by Sarah Chayes
23.Bosworth, pp. 34–35.
24.This version of events is quoted from The History of al-Tabari, Volume XXII, the Marwanid Restoration, Everett Rowson, trans. (New York: SUNY, 1989), pp. 182–88. In the interest of style, I occasionally change a verb tense or substitute a synonym for a word in the text. Cf. Baladhuri, pp. 150–51.
25.“Their city,” in the next sentence, would probably have been the summer capital, Ghazni, rather than the Kandahar region, since the raid must have been launched during the traditional fighting season, and since only that location would allow for Muslim passage across the vast tracts of land described.
26.Al-Tabari, p. 185; Bosworth, p. 54.
27.Kufa and Basra.
28.This part of the story, from al-Hajjaj’s letter to ibn al-Ash’ath’s, can be found in at-Tabari, Vol. 22, pp. 188–94. See also Bosworth, pp. 57–59, and Julius Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and Its Fall, Margaret Weir, trans. (Beirut: Khayats, 1963) (1st ed.,1927), pp. 231–32.
29.Al-Tabari, Vol. 23, p. 4.
30.Ibid., pp. 50–51.
31.For this part of the story, see al-Tabari, Vol. 23, pp. 1–9, 49–53, 77–80; Baladhuri, pp. 151–52 (though his interpretation is rather different); Bosworth, pp. 58–63; and Wellhausen, pp. 232–41.
32.Bosworth, p. 101.
33.Ibid., p. 104. Gardez is the Afghan region where most of the firefights take place between U.S. outposts and “resurgent Taliban.”
34.Ibid., 105–21; R. N. Frye, ed., The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 4, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 106–14; Theodore Noldeke, Sketches from Eastern History, John Sutherland Black, trans. (Beirut: Khayats, 1963), pp. 176–79.
35.Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 4, pp. 111–12.36. Saffar means “coppersmith.” 37. Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 4, pp. 129–30, 607–8.
CHAPTER 21: MURDER
1.Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), pp. 118–19, 121, ff.
2.See, e.g., Owen Benett Jones, Pakistan: The Eye of the Storm (New York: Yale,2002), pp. 100–4.
3.Coll; George Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War (New York: Grove Atlantic, 2003); Ahmad Rashid, Taliban (New Haven: Yale, 2001), p. 184.
4.Rashid, p. 186.5. See Rashid’s chapter 14: “Master or Victim, Pakistan’s Afghan War,” for telling details about Pakistan’s involvement in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, the limits to Pakistan’s overlordship, and the devastating impact on Pakistan’s hopes for a healthy development.
CHAPTER 22: MONGOL CONQUESTS AND REBIRTH
1.The Secret History of the Mongols, p. 264, a few words cut and brackets removed for clarity. Urgunge Onon, trans. (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2001), p. 255, or the definitive scholarly edition, Igor de Rachewiltz (Leiden: Brill, 2004), p. 195.
2.Mary Renault, The Nature of Alexander (London: Pantheon, 1976), pp. 103–5.
3.Guy MacLean Rogers, Alexander: The Ambiguity of Greatness (New York: Random House, 2004), pp. 110–11. This book is particularly useful for its clear maps.
4.Renault, p. 134.
5.Ibid., p. 167.
6.For the details of Alexander’s campaigns, drawn from a rather limited number of ancient sources, there is an abundance of secondary literature. Apart from Rogers and Renault, cited above, see Mary Renault’s fictional version, The Persian Boy, narrated by the young Persian eunuch who in fact became Alexander’s intimate. It is a dazzling piece of historical reconstruction.
7.Ata-Malik Juvaini, Genghis Khan, the History of the World-Conqueror, J. A. Boyle, trans. (Paris: UNESCO, 1997), p. 116. Current standard transliteration puts a “y” in place of the first “i” in the author’s last name.
8.See the very detailed description by papal envoy Giovanni di Plano Carpini in 1247. The Story of the Mongols Whom We Call the Tartars, Erik Hildinger, trans. (Boston: Brandon Publishing, 1996), p. 72.
