Aged nearly 40 years old, Household was seeking something exciting to do when he learnt from a colleague that FS sections were being formed. He met with Major Wordsworth in October and while waiting for the next FS course, he overheard Wordsworth and Captain Robinson discussing the need for an officer to lead the British Military Mission FS Section to Athens. On the basis that he could read a Greek menu, Household volunteered and joined B FSS in the desert near Alexandria, then being commanded by a genial Cornish former military police sergeant major. Other Intelligence Corps in the Mission included Captain Nicholas Hammond, a Cambridge University lecturer on Greece and Albania, who had previously been sent by the Special Operations Executive into Albania to encourage resistance against the Italians. Returning to Athens in March 1941, Hammond trained a disparate group of Greek liberals, democrats and communists as wireless operators and saboteurs as the nucleus for resistance. During the voyage to Piraeus on the cruiser HMAS Sydney, Household, as Officer Commanding Troops, was allocated a large comfortable cabin. For the next four months, life in Athens was welcoming. Household made some interesting observations that most Intelligence Corps will recognize:
We were never too military and discipline was informal. When we did go through the traditional motions of parades and inspection, we performed them in a spirit of a holiday – for the close mutual trust between the section and its officer made the continual practice of obedience obviously unnecessary. Daily relations in a crack section between the Field Security Officer and his NCOs much resembled those between a fatherly sales manager and his salesmen. But each section had its own individual character. In some, the smartness of the men – when they were in uniform – and the atmosphere of the section officer were reasonably regimental; in others the place looked and sounded like the salesman’s office in Soho. And these were sometimes the best when it came to the real job of detecting enemy agents.
Nevertheless, his counter-intelligence inexperience surfaced when he disapproved when an NCO dressed in civilian clothes had tested Mission security by removing classified documents left on its Commander’s desk. When he insisted that an NCO detailed to follow the German Minister on his motor cycle should wear uniform, the German counter-intelligence spotting the tail generated a diplomatic spat.
On 6 April, Germany, determined to secure its southern flank before its invasion of Russia, and embarrassed by the strength of Greek resistance, transferred troops through the Balkans to help Italy. This move effectively forced Turkey onto the Axis side as Syria was being governed by Vichy France and there was a coup in Iraq. Prime Minister Churchill, again believing that Egypt was under a major threat, instructed Wavell to send four divisions from XIII Corps to Greece, even though the men in the Corp were exhausted. But the division had little time to prepare. Intelligence was largely confined to intercepts collected by No. 101 (B-Type) Special Wireless Section and its Italian-speaking 4 Wireless Intelligence Section detachment.
However, powerful German forces drove the Allies south through Greece and, once again, Allied troops were evacuated from beaches. The three FSS that accompanied XIII Corps, namely 252 (Suez), 263 and 279 (GHQ Greece) FSS, had little time to develop counter-intelligence and as their predecessors had done at Dunkirk, they checked withdrawal routes and, looking for spies, vetted civilians seeking evacuation. The transport of a 279 FSS detachment was stolen in Athens, nevertheless it rejoined the section on a Peloponnesian beach and, after four days, was evacuated to Crete with the two other sections by a destroyer. Near Kalamai, B FSS and an Australian FSS persuaded a tug boat captain to sail to Egypt, where Household was tasked to use Greek speakers from the FS Depot and sections in Egypt to screen refugees for agents and infiltrators from the wide cross-section of Greek society packed into the stalls of the Cairo Agricultural Hall.
Of the 27,000 Allied troops commanded by the charismatic New Zealander, Major General Bernard Freyberg VC, in Crete, many had been evacuated from Greece and lacked essential equipment. Given access to Enigma intercepts, Freyberg knew of the date and time of the German attack, but, controversially, he had been told by General Wavell that the Ultra high quality intelligence was not to be exploited in isolation in case it alerted the Germans that their codes had been cracked. While No.101 Special Wireless Section was evacuated to Egypt, No. 4 Wireless Intelligence Section was supported by No. 4 (Australian) Special Wireless Section in a large empty water tank overlooking Suda Bay. To replace equipment abandoned in Greece, the sections recovered Direction Finding equipment from damaged warships and kept Freyburg supplied with information. During the German 7th Parachute Division assault on Crete that began on 20 May, both Sections reverted to infantry and attacked several gliders but lost an Australian, killed, and three wounded, one being hospitalized and later captured. Seized codebooks and a complete set of a signals plan sent to Cairo led to the Royal Navy intercepting a convoy. When Maleme airfield was overrun and German transport aircraft flew in reinforcements, the balance tipped against the Allies and the Intelligence Section joined hundreds of soldiers plodding along fifty miles of mountainous tracks and was evacuated from Sphakia.
