10. Speer, 308.
11. Skorzeny, Secret Missions, 56.
12. A petty officer said he had seen the Duce boarding a vessel in Gaeta: Deakin, 544.
13. Demanded that he be kept informed of the latest leads: Ibid., 543.
14. Fuehrer Conferences, 110.
15. Ultimate source of the Ventotene lead was Laurich: Deakin, 544.
16. Laurich worked at a German navy signals base at Gaeta: Ibid. He received the tip from an Italian naval officer, with whom he had become friendly: Ibid., 544; and Martienssen, 189 (in a footnote).
17. Fuehrer Conferences, 113.
18. Ventotene lead may have been a plant by SIM: Davis, Who Defends Rome, 286.
19. Fuehrer Conferences, 110.
20. Ibid.
21. Rescue of the Duce was put on hold, as well as Hitler’s plans to take over Italy by force: Deakin, 502.
22. Keitel, 188.
23. Fuehrer Conferences, 113.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., 113–114.
27. Ibid., 114.
28. Maugeri, 142.
29. Badoglio, 63.
30. Maugeri, 143.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., 144.
33. Ibid., 145.
34. Ibid., 147–148.
35. Benito Mussolini, Memoirs, 91.
36. Evacuated after a heavy bombing raid: Hibbert, 245.
37. Composed mainly of sailors and fishermen: Ibid.
38. Benito Mussolini, Memoirs, 92.
39. He called his journal the Pontine and Sardinian Musings: Hoettl, 264.
40. Ibid., 239 (from Mussolini’s Pontine and Sardinian Musings).
41. Ibid., 242 (from Mussolini’s Pontine and Sardinian Musings).
42. Ibid., 248 (from Mussolini’s Pontine and Sardinian Musings).
43. Ibid., 258 (from Mussolini’s Pontine and Sardinian Musings).
44. Benito Mussolini, Memoirs, 92.
45. “Live dangerously” was a Fascist motto: Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini, 115.
46. An enormous case: Badoglio, 64.
47. Benito Mussolini, Memoirs, 93.
48. The same gift that Mackensen had attempted to deliver: Plehwe, 66.
49. Badoglio, 64.
50. Polito was his senior jailer: Hibbert, 248.
51. Not certain he could prevent Mussolini from being seized by mobs: Monelli, 225.
52. Hoettl, 246 (from Mussolini’s Pontine and Sardinian Musings).
Chapter 8
1. Fuehrer Conferences, 115.
2. Schmidt, 263.
3. Ibid.
4. Warlimont, 376.
5. Deakin, 506 (from Hitler e Mussolini).
6. Ibid. (from Hitler e Mussolini).
7. Ibid. (from Hitler e Mussolini).
8. Ribbentrop had been instructed to gauge intentions: Plehwe, 111; and Warlimont, 375.
9. Dollmann, Interpreter, 245.
10. The return of Italian troops: Garland and Smyth, 369–370.
11. Would refer the matter to Hitler: Ibid., 370.
12. Conference was a bust: Ibid.
13. Dollmann, Interpreter, 246.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Fuehrer Conferences, 114.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 115.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. “Game”: Gilbert, 50–51.
24. Fuehrer Conferences, 115.
25. Ibid., 116.
26. Ibid.
27. Liddell Hart, Rommel Papers, 441.
28. Fuehrer Conferences, 118.
29. Kappler had traced the Duce to Ponza: Student, 410.
30. An Italian grocer who supplied the island: Radl, 88–94.
31. Sometime during the first ten days of August: Ibid., 94–98.
32. Fuehrer Conferences, 119.
33. Student, 411.
34. Fuehrer Conferences, 119.
35. Ibid., 118.
36. Doenitz was becoming one of Hitler’s closest advisors during this period: Warlimont, 374.
37. Fuehrer Conferences, 121.
38. Ibid., 117.
39. Ibid., 118.
40. Warlimont, 374.
41. Keitel, 187.
42. A mass exodus from Berlin during August: Irving, Hitler’s War, 612.
43. One million civilians were eventually evacuated, many of them women and children: Ibid.
Chapter 9
1. Student, 413.
2. Kamptz had run across an old navy buddy in Rome: Ibid., 411.
3. Rumor going around the island: Ibid.
4. Flew to the Wolf ’s Lair on August 16: Fuehrer Conferences, 122.
5. Ibid., 123.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Being held on an Italian warship in Spezia: Student, 411.
9. “Reliable source” revealed Mussolini’s secret location: Ibid.
