Transferring the officers took four years, the successful applicants styling themselves ‘The First 100’, some of whom had served in intelligence appointments. An early transferee was Major Peter Goss (8 Gurkha Rifles). He had fought in the first Arakan campaign in 1943 and at Imphal in 1944 before being parachuted into Burma as a member of SOE Force 136. A Czech, Russian and French interpreter, he transferred from the Infantry in 1957. Captain Lionel Savery (Royal Artillery) had served as an intelligence officer in Malaya and in Cyprus where he had led a turned EOKA squad and had accounted for twelve terrorists. He had recently been severely wounded in a firefight. One problem was that several Short Service Engagement officers already serving in the Corps were now required to pass the Regular Commissions Board. Some who had served during the Second World War resigned their commissions. Reliance again landed on the shoulders of other ranks, as it had done in 1945, to retain the experience so necessary in intelligence and security. Nevertheless, the First 100 set about creating a Corps capable of providing multi-skilled intelligence units to the Army and, as they climbed the seniority ladder over the next twenty years, solidified the existing esprit de corps. It was envisaged that sixty-five per cent of the majors would reach lieutenant colonel by an average age of forty-three. By 1971, sixty-two per cent had been promoted.
By December 1959, Major Felix Robson, a former Army pilot and now Commander, Intelligence Corps Strategic Reserve, had developed the concept of an autonomous Intelligence Platoon to support Southern Command. Consisting of a captain or lieutenant and his batman, a Warrant Officer 2 as second-in-command, two SNCOs and a Royal Engineer draughtsman, it was equipped with two Austin Champs and a 1ton Austin lorry and their trailers and a semi-covert VW Beetle. Platoons were expected to provide:
• Operational Intelligence support.
• Counter-Intelligence through its Field Security detachment.
• Interrogation.
• Air Photographic Reading Interpretation.
Within five months, 3rd (Strategic Reserve) Division at Colchester had accepted 4 Intelligence Platoon and was followed by:
• 1 (24 Infantry Brigade) Intelligence Platoon in Kenya.
• 2 (19 Infantry Brigade) Intelligence Platoon at Colchester.
• 3 (2 Infantry Brigade) Intelligence Platoon at Plymouth.
• 5 (5 Brigade) Intelligence Platoon at Barton Stacey.
• 6 (16 Independent Parachute Brigade) Parachute Intelligence Platoon at Aldershot.
Twenty Regular Platoons reporting to the Theatre HQ Intelligence Corps for domestic matters and specialist training were eventually formed and administered by the relevant Corps, Divisional and Brigade Headquarters Company, the size varying according to its role. Intelligence Platoons (TA) supported the Home Commands. In West Germany, the Platoons were controlled by HQ Intelligence Corps and Theatres Intelligence Unit, which was commanded by a lieutenant colonel reporting to HQ BAOR. Also under command was the Photographic Interpretation Company. Major F.S. Austin had been the first Intelligence Corps officer to command the Army Photographic Interpretation Unit (UK) in 1953, an appointment that had been amalgamated with Deputy Commander, Joint Air Photographic Interpretation Centre in 1952. Interpreters had been trained at Nuneham from 1947 until 1956, when the Air Photographic Reading Branch was formed at the School of Military Intelligence, Maresfield and tri-Service courses began at the Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre.
By 1960, the Platoon experiment had been re-assessed for several reasons, not least of which was that none were under direct command of an Intelligence Corps officer of field rank and they were often seen as a general duties resource. When Captain Angus Southwood arrived in Kenya in 1959 as GSO 3 (Intelligence) of the airportable HQ 24 Independent Infantry Brigade Group, its Intelligence Increment consisted of three Military Intelligence Officers and a Platoon officer, none of whom were Intelligence Corps, and four Intelligence Corps sergeants. Its 1 Intelligence Platoon was formed a year later but when Captain Chris Halsall arrived to command it, of its twelve NCOs, eleven had been lent to battalions as storemen and orderly room clerks. Trade training was also difficult to organize because operational and exercise commitments took priority. Although the Brigade had several Middle East Command Contingency Plans, the Brigade Commander saw no need for intelligence planning. One of its first operations was Kuwait in 1960. When the ruling al-Sabah dynasty handed its foreign affairs to Great Britain in 1899 and threatened Iraqi access to the Persian Gulf, Iraq rejected the treaty and declared in 1932 that Kuwait had been part of its territory for centuries. In July 1961, Iraq threatened to invade and the Brigade deployed to Mutla Ridge, several miles south of the border, where heat and lack of water took its toll. Three years later, Iraq recognized Kuwait. When Southwood was posted to HQ 2 Infantry Brigade in Plymouth, he found that, although 3 Intelligence Platoon was under strength, the Brigade Commander, who had commanded the SAS in Malaya, was using it appropriately.
