by Mark Simmons
All units of the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet were recalled to fuel, while air reconnaissance over Greece and the Ionian Sea from Malta was intensified. On 29 October Cunningham’s whole fleet put to sea; four battleships, two aircraft carriers, four cruisers and three destroyer flotillas swept into the Ionian Sea. They found no sign of the Italians. In fact the Italians had planned an operation for landings on Corfu, but this was cancelled and the forces involved switched to landing at Valona in Albania.
Air reconnaissance reported the Italian fleet to be at Taranto and Brindisi. Warspite and Illustrious returned to Alexandria on 2 November. The rest of the fleet returned the next day.
The Regia Marina, although not entirely in the dark, was not told officially of the decision to invade Greece until 16 October. According to Commander Bragadin:
The Navy’s view was that the proposed move would worsen, among other things, the strategic situation in the east-central Mediterranean and in the Ionian Sea.
Further this undertaking would put the Italian garrison in the Dodecanese Islands in serious difficulties and would split the navy’s forces even more.
The Italians’ Greek campaign soon degenerated into a shambles, much of it due to poor planning. The Albanian ports did not have the capacity to supply the armies, as they were only able to handle 3,500 tons of supplies a day; the Italian Army needed 10,000 tons. Soon the port of Durazzo was congested with 70 ships waiting to unload while 30,000 tons of supplies were piled on the docks.5
General Wavell, after a meeting of the Defence Committee, was authorised to send a further infantry brigade to defend the Greek Islands and Suda Bay on Crete in particular. An infantry battalion would be sent out via Gibraltar to Wavell, along with reinforcements for Malta and the Eastern Fleet; this was while Operation Sea Lion still remained a possibility at home.
During October and the early days of November there was a great deal of traffic through the waters of the Mediterranean, as men and materiel were ferried from Italy to Albania. British convoys moved from their main bases to outposts around Greece in the Aegean Sea. Most Italian moves were beyond the striking distance of British forces; however the Royal Navy and its convoys were subjected to continuous raids by the Regia Aeronautica. And all the time Admiral Campioni was waiting at Taranto to pounce on any weak detachment if it strayed within his range.
Admiral Cunningham had for some time considered attacking the Italian battle fleet in their harbour at Taranto. By October 1940 there were six battleships there with numerous cruisers and destroyers, safe from surface attack. The planned raid on Taranto had been about for several years. First hatched in 1935 when Italy invaded Abyssinia, the then C-in-C Mediterranean Fleet Admiral Sir William Wordsworth Fisher had planned to use aircraft from the carrier Glorious to attack the fleet at Taranto, but at the time Britain took no action.
Three years later in March 1938, tension was high again when Hitler annexed Austria. Admiral Sir Dudley Pound then commanded in the Mediterranean, while on board Glorious was Captain Lumley St George Lyster who was to become one of the mainstays of the Fleet Air Arm. His squadrons had become highly proficient at night flying.
With the help of his Commander Flying, Guy Willougby and the senior observer Commander Lachlan Mackintosh, they revised the 1935 plan, while the three Swordfish squadrons conducted intensive training. The crisis passed and the plan was locked away in a safe aboard the Glorious, and may have gone to the bottom with her when she was sunk off Norway.
Lyster had arrived with Illustrious as Rear Admiral Carriers. Cunningham wrote of his first meeting with him.
At our first interview he brought up the matter of an attack on the Italian fleet in Taranto harbour, and I gave him every encouragement to develop the idea. It had, of course, already been mentioned in my correspondence with Sir Dudley Pound, though to him the operation always appeared as the last dying kick of the Mediterranean carrier before being sent to the bottom. To Admiral Lyster and myself the project seemed to involve no unusual danger.6
So Operation Judgement was born. The RAF increased reconnaissance flights over Taranto providing photographs of the two harbours – the large outer harbour Mar Grande, and the smaller inner harbour Mar Piccolo – the defences and shore facilities. Both carriers were to be used in the operation. The date was set as 21 October, Trafalgar Day, although the fact it was a moonlit night was more pertinent.
