDIT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
“Smiling Albert” Kesselring, with characteristic grin, confers with Hitler and Mussolini. Kesselring’s faith in Badoglio was an endless source of frustration to Hitler. CREDIT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
The disappearance of Mussolini had presented Joseph Goebbels (left) with a major PR dilemma. But the Duce’s subsequent rescue helped to boost German morale. CREDIT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
Admiral Karl Doenitz, chief of the German navy, dissuaded Hitler from blockading the harbor at Ventotene Island. CREDIT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
General Alfred Jodl in 1945. Fearful of being poisoned, Jodl had refused to drink his coffee during a meeting with the Italians at Bologna in 1943. CREDIT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
September 3, 1943: General Walter Bedell Smith (seated) signs the Italian armistice agreement as General Giuseppe Castellano (in black suit) looks on. Brigadier Kenneth W. D. Strong, Eisenhower’s intelligence chief, is partially visible behind Castellano. CREDIT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
The ancient prison on Santo Stefano. Hitler considered landing paratroopers here in an effort to rescue Mussolini, though the Duce had never set foot on the island. CREDIT: PETER BARDWELL.
An aerial photo of La Maddalena taken from an altitude of 38,000 feet. Note: The “San Stefano” shown in this picture is not the “Santo Stefano” island mentioned in this book. CREDIT: DAN HUNT.
Maddalena town as seen from the ferry. CREDIT: DAN HUNT.
Mussolini spent the last three weeks of August at the Villa Webber on La Maddalena. CREDIT: MR. CAMERON ARCHER, DIRECTOR OF THE TOCAL AGRICULTURAL CENTRE, PATERSON NSW, AUSTRALIA.
Skorzeny’s postwar sketch of the proposed Maddalena raid, which was aborted at the last minute. CREDIT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
An Allied “identification poster” of the Heinkel 111. Note the gunner lying on his stomach in the front of the cockpit. This is where Skorzeny was positioned while taking reconnaissance photos of La Maddalena. CREDIT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
A World War II–era photo of the Gran Sasso region. CREDIT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
La Villetta in 1945. Mussolini was held at this small inn near Assergi for several days before being transferred to the nearby Hotel Imperatore. CREDIT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
“The highest prison in the world”: A panoramic view of the Hotel Imperatore and surrounding area. The observatory in the foreground is a post–World War II addition. CREDIT: ADAPTED FROM AFTER THE BATTLE MAGAZINE (1978).
A closer view of the general area in which the gliders touched down. The Stork aircraft landed in and took off from the clearing on the left (opposite the hotel’s right shoulder). The observatory in the foreground is a modern addition. CREDIT: ADAPTED FROM AFTER THE BATTLE MAGAZINE (1978).
A close-up of the rear of the hotel. Skorzeny claims to have entered the radio room in the back of the building before running outside and making his way around the hotel’s left shoulder. CREDIT: AFTER THE BATTLE MAGAZINE (1978).
A three-quarter view of the Hotel Imperatore showing the windows of Mussolini’s suite. CREDIT: ADAPTED FROM AFTER THE BATTLE MAGAZINE (1978).
A close-up of the DFS 230 showing the single skid and two-wheel dolly. The dolly was jettisoned after takeoff. CREDIT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
The DFS 230 in flight. CREDIT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
The Fieseler 156 Stork. This is the same type of plane that Gerlach used to fly Mussolini and Skorzeny off the mountain. CREDIT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
Skorzeny’s postwar sketch indicating where the DFS 230 gliders landed on September 12, 1943. In this sketch, his glider is located very close to the hotel’s right shoulder. The remaining DFS 230s are widely scattered. CREDIT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
German newsreel footage: Skorzeny (far left) and the Duce (wearing black hat) walk past the Hotel Imperatore shortly after the rescue. CREDIT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
German newsreel footage: Lieutenant Baron Otto von Berlepsch (left) shakes hands with Major Harold Mors on the Gran Sasso. CREDIT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
German newsreel footage: Mussolini gets a boost as he climbs into the Stork. The instrument panel is partially visible behind his hat. CREDIT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
German newsreel footage: Mussolini and Skorzeny mug for the camera after taking their positions inside the Stork. The subsequent takeoff was hair-raising. CREDIT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
German newsreel footage: Mussolini waves as he steps off the plane at Rastenburg on September 14, 1943, two days after being rescued. CREDIT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
German newsreel footage: Hitler and Mussolini shake hands near the wing of the Duce’s plane on September 14, 1943. This was the first time they had seen each other since the Italian dictator’s arrest. CREDIT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
* * *
*Bedell Smith went on to become director of the CIA in 1950.
*The subject of Mussolini also emerged during the talks. Over drinks, Bedell Smith asked Castellano about the Duce’s whereabouts. The Italian evaded the question, but said that Hitler, too, was very much interested in this sort of information.
