by Dexter Hoyos
Appian and Zonaras report, waiving the clause in Lutatius’ treaty forbidding
one state from hiring mercenaries in the lands of the other. The freed veter-
ans look like Carthaginian citizens, who would be a welcome addition to the
city’s hard-pressed military resources.
Roman goodwill turned out to be one of the decisive factors in a struggle
that grew more and more bitter. It also encouraged Hiero of Syracuse to
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T H E R E VO LT O F A F R I C A
continue his own helpful efforts, which were equally vital. His motive, prag-
matically set forth by Polybius, was to make sure that Carthage remained in
existence as some sort of balance to the might of Rome. The Romans too
were hardly motivated by simple generosity: they took an austere view of
rebellion by subjects and allies (they had had to crush one themselves just
after Lutatius’ peace) and probably worried too about a dangerous power-
vacuum in North Africa if the Carthaginians were overthrown. Not to
mention that they would not be paid their yearly war-indemnity, though they
may have waived its payment during the revolt.
Hamilcar’s operations were not risk-free. Spendius shadowed him but kept
to higher ground, avoiding pitched battles and harassing the Punic army on
its march—tactics much like those later followed by Fabius Cunctator against
Hamilcar’s son. When Libyan and Numidian reinforcements joined him he
was even able to entrap Hamilcar’s army, and with superior numbers.6
Hamilcar may well have expected destruction, but his carelessness or error
was counterbalanced by his good fortune. One of the Numidian leaders, the
young prince Naravas, brought his 2,000 horsemen over in eagerness for the
general’s friendship. Hamilcar’s anxiety about the situation he had got into is
suggested by his enthusiastic reaction—he promised not only to make Nar-
avas his partner in action but also to give him a daughter in marriage. The two
of them then smashed the rebels and their remaining Numidian allies in a
spectacular victory. Having pulverized this enemy army Hamilcar began a
much-publicized policy of freeing prisoners unharmed and even accepting
them into his own forces if they wished.7
What Hanno was doing meanwhile we are not told. Polybius is our only
source and his strongly pro-Hamilcar account has little time for other gener-
als or operations. The other rebel leader, Mathos, had taken charge of the
forces blockading Hippou Acra while a third rebel force remained at Tunes.
Most likely then Hanno made himself useful by offering threats to both sets
of rebels—possibly using Utica, halfway between them, as his base—to pre-
vent them from pressing their own efforts or sending reinforcements to
Spendius. They certainly made no progress against Hippou or Carthage.8
IV
But at this point, probably around the end of 240, the struggle took on an
even uglier colour. To counter Hamilcar’s successes, and stimulated by the
mercenaries in Sardinia who had seized that island for themselves, the rebel
leaders tortured to death their long-held Punic prisoners (including their old
and respected commandant from Lilybaeum, Gisco) and began to treat other
Punic captives in the same way. Hamilcar, still operating away from Carthage,
abandoned his mercy policy for one of no quarter to prisoners—which
meant putting some to the sword and throwing others under the feet of war-
elephants, following a precedent from Alexander the Great’s time.
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T H E R E VO LT O F A F R I C A
Polybius sees this change as not just understandable but necessary, but it
may well have been counterproductive. Rebels now had to choose between
being slaughtered and fighting on. Some rebel areas that had previously
yielded may have taken up arms again: for much of Libya and ‘most of its
cities’ were still in revolt well over a year later.9
Hamilcar plainly found himself under some pressure again, for he now
thought it desirable for Hanno to join forces with him. This may also have
been how he interpreted a new message from the authorities at Carthage,
urging both generals to avenge Gisco and his companions, and in any case he
would be forming plans for the new campaigning season of 239. Just what
move he had in mind for the joint army we are not told—it would still have
been fairly small, probably not much over 20,000 men—but at a guess he
aimed to pounce on the different rebel camps in turn before they could try
any union of forces in turn. Instead and ironically, the union of the two
Punic armies led to disunion between the two generals.
It may have been due to an entirely personal matter. But, rather likelier,
they may have disagreed on strategy and methods. Hanno, for instance, may
not have liked his colleague’s unalloyed frightfulness: whatever his talents for
squeezing taxes out of subjects, in his capture of Theveste he had shown a
preference for leavening severity with moderation. Or—even though he had
agreed to join Barca—he may have felt they ran a serious risk in taking the
bulk of Carthage’s field forces well away from the city and the coast, while
Tunes remained a rebel centre and Hippou under siege.
On both of these counts Hanno would have had good grounds for criti-
cism. He may well have been unhappy too about his colleague’s strategy for
the coming campaign. At all events he refused to co-operate with Hamilcar,
and without Hanno Hamilcar thought it too risky to act. The paralysis was
broken only when ‘the Carthaginians’—we may infer the senate seconded by
the people’s assembly—ordered the troops to determine which of the two
should stay in command and which step down.