It was almost as if once the date of the operation was set the fates turned against the Fleet Air Arm. The Swordfish aircraft had to be fitted with long range tanks to enable them to reach Taranto while keeping the carrier out of harm’s way, which were fitted into the middle cockpit thus reducing the crew and moving the observer to the rear cockpit. While the modification work was being carried out on Illustrious a fire broke out; the sprinkler system on the hanger deck saved most of the aircraft, but two were burnt out, while five others were damaged by fire and the salt water from the sprinklers. All the aircraft had to be stripped down and rebuilt, after being cleaned with fresh water. Even though many members of the squadrons helped with the work, there was no alternative but to postpone the raid to 31 October which would make it more difficult as there would be limited moonlight.
It was only realised days before the raid was due that it would now depend much more on light from flares. They had to get it right; there would be no second chance. So it was postponed again to the next moonlit night, 11/12 November.
The carriers would leave Alexandria with the rest of the fleet to cover convoys to Greece, Crete and Malta. A good cover for the operation for secrecy was vital. Force H would come into the western basin attacking Cagliari with aircraft from Ark Royal. Convoy MW3 would sail from Alexandria to Malta and the empty ships ME3 from Malta to Alexandria. Also the battleship Barham, cruisers Glasgow and Berwick and six destroyers after dropping troops at Malta would move through to join the Mediterranean Fleet.
On 4 November the first of the convoys began. However, ill fate struck again. The carrier Eagle had suffered numerous near misses in Italian bombing raids but this strain led to a breakdown in the ship’s aviation fuel system, and her ageing boilers were troublesome. Further delays were out of the question with winter weather approaching. Like many of the Royal Navy’s ships, Eagle was old and due to operational demands long overdue a refit. Without Eagle it meant 24 aircraft would now be available instead of 30; this included six aircraft transferred from Eagle to Illustrious.
On 6 November Illustrious set sail from Alexandria accompanied by four battleships as well as cruisers and destroyers. Her Fulmars providing air cover for the fleet and convoys. Charles Lamb recalled the final briefing for the Swordfish crews on board Illustrious.
In the wardroom a large scale map of Taranto and a magnificent collection of enlarged prints of the photographs I had brought out from Malta were pinned to cardboard backings and on display. It was possible to study every aspect of the harbour and its defences, and the balloons; and, of course all the ships in detail.
All the Italian capital ships and some of the heavy cruisers were protected by anti-torpedo nets, hung from booms, shielding the ships down to the keels. However the torpedoes carried by the Swordfish were fitted with Duplex Pistols, a magnetic device which would explode on contact or would be activated by the ship’s magnetic field. The torpedoes to be used were set to pass under the hulls avoiding the nets.7
The use of torpedoes made the operation hazardous, as the aircraft would be forced to come in low. The dropping area was known to be restricted by balloons; for this reason no more than six torpedo-bombers were to be used at a time. The attack would be formed in two waves an hour apart. In each wave there would be two aircraft dropping flares to the east of the anchorage to light up the battleships. Also, more as a diversion, bombing attacks would be made on the inner harbour.
However bad luck had still not deserted the British forces. Swordfish aircraft maintained reconnaissance patrols, in particular on the lookout for enemy submarines as the f
leet steamed west. On 10 November one of 819’s Swordfish, an Illustrious aircraft, had its engine cut out 20 miles from the ship. The pilot tried to glide the aircraft back to the carrier but it was too far and the plane crashed in the sea. Both crewmen were picked up, returning to Illustrious in a cruiser’s Walrus aircraft. One aircraft suffering engine failure was not that unusual, but the next morning another aircraft suffered the same fate. It was quickly found that one of the ship’s aviation fuel tanks had been contaminated by seawater, probably due to the hanger fire and the use of the sprinkler system. All aircraft to be used on Operation Judgement had their fuel systems drained and refuelled.
By the late afternoon of 11 November the latest aerial photographs were flown to Illustrious; they showed five battleships in the outer harbour, and a flying boat had reported a sixth entering. They were about 200 miles from the target. Fulmers shot down two Italian spotter planes which might have raised the alarm but did not, as they were no doubt surprised by the fighters directed onto them by the radar on Illustrious.