The reduction in the size of the Army saw a fundamental shift in the employment of Intelligence Corps other ranks into two types of Class A tradesmen, supported by progressive promotion through three examinations over about a four year period. The intercept role of Wireless Intelligence reformed as Analyst, Special Intelligence (ANSI). Trained at Garats Hay and generally first posted to 9 and 13 Signal Regiments in Cyprus and West Germany respectively, NCOs returned for intensive training in Russian and other languages, such as Arabic. Some progressed to Interpreter courses at the Army Education Centre, Beaconsfield and Mulheim in West Germany.
The creation of Operator Intelligence and Security saw the Intelligence Corps taking dual responsibility for the provision of operational intelligence to commanders at all levels from the previous practice of All Arms intelligence clerks and the principles of FS, now known as Security. Indeed, FS sections were replaced by Security sections. Previously, intelligence clerks posted from any Arm or Service had assisted intelligence officers. Intelligence phase training included photographic interpretation, map marking, studying the tactical doctrines, equipment and uniforms of the Soviet Armed Forces and the British Army and the theories of counter-revolutionary warfare. The Intelligence Cycle remained a fundamental principle.
The jailing of eleven people between 1946 and 1962 for Official Secrets Act offences and a series of spy scandals exposed the depth of Soviet penetration into British society and the weaknesses of the security defences. On 14 November 1962, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan told the House of Commons,
I feel it right to warn the House that hostile intrigue and espionage are retentively maintained on a large scale.
Following the 1961 and 1962 Radcliffe Reports and the 1961 Romer Report into the breaches, the War Office formed Directorate of Military Security as the pinnacle of the General Staff security function found in all Army formations and represented at operational level by unit and branch security officers in all military and associated civilian organizations. Using the Second World War Defence Security curriculum as a format, the philosophy of Protective Security was developed to discover, assess and defeat or contain the overt and covert threats from espionage, sabotage and subversion from hostile intelligence services and domestic subversive organizations against the Army by continuous threat assessments and security planning. After 1969, terrorism became firmly entrenched in the bank of knowledge.
Since pure security is unlikely to be totally achieved, by applying the fundamental principles of sensible minimum standards, security awareness and defence in depth, the risk can be significantly reduced. All Army and civilian organizations were categorized according to threat assessments against the organization and were then subjected to rolling programmes of security surveys and inspections by Intelligence Corps Security sections on the basis of the greater the threat, the higher frequency of surveys and audits. Minimum standards were set out initially in Military Security Instructions, or MSIs, and Theatre Command security instructions and were supported by publications, such as Instructi
ons for the Despatch and Carriage of Official Documents and Parcels (Army), and periodic amendments issued through Army Security Circulars, Policy Letters and Defence Council. In West Germany, this was BAOR Security Instructions or BSIs Instructions. Branch and unit security officers were expected to develop Security Standing Orders. MSIs were superseded by the Manual of Army Security in 1982. Classified documents were audited against classified document registers and controls of access into military installations and offices and the storage of vehicles, arms, ammunition, explosive and equipment tested. Surveys and inspections were supported by detailed reports listing observations and recommendations cross-referenced to Command security instructions and sent to Command Security Wings. Thereafter it was a General Staff (Security) decision to take action on recommendations. Dismissals of Heads of Branch and commanding officers for security failures were not unknown. Breaches of security, such as missing classified documents, damaged classified packages received in Forces Post Offices and weapon losses, were investigated. The Security sections also provided security architect liaison advice for new builds, rebuilds and refurbishments and were expected to possess detailed knowledge of the latest security technology. The Catalogue of Security provided the benchmark for security equipment, all of which had been tested to destruction against sabotage and theft.
