by Mark Simmons
My aircraft was ordered to alight ahead of Warspite in the grain of the fleet. With the crane swung out on the starboard side, the plan was to hook on as the ship steamed up to overtake the aircraft, taxiing on a parallel course.
Luckily for PO Rice, the pilot, the sea was flat calm, and they began to taxi ahead of the ship at ten knots with the 30,000-ton battleship Warspite coming up astern at 20 knots.
We had never practised this method of recovery and were a good deal disturbed by the bow wave. However, I was able to con PO Rice to a position under the grab hook and Lieutenant-Commander Copeman, with whom I had a good understanding in the recovery operation hoisted us quickly clear of the water as soon as I gave the hooked-on signal.
The aircraft was put straight back on the catapult and refuelled. Bolt found out later Warspite had still been steaming at 18 knots throughout the recovery process.
At 17:45 less than an hour after coming back on board, Warspite’s Swordfish K 8863 took to the air again. According to PO Pacey the TAG, ‘The last thing I did before take-off was to grab three flame floats as I realised that we were going to have to alight at night on the open sea with no organised flame-path.’9
At Maleme on Crete the men of 815 Squadron Fleet Air Arm were hard at work; as soon as their first strike returned at 13:30 they tried to get another ready, but were short of aircraft. Also communications were difficult, since the cruiser York had been badly damaged. Maleme airfield had a small transmitter-receiver but it had a limited range. To try and get more information a Fulmer was sent out to try and find Vittorio Veneto and check her position, course and speed before launching a second strike.
Lieutenant Michael Torrens-Spence:
On 28 March, when we were refitting at Eieusis because of no moon, I was ordered to Crete with all available torpedo-armed aircraft, which amounted to just two. We landed at Maleme in Crete at about noon and given a position, course and speed of the Italian fleet … We took off at 17:00 for a dusk attack.10
He had brought with him the last remaining torpedo in Greece. Admiral Cunningham’s surface fleet had had no visual contact of the enemy since Vittorio Veneto had broken off the action minutes before noon. Aircraft reports had come in thick and fast during the afternoon but were confused concerning the composition and disposition of the Italian fleet.
It now became necessary to establish surface touch with the enemy, so at 4:44p.m. Vice Admiral Pridham-Wippell was ordered to press on at full speed and get into visual touch with the retreating enemy. The destroyers Nubian and Mowhawk were also sent ahead to form a visual signal link between Pridham-Wippell’s cruisers and the battle fleet.11
Cunningham wisely began organising his forces for the possibility of night action. A striking force of eight destroyers under Captain Philip Mack of the Jervis were to be on hand if the cruisers of VALF made contact with Vittorio Veneto to launch a night torpedo attack; if necessary, he was willing to commit his battleships to night action. If his ships failed to make contact he intended to work round to the north and northwest hoping to catch the Vittorio Veneto at dawn. He also ordered Formidable to launch another air strike at dusk. However by now Formidable was running short of aircraft, she recalled all her search aircraft except 4F Lieutenant Ellis who continued shadowing the Italian fleet.
Around 16:00 the Vittorio Veneto was underway but with greatly reduced speed; in fact at 15:30 she had stopped altogether. She was listing to port and was down by the stern. The explosion of the torpedo had broken the main shaft of the outer port engine; the inner port engine’s lubricating system was contaminated by sea water causing the suspension bearings of the shaft to seize up. This meant that only the starboard engines were working, and the vessel had to be steered by keeping the rudders to starboard and this had to be done by hand. However, by 17:00 – much to the credit of her engineering staff – she was making 19 knots.
Admiral Iachino was 420 miles from Taranto, a fair distance to go in a crippled ship that was hard to manoeuvre. He expected more air attacks before nightfall and destroyer attacks by night. At 16:15 he received an air sighting report of British destroyers reaching west from the Cerigotta channel. He was sure that Admiral Cunningham had ordered these ships from Suda Bay to attack him.
He still had little idea the British battle fleet was so close and closing on him. To combat possible air and destroyer attacks he decided to form his fleet into a defensive box with Vittorio Veneto at the centre with cruisers and destroyers on both sides. They would then be able to put up a wall of anti-aircraft fire. If aircraft came he expected them at dusk, when he would also use smokescreens. After nightfall he would change course to try and shake off any pursing destroyers.
