by Jared Rubin
Testable Prediction #2: Societies in which the economic elite play some role in propagating rule will be more successful in the long run than societies in which the economic elite play no role in propagating rule.
The framework also suggests that when religious legitimation is important, it tends to remain important even as the world changes. And barriers to long-run success arise when laws or policies that would change in the natural course of a growing economy’s progression instead persist. Such a sequence of events does not transpire when religious legitimacy is less effective or more costly. In such a case, the religious establishment has less capacity to impose restrictions that are harmful to long-run economic growth, and other forms of propagation become more appealing over time. It follows that institutional change proceeds in a manner shaped by the economic – and not the religious – incentives of the relevant actors. In turn, the society’s institutions are likely to be more conducive to economic growth, and this outcome grows stronger over time. Testable Prediction #3 summarizes these insights.
Testable Prediction #3: When religious legitimacy is highly effective or inexpensive, rulers propagate their rule with religion in the short run and the long run, even if economic circumstances change. If religious legitimacy is less effective or more expensive, its use will diminish in the long run once circumstances arise that decrease its effectiveness or decrease the cost of other forms of propagation.
One upshot of Testable Prediction #3, summarized in Testable Prediction #4, is that what were at one point in time small differences in propagating arrangements between societies can blossom into large differences over time as one economy stagnates and the other adjusts to changing economic realities.
Testable Prediction #4: A society in which religious authorities are an important source of political legitimation will eventually stagnate as institutions do not change in response to changing economic conditions. As a result, a society in which religious authorities are a less important source of political legitimation may pull ahead economically, even if it were once behind.
Testable Predictions #3 and #4 therefore suggest a possible answer to one of the historical puzzles posed in the first chapter: Why did the successful economies of the Middle East eventually fall behind Western Europe, which was once an economic laggard? If religious authorities more heavily legitimized Middle Eastern rulers than their Western European counterparts, then the “reversal of fortunes” is explainable in the context of the framework.
Testable predictions are one thing. Whether the historical record bears them out is quite another. The next chapter addresses this issue, exploring why religious propagation was important in Islam and Christianity and why its benefits to rulers differed in the two religions.
3
Historical Origins of Rule Propagation
In 1521, the Italian War of 1521–1526 broke out between Spain and France. The Holy Roman Empire sided with Spain – Charles V was both the king of Spain and the Holy Roman Emperor – as did England. The wealthy Republic of Venice sided with France. Pope Leo X (r. 1513–1521) needed an ally to stop the spread of the Reformation in the Holy Roman Empire, and he therefore involved the Papal States on the side of Charles V. The war culminated in January 1526 with the French King Francis I ceding significant territory to Charles V. But the new pope Clement VII (r. 1523–1534) did not welcome this outcome, as he felt that the Spanish were growing too powerful. Within weeks of the signing of the treaty, the pope gave his blessing to Francis I of France to attempt to reclaim what was lost in the Italian War. The Pope helped establish the League of Cognac – consisting of France, the Papal States, England, and the Republics of Venice and Florence – to drive the Spanish from Italy. This precipitated the War of the League of Cognac (1526–1530) and ultimately another Spanish–Holy Roman Empire victory. Although there were many factors determining the various alliances and causes of the wars, it is notable that within the span of one decade, almost all of the major Western European powers – France, Spain, the Holy Roman Empire, and Venice – were involved in wars against the papacy. Ironically, England was the only nation that sided with the pope in both conflicts, which occurred just before Henry VIII kicked the Church out of England.
To the southeast of these conflicts, the Ottoman Empire just concluded some important conflicts of its own. Prior to the reign of Selim I (r. 1512–1520), the Ottoman territories were confined to the western half of the Anatolian Peninsula (Turkey) and southeastern Europe. The Ottomans had long desired the territories controlled by the Egyptian Mamluk Empire, who ruled over the eastern half of the North African coast, much of the Levant including Syria, and the Arabian Peninsula including the holy cities Mecca and Medina. These territories were wealthy – they covered the fertile Nile Delta and the avenue to the Indian Ocean–Red Sea transit trade – and included the most important religious sites in Islam. But despite having superior force, the Ottomans could not simply attack the Mamluks, who, like the Ottomans, were Sunni Muslims. Prior to attacking the Mamluks, Selim I sought a fatwa from the Grand Mufti (şeyhülislam, the head of the Ottoman religious establishment) Ali al-Jamali to authorize an attack. Ali al-Jamali gave Selim permission for the attack, which was ultimately successful and brought extensive land and wealth under Ottoman purview.