*To further complicate matters, Castellano had some additional competition in the person of Dino Grandi, who was also included in the small army of Italian gobetweens who journeyed westward during August. Grandi, who had spearheaded the revolt against Mussolini in the Grand Council of Fascism on the eve of the coup, July 24–25, arrived in Portugal shortly after Castellano. Though he played no role in the negotiations, German agents followed his every move.
**When he discussed the Italian situation during a conference on August 11, Hitler remarked: “[E]verything so far indicates treason. Clarification of the situation now becomes imperative. Rommel shall negotiate.” Fuehrer Conferences, 117.
*A “Mickey Finn,” better known as a “Mickey,” was slang for a drink laced with knockout drops.
*My italics.
*Knowledge of this supposed plot may have been among the reasons for transferring Mussolini from Maddalena to the mainland in late August.
*The British historian F. W.
Deakin has described Galeazzo’s flight as a “kidnapping by consent.” Deakin, 519.
THE HIGHEST PRISON IN THE WORLD
Security preparations around the Gran Sasso complete.1
—Italian radio message intercepted by the Germans
BY THE END OF AUGUST, THE DANGEROUS AND CLANDESTINE GAME OF mutual deception that had occupied the Axis powers since July 25 was approaching a climax. On August 27, General Castellano finally returned from his covert trip to Lisbon.2 All in all, his two-week mission had been a colossal waste of time. Rightly or wrongly, the Allies were in no mood to “negotiate,” nor were they willing to divulge the details of their secret invasion plans to the Italians, whose suspicious behavior during the so-called negotiations had raised a few eyebrows.
When all was said and done, Eisenhower’s men in Lisbon had merely repeated the demand for unconditional surrender and handed Castellano a brief set of nonnegotiable armistice terms, the so-called Short Terms, which the Italian general was not even authorized to sign. This abbreviated version of the armistice, intended as a temporary measure, was put forward as a way for the two sides to reach rapid agreement. Eisenhower, whose invasion of the Italian mainland was scheduled for the first part of September, dearly wanted to reach some sort of understanding with the Italians before launching his attack; in this way, the Allied troops would face only one enemy instead of two.3
But agreement was anything but rapid. In fact, the Italians were despondent. Their strategy of trying to bargain with the Allies for more favorable terms had backfired. After four weeks of effort and half a dozen or so different diplomatic contacts, they were still faced with a choice between unconditional surrender on the one hand and Hitler and the dreaded Nazis on the other. This was the same choice they had faced on July 25. The only change in the meantime was that Italy was now crawling with German soldiers, making an Italian surrender a much riskier proposition than it would have been in the days immediately after the coup when the Nazis had only three divisions on mainland Italy.
What was the king of Italy to do? Fearful that the Anglo- Americans could not protect Italy from Nazi wrath, a majority of the king’s men recommended rejecting the armistice during a war council on August 28.4 But Victor Emmanuel continued to vacillate.
At the end of the month, General Castellano flew to Alliedcontrolled Sicily to haggle over the Short Terms with General Bedell Smith and learn more about the imminent invasion.5 “The Italians,” remembered Churchill, “wanted to be quite sure that these landings would be strong enough to guarantee the security of the King and Government in Rome. It was clear that the Italian Government were particularly anxious that we should make a landing north of Rome to protect them against the German divisions near the city.”6
If they were not prepared to land that far north, Castellano said, at the very least the Allies must insert an airborne division near the capital to scare the Nazis out of central Italy. Eager to reach an agreement, the Allies agreed to Castellano’s request on the condition that the Italians secured the airfields near Rome and took other reasonable measures to support the operation—known as Giant Two—which was fairly complex and not without its risks. Castellano agreed.
Though Hitler knew nothing of the armistice debates going on in Rome, he was prepared for any eventuality. By the end of August, the Nazis had more or less completed their military preparations in northern Italy and finalized their planning for Operation Axis, which involved occupying the peninsula and neutralizing the Italian armed forces.7 On August 23, Hitler personally warned Kesselring to be prepared for the worst, telling him that he had “infallible proof of Italy’s treachery,” though he did not explain the nature of that proof. “He begged me to stop being the dupe of the Italians,” Kesselring recalled, “and to prepare myself for serious developments.”8 Though he was not fully persuaded, Kesselring took the advice to heart.
Regardless of his suspicions, Hitler had no desire to force an open break with the Italians.9 A preemptive strike on the part of the Nazis might seal the fate of Mussolini before the Germans had a chance to find and free him. Aggression against an ostensible ally might also alienate the Axis satellite states such as Hungary and Rumania, whose loyalty the Germans already considered suspect.
