by David
Bombing was the first thing that crossed Digger’s mind, so he called out the guard. But no bombs appeared to have exploded. There was a general flurry of activity around the camp as dawn broke. A ‘recce’ – a reconnaissance mission – was organised to try to discover what these non-exploding bombs might be.
It turned out that the planes that had just bombed Singapore were dropping their extra fuel tanks, now empty, on their return journey to their bases in southern Indochina. The Japanese knew how important air support would be in Malaya and had taken great care to ensure that their planes could fly distances much greater than their initial designs permitted.8
Later this same day, the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, the action that would bring the United States into the war. They also landed at Kota Bharu on the east coast of the Malayan Peninsula, about 600 kilometres north of Singapore. By all accounts, the troops of the 8th Indian Brigade had put up a fierce defence here, and yet the British Royal Air Force had abandoned the position, claiming they heard that the Japanese had overrun the defences. This, in turn, caused the Indians to retreat southwards after dark, and thus a pattern of retreat by the Allies was begun on the Malayan peninsula. The Japanese also collected a very valuable airfield.
A day or two after this activity, Digger was sent north to join B Company at Mersing. It had been given the task of building an Advanced Dressing Station (ADS) into the side of a hill. The approach to the ADS was through a swampy area, so it needed what was known as a ‘corduroy road’, which was constructed of tree trunks laid across the road to form a reliable hard surface. Digger’s job was to help to build this road. The men of B Company were saying that this ADS would be like the defensive position which the Australian 9th Division had defended at Tobruk earlier that year.
As the Japanese advanced down the peninsula from Kota Bharu – meeting little resistance – life was still relatively quiet for the men of the 2/9th Ambulance at Mersing and Kota Tinggi. They knew, however, that the enemy was advancing on all fronts, and not just in Malaya. British troops in Burma had been forced to withdraw to Rangoon. The British also withdrew from Hong Kong to Hong Kong Island. On 16 December the Japanese landed on Penang, on the eastern coast of the Malayan peninsula, and on 19 December the British withdrew completely from that island.
Mersing was also bombed by the Japanese on 19 December, and shortly afterwards the Australians at Kota Tinggi, to the south, cheered as formations of Vildebeest and Hudson bombers, escorted by Brewster Buffalos, flew over them in a north-easterly direction. But none of these aircraft, despite their fearsome names, was a match for the Japanese Zeros, and shortly afterwards a few were observed limping back to Singapore. They soon acquired other names. The Vildebeest, which had a top speed of just 160 miles per hour, was nicknamed ‘the flying coffin’, while the Buffalos were called the ‘peanut specials’.9
In fact, the British High Command had been relying on air defence as its prime strategy for the defence of Malaya, but the Allied planes were clearly no match for the Japanese aircraft. A further problem was that there were never enough troops on the ground to defend the airbases, so the Japanese inherited several very useful airfields as they progressed down the peninsula. There was no more talk now of the ‘myopic’ Japanese pilots.
On 3 January 1942 the Australians received a clear notification that the war was creeping ever closer when a patrol of the 2/18th Battalion captured two Japanese airmen who somehow had escaped with their lives when their plane was shot down.
A week or so later, all men of the Australian 27th Brigade – comprising the 2/26th, the 2/29th and the 2/30th Battalions – left Mersing to join three brigades from the Indian 9th Division under Major General Bennett on the western side of the Malayan peninsula. They were to hold the line north-west of Johor and stop the Japanese advance on the west coast. This left only Brigadier H. B. Taylor’s 22nd Australian Brigade – comprising the 2/18th, the 2/19th and the 2/20th Battalions – to defend Mersing in the east.
At Mersing, the 2/9th Field Ambulance’s B Company now had an ADS built into the side of a hill. Digger and his mates were confident it could withstand a siege by the Japanese. They were all well aware that the serious action was about to start.