Counter-intelligence remained a fundamental Corps skill with the booklet Their Trade is Treachery (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office) providing examples of the organizations of legal and illegal espionage networks and several illustrative case histories. Vetting, investigation interview skills and source handling figured in training. The persistent battle against hostile intelligence services led to claims that the Corps was on continuous active service.
When Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Dodds was posted to the BAOR in December 1963 as Commanding Officer Theatres Intelligence Unit, he was charged by Brigadier A.W. Vickers OBE DSO, the Inspector of Intelligence, to recommend a command and administrative structure capable of meeting the needs of the Army and the Intelligence Corps. After months of discussions, on 1 January 1965 Dodds launched an Intelligence and Security Group for a one year trial, followed by a Trials Report and Establishment Proposal written during the winter of 1965/66. When his recommendations were accepted by HQ BAOR on 1 September 1966, Dodds assembled a small headquarters at Rheindahlen that included an Adjutant and Regimental Sergeant Major and reformed the intelligence and security structures in West Germany into Intelligence and Security Group (Germany) thus:
Berlin
• 3 Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Company.
Security Wing
• 4 Counter-Intelligence Company providing protective security and counter-intelligence to the rear areas and the reinforcement ports from its headquarters in Dusseldorf.
• 5 Counter-Intelligence Company supporting 1st (British) Corps from Hannover.
• HQ BAOR Security Section at Rheindahlen.
Intelligence Wing:
• 6 Photographic Intelligence Company.
• 7 Intelligence Company reformed from 8 Intelligence Platoon to provide HQ 1st (BR) Corps in Bielefeld and its divisions and brigades with Intelligence Sections in direct support.
• HQ BAOR Intelligence Section at Rheindahlen.
Importantly, the Intelligence Corps had regained direct control of its officers and other ranks with a regimental organization capable of managing their careers, training, welfare and aspirations.
Adapting to the new concepts, the United Kingdom Intelligence Unit (TA) was formed in April 1961, primarily to provide general intelligence and security support in the UK and BAOR. Its HQ was adopted by the Borough of Heston and Isleworth in October. First commanded by Lieutenant Colonel C.T. Carter, seven counter-intelligence companies replaced the Home Command Intelligence Platoons; 11 Counter-Intelligence Company was earmarked to reinforce West Germany. In 1963, 7 (Travel Control Security) Platoon amalgamated with 11 Counter-Intelligence Company to form 18 Counter-Intelligence Company on lines of communication security to West Germany. Fortunately, the marriage of the two disparate organizations wearing the same cap badge worked well and it regularly trained in West Germany. Travel Control Security remains firmly embedded as a Corps skill. Inheriting an impressive training centre in Hampstead bordering Maresfield Gardens that was once the residence of Sir Thomas Lipton, the tea magnate, 18 Company enjoyed financial independence as custodians of the Travel Control Officers Mess silver and healthy Sergeants Mess funds. In 1964 the first TA recruit trade training course was held at Maresfield.
Cyprus
For many, Cyprus remained an interesting posting of sun, sea and sport, however, the volatile politics of the island was a constant reminder of the Emergency. In November 1963, sectarian tensions and the undermining of the Treaty of Guarantee by Archbishop Makarios led to the Turkish-Cypriots believing that enosis was inevitable. By December, the Field Security Unit (Cyprus) had reformed as the Counter-Intelligence Company (Cyprus) and was commanded by Major K.M.L. Frazer. During the Christmas Day morning service, he had passed a message to Major General Peter Young, Commander, British Forces Cyprus, that sectarian tension was escalating. Young immediately advised the War Office and was instructed by the Cabinet to restore order with a Truce Force. Taking two battalions to Nicosia, he was accompanied by Major M.J.D. Perrett-Young, the Cyprus Base Intelligence Officer, the intelligence gap at HQ British Forces in Episkopi being filled by Major Parritt, who had been transferred from Libya. When an Intelligence Corps source reported that Greek tanks had landed in the Panhandle, it was rubbished by a cavalry colonel at a morning Intelligence briefing. Parritt remembers:
I went to JARIC and asked our representative if he could arrange a photo flight over the area. This he did and next day at the end of the briefing, I was able to add, as an afterthought, ‘Oh yes, these pictures were taken yesterday showing Greek tanks dispersed around the Panhandle’. One of those rare satisfying moments for an Int Briefer!