It is even possible that Hitler believed he could avoid a major clash with the Italians. Though he never wavered in his belief that Badoglio was planning to betray him, he apparently clung to the hope that he could somehow keep the Italians in the Axis camp— either by bullying them into submission or by changing the rules of the game altogether by liberating the Duce and reinserting him into Italian politics.10 Ribbentrop, for one, still believed that the Nazis might be able to do business with the Badoglio regime, even at this late date.11
“So the Axis powers remained unhappy bedfellows,” remembered General Walter Warlimont, referring to the latter part of August, “in an alliance which had lost all form and meaning; one side was dependent upon the Allies who were slow to move; the other continued in its determination not to be the one to take the first step leading to the final break.”12 Accordingly, when Hitler got wind of the Italian peace overtures in Lisbon—and he did, of course, know about them, at least in general terms—he ordered his diplomats into action instead of his army divisions.
He decided to send an envoy to Rome to further probe Badoglio’s state of mind and play for more time.13 This move was all well and good with Italy’s leaders, who were also keen to maintain the status quo until such time as the Allies swooped into Rome and rescued them from the Nazis. But Hitler had no intention of sending the hapless Mackensen, the former ambassador to Italy; in fact, on August 31, Hitler officially cleaned house at the German embassy in Rome by firing Mackensen and the military attaché General Enno von Rintelen, whose rosy views on Italy had frustrated the German dictator to no end.14
Instead, Hitler selected Dr. Rudolf Rahn, the intelligent, bushybrowed chargé d’affaires at the embassy.15 Technically speaking, he was not named as the new ambassador: Hitler’s failure to make the appointment official was probably an intentional maneuver designed to increase Badoglio’s anxiety about the future.16
After receiving a briefing from Hitler, Rahn flew to Rome on August 30 and met with Guariglia, the Italian foreign minister.17 He took a carrot-and-stick approach, telling Guariglia that Hitler did not much care whether Italy was Fascist or non-Fascist or who headed the government. “The Fuehrer was a realist,” Guariglia recalled, paraphrasing Rahn, “and only one thing counted for him: to win the war. If the Badoglio government intended to continue the war . . . the Fuehrer would have the same confidence in us, and Italo-German cooperation would be more effective than before.”18 But Rahn also told his Italian counterpart that the Germans were aware of negotiations in Spain or Portugal and warned that they would not hesitate to use force if Italy attempted to forge a separate peace with the Allies.19
A few days later, on September 3, Rahn met with Badoglio.20 The latter apparently put on an Oscar-worthy performance, emphasizing Italy’s loyalty to the Axis and pleading with Rahn to restrain the Nazis from taking “provocative action.” Badoglio then said: “I am Marshal Badoglio—the Marshal Badoglio. I belong to the three oldest Marshals in Europe—Mackensen, Pétain and myself. . . . The distrust of the German government towards me is incomprehensible. I have given my word and stand by it. Please trust me.”21
The timing of this meeting was ironic. At the same moment that Badoglio was imploring Rahn to believe in him, General Castellano was in a Sicilian olive grove signing the Short Terms on behalf of the Italian government.*22 After weeks of debate and vacillation, Italy had officially hoisted the white flag, and done it on the sly. The armistice remained a closely guarded secret. Victor Emmanuel had no intention of broadcasting the fact of Italy’s volte-face until the Allies had chased the Nazis out of Rome.
If everything went according to schedule, the event would come to pass in a matter of days. However, as shall be seen later, things did not go quite
as the Italians had planned.
Though the Italians had inked a deal with the Allies, the king and Badoglio were in no hurry to hand over Mussolini.23 Victor Emmanuel may very well have discouraged such a move, fearing that the Germans would get wind of it and launch an immediate strike on Rome. The Italians, in fact, had considered surrendering the Duce to the Allies right after the coup as a sign of good faith; but the king vetoed this idea because he believed the news would leak out and so betray the fact that Italy was seeking a separate peace.24
As was seen earlier, on August 28 Mussolini had been transferred from Maddalena Island to the Abruzzi region of central Italy, east of Rome. He was installed in a room on the second floor of a small rustic inn called La Villetta, located near the village of Assergi on the lower reaches of the Gran Sasso d’Italia, the tallest mountain ridge in the Apennines. He spent a few uneventful days at the inn under the care of his two main guardians of the moment, Police Inspector Giuseppe Gueli and Lieutenant Alberto Faiola.25 As isolated as he was, the Duce could sense that the European Axis powers were headed for a clash, and the thought seemed to depress him. Gueli and Faiola were so concerned about his state of mind at La Villetta that when the dictator had finished his meals they quickly retrieved the knives and forks lest he use them to harm himself.26
At the beginning of September, Mussolini was led to a nearby cable car station and transferred skyward to what was to be his last prison, the Hotel Campo Imperatore, also known as the Albergo-Rifugio, on the majestic Gran Sasso.27 After a ten-minute ride in the cable car, which spanned the 3,000 feet between Assergi and the hotel, the Duce got a first look at his awe-inspiring surroundings.28 The Campo Imperatore, which was a ski resort during the winter season, was situated on a small plateau almost 7,000 feet above sea level.29 Not far from this spot was Gran Sasso’s Mount Corno, at 9,500 feet the highest peak in the Apennines.*30
Hitler's Raid to Save Mussolini Page 18