9.Almost as much secondary literature exists about the Mongols as about Alexander. For their general description, I have relied principally on Jack Weatherford, Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World (New York: Crown, 2004). On their battle tactics, see the excellent firsthand account by di Plano Carpini, above.
10.Juvaini, p. 98.
11.Ibid., p. 104.
12.Weatherford, pp. 5–6.
13.Minhaj ad-Din Juzjani, Tabakat-i Nasiri, H. G. Raverty, trans. (New Delhi: Oriental Reprint, 1970), p. 966.
14.In the case of Bukhara, its townsmen served these purposes against their own inner fortress, whose “moat had been filled with animate and inanimate, and raised up with levies and Bukharans…. Then the people of Bukhara were driven against thecitadel. And on either side the furnace of battle was heated.” Juvaini, p. 106.
15.Ibid., p. 118.
16.Ibid., p. 120.
17.Ibid., p. 116.
18.Juzjani, p. 270.
19.Ibid., p. 385.
20.Ibid., p. 279, has him “prostrated with a disease of the bowels,” which “drove him out of his mind.”
21.Juvaini, p. 376.
22.This is just what Giovanni di Plano Carpini advised western Europeans to do twenty-five years later, should the Mongols renew their attack: “If the Christians wish to save themselves, their country and Christianity, they must gather in one body the kings, princes, barons, and rectors of the lands and send the men to fight the Tartars under a single plan,” p. 89. In making his argument, according to Juvayni, Prince Jalal ad-Din invoked a rather modern notion of governance. He did not want the people to say that their rulers exacted tax and tribute, “yet in time of need, place us in the jaws of disappointment.,” p. 377.
23.The article “Ghurids” in the Encyclopedia of Islam by C. E. Bosworth says there is nothing to confirm this surmise. There seems to be nothing to contradict it either.
24.This fellow goes by different names in the various sources: Khan Malik, Amin Malik, Yamin Malik, Yamin al-Mulk, and so on. I have chosen to use Khan Malik because it is closest to what the Mongols called him, which has credence because they would probably have been writing down what they heard phonetically.
25.Juvaini, p. 461.
26.Ibid., p. 462. Cf. Muhammad ibn Ahmad an-Nasawi, History of Djalal el-Din Mankobirti, Shah of Khwarazm, Havez Hamdi, ed. (Cairo: Dar el-Fikr el-Arabi, 1953), pp. 133–34. In French translation: Mohamad en-Nesawi, Histoire du Sultan Djelal ed-Din Mankobirti, Prince du Kharezm, O. Houdas, trans. (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1895), p. 109. Nasawi has Jalal ad-Din and Khan Malik entering Ghazni from this victory at Kandahar together and triumphant. The people of Ghazni, he says, were every bit as thrilled to see the two princes as hungry Muslims are to see the moon that marks the end of Ramadan.
27.Nasawi, Hamdi, ed., pp. 133–34. For the record, here is the complete translation of the incident. I have tried to preserve the Arabic literary style: Genghis Khan was trying to cut Jalal ad-Din off on his way back from his father’s burial, “so Jalal ad-Din got serious about fleeing to the outer limits of Bost [near the current Helmand Province capital, Lashkar Gah, about a three-hour drive west across the desert from Kandahar]. He was apprised that Genghis Khan had set himself up in Taloqan [north of Kabul] with a densely gathered troop, soldiers uncountable. And the light of day was darkened for Jalal ad-Din. Both fixedness and flight seemed hard for him, for there was no refuge in store, no security either behind him or in front of him, and his perils persisted. So to Ghazni he embarked, as suddenly as a man who will not remain in place, or who does not tread the earth with sedentary intentions. On his second or third day, he received news that his cousin Amin Malik [aka Khan Malik]…had left Herat to get away from the Tatars, and had conceived designs on the province of Sistan [Zaranj], to become its governor. But he was not able to, and he was now returning with roughly 10,000 Turkic horsemen, brave youths like lion cubs, lethal. These were select troops from the Sultan’s armies who had escaped the [Mongol] catastrophe with abundant equipment and quantities of provisions. Jalal ad-Din sent word to [his cousin] of his proximity, pressing him to be quick and come. The two joined t
ogether, and decided to attack the Tatars who were besieging the fortress of Kandahar. And the two pounced on the Tatars. And the Enemies of God were downcast; they did not know how the princes had laid in wait for them, and how the troops of horsemen had closed in on them from all sides. They had figured that the doe-gazelles would run away from them, unable to stand it, that the business ends of their spears would be idle and ineffectual. Until, when they saw [the lance-points] thirsting to slaughter them, parched for [the blood of] their chests, they mounted the withers of flight. And none of them escaped except an insignificant band, which informed Genghis Khan of what had befallen his soldiers.
