by Dexter Hoyos
besieged ports, but nothing more is heard of naval raids and by mid-242
there were no Punic ships at all in Sicilian waters. On land his numbers and
site hardly allowed him to range too far from the area.
At best he eased the plight of the besieged by giving the besiegers plenty of
trouble. Polybius again merely supplies unhelpful generalizations about both
sides experiencing ‘every kind of privation’, ‘every means of attack and every
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T H E H E I G H T S O F H E I RC T E A N D E RY X
variety of action’. But an excerpt of Diodorus tells how a Punic officer named
‘Vodostor’—probably a version of the Carthaginian name Bostar—after a
victory suffered heavy losses by letting his men plunder against Hamilcar’s
orders; the total loss of his infantry was prevented only by the discipline of
his 200 horse. Plunder after victory and cavalry rescuing infantry point to an
action on the plain, most likely an attack on the Roman siege-camp.
Hamilcar then sought a truce from the consul in command, C. Fundanius,
to bury his dead, thus conceding defeat. Fundanius brusquely refused, only
to be forced to make the same request when he in turn suffered heavy losses.
He must have tried to follow up his success against Bostar by launching an
attack of his own, either on Hamilcar’s position or on Drepana, without suc-
cess. Hamilcar set him an example of civility by granting his request, ‘stating
that he was at war with the living, but had come to terms with the dead’.
This will have been in 243 or early 242, for Fundanius presumably took up
office around 1 May 243, the normal period in this era, and left it 12 months
later.
Polybius does tell a story, in another place, of the 3,000 Gallic mercenaries
in Hamilcar’s army. Some at least were notching up 20 years in Punic service,
and a thousand or so of them found their situation on the mountainside irk-
some: no plunder worth mentioning and probably no pay either. They plotted
to betray Eryx town, and their comrades, to the enemy. Had they succeeded,
Hamilcar Barca would have been led in a consul’s triumphal procession
through Rome and then put to death. The history of Carthage, Rome and the
Mediterranean would have been tantalisingly different.
Instead, but not too surprisingly, the scheme foundered and the malcon-
tent thousand merely deserted to the Romans. These could think of nothing
better to do with them than station them on the summit of the mountain in
place of its Roman garrison. Embarrassment ensued when the irreverent
Celts looted the sacred and wealthy temple. Still, there they had to be left
while the war lasted (at its end the Romans hastily sent them packing)—
giving, we may surmise, little trouble to their former commander.12
The other 2,000 Gauls under their chieftain Autaritus remained loyal. All
the same, Hamilcar’s force was further reduced. In practical terms he was
having no effect on the war. In fact the entire Carthaginian war-effort in
Sicily kept going only thanks to Roman forbearance in not building a fleet to
cut supply-links from North Africa. This forbearance ended in 242.
V
A patriotic loan enabled the Romans to build a brand-new fleet of 200 ships
to an excellent design (ironically, that of a famous Carthaginian blockade-
running quinquereme captured back in 249), and in mid-242 the consul
C. Lutatius Catulus arrived with it on the western coast of Sicily. This seem-
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T H E H E I G H T S O F H E I RC T E A N D E RY X
ingly was the first the Carthaginians knew of the new fleet, a striking sign of
the shutdown of their normal overseas contacts.
Their reaction was oddly lethargic. For years the bulk of their war-fleet had
been moored in the well-protected harbour of Carthage; yet the sailing
season closed in October without it setting sail. When it did sail, as early in
the new year as was safe, it was undermanned and its crews untrained. In
other words, even after eight or nine more months these had only just been
gathered, nor can all that many of the seamen have been veterans of 249. On
top of this, the warships were overloaded with supplies for Sicily even
though it seems they were accompanied by transports with other supplies.
This can only be a sign that the situation in the besieged ports—and maybe at
Eryx too—was now truly desperate.
Everything had been left to the last minute. This sorry response to a devel-
opment that for years had been liable to happen suggests a bemusing level of
complacency—if not fecklessness—in the governing élite at Carthage. If
this was due to financial reasons it ranks as one of the most disastrous
economies in history. Common sense should at least have dictated keeping
the fleet in enough trim to be launched as soon as possible once the Romans
reappeared on the sea, and in as battle-worthy a condition as possible. Instead
Lutatius could blockade both the harbour at Drepana, probably by seizing
the islands at its mouth, and the roadstead at Lilybaeum, and press the siege
of Drepana even more closely. Too closely for his own health, for he suffered
a severe wound in an assault. If this involved Hamilcar, it was the general’s
last coup—and an unprofitable one again, for Lutatius’ deputy, the praetor
P. Valerius Falto, was just as energetic.
Hamilcar could not of course have foreseen when the enemy would launch
a new naval effort (though this would not deter enemies from blaming him
for not foreseeing it). But it would be interesting to know whether he had
condoned or criticized the laying-up of the fleet. There must, of course, still
have been a few warships in commission down to 242 to maintain a trickle of
supplies from and contacts with Carthage, even if raids on Italy had stopped.