10. Ultimate source was an Italian naval officer: Skorzeny, Secret Missions, 57.
11. Student, 411–412.
12. Student did not know what to believe: Ibid., 412.
13. Left the Pontine islands aboard an Italian warship (destination unknown) prior to mid-August: Radl, 91–95. Note: Skorzeny, My Commando Operations, 248, claimed that the Germans learned this on August 10 or 11.
14. Cordon around Spezia: Davis, Who Defends Rome, 286.
15. Student, 412.
16. Skorzeny, Secret Missions, 57.
17. Jaegerleitoffiziere based in Spezia: Student, 412.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., 413.
20. Whiting, Skorzeny, 14.
21. Skorzeny, My Commando Operations, 127.
22. Skorzeny, Secret Missions, 13.
23. About five hundred yards west of the town: Infield, Skorzeny, 35.
24. Hunaeus mentioned the Villa Webber: Skorzeny, My Commando Operations, 249; and Radl, 102–104.
25. Multiple leads pointed to the area of Sardinia: Radl, 95–97, 103–105.
26. Flak unit commander said that Mussolini was in Santa Maria: Skorzeny, My Commando Operations, 248–249.
27. Skorzeny, Secret Missions, 58.
28. An interpreter working for Hunaeus: Skorzeny, My Commando Operations, 249; and Radl, 103–105.
29. Skorzeny, Secret Missions, 59.
30. Student, 413.
31. Skorzeny, Secret Missions, 60.
32. Ibid.
33. The 20,000-pound airplane: Green, Warplanes, 303.
34. Skorzeny, Secret Missions, 62.
35. Arrived in Rome on August 20: Ibid., 63. He learned of Kappler’s discovery: Skorzeny, My Commando Operations, 250.
36. Had focused on Mussolini’s family: Radl, 106–108. Vittorio had fled to Germany: Davis, Who Defends Rome, 287.
37. Kappler traced it to Maddalena: Radl, 107–109.
38. Had actually seen the Duce: Skorzeny, My Commando Operations, 250; and Radl, 108–110.
39. On August 23 he flew back to Maddalena with Radl: Skorzeny, My Commando Operations, 250; and Radl, 108–110.
40. Spied a bald, stocky man on the terrace: Radl, 109–111.
41. Was almost certain that it was the Duce: Ibid.
42. Returned to Rome on August 24 and conferred with Student: Ibid., 110–112.
43. Skorzeny, Secret Missions, 63–64.
44. Abwehr and Amt VI were separate organizations with similar agendas, and the lines of demarcation were gray: Lucas, Kommando, 21–22.
45. Competed for Hitler’s favor: Ibid., 22–23.
46. Almost a matter of policy: Brendon, 289; Lucas, Kommando, 22–23; and Doenitz, Memoirs, xv.
47. Philosophy of “divide and rule”: Brendon, 289; Lucas, Kommando, 22–23; and Doenitz, Memoirs, xv.
48. Reassured the Nazi leadership that the loyalty of the Italians was beyond reproach: Hoehne, 532.
49. On Elba or somewhere close by: Student, 414.
50. To meet with Hitler in person: Note: Contrary to what the accounts of Student and Skorzeny say, Radl, 141–146, claimed that this visit took place after the aborted Maddalena rescue attempt.
51. Student, 414.
52. Skorzeny, My Commando Operations, 251.
53. Student, 414.
54. Skorzeny, My Commando Operations, 252.
55. Student, 414.
56. Skorzeny, Secret Missions, 71.
57. Some of them were drinking wine: Radl, 142–144.
58. Skorzeny, Secret Missions, 71.
59. Student, 414.
60. Skorzeny, Secret Missions, 72.
61. Dulles, From Hitler’s Doorstep, 111.
62. Open secret among the local population: Patricelli, 42.
63. Believed that a rescue attempt was in the making: Hibbert, 248.
64. On August 28 at around 4:00 A.M.: Benito Mussolini, Memoirs, 93.
65. An hour and a half: Ibid.
66. Not far from the headquarters of the Third Panzergrenadier Division: Davis, Who Defends Rome, 287.
67. Gueli replaced Polito after the latter was injured in a car accident: Hibbert, 248.
68. The “usual motor-ambulance,” and was driven past Rieti and Cittaducale: Benito Mussolini, Memoirs, 93–94.
69. Fifteen miles or so: Hibbert, 249. Small inn called La Villetta: Iurato and Antonelli, “With Mussolini at the Campo Imperatore,” 244.
70. Two primary guardians were Gueli and Faiola: Benito Mussolini, Memoirs, 94; and Iurato and Antonelli, “With Mussolini at the Campo Imperatore,” 245.
