by Dexter Hoyos
along the coast would provide stops for rest and resupply. It is very unlikely
that Diodorus is wrong and that he marched by land along the coast to the
straits. That would have taken far longer, would have worn down his forces to
no appreciable benefit, and by the time they reached Spain he would have lost
most of his first campaigning season.1
Spain was a busy jumble of towns (including the many Phoenician and
Greek colonies along its southern and eastern coasts) and rural cantons.
Many were prosperous or even rich, especially in the south across the broad
fertile basin of the river Baetis, now the modern Guadalquivir, and along the
Levant coast from Cape de la Nao to the Pyrenees. Tougher terrain and life-
styles prevailed farther inland and along the north-western coasts.
Some relatively sophisticated communities were republics of varying forms,
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H A M I L C A R I N S PA I N
with regularly chosen officials and senate-like councils: for instance not only
Gades and probably the other foreign colonies, but also an Iberian city like
Saguntum. Even such places were probably run in practice by their small local
élites. In other communities the oligarchic, even feudal element would be still
more dominant, often with ‘kings’ at the top.
Political structures more extensive than the individual community were
loose and changeable. Outsiders like the Greeks and Romans, and probably
the Carthaginians, did identify major groupings of peoples—Iberians across
the south and east, Celtiberians on the plateaux and uplands beyond the river
Tagus, Lusitanians over in the west, Cantabrians and Gallaecians and others
in the mountainous far north. These they subdivided into various smaller
regional ‘tribes’, for instance Turdetanians in the Baetis valley, Vaccaei around
the river Durius (today’s Duero), Bastetani in the south-west corner of the
peninsula, Contestani and Edetani along the east coast.
Religious practices, dialect and old traditions may well explain such group-
ings. But in political and military affairs the individual communities were their
own masters. Some might form alliances, or be united under a successful
leader for a time. In the dim past the region north-west of Gades had formed
a kingdom of some kind, called Tartessus by the Greeks (and possibly
Tarshish in the Old Testament), but little is known of it apart from the exag-
geratedly fabulous wealth of its silver mines in the Río Tinto area, and by
Hamilcar’s time it was three centuries gone.
The disunion and quarrelsomeness of peninsular states made them rela-
tively easy targets for a determined Punic expansionist. Their high cultural
level (visible still in pottery, architecture and surviving sculpture like the
fourth-century ‘Lady of Elche’), widespread natural wealth and well-
developed military prowess were, in turn, powerful attractions to such an
expansionist. Hamilcar could count on the Phoenician towns of the south
coast as allies, supply-bases and anchors for his communications with home.
Some Iberian states too may already have been well disposed: with warfare so
endemic in the peninsula, he needed only to assure the ones whose alliance
he wanted that he would back them against their enemies.2
II
A paragraph of Diodorus and generalities in other writers are all we have on
Barca’s doings in Spain. Diodorus is coherent and plainly well informed, but
only a few events in the nine-year saga are described. The first is Hamilcar
confronting a coalition of the Iberians and ‘Tartessians’, together ‘with Isto-
latius, general of the Celts, and his brother’.
The realm of Tartessus no longer existed but, if ‘Tartessians’ is not just a
cloudy misunderstanding, the term should mean people in south-western
Spain and Portugal: that is, northerly neighbours of Gades. In later times
most communities of that region were covered by the general names Turduli
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and Baeturii. It is much less plausible that Diodorus, or the source he used,
really meant Turdetani—the later broad term for virtually all the Spaniards in
the Baetis valley and the mountains north and south of it. Rather these, and
probably only some of these, were the ‘Iberians’ in the hostile alliance.
For the newly arrived Hamilcar to be confronted by an anti-Punic coalition
is not surprising. A veteran army landing in the richest region of Spain would
look like nothing but trouble to peoples not already allied with the invaders
or disposed to submit to them. Gades itself probably had a number of
regional enemies (just as when the Magonids had intervened in the distant
past); they would be very alarmed at Hamilcar’s coming, and so would other
communities.
More than that, the ‘Tartessians’ give a clue to Hamilcar’s opening strategy.
The wealth of ancient Tartessus lay in its silver and copper mines in the
country along the river now called Río Tinto, only 60 miles (100 kilometres)
or so north-west of Gades. These remained productive, as they would into
modern times. They were an obvious—and pressing—attraction to a Punic
conquistador. Other sources of precious metal existed, but were farther off
to the east and needed development; not so the long-established Tartessian
workings. Nor could Hamilcar afford to wait, either financially or strategi-
cally.