Admiral Cunningham signalled Illustrious about 18:00, along with her cruisers and destroyers to proceed with ‘orders for Operation Judgement. Good luck then to your lads in their enterprise. Their success may well have a most important bearing on the course of the war in the Mediterranean.’8
Two hours later Illustrious was 40 miles 270° from Kabbo Point, Cephalonia, and 170 miles from the target.
Shortly before 20:30 the first wave of Swordfish from 813, 815, and 824 Squadrons led by Lieutenant-Commander Kenneth Williamson started lumbering off the flight deck of Illustrious with their heavy loads, clawing at the air to gain height. Williamson led them up into cloud at 4,500 feet, turning toward the west and immediately lost contact with the others. At 7,500 feet he emerged into clear moonlight to find he had lost four aircraft, he was not overly concerned it was accepted they would make their own way to the target 90 minutes flying time away.
The second strike led by Lieutenant-Commander J.W. ‘Ginger’ Hale CO of 819 Squadron took off an hour later. His flight was reduced to eight aircraft, five armed with torpedoes, the others with bombs and flares.
Charles Lamb’s aircraft L5B was a flare dropper; from 50 miles out they could see lights from the harbour. As they got closer the defences came to life.
The sky over the harbour looked like it sometimes does over Mount Etna, in Sicily, when the great volcano erupts. The darkness was being torn apart by a firework display which spat flame into the night to a height of nearly 5,000 feet.9
Just before 23:00 the flare droppers and bombers of the first wave left formation for their tasks; all aircraft had rendezvoused at the target.
The moon was three-quarters full, and to the east flares were brightly illuminating the battleships ahead as the torpedo bombers peeled off to the westward for their final approach. The two sub-flights of three came in toward the anchorage across Cape Rondinella and San Pietro Island, dropping down to 30 feet skimming across the water. Anti-aircraft fire flashed toward them from shore batteries and the ships.
The first aircraft attacked the southernmost battleship, the Cavour, the torpedo struck home but the aircraft was badly damaged and crashed into the water near the floating dock.
A minute later Littorio was struck under the starboard bow by a torpedo from the second flight. Minutes later she was hit again on the port quarter. The other torpedoes from the first wave missed, exploded prematurely, or failed to go off. The flare dropping aircraft, having completed their primary task, switched to bombing the oil storage tanks, while other bombers swooped on the ships in the inner harbour, mostly cruisers and destroyers, where they were moored with sterns against the jetty.
The approach of the second wave was the same. The five torpedobombers came in and struck the Duilio on the starboard side and hit the Littorio again; a fourth hit on this ship failed to explode.
Lieutenant Michael Torrens-Spence, Swordfish torpedo-bomber pilot:
During the attack a hundred thousand rounds were fired at us but only one aircraft was shot down in each wave. I got hit underneath by one half-inch machine gun bullet. It was the pilot’s job to aim the torpedo. Nobody was given a specific target. I dived down in between the moored ships aimed at the nearest big one, which turned out to be the Littorio, and released my torpedo. While you’re low down over the water and surrounded by enemy ships the comfort is that they can’t shoot at you without shooting each other. I then made for the entrance to the harbour at zero feet and thence back to Illustrious. 10
The Vittorio Veneto and the heavy cruiser Gorizia were attacked but escaped unscathed. The Italians, as Lieutenant Torrens-Spence indicated, had a great dilemma firing at aircraft only 30 feet above the surface of the harbour, as it meant hitting their own ships and the town and harbour facilities of Taranto. Generally they lifted their angle of fire. Had they maintained fire at water level it is possible few aircraft would have reached their targets, instead of only two being shot down.
The first wave, less one aircraft, arrived back on board Illustrious four and a half hours after taking off. The one aircraft lost was that of their leader Williamson, who with his observer was taken prisoner. By 03:00 the second wave, also less one aircraft, was back on board. Swordfish E4H was lost, shot down attacking the cruiser Gorizia. Lieutenants A. Bayley and H.J. Slaughter were both killed when their aircraft blew up. Bayley’s body was found after the war and buried at Taranto; it was later moved to the military cemetery at Bari, and there maintained by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission. Slaughter’s body was never recovered.11
During the next day, 12 November, Italian aircraft tried to locate the British fleet, and in particular Illustrious. Some of these aircraft were shot down by Fulmars, and they failed to find any ships. It had been intended to repeat the attack the next night but weather conditions deteriorated. However that night ten RAF Wellington bombers from Malta attacked the inner harbour and set the Agip oil tanks on fire.12
Air reconnaissance photographs over Taranto showed the Cavour beached. The Littorio and Duilio were seriously damaged. It looked like two cruisers had been hit by bombs.
