The hard facts of military campaigning meant that Warbeck would need both a reasonably-sized foreign force (as provided by France for Henry in 1485 or by Duchess Margaret for Simnel in 1487) and English defections or neutrality to succeed. Edward IV had not had any significant foreign help from Burgundy as he returned to challenge Henry VI and Warwick ‘the Kingmaker’ in 1471, but had a ready ‘power-base’ as a past, competent ruler and was known to his ex-subjects; and he duly benefited from defections led by his brother Clarence. Similarly, Warwick was a known and popular senior magnate and political actor when he invaded England on Richard of York’s behalf in 1460 and on his own behalf in 1470. The Duke of Buckingham was the principal local magnate in South Wales as he revolted against Richard III in 1483, though lacking known allies outside the region. Henry Tudor was as unknown in 1483 and 1485 as Warbeck was to be in the 1490s, but his genealogical provenance was known; as of December 1483 he had promised to marry the ‘legitimate’ heiress Elizabeth of York, and he faced a murdering usurper and possible regicide. He also benefited from having his stepfather, Stanley, in charge of one of his opponents’ main military contingents. Even Simnel, of uncertain provenance, had military veterans and senior ex-Yorkists Lincoln and Lovell at his side and a body of Continental mercenaries fighting for him. By contrast Warbeck–whoever he really was –lacked support in England after the arrests of January 1495, or at the latest the arrests of Kendall’s Hospitaller-Church circle in spring 1496, and had no foreign troops to make up for it.
Had Charles VIII or Maximilian and Philip provided him with as many experienced men to attack Kent in 1495 as Margaret had given Simnel in 1487 (or preferably more), Henry might at least have faced a hard-fought battle. Warbeck’s main backer after 1492 was Maximilian, who even set him up as a ‘genuine’ exiled King of England in Flanders, but the prospect of a large army of German ‘landsknechts’ marching on London for him was remote despite this support. Maximilian was only regent of the Flemish duchies for his son Philip, who achieved full control in 1494, and the prospect of Flemish funds for Warbeck’s cause would depend on the local elected assemblies of cautious, thrifty burgers who needed a friendly regime in England for trade. Maximilian was not Emperor until his miserly father Frederick III died late in 1493 so had no Austrian lands or funds from the German princes until then, and in 1493 he ‘bought out’ his cousin Sigismund, Duke of the Tyrol and Styria, to secure their revenues (especially the lucrative local mines). Until this double windfall he was reliant on loans from the Fugger banking family, agreed on in 1491 to save him from bankruptcy. 1494 also secured him a rich wife, Bianca Sforza of Milan, with a huge dowry; but this brought him into Italian politics to oppose French ambitions there as a greater priority than invading England.128 Thenceforward he was usually resident in Innsbruck, and had diminished interest in Flanders, where Philip was now ruling and did next to nothing for Warbeck. The Habsburg family developments of 1491–9 thus served to minimalize the chances that Warbeck would get serious aid from them, and Duchess Margaret was a widow living on a fixed income on her jointure lands. Warbeck, and later the refugee Edmund de la Pole, were useful threats to hold over Henry VII but not objects of urgent consideration–and when Duke Philip and his wife Queen Juana of Castile were shipwrecked in Dorset in 1506 Henry was to ‘invite’ them to Windsor and not let them leave until Edmund was handed over. Would this have been Warbeck’s fate too?
What of Warbeck’s English support? The Cornish rebels of September 1497 suffered from their recent losses in the June rebellion, though in neither case were experienced commanders or well-armed military veterans with adequate artillery involved. Many had billhooks or spears. The best hope Warbeck would have had in 1497 would be if he had happened to leave Scotland for southern Ireland sooner (April or May?) so luck would have had it that he could hasten to Cornwall when the first revolt broke out. He lacked senior gentry backers in the county who would have had the resources to send messengers to him in time once they heard of the revolt at St Keverne gathering pace, so it would have depended on Lord Audley deciding to send for him and him arriving quickly. This would rely on luck, as a royal ship could easily intercept him en route; and even if he reached the rebels in time and they accepted him as their leader the expedition would still have been outclassed militarily by Daubeny. Lacking major defectors, he would have faced defeat in Kent in June 1497 as he did in reality in Somerset in September. But he might still have been able to flee safely to a ship at a Channel port and return to Flanders to eke out a frustrating existence as Margaret’s pensioner until she died in 1503 and Maximilian or Philip expelled him. His decision to take sanctuary at Beaulieu–probably as there was no ship available in Southampton Water–meant that he would fall into royal hands and end up having to confirm that he was a fake. But his eventual imprisonment in the Tower and execution followed a failed attempt to ‘run for it’ from honourable detention at Court at Westminster, which ended with him floundering about in the reeds of the Thames somewhere near Sheen.129 If he had had sympathizers ready to find him a ship then, instead of bolting without a clear plan, he could still have ended his days safe on the Continent. Instead, he was put in the Tower and later lured into a ‘plan to escape’ for which he was tried and executed–probably at least partly a ‘put-up job’ by the King to ensnare the unfortunate Earl of Warwick in the cell beneath him and secure enough of a legal excuse to execute both of them. Ferdinand and Isabella seem to have been behind this, insisting that Warwick be executed to ensure that the English throne was secure before they would send their daughter Catherine of Aragon to England to marry Prince Arthur.
