Nixon, however, told David Frost in a television interview broadcast May 25, 1977, that the money he offered Haldeman and Ehrlichman was the Hughes $100,000. “Well, as a matter of fact,” said Nixon, “I had in mind the campaign contribution that [Rebozo] received from Hughes.” It should be noted, however, that Nixon actually offered his two top men up to $300,000, and it is also clear that by the time he made the offer at least some of the Hughes money had already been spent.
The Rebozo-Kalmbach meeting of April 30, 1973, was described by Kalmbach in testimony before the Senate Watergate Committee and further detailed by a confidential source with direct knowledge of their conversation. Rebozo’s statement that he had given some of the Hughes money to Nixon’s brothers, Woods, and “others” was quoted by Kalmbach under oath.
Rebozo’s May 10, 1973, statement to the IRS was reported by the Senate Watergate Committee. The IRS’s fears of probing Rebozo were noted by Ehrlichman in an interview. Rebozo’s attempts to return the Hughes money to Danner were described by Danner in Senate Watergate Committee testimony. Danner also gave testimony on his May 20, 1973, meeting with Nixon at Camp David.
Both Haig and Simon confirmed in Senate testimony their conversation about the IRS probe of Rebozo. The FBI chief agent in Miami, Kenneth Whitaker, described Rebozo’s unveiling of the Hughes $100,000—and the discovery of an extra hundred-dollar bill—in testimony before the Senate Watergate Committee. The return of the money to Chester Davis was described by Davis, Rebozo, and their intermediaries in Senate testimony.
The Federal Reserve later reported that thirty-five of the hundred-dollar bills returned by Rebozo were issued by the U.S. Treasury after the last date Danner, Maheu, and Rebozo himself originally testified the money had been delivered. While Rebozo changed his account to cover all the Hughes cash and tried to pressure Danner to do likewise, Danner would never agree to confirm a delivery date that would cover the thirty-five late-issue bills.
Rebozo’s fears about revelation of the Hughes money are quoted from his testimony before the Senate Watergate Committee.
The apparent connection between Cox’s probe of the Hughes-Rebozo affair and the Saturday Night Massacre was detailed by a senior aide in the Nixon White House who agreed to provide information only on a not-for-attribution background basis. His account was confirmed in large part by the public testimony of others directly involved and by available government records.
Rebozo’s discovery of the special prosecutor’s probe on October 18, 1973, was established by the Senate Watergate Committee from the handwritten notes of the IRS agent who tipped him off, and these notes also show that he called Rebozo’s lawyer “about disclosure to Cox” and indicate that he also called White House counsel Fred Buzhardt that same morning to inform him of Cox’s demand for the IRS files on the Hughes $100,000. In any event, Rebozo could not have missed the eight-column banner headline in the Miami Herald.
Nixon’s angry reaction to the news, apparently first received in a phone call from Rebozo, was quoted by a member of the White House staff. Haig confirmed in an interview that he discussed the Cox probe with Nixon and that the president said it was “a perfect illustration” of how Cox was out to get him.
Richardson told the Senate Judiciary Committee that Haig called him on October 18 and said that Nixon “didn’t see what Mr. Cox’s charter had to do with the activities of Mr. Rebozo.” Haig confirmed in Senate Watergate Committee testimony that after talking with Nixon he called Richardson: “I may have expressed this as being of presidential concern and I’m sure if I did I would have had reason to know … because he specifically told me so.”
Secret Service records obtained from the National Archives show that Rebozo arrived at the White House October 19 and stayed there through October 20 as a “house guest,” meeting with the president at least twice in his office, and, according to a member of the staff, he spent “considerable time” alone with Nixon at night.
Haig testified that when he was with the president in Key Biscayne he had “invariably” heard both Nixon and Rebozo complain about the “unfair and unjust persecution” of Rebozo over the Hughes money.
“There’s no doubt that the tapes were the big issue,” said a senior White House aide, “but there’s also no doubt in my mind that Nixon’s anger over the Hughes investigation, and quite possibly his fear that it would lead to a broader investigation that would uncover the entire Rebozo slush fund, was a real flash-point in the whole Cox affair. I think it pushed him over the edge.”
Hughes was indicted in the Air West deal on December 27, 1973. Maheu and Davis were named co-defendants.
The scene of Davis dumping the Rebozo $100,000 in front of Senator Ervin was described by a member of the committee staff who was present.
One of the Mormons confirmed that Hughes was never told that his secret papers were stolen in the Romaine break-in, and the memos Hughes dictated in the aftermath of the burglary make it clear that he was not aware they were missing.
