Delphi Complete Works of Lucretius
Page 79
quod quoniam ratio reclamat vera negatque
credere posse animum, victus fateare necessest
625 esse ea quae nullis iam praedita partibus extent
et minima constent natura. quae quoniam sunt,
illa quoque esse tibi solida atque aeterna fatendum.
Denique si minimas in partis cuncta resolvi
cogere consuesset rerum natura creatrix,
630 iam nihil ex illis eadem reparare valeret
propterea quia, quae nullis sunt partibus aucta,
non possunt ea quae debet genitalis habere
materies, varios conexus pondera plagas
concursus motus, per quas res quaeque geruntur.
635 Quapropter qui materiem rerum esse putarunt
ignem atque ex igni summam consistere solo,
magno opere a vera lapsi ratione videntur.
Heraclitus init quorum dux proelia primus,
clarus ob obscuram linguam magis inter inanis
640 quamde gravis inter Graios, qui vera requirunt;
omnia enim stolidi magis admirantur amantque,
inversis quae sub verbis latitantia cernunt,
veraque constituunt quae belle tangere possunt
auris et lepido quae sunt fucata sonore.
645 Nam cur tam variae res possent esse, requiro,
ex uno si sunt igni puroque creatae?
[602] and so a first and single part and then other and other similar parts in succession fill up in close serried mass the nature of the first body; and since these cannot exist by themselves, they must cleave to that from which they cannot in any way be torn.
First-beginnings therefore are of solid singleness, massed together and cohering closely by means of least parts, not compounded out of a union of those parts, but, rather, strong in everlasting singleness.
From them nature allows nothing to be torn, nothing further to be worn away, reserving them as seeds for things.
Again unless there shall be a least, the very smallest bodies will consist of infinite parts, inasmuch as the half of the half will always have a half and nothing will set bounds to the division.
Therefore between the sum of things and the least of things what difference will there be? There will be no distinction at all; for how absolutely infinite soever the whole sum is, yet the things which are smallest will equally consist of infinite parts.
Now since on this head true reason protests and denies that the mind can believe it, you must yield and admit that there exist such things as are possessed of no parts and are of a least nature.
And since these exist, those first bodies also you must admit to be solid and everlasting.
Once more, if nature, creatress of things, had been wont to compel all things to be broken up into least parts, then too she would be unable to reproduce anything out of those parts, because those things which are enriched with no parts cannot have the properties which begetting matter ought to have, I mean the various entanglements, weights, blows, clashings, motions, by means of which things severally go on.
For which reasons they who have held fire to be the matter of things and the sum to be formed out of fire alone, are seen to have strayed most widely from true reason.
At the head of whom enters Heraclitus to do battle, famous for obscurity more among the frivolous than the earnest Greeks who seek the truth.
For fools admire and like all things the more which they perceive to be concealed under involved language, and determine things to be true which can prettily tickle the ears and are varnished over with finely sounding phrase.
For I want to know how things can be so various, if they are formed out of fire one and unmixed:
nil prodesset enim calidum denserier ignem
nec rare fieri, si partes ignis eandem
naturam quam totus habet super ignis haberent.
650 acrior ardor enim conductis partibus esset,
languidior porro disiectis disque supatis.
amplius hoc fieri nihil est quod posse rearis
talibus in causis, ne dum variantia rerum
tanta queat densis rarisque ex ignibus esse.
655 Id quoque: si faciant admixtum rebus inane,
denseri poterunt ignes rarique relinqui;
sed quia multa sibi cernunt contraria quae sint
et fugitant in rebus inane relinquere purum,
ardua dum metuunt, amittunt vera viai
660 nec rursum cernunt exempto rebus inane
omnia denseri fierique ex omnibus unum
corpus, nil ab se quod possit mittere raptim,
aestifer ignis uti lumen iacit atque vaporem,
ut videas non e stipatis partibus esse.
665 Quod si forte alia credunt ratione potesse
ignis in coetu stingui mutareque corpus,
scilicet ex nulla facere id si parte reparcent,
occidet ad nihilum ni mirum funditus ardor
omnis et e nihilo fient quae cumque creantur;
670 nam quod cumque suis mutatum finibus exit,
continuo hoc mors est illius quod fuit ante.
proinde aliquid superare necesse est incolume ollis,
ne tibi res redeant ad nilum funditus omnes
de nihiloque renata vigescat copia rerum.
675 Nunc igitur quoniam certissima corpora quaedam
sunt, quae conservant naturam semper eandem,
quorum abitu aut aditu mutatoque ordine mutant
naturam res et convertunt corpora sese,
scire licet non esse haec ignea corpora rerum.
680 nil referret enim quaedam decedere, abire
atque alia adtribui mutarique ordine quaedam,
si tamen ardoris naturam cuncta tenerent;
ignis enim foret omnimodis quod cumque crearet.
verum, ut opinor, itast: sunt quaedam corpora, quorum
685 concursus motus ordo positura figurae
efficiunt ignis mutatoque ordine mutant
naturam neque sunt igni simulata neque ulli
praeterea rei quae corpora mittere possit
sensibus et nostros adiectu tangere tactus.