At best, a genuine ‘cell’ of Yorkist plotters in London–a site of earlier plots to free Warwick in the early 1490s–was infiltrated and used by the King, and the ‘coincidence’ that Warbeck was put in the next cell to Warwick and allowed to make a hole in his floor and contact him was clearly no such thing. Henry, to his credit, seems to have been aware of the injustice of executing the innocent Warwick–and in 1497–8 he had treated Warbeck with considerable leniency given his proven offences. Was this just a ploy, or did he believe that he might be a genuine prince after all? The involvement of Warwick in the ‘escape plot’ and his subsequent trial and execution also brings in another ‘what if?’ possibility, as the injustice of the punishment was widely felt in England. Subsequent rumour had it that the sudden death of Henry’s eldest son, Arthur, in April 1502 was divine vengeance on him for the ‘murder’130–and a king who was believed to have incurred God’s wrath could be at greater risk of revolt. Luckily for Henry, the only likely potential beneficiary in 1502–6 was Suffolk, in exile and with no great chance of his host Archduke Philip lending him an army as Charles VIII had loaned one to Henry against another ‘royal murderer’ in 1485. Warwick’s own sister and the ‘legitimist’ Yorkist claimant, Margaret, was safely married off to a regime loyalist and Beaufort relative, Sir Richard Pole.131 What if she had been at large on the Continent too and available to marry Suffolk? Instead, the last senior member of the House of York ended up arrested for an alleged plot in 1538 and on the execution block in a ‘clear-out’ of potential threats by Henry VIII in 1541. She was chased round Tower Green by the King’s henchmen as she refused to submit quietly–tragedy combined with farce.
Notes
Chapter 1
1 For the 1320s, see Ian Mortimer, The Greatest Traitor: the Life of Roger Mortimer, First Earl of March, Ruler of England 1327–30 (Pimlico 2004) pp. 100–01, 109–10, 126–8. For the mid-1380s: Anthony Tuck, Richard II and the Nobility (Edward Arnold 1971), pp. 66–7; Nigel Saul, Richard II (Yale UP 1997) pp. 120–1. For the 1440s, see Bertram Wolffe, Henry VI (Methuen 1981) pp. 106–34.
2 See The Brut, ed. F T de Brie (London 1906–8) pp. 511–13 on the popular view of Humphrey’s victimization by the ‘peace party’. Also: J A Giles, Chronicles of the White Rose of York (London 1845), pp. 33–4; Historical Collections of a Citizen of London: Gregory’s Chronicle, 1189-1469, ed. Jame
s Gairdner (Camden Society 1876) pp. 187–8, John Benet, ‘Chronicle for the years 1400 to 1462’, ed. G and M Harriss in Camden Miscellany, vol xxiv (Royal Historical Society 1972) pp. 192–3, Davies’ Chronicle pp. 62–5, Chronicles of London, ed. H Kingsford (Oxford 1905) pp. 157–8; also English Historical Review, vol xxix (1914) p. 513.
3 Juliet Barker, Conquest: the English Kingdom of France 1415–50 (Abacus 2009), pp. 247–9.
4 Wolffe, pp. 162–5.
5 Ibid, pp. 110–11.
6 See also ‘Articles of the Duke of York against the Bishop of Chichester’, B L Harleian Mss. 543, ff. 161r–163r.
7 Wolffe, p. 221.
8 Roger Virgoe, ‘The Death of William de la Pole, Duke of Suffolk’, in Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, vol xlvii (1965) pp. 489–502.