Perhaps he and like-minded Carthaginians had reckoned that if the main
fleet did put to sea it would achieve little while costing much, since the war
was now confined to western Sicily and there were no resources to widen it
effectively. On the other hand his own experience and good sense would
have made him wary of lowering the fleet’s combat-readiness to the level it
had now reached. If he did criticize, his criticism was discounted.
The Punic fleet in its less than satisfactory condition sailed for Sicily at the
very start of the sailing season in 241, under the command of one of
Carthage’s many Hannos. Despite the Romans’ naval presence there must
have been intermittent contact with Hamilcar in the previous months, for a
plan had been arranged: Hanno would race to Hamilcar’s bay, unload the sup-
plies, take aboard the veterans of Eryx as marines and then turn to fight
Lutatius’ fleet. This called for both luck and enemy incompetence. Instead
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T H E H E I G H T S O F H E I RC T E A N D E RY X
the consul and praetor intercepted him near the Aegates islands just off
Drepana on the blustery morning of 10 March 241. Hamilcar could watch it
all from his stronghold.
Lutatius and Valerius had used the months of Punic unresponsiveness to
train and exercise their fleet and crews to an unusual height of
skill. The
Carthaginians fought strenuously but succumbed after a long day. Hanno got
away to Carthage with some 50 ships—to meet the usual fate of a beaten
commander, crucifixion, which can hardly have surprised him. The Romans
sank or captured 120 other quinqueremes and took 10,000 prisoners. As the
sun went down behind the Aegates islands, Hamilcar must have recognized
that the war was lost.
Later writers fancied not. They supposed that he wanted to carry on,
believed victory could yet be won, and was let down by the spineless authori-
ties at home. This is part of the hostile and romantic notion that no sooner
was the first war with Rome over than Hamilcar Barca began plotting the
second. In reality, not only could hungry Drepana and Lilybaeum (not to
mention Eryx) now be starved out before the Carthaginians could hope to
build a new navy and find crews for it, but the Romans were in a position to
repeat Regulus’ invasion of North Africa. Hamilcar could see that as well as
or better than anyone over at Carthage. Even if he beat off a new Roman
attack on his stronghold, as a late writer implies, it made no difference on the
larger scale.
The Carthaginians decided to seek peace terms. Whether they were able to
consult Hamilcar is not known, but it was Hamilcar they appointed to negoti-
ate with full powers. His feelings may well have been mixed. He had
commanded longer than any previous general in Sicily, knew the enemy well
and had earned their respect; nor was he someone easily browbeaten. At the
same time he had commanded on a shoestring, his veterans had again not
been paid for years, and his political standing at home (as we shall see) had
fallen away badly. He would be an easy target if the terms were harsh. But to
refuse would mean handing over the decisions on Punic Sicily, his men and
himself to some other negotiator, very possibly a political enemy. Hamilcar
accepted his appointment.
He sent Gisco, the commandant of Lilybaeum, to ask the consul’s terms.
Lutatius put various predictable demands: Punic withdrawal from Sicily, the
return of all Roman prisoners without ransom (the Carthaginians being of
course expected to pay ransom for theirs in the usual way), a guarantee not
to make war on the Romans’ ally Hiero of Syracuse and an indemnity of
2,200 Euboic talents—13,200,000 drachmas or 132 million asses—payable
over 20 years. These terms may well have been more restrained than Hamil-
car had expected. Sardinia was not demanded too and nothing was said about
the Punic fleet or home territory. One other demand he did reject: the
handover of all his troops’ weapons and all deserters. He was making peace,
the Carthaginian stated, not surrendering. It was probably now too that he
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T H E H E I G H T S O F H E I RC T E A N D E RY X
reconciled his unbeaten but restive men—on the mountain, at Drepana and
at Lilybaeum—to defeat by promising them fair treatment once they
returned to North Africa.
Lutatius did not press the point. His year of office would expire soon, an
agreement still had to be sent to Rome to be ratified, and he could not be sure
how far the Carthaginians could be pushed without reviving their will to
fight. Regulus had pushed too far and paid for it, and Polybius insists that
even now the Carthaginians were ready to fight on but had simply run out of
resources. The draft peace terms, minus the offending demand, were sent to
Rome.
There they met opposition. The sovereign People thought them too easy
on the Carthaginians, refused ratification and sent a commission of ten (no
doubt senators) ‘to examine the situation’, as Polybius puts it. For a while the
issue of peace or continuing war hung in the balance. But in the end the com-
mission only heightened the money terms and made a couple of other
changes.