Although these historical episodes take place near the end of the period covered in this book, I mention them here because they reflect differences in the importance of religious legitimation in the Middle East and Western Europe. In Western Europe, the major political players did not hesitate to enter into wars against the papacy. Meanwhile, the most important Middle Eastern power sought legitimation for military actions that would have been successful even in the absence of religious blessing. These differences are important, for reasons highlighted in the last chapter. Specifically, reconsider Testable Prediction #4: A society in which religious authorities are an important source of political legitimation will eventually stagnate … [and] a society in which religious authorities are a less important source of political legitimation may pull ahead economically, even if it were once behind.
How was it determined who propagated rule in the Middle East and Western Europe? Why did the identity of propagating agents differ across the two societies? This chapter addresses these questions, exploring the historical determinants of religious legitimation in Middle Eastern and Western European history. Religious legitimation was important in both regions for one simple reason: it was relatively inexpensive. But this only explains why rulers frequently used religious legitimation in European and Middle Eastern history; it does not explain why rulers used it differently in the two regions. More to the point, it does not explain why religious legitimacy was historically more important in the Middle East than in Western Europe. This chapter makes the case that historical differences in the two regions arose from the unique circumstances under which Islam and Christianity were born. These circumstances shaped how political and religious institutions interacted with each other at the births of the religions and persisted long after the original circumstances were relevant.
The Doctrine of Religious Legitimation in Islam and Christianity
Islam arose in the seventh century in the western half of the Arabian Peninsula between the powerful Byzantine and Sasanid empires. The Bedouin tribes who dominated the area engaged in trade with each other and with neighboring empires. Their trade networks reached at least as far away as Syria and Iraq. Mecca was at the center of this trade. The tribal confederation of Mecca constructed a regional trade network that reached throughout the Peninsula. Mecca was also a center of worship due to its housing the Ka’ba, and by the sixth century it was an important pilgrimage destination.1
Muhammad was born into the Meccan tribal confederation. The trade network familiarized Muhammad with the religions and cultures of the Peninsula, including Christianity and Judaism, as well as the economic realities of trade and the power of religious symbolism. Muhammad’s initial message, which he carried t
o Medina, focused on faith and morality. The community he established in Medina accepted God as the ultimate source of authority, with this precept providing a basis for all aspects of life. As Muhammad’s influence spread beyond Medina, he oversaw the formation of a new religion, a new polity, and a new legal system – all of which were intimately connected. The proto-institutions created in Muhammad’s lifetime had the ability to establish laws, dispense justice, collect taxes, and conduct diplomacy. These institutions drew from the existing, pre-Islamic framework of the Arabian Peninsula, which included Judeo-Christian monotheism but also included unique Islamic elements covering both morals (e.g., prohibition of alcohol) and laws (e.g., inheritance).