690 dicere porro ignem res omnis esse neque ullam
[647] it would avail nothing for hot fire to be condensed or rarefied, if the same nature which the whole fire has belonged to the parts of fire as well.
The heat would be more intense by compression of parts, more faint by their severance and dispersion.
More than this you cannot think it in the power of such causes to effect, far less could so great a diversity of things come from mere density and rarity of fires.
Observe also, if they suppose void to be mixed up in things, fire may then be condensed and left rare; but because they see many things rise up in contradiction to them and shrink from leaving unmixed void in things, fearing the steep, they lose the true road, and do not perceive on the other hand that if void is taken from things, all things are condensed and, out of all things is formed one single body, which cannot briskly radiate anything from it, in the way heat-giving fire emits light and warmth, letting you see that it is not of closely compressed parts.
But if they haply think that in some other way fires maybe quenched in the union and change their body, you are to know that if they shall scruple on no side to do this, all heat sure enough will be utterly brought to nothing, and all things that are produced will be formed out of nothing.
For whenever a thing changes and quits its proper limits, at once this change of state is the death of that which was before.
Therefore something or other must needs be left to those fires of theirs undestroyed, that you may not have all things absolutely returning to nothing, and the whole store of things born anew and flourishing out of nothing.
Since then in fact there are some most unquestionable bodies which always preserve the same nature, on whose going or coming and change of order things change their nature and bodies are transformed, you are to know that these first bodies of things are not of fire.<
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For it would matter nothing that some should withdraw and go away and others should be added on and some should have their order changed, if one and all they yet retained the nature of heat; for whatever they produced would be altogether fire.
But thus methinks it is: there are certain bodies whose clashings, motions, order, position, and shapes produce fires, and which by a change of, order change the nature of the things and do not resemble fire nor anything else which has the power of sending bodies to our senses and touching by its contact our sense of touch.
Again to say that all things are fire and that no real thing except fire exists in the number of things, as this same man does, appears to be sheer dotage.
rem veram in numero rerum constare nisi ignem,
quod facit hic idem, perdelirum esse videtur.
nam contra sensus ab sensibus ipse repugnat
et labefactat eos, unde omnia credita pendent,
695 unde hic cognitus est ipsi quem nominat ignem;
credit enim sensus ignem cognoscere vere,
cetera non credit, quae nilo clara minus sunt.
quod mihi cum vanum tum delirum esse videtur;
quo referemus enim? quid nobis certius ipsis
700 sensibus esse potest, qui vera ac falsa notemus?
Praeterea quare quisquam magis omnia tollat
et velit ardoris naturam linquere solam,
quam neget esse ignis, aliam tamen esse relinquat?
aequa videtur enim dementia dicere utrumque.
705 Quapropter qui materiem rerum esse putarunt
ignem atque ex igni summam consistere posse,
et qui principium gignundis aera rebus
constituere aut umorem qui cumque putarunt
fingere res ipsum per se terramve creare
710 omnia et in rerum naturas vertier omnis,
magno opere a vero longe derrasse videntur.
adde etiam qui conduplicant primordia rerum
aera iungentes igni terramque liquori,
et qui quattuor ex rebus posse omnia rentur
715 ex igni terra atque anima procrescere et imbri.
quorum Acragantinus cum primis Empedocles est,
insula quem triquetris terrarum gessit in oris,
quam fluitans circum magnis anfractibus aequor
Ionium glaucis aspargit virus ab undis
720 angustoque fretu rapidum mare dividit undis
Aeoliae terrarum oras a finibus eius.
hic est vasta Charybdis et hic Aetnaea minantur
murmura flammarum rursum se colligere iras,
faucibus eruptos iterum vis ut vomat ignis
725 ad caelumque ferat flammai fulgura rursum.
quae cum magna modis multis miranda videtur
gentibus humanis regio visendaque fertur
rebus opima bonis, multa munita virum vi,
nil tamen hoc habuisse viro praeclarius in se
730 nec sanctum magis et mirum carumque videtur.
carmina quin etiam divini pectoris eius
vociferantur et exponunt praeclara reperta,
ut vix humana videatur stirpe creatus.
[691] For he himself takes his stand on the side of the senses to fight against the senses and shakes their authority, on which rests all our belief, ay from which this fire as he calls it is known to himself; for he believes that the senses can truly perceive fire, he does not believe they can perceive all other things which are not a whit less clear.
Now this appears to me to be as false as it is foolish; for to what shall we appeal? What surer test can we have than the senses, whereby to note truth and falsehood? Again why should any one rather abolish all things and choose to leave the single nature of heat, than deny that fires exist, while he allows any thing else to be? It seems to be equal madness to affirm either this or that.
For these reasons they who have held that fire is the matter of things and that the sum can be formed out of fire, and they who have determined air to be the first-beginning in begetting things, and all who have held that water by itself alone forms things, or that earth produces all things and changes into all the different natures of things, appear to have strayed exceedingly wide of the truth; as well as they who make the first-beginnings of things twofold coupling air with fire and earth with water, and they who believe that all things grow out of four things, fire earth and air and water.