CIA documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act show that Gay told the Agency on July 2, 1974, that the Glomar document was missing and presumed stolen. Colby confirmed his meeting with Nixon in an interview.
Haig’s call to Nixon informing him of the Supreme Court decision about the tapes was described by Nixon in his memoirs (RN, vol. 2, p. 640).
The suppressed Senate Watergate Committee staff report on the Hughes connection to Watergate was obtained from one of the staff investigators who wrote it. The chief minority counsel, Fred Thompson, apparently first proposed deleting it from the committee’s final report, and Senator Ervin quickly agreed. One of the senators said in a background interview that none of his colleagues, Republican or Democrat, wanted it published. “Too many guilty bystanders would have been hurt,” he remarked, “and after two years of Watergate I don’t think anyone was ready to accept such a small price tag.”
Haldeman’s conclusion that the Hughes connection triggered Watergate was stated in The Ends of Power (pp. 19–20) and confirmed in a series of interviews. In fact, every top Nixon aide who has publicly expressed an opinion on the cause of the break-in agrees that the Hughes-Nixon-O’Brien triangle lay behind it. It is also the thesis of Dean’s Blind Ambition (Simon & Schuster, 1976) and Colson said in an interview: “I’ve always believed that the real motive behind the Watergate break-in was to get dirt on Larry O’Brien, who was drawing a retainer from Hughes. Beneath it all we’ll find some day that the real motive was Hughes.”
Colby’s discussion of the Romaine-Glomar link was quoted in CIA records obtained through the Freedom of Information Act.
The Senate Intelligence Committee’s probe of possible Hughes links to Nixon, the Mob, and the CIA was reported in part by the New York Times on March 26, 1975, and further confirmed by a staff investigator. Norman Mailer’s speculations were published by New York magazine, August 16, 1976. The IRS report suggesting Hughes died in 1970 was obtained from a former IRS agent. Commissioner Walters confirmed in an interview that he tried to find out if Hughes was alive.
One of the Mormons, George Francom, stated in an affidavit that Hughes was falsely told that “the drug supply was drying up in the Bahamas and that there would be a better supply in Acapulco.”
The description of Hughes’s death and of his last fix was recounted by Francom in his affidavit—he was the Mormon who refused to give Hughes the injection—and also by several other aides and doctors in depositions and court testimony.
Angleton’s eulogy was reported in Time magazine, April 19, 1976. He refused in an interview to explain his remarks.
Acknowledgments
This adventure began as a project for New Times magazine. When I had little more than a wild hunch, New Times editor Jon Larsen supported me without question and gave me the total freedom I needed. Without his backing the entire quest would not have been possible, and the secret papers would never have been found.
Tom Wallace and Irv Goodman, my original edi
tor and publisher at Holt, Rinehart and Winston, displayed rare courage in taking on a book they knew would be more than controversial.
Steve Rubin, who published the paperback of the original edition at Bantam Books, and is publishing this new edition at Broadway Books, has been an enthusiastic and highly effective publisher, now spanning two decades. Charlie Conrad, my editor at Broadway, has been right on target from day one, and his assistant, Alison Presley, a source of constant help.
Rob Fleder, a senior editor at Playboy, was among the first outsiders to read the manuscript, and his enthusiasm and that of his magazine meant much.
Very special thanks to my lead attorney, Jerry Gutman, president of the New York Civil Liberties Union, whose wise counsel often went beyond legal advice—a friend who was there from the beginning and never wavered through the years. I am also grateful to Ira Glasser, Aryeh Neier, and Bruce Ennis of the American Civil Liberties Union who all helped at a critical early stage; to Melville Nimmer; and especially to Leon Friedman who played a central role. Men like these keep the First Amendment alive.
Several friends took time to read, criticize, encourage. One, Ron Rosenbaum, did far more. This book is in many ways as much his as my own. Much of what is best in it was suggested by him, and he kept urging me on day after day for years, always generous with his time and intelligence, always full of creative insights. To have had such a brilliant writer as so devoted a friend was truly a godsend. I would not have made it without him.
Finally, my source for the papers, the Pro. He risked everything and gave me total trust. That made it all possible.
About the Author
MICHAEL DROSNIN, a former reporter for the Washington Post and Wall Street Journal, is also the author of two other New York Times bestsellers, The Bible Code and Bible Code II: The Countdown. He spent seven years researching and writing this classic account of power gone mad. Drosnin lives and works in New York.
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