Chapter 10
1. Deakin, 522.
2. Warlimont, 374.
3. Liddell Hart, Rommel Papers, 440 (from a diary entry dated August 11).
4. Student, 397.
5. Deakin, 519.
6. Ibid., 520.
7. Ibid., 522.
8. For several weeks to come, Ribbentrop would nurture the hope that the Nazis could reach an understanding with Badoglio: Ibid., 516.
9. Ibid., 522.
10. D’Ajeta wanted to know whether they were open to the idea of negotiating: Davis, Who Defends Rome, 230.
11. Suave: Strong, Intelligence at the Top, 146. A quick-witted Sicilian: Plehwe, 53; and Monelli, 208.
12. Left by train on August 12: Delzell, 247.
13. Castellano could have taken a plane, but was told not to hurry: Denis Mack Smith, Italy and Its Monarchy, 311.
14. A “motley collection of garments”: Strong, Intelligence at the Top, 144–145.
15. Ibid., 151.
16. Not anxious to surrender: Delzell, 248; and Denis Mack Smith, Italy and Its Monarchy, 311.
17. Did not have the authority to surrender: Delzell, 248; and Denis Mack Smith, Italy and Its Monarchy, 311.
18. Trying to learn the details of the invasion plans: Denis Mack Smith, Italy and Its Monarchy, 312.
19. Strong, Intelligence at the Top, 149–150.
20. Failed to send a progress report: Denis Mack Smith, Italy and Its Monarchy, 311; Delzell, 249; and Clark, Modern Italy, 303.
21. Neglected to bring a radio: Denis Mack Smith, Italy and Its Monarchy, 311.
22. Italian intelligence services possessed several communications links, but no one told Castellano: Ibid.
23. Zanussi was on Roatta’s staff: Delzell, 249. Arrived on August 26: Churchill, Closing the Ring, 107–108.
24. Created confusion: Denis Mack Smith, Italy and Its Monarchy, 311; and Garland and Smyth, 462.
25. Churchill, Closing the Ring, 107.
26. One of Eisenhower’s men (Bedell Smith) considered having Zanussi shot: Davis, Who Defends Rome, 292.
27. Fuehrer Conferences, 117.
28. Would help to “clarify” intentions: Fuehrer Conferences, 117; and Liddell Hart, Rommel Papers, 441.
29. Just outside Bologna at a villa that had belonged to Federzoni: Deakin, 512.
30. Diplomats were told to stay at home: Garland and Smyth, 452.
31. Kesselring, 173.
32. Liddell Hart, Rommel Papers, 441.
33. Warlimont, 378. Note: Warlimont did not attend the Bologna conference.
34. On August 11: Warlimont, 377; and Plehwe, 118. Triggered the August 15 meeting: Warlimont, 377.
35. Warlimont, 378.
36. Roatta refused to answer: Garland and Smyth, 453.
37. Progress was almost nonexistent: Ibid., 452; and Badoglio, 69.
38. Fearful of a poisoning attempt: Davis, Who Defends Rome, 251.
39. In the center of Bologna: Ibid.
40. Jodl refused to drink his coffee: Plehwe, 119.
41. Roatta stressed the distrustful atmosphere: Garland and Smyth, 453.
42. Struck by the fact that the Nazis surrounded Federzoni’s villa with SS: Ibid.
43. Badoglio cautioned everyone present: Ibid.
44. Provocations might cause the Nazis to descend on Rome: Ibid.
45. In the early afternoon of August 15: Warlimont, 378.
46. Ibid.
47. Fuehrer Conferences, 124.
48. Could not hold on to all of Italy without the support of the Italians: Garland and Smyth, 469.
49. Fuehrer Conferences, 99.
50. Eighty percent of Italian industry: Brendon, 138.
51. By mid-month, half of Army Group B had entered Italy: Garland and Smyth, 442.
52. “Showed their true colors”: Fuehrer Conferences, 116. Kesselring’s divisions would withdraw from the south and regroup in the Rome area: Davis, Who Defends Rome, 330.
53. At which point Rommel would assume control of all German forces in Italy: Davis, Who Defends Rome, 330.
54. An assignment in Norway: Westphal, 153.
55. Rommel advocating the evacuation of southern and central Italy: Kesselring, 184.
56. Ibid., 171.
57. Had quarreled with the Italians: Plehwe, 68.
58. Warlimont, 379.
59. On August 17: Warlimont, 379; and D’Este, 74. After thirty-eight days of fighting: D’Este, 75.
60. Some 40,000 German troops: Garland and Smyth, 469; and Liddell Hart, Second World War, 445. Note: D’Este, 74, puts the number at 55,000.