28.Ibid., p. 405.
29.An-Nesawi, p. 108.
30.Juzjani, p. 1016.
31.The Secret History, p. 257. The text was probably written in 1228, just after Genghis Khan’s death, with some later additions. See de Rachewiltz, p. xxxiii. Some believe that this same Shigi Qutuqu is the fellow who wrote The Secret History, which would explain with special poignancy its lack of detail here.
32.It was a tactic documented by di Plano Carpini: “When the Tartars are few in numbers they use…dummy men…so that they may seem more numerous to their adversaries [who] are frightened and confused by this,” pp. 75–76. Note that guile has been traditionally seen as just as important to a soldier’s craft as bravery and brute force. See Shay, Odysseus.
33.For this whole account, see Juvaini, pp. 406–7.
34.Ibid., pp. 407–8. Nasawi’s telling is vivid, and it betrays his Ghurid sensibilities: “And the reason [for this separation],” he writes, “was that, after they shattered the Mongols at Parwan, the Turks started shoving [the Ghurids] around regarding what God had showered down on them in the way of booty, in a blameworthy fashion. To the point that, when one of the Turks wrenched a horse from among the Tatars’ livestock away from a loyalist of Ighraq’s, and the dispute between the two of them grew long, the Turk hit him with a riding whip. And [Ighraq’s men’s] souls recoiled at this, and their hearts drew back from it. And the arrogant idea of separating [from the army] flew into their heads, when they saw that they could not get a fair division. For, whenever Jalal ad-Din tried to satisfy [Ighraq’s men], the Turks would increase in evil and in zealous partisanship, with calamitous deeds…. And when Jalal ad-Din was trying with kindness to bring [Ighraq’s people] back, and, with leisurely and friendly words to bind them to rejoin, the Turks would bolt away. And it was God’s command: [Ighraq’s people] separated from the army,” pp. 155–56. Note the demonstration of both the yaghestan tendency and the tradition of long, drawn-out negotiations to try to thwart it.
35.Homer, The Iliad, I:1–9. I have taken from both the Fagles and Fitzgerald translations.
36.Jonathan Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character (New York: Scribner, 1994), pp. 13–14.
37.Juvaini, p. 408.
38.Ibid., pp. 410–11.
39.The Secret History of the Mongols, 264.
40.Jean Aubin, “L’ethnogenese des Qaraunas,” Turcica I (1969), p. 69. My translation from the French.
41.His name was Temur, and he was lamed by an arrow wound in Zaranj. “Leng” means “lame” in Persian, whence the Western “Tamerlane.”
42.In the Mongol belief system, rivers were almost sacred, for like mothers, they gave their milk to the land, providing life. In this context, anything that cut up the land, or worse, that interrupted the integrity of rivers, was taboo. So destroying irrigation systems was, for the Mongols, repairing the river and the land by restoring it to its natural condition. (From a private communication with anthropologist Jack Wetherford.)
CHAPTER 23: FIGHTING WITH THE PEN
1.April Witt, “Afghan Governor Strains to Shed Warlord Image. Gul Agha’s Rule in Kandahar Dismays Some in Kabul,” Washington Post, April 15, 2003, p. A22.
2.See Dana Priest, “The Proconsuls: America’s Soldier Diplomats: A Four-Star Foreign Policy?” September 28, 2000, p.A1; “An Engagement in 10 Time Zones,” September 29, 2000, p. A1; “Standing up to State and Congress,” September 30, 2000, p. A1.