In January 1966, 6 (Parachute) Intelligence Platoon, commanded by Lieutenant Lance Redler, arrived with 16 Parachute Brigade. Brigade Headquarters, which included Captain Mike Liley, the GSO 3 (Intelligence). In March, the UN Security Council formed the United Nations Force in Cyprus, with troops largely from neutral countries but also including British. Attached to Information Policy at Force Headquarters was an Intelligence Corps SNCO. United Nations culture denied that intelligence was a peacekeeping asset but acknowledged the value of ‘Military Information’. Perret-Young was Mentioned in Despatches and wore the oak leaf on khaki cloth as British soldiers then serving with the United Nations Force were not permitted to wear the United Nations blue and white ribbon.
For the next eight years, as Cyprus lurched from crisis to crisis, the Counter-Intelligence Company supported the two Sovereign Base Areas while the Joint Intelligence Staff (Near East) assessed military and political intelligence in Cyprus and the Middle East in a period that saw the 1967 Six Day and 1973 Yom Kippur Wars and escalation in international terrorism. When Makarios flirted with the Eastern Bloc, the Counter-Intelligence Company faced the additional problem of espionage and subversion against British Forces, Cyprus, from several East European communist embassies, complete with intelligence officers protected by diplomatic protocols and armed with target lists that included talent-spotting British Service personnel with access, or potential access, to classified information. Particularly at risk was 9 Signal Regiment, which electronically watched the region
Confrontation with Indonesia
Although the Emergency was still in force, Malaya achieved independence in 1957 and, consequently, 355 FSS withdrew to concentrate on affecting British military interests and supporting the newly-formed Malayan Intelligence Corps. A year after Far East Land Forces was formed in 1959, the Emergency was formally terminated. In many respects, the counter-insurgency principles developed by Briggs and Templer had set the benchmark for several counter-revolutionary campaigns in which Britain became involved. Nevert
heless, regional threats to British interests in South East Asia had not been resolved and the departure of the French from Indo-China (Vietnam) in 1954 had further destabilized the region. Chin Peng lingered in southern Thailand and the threat of Chinese communists threatening Laos saw 28 Commonwealth Brigade developing an intervention contingency plan. Major Norman Dunkley adopted the Intelligence and Security Platoon concept to form HQ Intelligence Corps (Far East Land Force) at Tanglin thus:
• 19 (17 Gurkha Division) Platoon at Seremban.
• 20 (63 Gurkha Infantry Brigade) Platoon at Kluang.
• 21 (99 Gurkha Infantry Brigade) Platoon in Singapore and covering Johore Bahru was accompanied by the Counter-Intelligence Unit, Singapore, formerly the Singapore FSS.
• 22 (28 Commonwealth Infantry Brigade) Platoon at Taiping Camp. The Brigade was part of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation.
• 23 Platoon in Hong Kong and the Counter-Intelligence Unit.
In 1962, further changes occurred when 63 Brigade was posted to England:
• 19 (17 Gurkha Division) Platoon at Seremban covered all Malaya except Malacca and Johore.
• 21 (99 Gurkha Infantry Brigade) Platoon in Singapore and covering the Johore Bahru and Malacca.
• 22 (28 Commonwealth Infantry Brigade) at Terendak Camp as part of South East Asia Treaty Organisation Task Force 3.
• 23 Platoon in Hong Kong.
An unexpected threat surfaced in December 1962 when Brunei nationalists seized the Seria oilfields and took expatriates hostage. A small force from 99 Gurkha Infantry and 3 Commando Brigades despatched by HQ Far East under Plan Ale to restore order crushed the rebellion within the week. Supporting the Gurkhas was Captain Van Gelder and four NCOs of 21 Intelligence and Security Platoon, including Corporal Peter Mobbs. Major General Walter Walker, who commanded the 17th Gurkha Infantry Division, was flying to Brunei to command operations when he scribbled down his vital elements, the first two being a ‘first class intelligence machine’ and ‘timely and accurate information’. A veteran of Burma and the Malayan Emergency, his belief that the rebellion was a prelude to Indonesian ambitions was not supported by existing intelligence, indeed the major threat to Borneo was assessed to be from the domestic Clandestine Communist Organisation.
Sharing the Secret Page 34