Just who did the choosing we are not told. Maybe the entire army,
Carthaginians, mercenaries, allies and any Libyan levies: after all who their
leader was would have a direct bearing on whether they all won or lost. Yet
legally the position was a Carthaginian office, and normally the citizen body
of Carthage chose the holder. Mercenaries were hired professionals; allied
and Libyan troops served because they had to. Most likely then it was the citi-
zen soldiers and officers who decided between Hanno or Hamilcar—though
their choice was probably encouraged by the other troops too.
The men kept Hamilcar. This was testimony, from the judges best
qualified, to the quality of his leadership compared with Hanno’s. Hanno’s
defects are no doubt too gleefully stressed by Polybius, but if he had achieved
anything so far in the war it was limited: preventing the rebels from capturing
Utica and Hippou Acra. Hamilcar, despite his propensity for risk-taking and
occasional misjudgements, had inflicted real hurt on them. Had the troops
39
T H E R E VO LT O F A F R I C A
voted the other way it is far from certain that the Carthaginians would have
won the war.10
Hamilcar’s position was significantly enhanced by this step. He was now in
supreme command. Another general, Hannibal by name, was soon sent out
by ‘the citizens’—but he held a clearly subordinate authority and quite lik
ely
was chosen at Hamilcar’s request. Barca thus took over the military and polit-
ical position that Hanno had enjoyed for most of the past ten years, and with
the extra advantage that there was no other general, in Sicily or anywhere else,
to match him. At Carthage his interests would be looked after by his friends
and associates, notably Hasdrubal. It might look as though he was now
supreme politically as well as militarily—and that Hanno from now on was a
mortal enemy.
This is too simple a reading of events. Hanno still had strong support at
home, for some time later (probably during 238) he was not only reappointed
to a generalship but, it seems, again on an equal footing with his rival. More
than this, he and Hamilcar from then on ‘co-operated singlemindedly’ until
the war was won. In other words they were still prepared to collaborate
despite what had happened.
Again, if Hamilcar already had the political muscle to oust Hanno at the
time they quarrelled, why use the roundabout—and risky—method of let-
ting the troops choose between them? Of course it may be that he knew the
troops were for him, while at Carthage Hanno’s support equalled his. But if
so, Hanno’s supporters in their turn had no reason to agree to the measure,
which (moreover) was unprecedented. More probably then the move was a
genuine effort to cut the Gordian knot of deadlock.11
V
Centralized command was certainly needed now, for more disasters struck
the Carthaginians. A laden supply-fleet coming up from the Emporia region
was lost in a storm: a spring storm, for the year 239 should have begun by
now. Even worse, their last two loyal allies, Hippou Acra and Utica, defected
to the rebellion.
Polybius presents this turnaround as inexplicable ingratitude, but some of
its reasons may be guessed. Hippou had been under siege from the begin-
ning, with Mathos himself in command of the besiegers, and Utica, though
relieved earlier by Hamilcar and then it seems protected by Hanno, was again
exposed—probably again besieged by the enemy—when the two generals
united their forces elsewhere. The paralysis of Punic effort caused by their
quarrel was surely the last straw. The two cities could envisage the Carthagini-
ans’ resistance soon falling apart and themselves being easy meat for the
rebels. Perhaps the pro-Carthage faction in each lost power to rivals who
then led the defection.
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T H E R E VO LT O F A F R I C A
As a result the rebels could now beleaguer the walls of Carthage herself.
This was probably around the middle of 239.12
The city was far from defenceless. It had its large population and at least a
modest navy; sea communications were open and so food and fresh merce-
naries could be obtained; the king of Syracuse and the Roman republic both
supplied help. Hamilcar’s son-in-law, later famous as a master diplomat, may
have contributed to these relations working smoothly. Hamilcar and his
deputy Hannibal, too outnumbered to tackle the besiegers directly, instead
harassed their communications with the rest of the country, while Naravas
the Numidian continued his invaluable support. Rather like Caesar’s legions
outside Alesia two centuries later, the besiegers in effect became besieged.
The siege probably lasted some months. Hamilcar’s attrition strategy was
bound to be a slow process: his forces were not large and the small Punic
navy likewise could not hope to cut off all supply by sea to the rebels. Yet the
Carthaginians, masters of their seas and of much of the countryside, could
afford a slow-strangulation struggle better than their foes. In these condi-
tions, the siege was even an advantage to them.