North Africa
On 12 February, No. 4 Wireless Intelligence Section had intercepted signals about the arrival of Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel and elements of the German Afrika Korps. The first contact was an armoured car Troop commanded by Lieutenant Edgar (Bill) Williams of the King’s Dragoon Guards sighting German armoured cars ten days later.
The fighting in North Africa was governed by the single coast road and the railway connecting strategically important towns, forcing the opposing armies to fight in the desert to the south. With armoured cars providing advanced guards and flank protection, the novelty of co-ordinating tanks, artillery, infantry and supply convoys spread over the vast, empty desert required extensive use of tactical radios. The streams of casualty, vehicle and logistic demands and returns transmitted at all command levels meant that masses of information was vulnerable to interception and interference. German reliance on laying telephone lines was considerably curtailed by distances. To meet the increased intercept requirement, the establishment of No. 5 Intelligence School at Heliopolis in December 1940, supported by reinforcements from No. 4 Intelligence School, laid the foundations for intercept but it was not until the arrival of crypto-analysts that Signals Intelligence took root. The arrival of No. 7 Intelligence School saw traffic being fed to Bletchley Park from Wireless Intelligence Sections in the field by landline and teleprinter links to GHQ and MI8.
The Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (Middle East) at Ma’adi, near Cairo, used the same eavesdropping techniques developed in England and hosted a dozen officers, mainly Intelligence Corps, and about 160 all ranks, including the guard force. But such had been the shortage of Italian linguists during Operation Compass that about seventy Maltese and British residents of Malta – mainly teachers, civil servants and police officers – were recruited to fill the interrogation void. In addition to providing collateral to other intelligence agencies, several collation desks specialized in studying particular units from documents, pay books and personal information, such as letters. Mobile interrogation detachments sent forward were self-reliant with vehicles, guard forces and technical support sections and were usually sited alongside prisoner of war cages on main supply routes so that trucks bringing supplies returned with prisoners, documents and equipment of technical intelligence interest. Some interrogators entered cages as stool pigeons. Important prisoners were transferred to England.
Rommel quickly drove the weakened XIII Corps eastwards, trapping a division in Tobruk, but by the time it reached the Egyptian border, the Afrika Korps lines of communications were severely stretched. At the insistence of Churchill, Wavell launched Operation Battleaxe to lift the siege of Tobruk but within three days the operation had been defeated in the scenes of confusion of the ‘Benghazi Handicap’ as units raced to the perceived safety of Tobruk. Wavell, who had been fighting on five fronts – North Afr
ica, East Africa, Iraq, Greece and Crete – was sacked and replaced by General Sir Claude Auchinleck in the autumn of 1941. He created Eighth Army from XIII and XXX Corps and began planning Operation Crusader to relieve Tobruk and destroy the Afrika Korps, but Berlin knew about virtually everything that he did because Italian Military Intelligence had broken the US State Department diplomatic code. They were intercepting telegrams sent to Washington by the US Military Attaché, Lieutenant Colonel Fellers, an Anglophobe, who regularly attended Auchinleck’s conferences and then sent despatches to Washington. Hitler regarded him highly, ‘It is only to be hoped that the American in Cairo continues to inform us so well over the English military planning through his badly enciphered cables.’