Chapter 3
Retreat to Singapore
The capture of two downed airmen on 3 January 1942 by the 2/18th Battalion was a reminder to all the Australians stationed at Mersing that the effort they were putting into the defence of the area was very necessary indeed. Morale had started off high enough, until the British battleship the HMS Prince of Wales and the battlecruiser the HMS Repulse were sunk off the east coast of Malaya on 10 December by Japanese bombers. This not only confirmed the vulnerability of the ‘invincible’ British fleet but also demonstrated the efficiency of the Japanese air force.
The troops on the ground in Malaya were determined that the Japanese would not find them such an easy target, and throughout late December and the first half of January defences were prepared around Mersing at a feverish rate. The 2/18th, the 2/19th and the 2/20th Battalions were all fully engaged in defence work north of Mersing. The defences included the construction of fortifications, such as weapons pits and machine-gun posts, as well as minefields and barbed wire on all approaches from the north, particularly along the northern bank of the Endau River. Unfortunately, the mines, laid for the sole purpose of killing the enemy, also led to casualties among those placing them.
The men of the 2/20th Battalion were engaged in laying thousands of mines between the sea and the road running north to Endau, which was about seventeen miles north of Mersing. Mines were laid very carefully and in strict mathematical arrangement, with fine tripwires running between them. Agricultural piping was set in the ground to accommodate the mine, then the wires were attached. When the tripwire was pulled, the mine was designed to rise up out of the ground and explode at about waist height. They were deadly to anyone within a fifty-yard radius.
The mined areas were indicated to the enemy, in accordance with international rules, by rags placed on poles every few yards. But because of monkeys and goats setting them off and the monsoon rains flooding the area, the mines were not very effective. And laying mines was very dangerous. One engineer near the Mersing Bridge literally blew himself to bits. He had to be collected and carried back to camp in a ground sheet.1
Around 7 January or 8 January, Digger accompanied an ambulance to the 2/20th Battalion’s Regimental Aid Post (RAP) to collect another casualty from the minefield being laid between sea and the road north from Mersing to Endau. This soldier had been laying mines according to the recognised pattern, and had just set the charges when a frightened goat had scuttled across the area and set off a mine. The man received bad wounds to both legs but was lucky it was not more serious.
On 13 January Mersing was heavily bombed, and the ambulances of B Company of the 2/9th Field Ambulance swung into action, rescuing civilians from the raid. The very next day, just as things were beginning to hot up in eastern Malaya, the 2/19th Battalion was called to join western force; the Japanese were apparently advancing faster there. This left only two battalions at Mersing, the 2/18th and the 2/20th. Later, it was learned that the very good defences north of Mersing had persuaded the Japanese to concentrate more of their forces on the west coast of the Malayan peninsula.
However, despite the solid defences, reconnaissance patrols from the 2/20th were reporting increased Japanese activity north of Mersing and had been engaged in several preliminary skirmishes. It was as if each side was testing the other.
On 15 January, a platoon from the 2/20th Battalion, led by Lieutenant Frank Ramsbotham, received intelligence that the Japanese were advancing south down the road from Endau. Ramsbotham moved his men north to set up an ambush at a small bridge crossing a tributary of the Endau River. The Australians knew the Japanese would have little hope of escape because there were minefields on either side of the road on the southern side of the bridge.
The Japanese – riding
bicycles three abreast – were given a very warm reception as they crossed the bridge. They suffered many casualties but kept coming. Ignoring the minefields on either side of the road, they tried to encircle Lieutenant Ramsbotham’s patrol. Unfortunately, the mines failed to go off, mainly due to the spring tides that had recently flooded the area. However, the platoon understood what the Japanese tactics were and very smartly withdrew before they were overwhelmed.
Three members of this platoon had suffered minor injuries, but they were able enough to regale Digger with exactly what happened as the ambulance took them to the ADS.
Digger was also involved with evacuating another casualty, Charlie O’Brien, a few days later. Charlie, a member of the 2/20th Battalion, had a more serious wound. He had taken at least one bullet in the groin area; it had broken either his pelvic girdle or perhaps his upper femur. O’Brien suffered this wound while in action with Corporal Elliott McMaster, who had been selected as a forward scout on the northern bank of the Endau River.