One even benefited the Carthaginians: not Hiero alone but all the allies of
either signatory should be safe from attack by the other, and neither side
should involve itself in the other’s territories, recruit troops there or form
alliances with the other’s allies. This was the only concessive crumb Hamilcar
could win for his city. A new clause added the islands ‘between Italy and
Sicily’, in other words the Aegates and Lipara groups, to the Punic withdrawal
from Sicily. But the revised indemnity clause made the most difference.
The 2,200 talents must be paid in ten yearly instalments, plus 1,000 (60 mil-
lion asses) payable immediately. This heavy lump sum both made it easier to
reimburse the Roman citizens whose loans had created Lutatius’ victorious
fleet, and at the same time made it harder or impossible for the Carthaginians
to renew warfare. Nothing suggests that they would have, but the commis-
sioners could not read minds. They were, after all, letting Hamilcar’s veterans
go and there was plenty of wood in North Africa for building new fleets. As
it turned out, the payment also made it hard or impossible to pay the Punic
mercenary forces their long-overdue arrears, with consequences that would
be calamitous not only for Carthage but, in the long run, even for Rome.13
The People’s assembly at Rome ratified the satisfactorily revised treaty. For
the first time since 264, the one-time Mediterranean friends were at peace.
Hamilcar led his men down from the mountain, and no doubt those from
Drepana, over to Lilybaeum. He put the Lilybaeum commandant Gisco in
charge of evacuating all 20,000 troops to Africa, and sailed for Carthage
ahead of them.
This prompt self-removal from the scene did not impress the veterans and
looks unimpressive even now. Hamilcar might argue that, with the war and
the negotiations both complete, his generalship had terminated, but no such
automatic cut-off of command is known in the Carthaginian republic. True,
he now had to undergo an official scrutiny at home on his conduct of affairs;
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T H E H E I G H T S O F H E I RC T E A N D E RY X
every general must. But he could have stayed on in Sicily for a time to see
what he could do for the men, whose needs and grievances he knew better
than most. The pull of homesickness may have been too strong; an even
stronger pull, perhaps, the danger developing against him politically and per-
sonally as the general who had failed to win the war. At all events he chose to
suit himself rather than others.14
Polybius judges Hamilcar’s performance in the war very highly. ‘He put to
the test all chances of victory in warfare, if ever a leader did’, and was ‘the
general to be ranked as the best, both in genius and in daring’. These acco-
lades seem excessive. Hamilcar’s most notable distinction was that in six years
he had never been defeated, either at sea or on land. Yet except for the first
couple of years at Heircte, his command had been strategically defensive. He
had run essentially a holding operation; but instead of winning time for
Carthage’s resources to improve or the Romans’ resolution to wane, had seen
his own strength and opportunities thin out to little more than nuisance
> value. If the Romans had decided on a new fleet sooner, his command might
not even have lasted the six years it did. When it ended he left behind discon-
tented and disaffected troops. Polybius’ verdict reflects, partly at least,
admiration for Hamilcar based on his later exploits.
The war-effort had been pared down too far. Hanno, the successful gen-
eral in North Africa, may share the blame, since he seems to have been the
dominant political force at Carthage in those years. It is not certain, though,
that he was a political rival of Hamilcar’s already (as often surmised): we shall
see that there is rather more reason to think the opposite. But at all events the
home authorities had not been strongly disposed to add to Hamilcar’s dwin-
dling strength. His own lack of major successes no doubt had had something
to do with this unenthusiasm. Whatever his own political influence at the
start of his command, it was much impaired by 241. There were lessons in all
this—about politics, leadership and resources—useful to an ex-general in his
prime.15
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I I
C A RT H AG E
I
Hamilcar Barca belonged more or less certainly to Carthage’s ruling élite. His
family’s social distinction is suggested for instance by the Roman poet Silius’
claim that they were descended from a brother of Dido, the exiled princess
of Tyre who in legend had founded the city around the year 814. The claim
probably dates from Hamilcar’s or his sons’ time: Belus, Dido’s father, has the
name not only of the chief Phoenician god Ba’al but also of a known
(though later) king Ba’lu of Tyre, while her brother in the tale is named Barca,
which was merely Hamilcar’s nickname. All the same, his appointment to a
major military command while still fairly young suggests, though it does not
prove, that his family was already an established one.
Whether he and his father Hannibal were kin to any of the numerous other
Hamilcars and Hannibals of Punic history, including several active in the first
war against Rome, cannot be known. Those names and a few others—
Adherbal, Bostar, Bomilcar, Carthalo, Gisco, Hasdrubal, Himilco, Mago and
commonest of all Hanno—were almost the only ones used by the
Carthaginian ruling élite. Telling them apart is often a problem. Thus Hamil-
