by Uzi Eilam
“Touché, well played,” said Bernard to Dan. “So, can we regard Dan’s update as an all’s-clear siren?” Bernard asked, looking at Gideon.
“This particular balloon certainly appears to have lost all its air,” replied Gideon. “But let’s not forget that there are more balloons on the way.”
Chapter 33
Professor Bernard was troubled. It would have been easy for the task force to rest on its laurels after its success at Lisbon Portela Airport, he thought. But it was the potential for precisely this kind of relaxation that concerned him. A round of phone calls to Gideon and Deutsch had convinced him to call a meeting of the full task force. Their work had been split up among smaller teams for many days, and task force members were happy to have a chance to meet. Invitations had also been extended to the two French and American special forces commanders.
“Good morning, ladies and gentlemen,” Bernard said, opening the meeting. “I thought it might be advantageous for us to meet today to engage in some self-critique of our work so far.”
“That’s an excellent idea,” agreed General de Villiers, who had been uninvolved in the task force’s work in recent days. “We could all benefit from being brought up to speed on what’s been happening and better preparing ourselves for what lies ahead.” He threw a glance at Dominique, who began recording the meeting proceedings in shorthand and never raised her head.
“Our ambushes to prevent the smuggling of prohibited materials via the Pyrenees Mountains ended in failure, and we need to assess why. Was it faulty functioning of our listening system? Inaccurate interpretation of our communications findings? Or perhaps successful deception on the part of the Iranians?” Bernard wondered aloud.
“I’d like to emphasize,” Bar-Oz said loudly, “that the preparations for the ambushes in the Pyrenees and the work of the special forces were successful. I think we can regard the level of readiness and the degree of coordination between the two forces as a success. This ability was manifested in action later, during the operations to stop the flight out of Portugal—”
“Thank you,” said Bernard tersely, cutting Haim off. “We’ll get to the intercept operation in Portugal later. We were able to establish a relationship with the Swiss government, and our coordinated effort to identify and stop the transfer of Iranian funds for the purpose of illegal procurement continues. On this note, I’d like to acknowledge the work of the monitoring team headed by John O’Connor, with General Bar-Oz and Madame de Saint-Germaine.” Dominique lifted her eyes from the shorthand pad and exchanged glances with Haim. These looks did not go unnoticed by de Villiers, who did not say a word.
“We’ve established an intelligence system focused on the issues our task force was charged with addressing,” Bernard continued. “Dan Avni is to be commended for his work, in cooperation with people from the US embassy here in Paris, to build an apparatus without which we would be in the dark. We also possess other means of intelligence gathering, which prudence prevents us from revealing at this point in time.” Bernard’s gaze moved quickly from Gideon to Dominique, and then to Deutsch.
“Our team of Dan Avni and local NSA personnel truly has been a success story,” Deutsch agreed.
“Our intelligence apparatus has enabled us to learn a great deal about the Iranians’ movements,” Bernard continued. “And let’s not forget our discovery of the tunnel the Iranians spent months digging, the one between the Iranian embassy and one of their local safe houses. We must admit that the Iranians appear to be aware of our discovery and are using activity in the tunnel to pass on false information. We have no idea how the Iranians learned that we had discovered the tunnel—”
“If I may, Professor Bernard,” Haim said, interrupting the professor. “Enough marks were left on the walls of the tunnel where the Sewage Authority discovered it to lead to these conclusions. It also appears that the monitoring devices that were installed in the tunnel were not sufficiently concealed.”
Gideon could not understand what had irked Haim and shot him a questioning glance. Bernard quickly made eye contact with Dr. Deutsch with an expression indicating that he had no interest in addressing the subject.
“The crowning achievement of our efforts,” Bernard continued, “was undoubtedly the operation at Lisbon Portela Airport. Our failure to prevent the planes from taking off with their Iran-bound cargo from their points of departure in Cologne and Beauvais appears to have been the result of information the Iranians received ahead of time.” Bernard refrained from looking in Haim’s direction. “We turned this failure into a success by executing the backup plan for the operation in Portugal, which enabled us to confiscate the cargo and take the deputy director of the Portuguese airport into custody.”
“We are still in the process of investigating our own companies, particularly Peugeot and Safran,” General de Villiers chimed in, in response to the invitation in Bernard’s eyes. “We still have not identified those responsible for selling the parts to the Iranians. We’ve interviewed a number of executives, and it seems that large sums of money persuaded good people to cooperate with the Iranians. The contact people who operated on behalf of the Iranians have also not been identified, although we have a number of suspects.”
“I’d like to continue in a vein similar to that of General de Villiers,” O’Connor interjected.
“Go ahead, John,” Bernard said.
“We can’t allow ourselves to be satisfied with our clear success in Portugal, and this is certainly not the time to be praising ourselves. As for our failure to apprehend the planes and the cargo at their points of departure, we’re fortunate that our backup plan worked. This is an important part of operations that we need to remember: always recognizing the possibility of failure and being ready with a backup plan. We’ve also learned that the Iranians will spare no expense bribing people to achieve their goals. This is a well-known method, and many a good man has been taken in by it. We should be troubled by the failure of our ambushes in the Pyrenees Mountains—”
“I disagree!” Bar-Oz broke in.
