Tactically, the Soviet anti-tank, divisional and self-propelled artillery stood out in the most favorable light. The techniques for conducting fire from close range at the most vulnerable locations on the German tanks and self-propelled guns – the flank and rear – were firmly confirmed. In the process, the most combat capable German panzer army at that time – the Sixth SS Panzer Army – suffered heavy losses:
In the period of the offensive, the German command undertook the commitment of tank groups consisting of 40 to 80 armored vehicles each simultaneously on several directions, with the aim of dispersing and breaking up our means of anti-tank defense. With such actions, the adversary obtained no success, and such a tactic led him to lose 80% of his tanks and self-propelled guns, which were destroyed by our anti-tank artillery, tanks, self-propelled guns and aircraft.
As concerns the losses in equipment, according to data of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, over the 10 days of fighting, 324 German tanks and self-propelled guns, as well as 120 armored halftracks, were left burned out on the battlefield; another 332 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 97 halftracks were knocked out (See Table 9).
According to German data, however, as of 13 March the irrecoverable losses of the Sixth SS Panzer Army amounted to 42 tanks and 1 halftrack (!). True, another 396 tanks and self-propelled guns and 228 halftracks were in the repair shop for short-term or long-term repairs. If you consider, though, that according to German documents a short-term repair could last for a month (and sometimes even longer), while no deadline at all was given for the completion of long-term repairs, then it will be clear that the German count of its armor losses is quite far from the truth. In addition, it should be considered that long-term repair was related to those vehicles that had to be evacuated from the battlefield. In addition, the German armor vehicles could switch from one category to another: initially short-term repair, then long-term, and then it might be written off as an irrecoverable loss. There you have it.
Table 9 German Armor Losses as Reported by the 3rd Ukrainian Front’s Armies over 6-15 March 1945
In sum, if we take the number of burned-out armor vehicles claimed by the 3rd Ukrainian Front, we won’t be far from the truth. The photos of the knocked-out or abandoned German armor in the Lake Balaton region, which were taken in the second half of March 1945 and are reproduced in this book, serve as confirmation for this. The author possesses photographs of 279 German tanks and self-propelled guns, which were marked with numbers by the Soviet trophy team, of which there are 70 Panthers, 40 Pz IV, 28 King Tigers, 3 Tiger I, 44 tank destroyers (Pz IV/70 and Hetzers), 22 assault guns, 17 Hungarian tanks and self-propelled guns, and a number of other vehicles. At the same time, the highest identification number that is visible in the photographs of the knocked out armor is 355. Considering that the photos depict 279 armor vehicles and just one halftrack, it can be assumed that the missing numbers all relate to German halftracks. Thus, one can confidently state that the irrecoverable German losses of tanks and self-propelled guns in the course of Operation Frühlingserwachen amount to no less than 250. As concerns Soviet losses, then over the 10 days of fighting they amounted to 165 tanks and self-propelled guns, of which T-34s comprised the largest number (84), followed by SU-100s (48).
On 16 March 1945, the units of the 3rd Ukrainian Front went on the offensive according to plans for the Vienna operation. The Sixth SS Panzer Army, after the heavy losses it had suffered in Operation Frühlingserwachen, was unable to offer serious resistance, and it was driven out of Hungary and into Austria literally within two weeks. Its remnants later surrendered in part to the Soviets, in part to the Americans, near Vienna in May 1945.
This bogged down StuG 40 assault gun is fitted with a Saukopf gun mantlet and has a Zimmerit coating.
A Marder III self-propelled gun, destroyed by Soviet artillery fire.
In a literal sense, the German spring offensive became mired in mud: A Pz.IV Ausf.J tank, bogged down in a cornfield. Two more Pz.IV tanks are visible in the distance.
Notes
Introduction
1. Raigorodetsky, E.Ia., K Al’pam [To the Alps] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1969), p. 123.
Chapter 1
1. Maier, Georg, Drama between Budapest and Vienna: The Final Battles of the 6 Panzer-Armee in the East (J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing, Inc., 2004), p. 15.
Chapter 2
1. TsAMO RF, f.320, op.4522, d.279, l.14
Chapter 3
1. Russianov, I.N., Rozhdennaia v boiakh [Born in battle] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1982), p. 194.
2. Ibid.
Chapter 4
1. As cited by Malakhov, M.M., Osvobozhdenie Vengrii i vostochnoi Avstrii (oktiabr’ 1944 g. – aprel’ 1945 g.) [Liberation of Hungary and eastern Austria (October 1944 – April 1945)] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), p. 123.
2. TsAMO RF, f.500, op.12462, d.243, l.31.
3. TsAMO RF, f.500, op.12462, d.243, l.45.
4. Raigorodetsky, E.Ia., K Al’pam [To the Alps] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1969), p. 116.
5. TsAMO RF, f.17BA, op.6518, d.437, l.222.
Chapter 5
1. TsAMO RF, f.243, op.2900, d.2011, l.311.
2. TsAMO RF, f.243, op.2900, d.2011, l.313.
Chapter 6
1. TsAMO RF, f.500, op.12462, d.243, l.114.
2. TsAMO RF, f.240, op.2795, d.308, l.162.
3. TsAMO RF, f.240, op.2799, d.366, l.111.
Chapter 7
1. TsAMO RF, f.320, op.4522, d.279, l.175.
2. TsAMO RF, f.500, op.12462, d.243, l.255.
3. TsAMO RF, f.500, op.12462, d.243, l.35.
4. TsAMO RF, f.243, op.2928, d.147, l.11.
Literature and Sources
The Central Archive of the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Defense. The following files were consulted: the Operational Branch of the Commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front; Headquarters of the Armored and Mechanized Forces of the 3rd Ukrainian Front; Headquarters of the 3rd Ukrainian Front’s Artillery Commander; Headquarters of the 4th Guards Army; Headquarters of the 26th Army; the Headquarters of the 27th Army; Headquarters of the 57th Army; Headquarters of the 18th Tank Corps; Headquarters of the 23rd Tank Corps; Headquarters of the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps.
Sandner, Leberecht, Die Schlacht am Platensee. Erlebnisberichte zur Geschichte des Zweiten
Weltkrieges. Der Landser Band 1562 Orange.
Gosztonyi, Peter, Der Kampf um Budapest 1944-45. Studia Hungarica, 1964.
Jester, Werner, Im Todessturm von Budapest 1945. Rumerberg, Eigenverlag W. Jester, 1985.
Maier, Georg, Drama between Budapest and Vienna: The Final Battles of the 6 panzer-Armee in the east, 1945. J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing, Inc., 2004.
The photographs in the book come from the files of the Russian State Archive of Film and Photo Documents, the Central Museum of the Armed Forces, the archive of the Publishing House “Strategiia KM”, as well as from the personal collection of I. Pereiaslavtsev.
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Tomb of the Panzerwaffe: The Defeat of the Sixth SS Panzer Army in Hungary 1945 Page 22