61. Brought their vehicles and equipment: Garland and Smyth, 469.
62. Kesselring and Jodl made the decision for him: Warlimont, 379.
63. Churchill, Closing the Ring, 102 (he wrote this in a message to Anthony Eden dated August 7 after learning that the Italians had made contact with a British diplomat in Tangier).
64. Frequently bombed Italian cities: Monelli, 228.
65. Milan, Naples, Turin, and Genoa: Ibid.
66. On August 13: Deakin, 513; and Davis, Who Defends Rome, 239. Declared Rome an Open City on August 14: Davis, Who Defends Rome, 240; and Garland and Smyth, 279–280.
67. Bombings of Italy undermined the idea that the Italians were forging a separate peace: Student, 414.
68. Eastern forces had been weakened: Davis, Who Defends Rome, 345. Captured Kharkov on August 23 and Taganrog one week later: Goebbels, 422 (in an editor’s note).
69. Hundreds of miles away: Ibid., 423 (in an editor’s note).
70. One million civilians: Irving, Hitler’s War, 612.
71. Might not be receptive: Deakin, 517.
72. Badoglio worried about the Nazis and the Fascists: Deakin, 517.
73. Exposed or manufactured: Ibid. Note: Davis, Who Defends Rome, 278, maintains that Badoglio made the whole thing up.
74. Some of the plotters had been arrested after July 25 and subsequently released: Deakin, 517.
75. Preemptive strike, settle accounts, and eliminate rivals: Davis, Who Defends Rome, 277–278.
76. Tongue lashing from the king: Ibid., 282.
77. For having illegally enriched himself: Deakin, 518.
78. On August 27: Skorzeny, My Commando Operations, 235; Hoettl, 267; Edda Ciano, 26; and Moseley, 182. Three children: Edda Ciano, 27. Conducted by Kappler: Dollmann, Interpreter, 292; Skorzeny, My Co
mmando Operations, 235; and Deakin, 518.
79. Edda Ciano, 26.
80. Believed that the Nazis would facilitate their journey to Spain: Hibbert, 268; and Ciano, Ciano Diaries, v, 580.
81. Edda Ciano, 28.
82. Edda Ciano, 28.
83. Hoettl helped plan the Cianos’ escape: Hoettl, 265–268; and Skorzeny, My Commando Operations, 246 (in a footnote).
84. Hoettl, 265.
Chapter 11
1. Skorzeny, My Commando Operations, 254.
2. On August 27, Castellano returned: Plehwe, 135; and Delzell, 253. Note: Some sources give the date as August 28.
3. Dearly wanted to reach an understanding: Strong, Intelligence at the Top, 154; Lamb, War in Italy, 16; and Garland and Smyth, 465.
4. A majority recommended rejecting the armistice: Denis Mack Smith, Italy and Its Monarchy, 312.
5. To haggle over the Short Terms and learn more about the invasion: Delzell, 254.
6. Churchill, Closing the Ring, 109.
7. By the end of August the Nazis had more or less completed their military preparations in northern Italy: Deakin, 517; and Garland and Smyth, 474.
8. Kesselring, 171.
9. Had no desire to force an open break: Deakin, 516.
10. Clung to the hope that he could keep the Italians in the Axis camp, possibly by reinserting Mussolini: Warlimont, 374.
11. Ribbentrop believed that the Nazis might be able to do business with Badoglio, even at this late date (the end of August): Deakin, 516.
12. Warlimont, 379.
13. To probe Badoglio’s state of mind and play for time: Deakin, 516.
14. On August 31, Hitler fired Mackensen and Rintelen: Westphal, 147. Note: Garland and Smyth, 473, give the date as September 1.
15. Intelligent: Dollmann, Interpreter, 254; and Deakin, 514. Bushy eyebrows: Dollmann, Interpreter, 254.
16. Designed to increase Badoglio’s anxiety: Deakin, 528 (in a footnote).
17. Flew to Rome on August 30 and met with Guariglia: Ibid.
18. Ibid. (from Guariglia’s book Ricordi 1922–1946).
19. Were aware of negotiations; would not hesitate to use force: Deakin, 528.
20. On September 3, Rahn met with Badoglio: Ibid., 529.
21. Ibid. (from Rahn’s book Ruheloses Leben).
22. At the same moment: Deakin, 529. Olive grove: Churchill, Closing the Ring, 111.
23. In no hurry to hand over Mussolini (after the September 3 armistice signing): Plehwe, 146.
24. The Italians had considered handing Mussolini over to the Allies right after the coup: Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini, 298–299.
Hitler's Raid to Save Mussolini Page 30