“I was referring to the intelligence failure, General Bar-Oz, not the fitness of the special forces, which no one disputes,” O’Connor clarified. “We also need to remember that there are Iranian Quds Force operatives working here in Paris. We still haven’t identified their activity, that is, unless we count Gideon and Dan’s ski accident at Val Thorens. Was it really an accident caused by a couple of young, wild snowboarders? Or was it actually something more intentional and menacing? I would continue looking into it and find out what really caused the accident,” O’Connor said with conviction.
Now Deutsch joined the discussion. “I’d like to add the danger of moles, which the Iranians may have cultivated here. We’ve seen their abilities in other contexts in the past, and I have no doubt that it’s also a concrete danger here. Uncovering moles is no simple matter until they actually start operating and compromise themselves in some way. Our awareness of the threat should help us minimize the damage by discovering the moles as soon as possible after they emerge from their burrows.”
Numerous thoughts passed through Bernard’s mind as he listened to the proceedings. O’Connor’s and Deutsch’s remarks were extremely logical and insightful, and he wondered whether the time had come to settle with Gideon on how to deal with the Israeli general. Why had General de Villiers only defended the General Secretariat’s failure to effectively supervise French companies? Why had Gideon and Dan refrained from saying anything the entire meeting? And what about Dominique, who was wise and intelligent but had also said nothing at the meeting? What did she know? Did her role as Kayghobadi’s handler require her to remain silent? It suddenly dawned on Bernard that the questions produced by the meeting far exceeded the answers it had generated and that there was no effective way to continue the discussion.
“I believe we’ve identified our successes as well as the lessons we can learn from our failure
s,” Bernard said, attempting to bring the meeting to a close. “We’re all leaving this table with substantial food for thought and important issues to analyze. Thank you all.”
“Do you two have a few minutes?” Bernard asked Gideon and Dr. Deutsch quietly as the other task force members began filing out of the room. “I’d like to speak with you.”
When the three were alone, Gideon spoke. “It was a strange meeting, which muddied the waters for me instead of clarifying things. I’m not certain we really have things under control here.”
“My sentiments exactly,” Bernard replied. “What are your thoughts, Deutsch?”
“I also feel like things here are somehow slipping through our fingers,” Deutsch admitted. “I don’t think it would do any harm for us Americans to consult with the relevant parties back home.”
“You took the words right out of my mouth,” said Gideon quickly. “I also think it would be wise to brief our superiors in Israel on the situation and get an independent opinion.” He did not mention Dan’s findings regarding Haim Bar-Oz’s activities, but both Bernard and Deutsch knew that this would be the primary issue addressed by Gideon during his visit to Israel.
“Perhaps the French delegation should also begin thinking more flexibly,” Bernard said, echoing the sentiments of his two colleagues. “I also feel uncomfortable in a number of areas. I’m not comfortable with how easy it was for the Iranians to mobilize support and recruit collaborators within our companies. General de Villiers will need to work harder than ever to convince us that he’s truly in control of the division of the General Secretariat that’s responsible for the supervision of defense exports. I’m also not at ease about the issue you raised, Dr. Deutsch, and I’m not at all certain how many moles we have in our midst. I feel better about the decoding of communications, and I know that Dan and his colleagues at the American embassy have built a high-quality listening system that allows the collection of reliable information for analysis. In my opinion, Dan’s most prominent accomplishment has been his ability to penetrate the mobile phones of enemy agents and to use them to extract information and in other productive ways.”
“I’d like to point out something else troubling,” Gideon said. “I’m finding it difficult to reach conclusions regarding suspicions of leaks from our inner circle. I don’t know exactly what’s going on between Dominique de Saint-Germaine and Dr. Kayghobadi, but this is something we need to think about. I’m not sure that General de Villiers knows any more than we do. Perhaps discussing the facts with my superiors in Israel will help free up my mind somewhat and give me new insight.” Gideon was unwilling to admit, even to himself, that his comments regarding Dominique’s relationship with the Iranian agent were motivated by considerations that were more than just professional.
“I agree,” Deutsch said. “We have a lot of information, and we need to start examining it in a different, more flexible way. Consulting with others from outside the task force might help us see things that we’ve been overlooking so far.”
“That was a good meeting, gentlemen,” Bernard said, looking somewhat relieved. “We’re all in agreement regarding the major issues we’re dealing with and that it would be helpful to take a break and solicit outside opinions. Gideon, am I to understand that you’ll be flying to Israel alone? Perhaps you should talk to Haim. He’s likely to get offended.”
“I’ll suggest that O’Connor fly back to Washington with me,” Deutsch said. “The folks at the FBI that he can discuss the situation with could really help us.”