This first coalition against him may have been fairly limited. Communities
in the eastern half of today’s Andalusia would be worried about Punic inten-
tions, but would not be likely to risk sending forces far to the west in aid of
the peoples there. They rarely tried such co-operation even in the next cen-
tury during the Roman conquest. Perhaps too not all the communities in
Hamilcar’s area of operations chose to resist; as mentioned earlier, some may
even have been willing to collaborate.
Those who did resist had the help of the Celtic chieftain Istolatius and his
unnamed brother. Diodorus’ phrasing strongly implies that these two were,
in effect, mercenary condottieri—no doubt leading a contingent of Celtic
warriors. This can be believed, for a branch of Celtiberians, called Celtici by
later writers, dwelt in the south-west between the Sierra Morena, the river
Anas (the Guadiana) and the Atlantic coastline. Celtiberian war-bands, like
Iberian ones, are found on other occasions serving for pay outside their
home territories, including in Carthaginian armies. On this occasion it looks,
too, as though the two Celtic chieftains were given command of the allied
forces.
A different excerpt in Diodorus plays up the boastful overconfidence of
the Celts and how much they outnumbered the Punic forces. Whether this is
accurate reporting or exaggeration for effect is impossible to tell. If Hamilcar
was outnumbered, one reason may be that he had stationed part of his army
elsewhere—for instance to protect Gades or new and hesitant allies in the
lower Baetis valley, a job he could leave to Hasdrubal. He himself smashed
the enemy allies in a bloody battle. The two Celtic generals and ‘other
very
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distinguished leaders’ were among the dead. Three thousand of the defeated
army were promptly enrolled in his own. This not only added to his military
strength but was useful propaganda: a general both humane and, when it
came to judging military worth, impartial would greatly impress the Spaniards.
The results of the victory are not stated, but quite likely it brought under
his control the territory Barca aimed at, stretching from Gades to the
Tartessian mines along with some of the lower Baetis valley—districts
conquered in the campaign or within a few days’ march of his Gaditane
headquarters. Gades soon began issuing a new, high-quality silver coinage.
He could now direct his energies to the rest of the Baetis valley and its
neighbouring highlands.3
The Baetis valley stretches over 250 miles (400 kilometres) from the
Atlantic coast to the edge of the vast mountain- and plateau-lands of south-
eastern Spain. Fertile and well populated, it had the potential for stiff
resistance to the Carthaginians if enough of its towns and peoples held
together. To the Carthaginians the same endowments were a powerful attrac-
tion, and more powerful still the silver workings in the mountains north of
the river: the Mons Marianus of Roman times, today’s Sierra Morena, and the
even richer ones to the east around the important town of Castulo.
In Diodorus’ account Hamilcar next confronted a leader named Indortes.
This chieftain’s connexions are not described but must have been extensive:
the army he commanded is given as 50,000 strong. If Hamilcar was now
ranging eastwards, up the Baetis, Indortes’ resistance probably drew on the
communities of the central and eastern districts of the valley. After all, they
were next in the path of the lightning.
Yet Indortes’ army and campaign collapsed before he could fight a battle.
Diodorus fails to explain why, but one obvious possibility is desertion. Barca
may have enticed some of the large but heterogeneous Spanish force to join
him, or at least to go home. Indortes judged retreat the best option with the
troops still loyal to him. Diodorus describes him as routed, but since he was
able to concentrate his remaining force on a hilltop a rout seems exaggerated.
All the same, Indortes only postponed destruction. Once again, rather like
the African rebels at The Saw, Hamilcar succeeded in surrounding an enemy
army. This time they tried to break out, only to be slaughtered or captured.
One of the prisoners was Indortes himself. Hamilcar made a ruthless exam-
ple of him. The Iberian leader was blinded and mutilated—probably much as
the African rebels had treated Gisco and their other Punic prisoners, cutting
off hands, feet and private parts—then crucified. Yet the ordinary prisoners,
no fewer than 10,000, were set free. Hamilcar plainly meant Indortes’ fate to
carry a warning to other Spanish leaders who might be considering resistance,
and that of the ordinary prisoners to reassure their peoples.4
Diodorus’ extracts give no chronology for these campaigns, and any esti-
mates of time based on Punic Spanish coin-series are guesswork. But it
would be surprising if the fighting against Istolatius and then Indortes lasted
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beyond 236 or at latest 235. After that Hamilcar fought further campaigns
and scored diplomatic successes, but Diodorus offers no details. He simply
affirms that the general, partly through diplomacy and partly by fighting,
brought ‘many cities throughout Iberia’ under his power. Still, as the last
drama in Barca’s life was played somewhere in the south-east, we can infer
that from about 235 on his activities, military and civil, spread across the
Baetis lands including the silver-rich Sierra Morena. With Hasdrubal a reli-
able deputy and their military strength growing, expansion and consolidation
could take place together. The proceeds of conquest that began to accrue—
some of it sent over to Africa—were phenomenal: horses, weapons, men and
money, writes Nepos. Strabo tells a story of Hamilcar’s expedition finding
that the Turdetani used feed-troughs and wine-jars of silver, not a literal but a
proverbial way of highlighting the mineral wealth of southern Spain.