The Italian fleet formed into five lines, with Vittorio Veneto in the centre, two destroyers ahead and two astern. The 3rd Cruiser Division took up station on the port beam 1,000 yards away leading Trento, followed by Trieste and Bolzano, with three destroyers a further 1,000 yards out forming an outer screen. On the starboard beam formed Admiral Cattaneo’s 1st Cruiser Division ships in which Iachino had served. He had been in Zara during the Abyssinian war and Pola had been his own flagship until December 1940. He knew the officers and men; the Captain, De Pisa, had been his own flag captain, a capable officer and friend.Fiume had been his flagship in 1938 at the naval review in Naples. The ill-fated squadron was special to him. Four destroyers formed the outer screen, while the light cruisers Abruzzi and Garibaldi were instructed to return to their base at Brindisi. By 18:00 all the ships were in position.12
Vittorio Veneto was still listing although the pumps kept the flooding down; her starboard engines were working normally. The possibility of sea water entering their lubricating system was a constant worry. However another problem came up; a signal intercepted by Vittorio Veneto’s cipher experts revealed an air attack was to be carried out against them at sunset by aircraft from Crete. Supermarina did not forward this signal to Iachino until 21:00, by which time the attack was over.
About 18:23 the first enemy aircraft was spotted astern keeping their distance, circling like vultures waiting for dusk. It soon became clear that there were nine aircraft.13
Notes
1 Playfair, Major-General I.S.O. The Mediterranean and Middle East Volume II p.64
2 Poolman, Kenneth, Experiences of War: The British Sailor p.125
3 Bragadin, M.A. The Italian Navy in World War II p.89
4 Cunningham, A. B. A Sailor’s Odyssey p.329
5 Bragadin, p.101
6 Ibid p.90
7 Ibid p.90
8 Pack, S.W.C. The Battle of Matapan p.83
9 Poolman, p.125–126
10 Arthur, Max, Lost Voices of the Royal Navy p.270
11 Cunningham, p.329
12 Seth, Ronald, Two Fleets Surprised: The Battle of Matapan p.96
13 Bragadin, p.91
15
Attack at Dusk
I shall go at them at once, if I can, about one-third of the line from their leading ship … I think it will surprise and confound the enemy … It will bring on a pell-mell battle, and that is what I want. Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson off Cape Trafalgar, October 1805.1
At 18:20 Warspite’s Swordfish, with Bolt on board. sighted the Vittorio Veneto. He estimated her speed at 12–15 knots. At this speed it would take the British battle fleet at least four hours to get within gun range so all now rested on the destroyer attack, and Formidable’s third strike, to slow the enemy further. Bolt kept sending out a stream of messages, which Vittorio Veneto was soon reading. They were surprised at the accuracy of his messages regarding speed and course.
The aircraft which had been spotted by Italian lookouts were Formidable’s third strike force, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander W.H.G. Saunt in 4A composed of six Albacores of 826 Squadron and two Swordfish of 829 Squadron. They were soon joined by two Swordfish from Maleme, Crete, of 815 Squadron. According to Lieutenant Michael Torrens-Spence:
My young observer, Sub-Lieutenant Peter Winter, did a go
od job and found the enemy. Before attacking we had to circle for a long time until the light conditions were right. While doing so a mixture of eight Swordfish and Albacores … arrived from Formidable, flying in line at low level.2
The Fulmar fighter sent out to find Vittorio Veneto from Maleme returned about 16:00 with the location. Three Swordfish took off for the strike, but one developed engine trouble and had to turn back at about 17:15. The sea was calm, the evening fine as the aircraft circled waiting for the sun to sink in the west, the Italian ships below steaming steadily on.
About 18:15 Admiral Iachino ordered his fleet to change course 30° to port to try and shake off the aircraft. The two destroyers astern of the flagship began to make smoke. To avoid ramming the two destroyers ahead he ordered them to move 10°, one to port and one to starboard and they began making smoke, while the cruisers turned on their searchlights to blind the attacking pilots.3
Alpino, the last destroyer of the centre column, reported the aircraft were beginning their approach. By 19:30 it was almost dark although the ships were clearly silhouetted against the western sky. Iachino ordered the fleet to again change course 30° to starboard bringing the fleet back onto its original course. Soon the destroyers began firing, and then the cruisers joined in. Lieutenant Michael Torrens-Spence watched the Formidable’s aircraft attack:
The enemy was in very close formation with all ships making smoke which obliged Saunt’s aircraft to drop their torpedoes in succession outside the smoke screen.