9 Wolffe, p. 224.
10 The claim of Humphrey’s murder by the King or court was not widely believed in 1447 (Wolffe, p. 131) so it was probably exacerbated by York’s propagandists later; a few individuals did, however, blame Henry that early, see PRO King’s Bench 9/256/12 indictment.
11 Davies’ Chronicle, pp. 79–80; but as above, the story of Prince Edward’s illegitimacy was only widespread in the later 1450s.
12 Giles’ Chronicle, p. 39; The Brut, p. 517.
13 Wolffe, pp. 240–1.
14 Benet’s Chronicle, pp. 205–6; Bale’s Chronicle, p. 139. See also J Roskell, ‘Sir William Oldhall, Speaker in the Parliament of 1450–1’ in Nottingham Medieval Studies vol v (1961) pp. 87–112.
15 Benet’s Chronicle, pp. 206–7; Wheathampstead, Registrum, vol I p. 162; Rotuli Parliamentarum, vol v p. 346; H Kingsford, English Historical Literature in the Fifteenth Century (Oxford 1913) pp. 297–8.
16 Rotuli Parliamentarum, vol v, pp. 147–8; Benet’s Chronicle, p. 195.
17 Rotuli Parliamentarum, vol v, p. 148.
18 Quoted in Joseph Stevenson, The English Wars in France in the Fifteenth Century, vol ii part ii (Record Society 1861–4) pp. 639–42.
19 Capgrave, quoted by Wolffe p. 16. Also: PRO King’s Bench 9/260/85; 9/256/12; 9/262/1; 9/262/78; 9/122/28; and see RF Heinesett, ‘Treason by Words’ in Sussex Notes and Queries, vol xiv (Lewes 1954–7) pp. 116–20.
20 Wolffe, pp. 137 and 139–41, 143–4.
21 Ibid pp. 5–8 and 10–11.
22 Ibid pp. 119–26, and Sir J Ramsay, Lancaster and York (Oxford 1892) vol ii pp. 49–53. On a local level in a region with a pro-regime ‘favourite’ as the local ‘strongman’, see Documents Illustrative of Medieval Kentish Society, ed. F H Du Boulay (Kent Archaeological Society 1964), pp. 220–43. For Fortescue’s complaints, see his The Governance of England (Oxford 1885) p. 134.
23 See R A Griffiths, ‘The Trial of Eleanor Cobham: an episode in the fall of Duke Humphrey of Gloucester’, in BJRL, vol li (1968–9) pp. 381–99.
24 Wolffe, p. 39.
25 Bertram Wolffe, The Royal Demesne, pp. 124–30; Wolffe, Henry VI, pp. 230–1; see also The Paston Letters, ed. James Gairdner (6 vols, 1904).
26 See Bertram Wolffe, Henry VI, chapter 7.
27 As n. 18.
28 Wolffe, p. 234. See also Giles’ Chronicle p. 33 for Henry’s fear of Duke Humphrey and resort to armed guards from c. 1445.
Chapter 2
1 See the first documentary reference to York as a potential challenger in PRO King’s Bench 9/265/12–29, an indictment of January 1451. J Stevenson, Wars, vol ii (Record Society 1861–4) p. 750 for the 1451 formal Parliamentary proposal that York be named as heir.
2 Rotuli Parliamentarum, vol v, pp. 228–33.
3 K B MacFarlane, ‘William Worcester: a preliminary survey’ in Studies Presented to Sir Hilary Jenkinson, ed. J Conway Davies (Oxford 1957) pp. 211–15; and p. 5 for the expectation that Henry would lead the expedition.
4 Wolffe, Henry VI (Methuen 1981) pp. 263–4.
5 Paston Letters, introduction: p. cxi.
6 Calendar of Patent Rolls 1446–52, pp. 537, 577.
7 Rotuli Parliamentarum, vol v, p. 346.
8 Wheathampstead, Registrum vol I, p. 162; Benet’s Chronicle, p. 206; Davies’ Chronicle p. 70.
9 Benet’s Chronicle, p. 207.
10 Giles’ Chronicle, p. 43; A Short English Chronicle, p. 69; Rotuli Parliamentarum, vol v, pp. 346–7.
11 PRO E 101/ 410/ 9; for the ‘rebels’ grovelling in halters in the snow, see Six Town Chronicles, ed. R Flenley (Oxford 1911) p. 107.