The first Supermarina had known of the raid was when they received frantic telephone calls from Taranto. Commander Bragadin was on duty in the operations room at Rome that night. ‘Bulletin followed on bulletin. It seemed that a great naval battle had been lost, and no one yet knew if and when it would be possible to recover from the grave consequences of it.’
Salvage work was quickly underway at Taranto.
The Littorio and Duilio were ‘out of danger’ within a few days and were sent to ship yards for repair. Moving the Littorio was a particularly delicate operation because divers discovered an unexploded torpedo in the mud under the keel.13
Littorio and Duilio were rapidly repaired and ready for sea by May 1941. The Cavour could not be refloated until July 1941, and then she was towed to Trieste for repair, but this had not been completed by the armistice in 1943.
The main objective of the British attack had been successfully achieved. Half the Italian battle fleet had been put out of action, albeit temporarily. Illustrious soon rejoined the fleet to be welcomed by a signal from the flagship. ‘Illustrious manoeuvre well executed.’14
Italian losses of the night of 11/12 November were not confined to Taranto. Admiral Pridham-Wippell had taken his cruisers and destroyers north, raiding the convoy route between Albania and Italy. A convoy of four merchantmen heading for Brindisi was sighted with two escorts; a short action followed in which all four ships were sunk.
The Taranto raid made a profound impression around the world; here was proof that a fleet was not safe in harbour. The effect on the balance of power in the Mediterranean was immediate, for all major Italian warships left Taranto for more secure ports on the west coast of Italy, thus reducing the threat to British convoy routes through the Mediterranean and to Greece.
Winston Churchill announced to the House of Commons that the Fleet Air Arm had
‘annihilated the Italian fleet forever.’ Something of an exaggeration but it was one of Britain’s first victories and a welcome boost for morale.
Ciano wrote in his diary:
12 November
A black day. The British have attacked the Italian fleet at anchor in Taranto without warning and have sunk the dreadnought Cavour … I thought I would find the Duce downhearted. Instead, he took the blow quite well and does not at the moment seem to have fully realised its gravity. When Badoglio [Marshal Pietro Badoglio Chief of the General Staff] last came to see me at the Palazzo Chigi, he said that when we attacked Greece we should immediately move the fleet, which would no longer be safe in the port of Taranto, why was this not done?15
Notes
1 Lamb, Charles, War in a Stringbag p.74
2 Ibid p.41
3 Wragg, David, Swordfish The Story of the Taranto Raid. p.75
4 Ciano, G. Ciano’s Diary 1937–1943 p.392
5 Bragadin, M.A. The Italian Navy in World War II p.42
6 Cunningham, A. B. A Sailor’s Odyssey p.273
7 Lamb, p.104
8 Cunningham, p.285
9 Lamb, p.105
10 Arthur, Max, Lost Voices of the Royal Navy p.267–268
11 Wragg, p.129
12 Playfair, Major-General I.S.O. The Mediterranean & Middle East Volume I p.237
13 Bragadin, p.45–47
14 Cunningham, p.286
15 Ciano, p.395
7
Cape Spartivento
Days after the raid on Taranto Admiral Cunningham informed the Admiralty that with the arrival of Barham he could release Ramillies, a welcome piece of news given the activity of German raiders in the Atlantic. The cruisers Berwick and Newcastle would also return to the Home Fleet.
A plan was formed to send a fast convoy through the Mediterranean, three merchant ships, two for Malta and one for Alexandria, escorted by the 6-inch gun cruisers Manchester and Southampton, each cruiser carrying hundreds of RAF airmen, reinforcements for units in Egypt that had sent men to Greece. To the north and west Force H, Renown, Ark Royal and the cruisers Sheffield and Despatch would provide support.