CHAPTER 24: MISFIRE
1.April Witt, “Karzai Gets Agreement from Local Leaders,” Washington Post, May 21, 2003.
2.Carlotta Gall, “Warlords Yield to Afghan Leader, Pledging to Hand Over Funds,” New York Times, May 21, 2003.
3.Witt.
CHAPTER 25: ROUND THREE
1.Sarah Chayes, “Afghanistan’s Future, Lost in the Shuffle,” New York Times, July 1, 2003.
CHAPTER 28: MAZAR-I-SHERIF
1. Ahmad Rashid, “Mazar-e-Sharif 1997: Massacre in the North,” in Taliban (New Haven: Yale, 2000), pp. 72–74.
CHAPTER 32: COVER-UP
1.Marcello Fois, Sempre Caro, Serge Quadruppani, French trans. (Paris: Seuil,1999), p. 85.
INDEX
Abbas, Shah
Abdalis. See Durranis
Abd ar-Rahman Khan
Abdullah (Karzai family’s engineer)
Abdullah, Hajji
Achekzais
Achilles
Achilles in Vietnam (Shay)
ACS. See Afghans for Civil Society (ACS)
Afghanistan. See also specific cities and provinces
borders of. See borders, Afghan
Britain and
culture of retribution in
ethnic conflict in
government and elections
history of See also Soviet invasion and occupation
Iranian culture and
Islam and
nationhood of
Pakistan and
pre-Islam religion in
rebuilding of. See rebuilding, post-Taliban
repeated conquests of
Russia and
Soviet invasion of. See Soviet invasion and occupation
Soviet withdrawal from
U.S. and, post-Taliban
U.S. military action in. See Afghan-U.S. conflict (2001)
“Afghanistan’s Future, Lost in the Shuffle” (Chayes)
Afghan National Army
Afghans
courage and
fighting skills of
Soviet occupation’s effect on
Afghans for Civil Society (ACS)
Abdullah’s thefts from
Akokolacha project of
author’s resignation from
emergency plans of
publicity tours of
Qayum Karzai and
schools projects of
warlordism and
women’s project of
Afghan-U.S. conflict (2001)
civilian casualties of
covert activities during
news coverage of
Pakistan’s role in
pincer operation in
reasons for
Special Forces, role in
Agamemnon
Agha, Seyyid Karim
aid workers and foreigners
attacks on
life style of
murders of
neutrality of
security issues of
airport, Kandahar
Akokolacha and
during battle for Kandahar
as U.S. Army base
Akokolacha
fund-raising for
securing materials for
water supply of
alcohol
Alexander III, king of Macedonia (Alexander the Great)
’Ali (Muhammad’s son-in-law)
Al-Jazeera
All Things Considered
Alokozais
Al-Qaeda
September
Taliban and, Pakistan’s different treatment of
Al-Qaeda Arabs
burial place of
control of Kandahar by
deaths of
Amend, Kurt
Amnesty International
Anglo-Afghan wars
Anwar, Mahmad
Arab Cemetery
Aramaic
Argh
andab, Afghanistan
Arghandab River
Arghestan, Afghanistan
army, Mongol
Army, U.S.
author and
base of
casualties of
Civil Affairs
command structure
as deterrent
extended rotations in
Gul Agha Shirzai and
Hikmatyar and
humanitarian aid and
interpretation services for
Khakrezwal and
Naqib and
PolAd
rebuilding, role in
skirmishes
Special Forces
Twenty-fifth Light Infantry Division
Army of the Indus
Ashoka (Indian ruler)
Ashoka Edict
assassinations. See deaths and murders
Ata, Ustaz
Aubin, Jean
ayyars (brigands)
Ayyub Khan
Baba, Hajji
Babur (Zahir-ud-Din Muhammad)
Bacha (fruit grower)
Baghdad, Iraq
Bala (Mongol general)
Balkans
Balkh Province, Afghanistan
Barakzais
Barry, Michael
battle for Kandahar
Gul Agha Shirzai and
Hamid Karzai and
reporting following
U.S. role in
Battle of Maywand