Bernard parted from Gideon and Deutsch with a promise to do his homework on the French side of things. He also assured them that he would take no heroic action in their absence unless absolutely necessary, and he promised to keep in regular contact with Dan and Haim and to keep them informed.
***
“That’s it? Are you all done with your secret meeting with the professor?” Haim grumbled when Gideon joined him in the lobby of their hotel. Haim was already on his second beer, and the alcohol was not improving his mood.
“We decided that Deutsch and I will fly home to update our supervisors directly.”
“And you didn’t suggest that I come along?” asked Haim. “You know, there are issues that I’m an expert on—the information I would present could be helpful.”
“We can’t have the task force fall apart, Haim,” Gideon said, weighing his words carefully. “And as far as Israel is concerned, a ‘responsible adult’ needs to stay here, on the ground.”
“What about Dan? Can’t we leave the boy genius alone for a few days?”
“I don’t think that would be such a good idea. He doesn’t have your experience in intelligence and combat. Things can change here from one minute to the next, and we have no way of knowing what direction things will take. Face it, Haim—you’re irreplaceable.” Gideon continued to rationalize the decision as best as he could until he was certain that Haim had come to terms with it.
“Okay, Gideon. Have a successful trip, and don’t stay away too long,” Haim said in a placated tone. “I may not be built for French style and culture, but I’ll do whatever needs to be done.”
Chapter 34
Deutsch and O’Connor made themselves comfortable in their business class seats on the American Airlines flight from Paris to Washington. A smiling blonde flight attendant with a southern accent greeted them and offered them each a small glass of top-shelf single-malt scotch, which they now had no reason to refuse. They sipped the full-bodied amber liquid and struck up a quiet conversation.
“The full task force meeting in Bernard’s office left me with a lot of questions,” Deutsch said.
“Really? Like what?” O’Connor asked.
“Well, first of all, I still can’t understand Bar-Oz’s outburst. He spoke so emotionally. And the things he said about the preparedness of the special forces units had already been said. We all agreed on them.”
“I also found his behavior perplexing, especially his comments about the monitoring devices in the tunnel. And while Bar-Oz was acting out, General de Villiers was busy trying to defend himself.”
“I can certainly understand why he’d want to do that,” said Deutsch. “After all, how could his supervisory division allow French companies to flout the regulations and ship items on the embargo list to Iran?”
“Gideon didn’t say anything during the meeting,” O’Connor pointed out. “Do you think he doesn’t trust the confidentiality of the task force?”
“Maybe. He might also just be tense about his trip home. In any event, John, what you said about the threat posed by the Quds Force teams operating in France undisturbed was extremely important.”
“Thanks. So was your point about the possibility of moles still waiting in their burrows.”
“Yeah. I guess the task force has been so focused on stopping illegal Iranian procurement and monitoring financial transactions in Switzerland that it’s neglected some of the other threats.” Deutsch went back to sipping his scotch. “John,” he continued after a minute of silence, “what do you say we use this time to think a bit about what awaits us in Washington—you know, the meetings at the National Security Council in the White House.”
“That sounds like a good idea.” O’Connor took a sip of his drink. “I suggest we decide for ourselves what we want to get out of the meetings and then plan our briefings accordingly.”
“First of all,” said Deutsch, “I think that, in addition to updating the relevant parties in Washington about the work of the task force, we also need their approval for the continuation of our role on the task force in its existing form.”
“Okay. And what about getting authorization for reinforcements for the SEALs? If your predictions prove true, Gerald, the special forces we currently have at our disposal won’t be enough. Personally, I wouldn’t completely rely on the French,” said O’Connor. “I’ll prepare a presentation o
n the threat posed by the Quds Force, including assessments of what they’ve done so far. I’ll also touch on the importance of reinforcements.”
“We should also explain the failure in the Pyrenees Mountains and the successful two-stage operation in Portugal,” Deutsch suggested. “I’ll talk about the supervision of companies and the technological aspects of the items procured. We should definitely also praise the work of the NSA team at the embassy. They really deserve it. And we should also point out the work of Dan and Gideon, for their construction of an effective apparatus for gathering intelligence regarding the plans and actions of the Iranians.”
“We can also thank the State Department for its successful handling of the financial issues with Switzerland,” O’Connor said, “and for their excellent job laying the political groundwork for the operation in Portugal.”
“I think that just about covers it,” said Deutsch. “Overall, by the time we leave the White House, we need all the parties in attendance to be committed to the future work of the task force and to making its needs a priority.”
***
The morning after they landed in Washington, Deutsch and O’Connor were picked up by a car that had been sent by the Pentagon to bring them to National Security Council headquarters in the West Wing of the White House. The council’s conference room was filled beyond capacity. The president’s national security advisor had invited representatives of all the relevant government departments. Deutsch recognized an acquaintance from the Pentagon, who greeted him enthusiastically. He was still remembered fondly in the Defense Department for the time he spent as a high-ranking official in the Pentagon’s Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. O’Connor ran into two senior FBI officials with whom he had worked for years. The State Department had sent a senior undersecretary, and the CIA and NSA had also sent representatives.