The patrol was on the north side of the Endau River. The men had just organised their breakfast when a lookout returned and reported that he had seen about fifty Japanese moving down the road towards them. They informed their battalion headquarters by field telephone, and back came an order to attack. Corporal McMaster wasn’t too happy about this since they were so few. They only had .303 rifles and one Tommy gun, while they knew the Japanese would be armed with automatics.
Keeping a lookout, they saw six Japanese disappearing behind a house about fifty yards up the road, so they attacked. All hell broke loose. Charlie, who had the Tommy gun, was firing from a standing position in the open but suddenly his gun jammed – he became a sitting target for the Japanese, who were now apparently occupying the hillside above and behind the house. Charlie was hit and put out of action, but he was rescued by his mates, who carried him to cover.2
Digger accompanied Charlie in the ambulance to the MDS at Kluang, since the road to Kota Tinggi was flooded. During the journey, Charlie was delirious from the combination of morphine and pain from his wound, but he was conscious enough to insist that Digger see to it that his Tommy gun went to the battalion armoury to be repaired. Digger assured him that he would attend to this.
Charlie was sent back by ship to Australia, and Digger took his Tommy gun to the armoury as promised. Despite his position as a medical orderly – a non-combatant – Digger persuaded the armoury corporal to sign him out a .303 rifle in Charlie’s name.
I’d thought about this often. What the hell would I do if, by some chance, I found myself alone and facing an armed Japanese soldier? Would I put my hand up as a halt sign and then try to explain in sign language that I was a non-combatant? I knew it was likely I’d be dead before I got that far. Bugger it, I thought. I’ll make my own luck and get myself a rifle. Nobody seemed to care that I had one.
The Allied forces on Malaya’s eastern coast were now more determined than ever that they would put up a good show against the Japanese. They had received minimal casualties and were sure that they had accounted for many Japanese dead and wounded. Morale was high, they were confident of victory, and – despite the disappointment of the flooded minefields – they had created great defences.
However, on 23 January the 2/18th and the 2/20th Battalions received orders to abandon their well-prepared defences at Mersing and withdraw further south to Jemaluang. Japan’s successes in the west were now threatening the forces on the east coast. Although never really tested, the strong defences had indeed dissuaded the Japanese from conducting a landing around Mersing, which would have allowed them to take the shortest landward route to advance on Singapore.3
Meanwhile, the three battalions of the Australian 27th Infantry Brigade and the 2/19th Battalion of the 22nd Infantry Brigade were having a much harder time on the west coast of the Malayan peninsula. The Japanese forced them to retreat southwards towards Singapore.
The Japanese first experienced the Australians’ determination and aggression on the west of the peninsula as they moved between the towns of Tampin and Gemas. An ambush was set up by Captain Desmond Duffy of B Company of the 2/30th Battalion at a bridge over the Gemencheh River, about eleven kilometres west of Gemas. The main force of the 2/30th Battalion was five kilometres to the rear.
As the Japanese approached the bridge in their hundreds, many of them on bicycles, the bridge was blown and the Australians opened fire. Unfortunately, Captain Duffy was unable to contact his battalion headquarters to call in the artillery and B Company was forced to withdraw. In this action alone, however, it was estimated that the Australians killed 600 Japanese for the loss of one of their own soldiers. Following this ambush, a prolonged battle took place nearer Gemas, that lasted for two days, and the Australians eventually had to withdraw to the Fort Rose Estate.4
On 15 January the 2/19th and the 2/29th Battalions were sent to the aid of the Indian 45th Brigade, defending the line of the Muar River against the Japanese Imperial Guards Division, at the village of Bakri, about sixty-five kilometres south of Gemas. Japanese forces were able to penetrate between the 2/29th and the 2/19th, which was closer to the main force at Bakri. The men of the 2/29th were isolated but fought their way back to join the main force. Their commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel James Robertson, was killed in this engagement.