‘The history of photographic interpretation is inextricably woven with military aviation’. So wrote Captain Hamish Eaton in his history APIS; Soldiers with Stereo. In April 1941, the Army Air Photographic Interpretation Unit (Middle East), which included several Intelligence Corps officers, was formed at Heliopolis by Lieutenant S.J. Phillips (Royal Artillery) and had photographic interpreters attached to Army, Corps and divisions. In July, the Western Desert Section joined 285 Wing of the Desert Air Force, whose air photographic elements included 2 Squadron RAF, 60 Survey Squadron and 1437 Flight Baltimores flying long-range strategic missions. Generally, the summer cloudless skies and the absence of ground features exposed ground defences, however, low level sorties were at high risk from air defence having plenty of time to see aircraft. But convincing senior officers remained an uphill task. While preparing for Operation Crusader, Captain Ralph Dalton (Royal Engineers) visited GHQ with enemy defences annotated onto specially printed maps:
I shall never forget General Auchinleck with a magnifying glass in his hand get down on his hands and knees of the War Room and gaze earnestly in the best Sherlock Holmes tradition at the mosaics spread in front of him, asking searching questions as to how we knew that this was an 88mm and that was a minefield and so on. After spending some time with the General, I think he was partly convinced that air photos had their uses, even if they had their limitations (Robson)
Dalton designed offices to be fitted in 3-ton lorries, which permitted first phase interpretation immediately after the aircraft had landed, a concept that had been pioneered during the First World War but which had been allowed to lapse. Detailed interpretation then followed at Divisional level from which maps and overlays were drawn.
Auchinleck launched Operation Crusader on 18 November but soon ran into trouble when a copy of the Operations orders was captured and XXX Corps suffered badly; nevertheless, he drove Rommel back to El Agheila and relieved Tobruk. In the meantime, Malta had been under siege since June 1940 with the frequent air raids hindering convoys delivering equipment and supplies to Egypt.
Early on 29 November, Lieutenant General Johann von Ravenstein, the Afrika Korps deputy commander, was captured by the 21 (New Zealand) Battalion Intelligence Section in confused fighting near Sidi Rezegh and a map showing Axis positions and a collection of papers, including daily cipher changes for 21st Panzer Division, were found in his car. Posing as ’Colonel Schmidt’, the general was escorted to the New Zealand Divisional Headquarters but Prussian military etiquette prevailed and he introduced himself to Major General Freyberg using his correct name. Sent to a cage, von Ravenstein masquaraded as a sergeant during an escape attempt but was recognized by Captain Donald Prater, an Intelligence Corps officer, shortly before he was wounded. Captain Eric Peters, of 22 (44th (Home Counties) Division) FSS, escorted von Ravenstein to Alexandria by destroyer and although it was sunk, he delivered his prisoner to the Detailed Interrogation Centre.
In spite of inadequate resources and lack of transport, Eighth Army was supported with the fullest Y Service able to be mustered and set the benchmark for other Theatres. Mobile Direction Finding stations supported the static intercept stations and, as an experiment, 101 Special Wireless Section/40 Wireless Intelligence Section joined 7th Armoured Division in XXX Corps; however, its mobility proved impractical. Major John Makower was awarded the Military Cross for intercepting messages under fire and Sergeant W.T. Swain the Military Medal for delivering decrypted messages to HQ 4th Indian Division. A Terence Cuneo painting of their activities hanging in the Chicksands Officers Mess has the Cuneo deliberate error trademark – the steering wheel of the US jeep driven by Swain is on the right. In Tobruk, the credibility of the Polish 1st Carpathian Brigade interception of German communications doubted by HQ Eighth Army was proven during interrogations of prisoners. On one occasion, a Pole instructed a flight of German aircraft to divert to Crete, which they did.
In February 1942, had Rommel learnt from his Signals Intercept Company 621 that the British had a strong defensive position, the Gazala Line, stretching from the coast south to the fort and oasis at Bir Hacheim. When Colonel Fellers speculated to Washington that the British would take advantage of a brief superiority in tanks, on 26 May Rommel launched a spoiling attack from the south and, in spite of the gallant Free French at Bir Hacheim, forced Eighth Army to retreat in considerable confusion as the opposing forces again mingled.
Lieutenant General Ludwig Crüwell, who had been commanding the Afrika Korps since July 1940 after Rommel was appointed to command Panzer Army, Africa, was captured three days later when the pilot of the aircraft he was using to visit troops mistook a British position for an Italian one and landed. Cruewell was sent back to a Combined Detailed Interrogation Centre in England where his conversations proved to be most interesting. As Eighth Army retreated, the FS sections investigated reports of stay-behind parties threatening British lines of communication, rounded up stray prisoners of war and searched abandoned enemy bunkers and vehicles for items of intelligence interest.