12 Calendar of Patent Rolls 1446–52, pp. 111, 162; ibid 1452–61, pp. 34-5; PRO E 28/83/41.
13 D Wilkins, Concilia, vol iii, p. 560.
14 Robert Knecht, The Valois: Kings of France 1328-1589 (Hambledon and London 2004) p. 47.
15 See Wolffe, Henry VI, pp. 270–1 for plausible reasons for Henry’s collapse. For Heworth Moor, see R A Griffiths, ‘Local rivalries and national politics: the Nevilles and the Duke of Exeter, 1452-61’ in Speculum xliii (1968) pp. 589–632.
16 Cambridge Medieval History, vol vii, pp. 372–3.
17 Paston Letters, vol I pp. 259–61 and 403–6.
18 Rotuli Parliamentarum, vol v, pp. 242–4; Wolffe, Henry VI, pp. 278–81.
19 Benet’s Chronicle, p. 211.
20 C A J Armstrong, ‘Politics and the Battle of St Albans, 1455’ in Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, vol xxxiii (1960) pp. 8–9.
21 Armstrong, pp. 8–9.
22 Griffiths in Speculum, vol xliii, pp. 606–8; Benet’s Chronicle, p. 210; Paston Letters, vol I p. 264.
23 Wolffe, Henry VI, p. 285.
24 Proceedings of the Privy Council, ed. Nicholas (1834–7) vol vi, pp. 339–42.
25 PRO E 404/70/3/ 2, 71: orders for arms for the King’s entourage.
26 Wolffe, Henry VI, p. 291.
27 Ibid pp. 291–2.
28 Ibid p. 292.
29 Paston Letters, vol I, pp. 328–9 and Wolffe, Henry VI, pp. 292–3.
30 Armstrong, pp. 42–8; Wolffe, Henry VI, pp. 293–5.
31 Rotuli Parliamentarum, vol v, pp. 321–2.
32 Ibid, pp. 289–90; and pp. 284–9 on provision for the Prince of Wales to succeed as regent.
33 See J Roskell in BIHR, vol xxix (1956) pp. 193–5.
34 Rotuli Parliamentarum, vol v ,pp. 300–03, 335a; Armstrong, pp. 58–62.
35 Wolffe, Henry VI, p. 299; PRO E 28/87/ 29A.
36 Wolffe, Henry VI, pp. 297–8.
37 Rotuli Parliamentarum, vol v, pp. 321–2.
38 Wolffe, Henry VI, p. 306. See also Thomas Gascoigne, Loci et Libra Veritatum, ed. J E Thorold Rogers (Oxford 1881) p. 214; Croyland Chronicle, p. 454 on Henry’s weak-mindedness by 1460. See also R L Storey, The End of the House of Lancaster (Cambridge University Press 1966), pp. 178–82 and 228–30 on politico-military reasons for the King’s progresses.
39 Wolffe, Henry VI, p. 309; Calendar of Patent Rolls 1452-61, pp. 371, 400, 405, 410.
40 Storey, p. 179.
41 PRO E 404/70/3/44, C. 81/ 1546/89c.
42 Gascoigne, op. cit., and Paston Letters, vol I, pp. 407–9 for the Queen’s involvement in these changes of personnel.
43 Proceedings of the Privy Council, vol vi, pp. 333–4; Rotuli Parliamentarum, vol v p. 347.
44 PRO King’s Bench 9/35/24, 44, 60, 70, 71, 72; Calendar of the Patent Rolls 1452–61, pp. 348, 353.
45 Benet’s Chronicle, p. 221; Davies’ Chronicle, p. 77; Six Town Chronicles, pp. 145, 160; Chronicle of London, ed. Nicholas, pp. 251–4 on the ‘Love-Day’ ceremony.
46 John Gillingham, The Wars of the Roses (Weidenfeld and Nicolson 2001) p. 72.
47 Gaston du Fresne de Beaucourt, Histoire de Charles VII (Paris 1881–91, 6 vols) vol vi pp. 52, 55, 137.
48 Beaucourt, vol vi, pp. 144–5.
49 Memoires du Philippe de Commignes, ed. D Godefroy and L de Fresnoy (Paris 1747) vol ii pp. 110–11.
50 Wheathampstead, Registrum, vol I, pp. 336–7.
51 Six Town Chronicles, p. 113; The Brut, p. 526; Davies’ Chronicle, p. 77; Kingsford’s London Chronicles, p. 169.
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