At that time we still had no radio communication between aircraft, so that, even if Saunt could have thought out a better tactic, he had no means of ordering it.
The Maleme aircraft were free to attack as they saw fit. Torrens-Spence found a gap in the smokescreen into which he dived from the southwest. ‘I descended into this space and aimed my torpedo at very short range at an easily identifiable cruiser of the Pola class.’4 The attacking aircraft were met by a heavy barrage of anti-aircraft fire and the blinding effect of searchlights.
Lieutenant-Commander Bolt in the Warspite Swordfish K 8863 watched the attack from about five miles astern of the Italian fleet. He was frustrated he could not join in because his aircraft carried no bombs. ‘The attack was most spectacular, the Italian fleet pouring out vast quantities of coloured tracer from their close-range weapons.’5 Lieutenant Hopkins, the observer of Albacore 4A:
While waiting for the right light conditions we joined up with two Swordfish which had come out on their own from Crete. At first we thought they were Italian CR 42 bi-plane fighters and we spent some time dodging them. When we eventually went into attack from the dark side with the Italians silhouetted against the last glow of light in the west, we found we had been spotted at long range and were met with an impassable barrage of fire. We were forced to withdraw and split up and come in again individually from different angles.6
After the attack Formidable’s aircraft could not return to the carrier in the dark so they flew on to Suda Bay, where they landed between 21:00 and 23:00. 5A ran out of fuel and ditched in the sea; fortunately the destroyer Juno picked up the crew.
Whether it was Torrens-Spence or Lieutenant Kiggell with the second Maleme Swordfish who hit the cruiser Pola is hard to say, but it was likely to have been one of these aircraft. According to Torrens-Spence, ‘It was subsequently confirmed by Italian prisoners-of-war that the Pola class cruiser was hit by a single aircraft attacking in the manner I described some minutes after the main attack.’7
Commander Bolt with Swordfish K 8863 was relieved of his shadowing role at 19:50 and told to return to Suda Bay. However they did not feel confident to land in Suda Bay, as it ‘was steep [and] narrow, and with all the shore lights blacked out was not the sort of place to take liberties with on a very dark night.’ The Swordfish put down in the sea at 21:25, PO Rice making a good landing, and they taxied five miles into the bay, identifying themselves to patrol boats with the aldis lamp. They had been airborne for eight hours, a remarkable flight.8
Back on board Warspite, Cunningham had some hard decisions to make; about 19:30 he received reports from the third strike of probable hits. Meanwhile the VALF reported enemy ships about nine miles from him to the northwest.
Now came the difficult moment of deciding what to do … it would be foolish not to make every effort to complete the Vittorio Veneto’s destruction. At the same time it appeared to us the Italian Admiral must have been fully aware of our position. He had numerous cruisers and destroyers in company … for attacks on the pursuing fleet. Some of my staff argued that it would be unwise to charge blindly after the retreating enemy with our three heavy ships, and the Formidable also on our hands, to run the risk of ships being crippled … I paid respectful attention to this opinion, and as the discussion happened to coincide with my time for dinner I told them I would have my evening meal and would see how I felt afterwards.9
After dinner Cunningham still felt confident that his fleet could perform successfully at night and was unwilling to let the enemy off the hook. Cunningham resolved to accept the risk of night action. If he delayed until daylight, the enemy would be under fighter cover and the Stukas would be waiting for the British Fleet.’10 By 20:40 Cunningham had made up his mind to accept the risk of night action. He ordered the 2nd and 14th Destroyer Flotillas under the command of Captain Mack to find and attack the enemy; he would follow with the battle fleet.11
Geoffrey Barnard, the fleet gunnery officer, watched and spoke with Cunningham that night and he saw the ‘well-known steely blue look in ABC’s eye, and the staff had no doubt that there was going to be a party.’ Cunningham seemed high on adrenalin, quite unlike the picture his own reminiscences paint of a calm, calculating man paying ‘respectful attention’ to his own staff. Barnard says he told them: ‘You’re a pack of yellow-livered skunks. I’ll go and have my supper now and see after supper if my morale isn’t higher than yours.’12 One biography of Cunningham compares his going to dinner with Francis Drake calmly playing bowls. Of course there was little either commander could do at their respective times. But Cunningham hardly appears calm at any time like this, it was not his nature.13
On board Vittorio Veneto Admiral Iachino did appear calm. However he was still largely ignorant of the bigger picture, and might have been more agitated had he been better informed. Even after the dusk air attack it was some time before he was told that the heavy cruiser Pola had been hit. Before learning this he had been cheered by the fact that Vittorio Veneto could increase speed to 19 knots, and he revised his formation. Admiral Cattaneo’s 1st Cruiser Division was ordered to take up station 5,000 yards ahead of the flagship, while Admiral Sansonetti’s 3rd Division went 5,000 yards astern, both with their escorting destroyers. The 13th Destroyer Flotilla formed a close escort around Vittorio Veneto.