By contrast Mathos and his colleagues no longer had much choice of strat-
egy. To abandon the siege would be a heavy blow to morale. Besides, the only
alternative would be to try to crush Hamilcar himself, and he had shown how
dangerous that would be. They hung on grimly outside Carthage, with num-
bers no doubt thinning from sickness and desertion as Hamilcar’s pressure
tightened. If they kept the siege going through the winter of 239–238, the
starvation their troops came to suffer is all the more readily explained. Sup-
plies to Carthage too probably lessened, but with the return of spring they
would grow again and the rebels’ spirits could only sink further.
Finally they did give up the siege. All they could do now was go after their
tormentor. The breakout at least allowed them to collect some new recruits,
though Polybius’ figure of 50,000 looks grossly inflated. Not much imagina-
tion was shown. Mathos held the rebel headquarters at Tunes while once
more Spendius and Autaritus led an expeditionary force inland, now with a
colleague, Mathos’ fellow-Libyan Zarzas, who was probably one of the new
arrivals. Once more they tried Fabian tactics in hopes of trapping the
Carthaginians amid hills or in a pass. But this time Hamilcar harassed them.
What was virtually a guerrilla campaign, most likely during the spring and
early summer of 238, steadily whittled down their numbers. Mathos
remained immobile at Tunes, which suggests that another Punic force (the
garrison in Carthage?) was pinning him down. At length Hamilcar succeeded
in manoeuvring the whole rebel army into an escape-proof trap at a place
called The Saw, probably a razorback mountain ridge—much like the trap in
which Spendius and Autaritus had once shut him up, but there was no Nar-
avas to rescue them.
The general’s later Roman detractors probably made much of what ensued.
Even though we have only Polybius’ friendly account, his behaviour hardly
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T H E R E VO LT O F A F R I C A
shines. Having eaten all their stores and even their prisoners and slaves, the
rebels sent out ten delegates—Spendius, Autaritus and Zarzas among them—
to ask for terms. Hamilcar promised to release the entire army except for ten
whom he would choose. The ten delegates must have known what was
coming but, heroic in their way, they accepted and of course were seized.
Hamilcar did not tell the suddenly leaderless rebels what had been agreed;
instead, when they sprang to arms, they were slaughtered to the last man.13
Hamilcar was taking the policy of frightfulness to its extreme. The mur-
derers of Gisco did not in his view deserve civilized handling. Promises to
and pacts with them need merely be manoeuvres. His harshness was not
played out, either. While he and Hannibal brought most of rebel Libya back
under control, Spendius and his nine confrères were kept to become a public
show. At length—probably it was the middle of 238—the victorious generals
marched back to Tunes, boxed Mathos’ camp in between their two forces,
Hannibal on the Carthage side of the position and Hamilcar on the southern,
and nailed the ten rebel leaders to crosses outside Hannibal’s camp, in sight of
their remaining comrades.
This public gesture of how the republic punished rebellion and treachery
backfired right away. The infuriated Mathos fell on Hannibal’s camp, routed
his men and captured the general himself, without Hamilcar on the opposite
side of Tunes learning of it until too late. In grim parody of a sacrificial rite
Hannibal was tortured at the foot of Spendius’ cross, then nailed to it alive in
place of the Campanian, while around the dead rebel leader’s body thirty
high-ranking Punic prisoners were slain. With Hannibal’s force fled, Hamil-
car found it necessary to retreat with his own troops northwards to the
mouth of the Bagradas. The siege of Tunes was over.
This defeat probably came about because he and his deputy had been more
concerned with making a propaganda point—punishing the rebel leaders—
than with keeping proper watch on Mathos. Their forces may have been
equal, or even superior, to his (an encouragement to overconfidence), but by
separating them too widely Hamilcar had handed a tactical advantage to the
enemy. He had not made that mistake when surrounding Spendius and com-
pany at The Saw.
All the same it was a defeat, not a disaster. Hannibal’s camp had lain
between Tunes and Carthage, and his army was routed but not destroyed.
Much or most of it could escape to the city or else the coast beween Carthage
and the Bagradas. Carthage itself had its own defenders, whom Mathos had
not been able to defeat while the Punic field army was away. The most press-
ing needs would be to gather up Hannibal’s surviving troops and prevent
Mathos from fleeing to, or drawing any aid from, Utica and Hippou Acra (not
that these places ever had given the rebels much help, so far as we know). This
would explain why Hamilcar marched northward rather than, for example,
moving to shield Carthage. Mathos had won himself some breathing-space
but that was all. Hamilcar still held the strategic advantage.14
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T H E R E VO LT O F A F R I C A
It did not seem so reassuring to the people in the city. Yet again the war had
taken an unexpected and frightening twist. Thirty chosen senators and a
force of citizen troops escorted his old colleague Hanno out to Hamilcar’s
camp, with a mission to persuade the two men to be reconciled and to co-
operate for the sake of the state. By going with them Hanno already showed
he was willing, but Hamilcar took a deal of persuading. None the less, from