Of course Punic rule in some of the more difficult mountain or desert
regions, for instance the Sierra Nevada, the neighbouring Alpujarras and the
semidesert region inland from modern Almería, may not have been much
more than nominal. Such places were hard to get at and there were few min-
eral riches to attract sustained attention. Equally difficult was much of the
south-east’s interior, where the Sierra Morena range meets the complex mas-
sifs that separate the Baetis valley from the coastal plains of Murcia and
Alicante. Hamilcar, as we shall see, perished while campaigning to bring these
under control for strategic reasons.5
III
At some stage the general was distracted by news from Africa. The Numidi-
ans, or many of them, had risen against Carthage (again). The résumé in
Diodorus gives no reason. After the drubbing many had suffered for backing
the losers in the African revolt, the cause must have been specially pressing.
The drubbing itself may have been the cause—we saw earlier that Hamilcar
and Hanno had not been mild. As generalissimo of the republic Hamilcar
was responsible for Africa as well as Spain. How seriously he viewed the situ-
ation is shown by his reaction: he sent Hasdrubal his son-in-law to take
command.
Hasdrubal had probably added to his military experience through the
recent Spanish campaigns (he had not had much opportunity before). In his
war with the Numidians Naravas’ people, the Massyli, may well have been
allies again, for the prince’s family continued to rule their region of the coun-
try and be loyal to Carthage until late in the Second Punic War. Certainly
Hasdrubal must have had efficient cavalry, and therefore local auxiliaries. He
succeeded in bringing the hostile Numidians to a decisive battle, in which
8,000 of them were killed and 2,000 captured, and the revolt was over.
The subdued Numidians were firmly treated. ‘The rest were made slaves
and liable to tribute’, Diodorus rather contradictorily puts it. Enslavement of
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all the defeated tribes and clans is more than unlikely, so it is better taken as a
rhetorical touch which the mention of tribute then more mundanely
explains. Reprisals after the earlier war may have involved fines and levies
rather than tribute, or else their new tribute was heavier than the old.
How Hasdrubal’s arrangements related to the later known situation in
Numidia can only be surmised. The rebel territory was obviously too large,
and not productive enough, to annex—and too risky to give to the Massyli.
When the region earns more detailed mention 20 or so years later, the pro-
Carthaginian Massyli in its east are balanced by the larger (but probably not
more populous) kingdom of the Masaesyli in the west under Syphax. T
his
uneasy consolidation of Numidian territory into two realms may have been
Hasdrubal’s doing, possibly too the installation of Syphax or his father as the
western king. Certainly the Masaesyli make their appearance only after this
time. They, like the Massyli, furnished Carthage with troops in 218, but
Syphax’s attitude to the Carthaginians was variable—hostile enough some
years later for these to arrange with the Massyli to attack him, yet after a time
he became their ally again. In the circumstances Hasdrubal did reasonably
well, for both kingdoms remained true to Carthage for the next two decades.6
His success surely reinforced the Barcid group’s prestige and popularity at
home too. The impact of Spanish victories and wealth could easily have been
blunted (or worse) by a serious continuing threat to Carthage’s territories in
Africa. Hasdrubal averted the risk, and a stay—even a short one—in the city
must have enabled him to strengthen his and Hamilcar’s grip on domestic
politics. When he reported to his father-in-law on returning to Spain, the
general would be well satisfied.
IV
During all these years of expansion Hamilcar not only had to nourish his
power-base at home—successfully, as we have seen—but to keep an eye on
the Romans. After their chicanery over Sardinia, he might well feel wary.
They traded with North Africa and the eastern parts of Spain too, so that
care was always needed in handling their merchants in Punic territories.
Hamilcar would not have forgotten the dispute over these in the early days of
the African revolt and the use that the Romans afterwards made of this in the
Sardinia affair. Some new unpredictable coup against Carthage, or directly
against his growing empire in Spain, could never be ruled out.
As it happens, one or two late Roman writers tell stories of repeated
confrontations between the Romans and the Carthaginians in the later 230s,
which if true would reveal almost a cold-war climate in the western
Mediterranean. But in fact the stories are either confused repeats of the
Sardinia crisis—misdating it to 236 or 235—or grotesque misrepresentations
of other events. The Roman statesman Q. Fabius Maximus (for instance) is
reported as sending an ultimatum to the Carthaginians when consul in 233,
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