At about this time, the Indian 45th Brigade headquarters was bombed, killing or wounding all its staff. This left Lieutenant Colonel Charles Anderson, commanding officer of the 2/19th Battalion, in charge of all Australian and Indian troops. They were under attack from the Japanese on all sides. Anderson waited another two days for extra Indian troops to arrive, and then decided on 20 January to make a break through the Japanese lines for Parit Sulong.
Anderson’s push was successful, despite heavy casualties, and the men reached Parit Sulong on 22 January. A strong Japanese force still blocked their final escape route. Many Australian and Indian troops had been killed, and they were carrying 140 wounded. A British force sent to relieve them could not get through. Colonel Anderson ordered all guns and vehicles to be destroyed, then took the difficult decision to leave the 140 wounded at Parit Sulong. He then ordered his men to form small groups and escape as best they could through the countryside, with the aim of joining the main force further south at Yong Peng.
Some 271 men of the 2/19th Battalion and 130 men of the 2/29th Battalion escaped through the Japanese lines. This was less than a quarter of the Australians’ original force in this action. The Japanese murdered all but one of the wounded at Parit Sulong. Lieutenant Colonel Charles Andersen was later awarded the Victoria Cross.5
This was in the early days of the campaign, before the Australians understood how the Japanese treated their prisoners. It had to be assumed that they would abide by the international rules of war. But this was not the case; summary execution of prisoners was the rule rather than the exception. These men were simply lined up against a shed and gunned down. Only one survived to tell the tale. The Japanese general responsible for this massacre was Lieutenant-General Takuma Nishimura, who eventually suffered a similar fate as a result of the war crime trials after the Japanese surrender.6
Meanwhile, back on the eastern side of the Malayan peninsula, the 2/18th and the 2/20th Battalions of the 22nd Australian Infantry Brigade and B Company of the 2/9th Field Ambulance had been ordered by General Bennett to retreat to Jamaluang, but they were not ready to give up just yet. The retreat was barely completed when, on 26 January 1942, Brigadier Harold Taylor decided that they would prepare a surprise for the rapidly advancing Japanese. Of all places, it would take place at a pig farm on the Nithsdale Estate, just north of Jemaluang.
Three companies of the 2/18th Battalion lay in wait for the Japanese, expecting them to arrive before nightfall. The Japanese walked into the ambush in the early hours of the morning of 27 January. It took them completely by surprise. The Australians suffered too, however; in the confusion, D Company of the 2/18th was trapped behind Japanese li
nes. Eighty Australian lives were lost but it was estimated that about 2000 Japanese were also killed.
As a result of this action, we went into overdrive during the next few days, trying as best we could to tend to the severely wounded men and ferry them to the MDS at Kluang. After about two days I remember thinking to myself, Bugger it, I’m going to have a sleep for a bit. It was evening, so I ate some dry biscuit, drank some water and fell asleep in a thatched hut opposite our unit’s temporary headquarters.
I awoke the next morning thinking it was really early, but it was already eight o’clock. All was quiet. When I went outside, the ambulances and the men were gone. I had a good look around and there was no one to be seen. The bastards had left without me! By good luck, there was still some traffic on the nearby main road, so I got my haversack and my rifle and headed over there. Every army truck was headed south so I just hitched a ride. After driving for about three hours, we crossed the causeway into Singapore.
Chapter 4
The Fight for Singapore
Being a private, Digger of course had no say in the organisation of the war, but like all his mates, he knew that so far it had been a complete stuff-up. It seemed to them that those in charge – the British – had spent too much time organising and implementing the retreat, and not enough time planning how to attack the Japanese and win. They seemed to stumble from one retreating position to the next, concerned only with survival. As time wore on, the retreat strategy seemed to become ‘every man for himself’.
Digger decided for himself what action he should take, where he was going, where he slept, when and what he ate, and all the time he tried to keep ahead of the Japanese advance. He was more certain than ever that being a non-combatant was not really in his nature, particularly if he were the one making the decisions that affected his welfare. He was very glad that he had acquired his .303 rifle and ammunition.