About this time a signal came in from Supermarina that D/F had learnt the enemy flagship had been transmitting to Alexandria at 17:45, only 40 miles off Cape Krio, at the south-western end of Crete. This put the British fleet much closer, 75 miles from Vittorio Veneto. However he though this message was based on interpretative error, and he was inclined to believe it was more than likely the VALF group of cruisers. Also Supermarina had not seemed unduly alarmed and had not made any recommendations.
However, soon more pressing concerns claimed Admiral Iachino’s attention; Vittorio Veneto had picked up a signal from the cruiser Zara to Pola asking her condition. Obviously something was wrong. Fiume – which had been behind Pola – had seen her losing speed and then stopping altogether during the attack and had signalled Zara. A message, for some reason, that the flagship did not pick up. It soon became clear that Pola had been hit by a torpedo at the end of the attack and was in serious trouble. By this time she was several miles astern as the fleet had sailed on.
Admiral Iachino had little choice but to send a ship back to assess Pola’s damage. With unknown British surface units at sea and possibly coming into the area he decided Admiral Cattaneo should return to Po
la’s aid with his division, Zara, Fiume and the 9th Destroyer Flotilla.
Admiral Cattaneo had intended to send back two destroyers. Iachino did not believe this was sufficient force to deal with the situation: to take off Pola’s crew if necessary or to take the stricken cruiser in tow. By this time Cattaneo had a better idea of the state of Pola from her commander. She had been hit aft, one of her engine rooms was flooded and boilers 4,5, 6 and 7, and she was requesting a tow.14
Notes
1 Schom, Alan, Trafalgar: Countdown to Battle 1803–1805 p.307
2 Arthur, Max, Lost Voices of the Royal Navy.p.270
3 Bragadin, M.A. The Italian Navy in World War II p.91
4 Arthur, p.270–271
5 Pack, S.W.C. The Battle of Matapan p.93
6 Ibid p.95
7 Arthur, p.271
8 Pack, p.95–96
9 Cunningham A. B. A Sailor’s Odyssey p.330
10 Navy Records Society. The Cunningham Papers p.238
11 Playfair, Major-General I.S.O. The Mediterranean and Middle East Volume II p.66
12 Pack, p.97–98
13 Pack, S.W.C. Cunningham the Commander p.143
14 Bragadin, p.90
16
Night Action 28/29 March
Admiral Iachino, although concerned, was confident that due to Pola’s construction they would be able to salvage her. He still thought no British surface units were nearby. But he did signal Admiral Cattaneo: ‘In case of encounter with superior forces, abandon Pola.’ It was 21:06 when Cattaneo turned back with his ships toward Pola. 1
Iachino informed Supermarina of his actions and that he intended to make for Taranto with the Vittorio Veneto and the 3rd Cruiser Division. About 20:45 he had altered course to 323° heading for the Gulf of Taranto at 19 knots.
On Warspite after Cunningham had finished dinner he ordered his destroyer force of eight ships
… to find and attack the enemy. We settled down to a steady pursuit with some doubts in our minds as to how the four destroyers remaining with the battle fleet would deal with the enemy destroyer attacks if the Italians decided to make them. At this stage the enemy fleet was estimated to be 33 miles ahead making good about fifteen knots.2