Chief of whom is Agrigentine Empedocles: him within the three-cornered shores of its lands that island bore, about which the Ionian sea flows in large crankings, and splashes up brine from its green waves.
Here the sea racing in its straitened froth divides by its waters the shores of Italia’s lands from the other’s coasts; here is wasteful Charybdis and here the rumblings of Aetna threaten anew to gather up such fury of flames, as again with force to belch forth the fires bursting from its throat and carry up to heaven once more the lightnings of flame.
Now though this great country is seen to deserve in many ways the wonder of mankind and is held to be well worth visiting, rich in all good things, guarded by large force of men, yet seems it to have held within it nothing more glorious than this man, nothing more holy marvelous and dear.
The verses too of his godlike genius cry with a loud voice and set forth in such wise his glorious discoveries that he hardly seems born of a mortal stock.
Hic tamen et supra quos diximus inferiores
735 partibus egregie multis multoque minores,
quamquam multa bene ac divinitus invenientes
ex adyto tam quam cordis responsa dedere
sanctius et multo certa ratione magis quam
Pythia quae tripodi a Phoebi lauroque profatur,
740 principiis tamen in rerum fecere ruinas
et graviter magni magno cecidere ibi casu.
Primum quod motus exempto rebus inani
constituunt et res mollis rarasque relinquunt
aera solem ignem terras animalia frugis
745 nec tamen admiscent in eorum corpus inane;
deinde quod omnino finem non esse secandis
corporibus facient neque pausam stare fragori
nec prorsum in rebus minimum consistere quicquam,
cum videamus id extremum cuiusque cacumen
750 esse quod ad sensus nostros minimum esse videtur,
conicere ut possis ex hoc, quae cernere non quis
extremum quod habent, minimum consistere rerum.
Huc accedit item, quoniam primordia rerum
mollia constituunt, quae nos nativa videmus
755 esse et mortali cum corpore, funditus ut qui
debeat ad nihilum iam rerum summa reverti
de nihiloque renata vigescere copia rerum;
quorum utrumque quid a vero iam distet habebis.
Deinde inimica modis multis sunt atque veneno
760 ipsa sibi inter se; quare aut congressa peribunt
aut ita diffugient, ut tempestate coacta
fulmina diffugere atque imbris ventosque videmus.
Denique quattuor ex rebus si cuncta creantur
atque in eas rursum res omnia dissoluuntur,
765 qui magis illa queunt rerum primordia dici
quam contra res illorum retroque putari?
alternis gignuntur enim mutantque colorem
et totam inter se naturam tempore ab omni.
fulmina diffugere atque imbris ventosque videmus.
770 sin ita forte putas ignis terraeque coire
corpus et aerias auras roremque liquoris,
nil in concilio naturam ut mutet eorum,
nulla tibi ex illis poterit res esse creata,
non animans, non exanimo cum corpore, ut arbos;
775 quippe suam quicque in coetu variantis acervi
naturam ostendet mixtusque videbitur aer
cum terra simul et quodam cum rore manere.
at primordia gignundis in rebus oportet
naturam clandestinam caecamque adhibere,
780 emineat ne quid, quod c
ontra pugnet et obstet
quo minus esse queat proprie quodcumque creatur.
[734] Yet he and those whom we have mentioned above immeasurably inferior and far beneath him, although the authors of many excellent and godlike discoveries, they have given responses from so to say their hearts’ holy of holies with more sanctity and on much more grounds than the Pythia who speaks out from the tripod and laurel of Phoebus, have yet gone to ruin in the first-beginnings of things: it is there they have fallen, and, great themselves, great and heavy has been that fall; first because they have banished void from things and yet assign to them motions, and allow things soft and rare, air sun fire earth, living things and corn, and yet mix not up void in their body; next because they suppose that there is no limit to the division of bodies and no stop set to their breaking and that there exists no least at all in things; though we see that that is the bounding point of any thing which seems to be least to our senses, so that from this you may infer that because the things which you do not see have a bounding point, there is a least in them.
Moreover since they assign soft first-beginnings of things, which we see to have birth and to be of a body altogether mortal, the sum of things must in that case revert to nothing and the store of things be born anew and flourish out of nothing: how wide now of the truth both these doctrines are you will already comprehend.
In the next place these bodies are in many ways mutually hostile and poisonous; and therefore they will either perish when they have met, or will fly asunder just as we see, when a storm has gathered, lightnings and rains and winds fly asunder.
Again if all things are produced from four things and all again broken up into those things, how can they be called first-beginnings of things any more than things be called their first-beginnings, the supposition being reversed? For they are begotten time about and interchange color and their whole nature without ceasing.
But if haply you suppose that the body of fire and of earth and air and the moisture of water meet in such a way that none of them in the union changes its nature, no thing I tell you can be then produced out of them, neither living thing northing with inanimate body, as a tree; in fact each thing amid the medley of this discordant mass will display its own nature and air will be seen to be mixed up with earth and heat to remain in union with moisture.
But first-beginnings ought in begetting things to bring with them a latent and unseen nature in order that no thing stand out, to be in the way and prevent whatever is produced from having its own proper being.