The 2nd South African Division and three British brigades were stranded when Tobruk surrendered on 20 June, much to the fury of Churchill. Among those who escaped was 271 (Lines of Communications) FSS, which had arrived in Benghazi in January during Operation Crusader and had then withdrawn to Tobruk with 1 (South African) FSS. It was evacuated by ‘Derna’s Gate’, the euphemism for ‘by sea’ and joined 263 (HQ Eighth Army) FSS in Sidi Barrani.
The newly-arrived X Corps at Mersa Matruh meant that Eighth Army now had three Corps, each with a Special Wireless Sections and supported by two in reserve and training. Commanded by Captain J.R.B. Mellor (Royal Signals), its 105 Special Wireless Section disembarked on 27 January and, a month later, was joined by 44 Wireless Intelligence Section led by Captain Horsfield, leading to the usual disagreements as to who was in command. When the 7th Armoured Division experimental Special Wireless Section was terminated, 40 Wireless Intelligence joined the section. The fluidity of the fighting meant that a 12ft truck-mounted antenna was generally used in favour of the less flexible 30ft ground mast. Intercepts included 5 Tank Regiment Workshops/21st Panzer Division reporting battle damage; 8 Tank Regiment/15th Panzer Division reporting vehicle returns; strength and weapon returns of several units; and details of Axis forces reporting the locations of British units. Intercepts on 28 June included Rommel giving orders and communications of Reconnaissance Battalions 3 and 33 so that, on three occasions, operation orders issued by him were intercepted sufficiently early for counter-measures
As, on 14 June, Eighth Army began retreating to the El Alamein Line that stretched from a small railway station to the impassible Qattarra Depression. X and XIII Corps ordered to withdraw to the Fuka Escarpment, but so poor was the co-ordination between the two Corps that X Corps spent another day under increasing pressure. By the early evening Corps HQ was in danger of being overrun and 105 Special Wireless Section/44 Wireless Intelligence Section was instructed to destroy classified documents. Captain Mellor split 105 Special Wireless Section into Parties A and B and assigned 44 Wireless Intelligence to the latter. By 9pm, 50th (Northumberland) Division had secured an escape route from its defensive boxes at El Adem. As two of its brigades picked up the north-south Siwa Track, nicknamed the ‘Road to Rome
’, headed south for twenty miles and then swung east towards the escarpment, the columns broke through the Italian X Corps and some a battle group headquarters of the German 90th Light Division heading north to Mersa Matruh. Those that breached the enemy motored along the track and, dropping onto the desert floor, headed east, passing several German armoured cars and a workshop on the side of a track and headed for a defile. When Party A regrouped, it was missing a radio van that had slipped its tow. British lorries towing four 25-pounder guns seen in the misty desert dawn on top of Fuka Escarpment turned out to be full of German soldiers using captured equipment. Nevertheless, as Party B broke through, the Germans appreciated their tactical advantage and collected about 1,600 prisoners, including all Party A, except three Royal Signals, and a large number of vehicles, guns and equipment to add to the material captured in Tobruk.
Meanwhile, the US State Department had unwittingly plugged its diplomatic leaks by changing ciphers, thereby depriving Rommel of a reliable source of good intelligence. Although quickly compromised, Fellers returned to Washington to be awarded a medal in recognition of his reports described as ‘models of clarity and accuracy’. In one of his last messages, when he described ‘considerable British panic’ in Cairo, he refers to the Big Smoke. By the beginning of July, Eighth Army was in defensive positions stretching west of the railway halt at El Alamein south to the impassable Qattara Depression. However, the close proximity of the fighting to Cairo led to GHQ issuing orders for classified information to be destroyed, an event supervised by 36 (GHQ – Military Security) FSS, but such was the chaos that some staff officers, including some from the G Intelligence, burnt documents inside the headquarters and documents fluttered across Cairo, an event that became known as ‘Ash Wednesday’.
Sharing the Secret Page 8