The new Islamic polity spread rapidly after Muhammad’s death, reaching as far west as the Iberian Peninsula and as far east as the Indian subcontinent. The three empires following Muhammad (the First Caliphate, the Umayyad Empire, and the Abbasid Empire) were among the largest in terms of land mass in world history up to that point – much larger than the Roman Empire or Alexander’s Macedonian Empire (see Table 3.1). The economic benefits of Islam were an important reason the new religion spread. It initially spread along old trade routes, and many of the initial converts were those who benefited from trade.2 Indeed, a pre-Islamic merchant might reasonably suspect that foreigners would rip him off, meaning that he would be wary of conducting trade in the first place. The Arab conquests of the seventh and eighth centuries helped mitigate this problem. The spread of a relatively consistent Islamic legal framework helped foster a unifying ideology that accommodated divergent tribal interests while providing greater security for traders carrying expensive and easily stolen goods. This ideology respected trade – Muhammad himself engaged in commerce – unlike early and medieval Christianity, which largely disdained trade.3 Islam therefore served as a unifying force for groups with very different natural resource and geographic endowments, and early Islamic ideals associated with wealth redistribution were in part reflective of this fact.4 The creation of a network of coreligionists who spoke a common language, employed a consistent monetary system, and used similar Islamic financial instruments reduced other transaction costs associated with trade. This setting contrasted with both post–Roman Europe and the pre-Islamic Middle East, where the most significant impediments to trade were high transaction costs and a lack of trust between rival groups. New crops and agricultural techniques were also introduced to the newly Islamized lands, and the ensuing agricultural surplus and local agricultural trade that followed permitted the rapid growth of cities throughout the Islamic world.5
Table 3.1 Largest Empires in World History, through 1750
Empire Birth Year Death Year Peak Land Mass (million km2) Muslim
Mongol Empire 1206 CE 1502 CE 33.2 No
Russian Empire (Muscovy) 1462 CE 1795 CE 16.5 No
Umayyad Empire 661 CE 750 CE 13.2 Yes
Qing Empire (China) 1644 CE 1911 CE 12 No
Qin Dynasty (China) 247 BCE 209 BCE 12 No
Abbasid Empire 750 CE 861 CE 11 Yes
First Four Caliphs (Rashidun) 632 CE 661 CE 9 Yes
Source: Iyigun (2010).
The new Muslim polity founded by Muhammad evolved conterminously with Islam. This meant that when new questions of governance arose, rulers answered them in an Islamic context. Muhammad himself claimed that, “Islam and government are twin brothers. One cannot thrive without the other. Islam is the foundation, and government the guardian. What has no foundation, collapses; what has no guardian, perishes.”6 Bernard Lewis (1974, p. xviii) argues that as a result of the coevolution of Muslim political and religious institutions, the concept of a separation of church and states is absent in Islamic thought: “[S]uch pairs as spiritual and temporal, lay and ecclesiastical, and religious and secular have no equivalents in the classical languages of the Muslim peoples.”
Importantly, since the growth of the first Muslim state occurred in the early stages of Islamic doctrinal development, early thinkers codified Islamic ideas of the state in the Qur’an. The Qur’an lists at least three ways that rulers can gain legitimacy: appointment from God, inheriting authority from a legitimate ruler, and having an “oath of allegiance” from the populace.7 The following three Qur’anic verses detail these means of legitimacy:
2:247 And their prophet said to them, “Indeed, Allah has sent to you Saul as a king.” They said, “How can he have kingship over us while we are more worthy of kingship than him and he has not been given any measure of wealth?” He said, “Indeed, Allah has chosen him over you and has increased him abundantly in knowledge and stature. And Allah gives His sovereignty to whom He wills. And Allah is all-Encompassing [in favor] and Knowing.”
27:16 And Solomon inherited David. He said, “O people, we have been taught the language of birds, and we have been given from all things. Indeed, this is evident bounty.”
48:10 Indeed, those who pledge allegiance to you, [O Muhammad] – they are actually pledging allegiance to Allah. The hand of Allah is over their hands. So he who breaks his word only breaks it to the detriment of himself. And he who fulfills that which he has promised Allah – He will give him a great reward.
Regardless of how a ruler obtained legitimacy, the Qur’an and subsequent Islamic doctrine are explicit on one point: good Muslims should follow a ruler who acts according to Islamic dictates, and Muslims have a duty to rebel against a ruler who acts contrary to Islam. Islamic doctrine therefore tells Muslims exactly what type of rules a ruler can legitimately enact, as indicated in the following Qur’anic verses (italics added):
4:59 O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result.
2:190–191 Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress. Indeed. Allah does not like transgressors. And kill them wherever you overtake them and expel them from wherever they have expelled you, and fitnah [i.e., persecution] is worse than killing.
The first verse cited above suggests that Muslims should follow worldly authorities, but only if their statements are consistent with those of Allah and Muhammad (the Messenger). The second verse suggests that it is better to kill one who persecutes – one who transgresses Allah – than live under persecution. The hadith of al-Bukhari makes much clearer statements on which rulers Muslims should or should not follow. Hadiths are the reports of the teachings of Muhammad that scholars handed down orally over generations. They are among the most important sources of authority in Islam. Al-Bukhari’s hadiths were compiled two centuries after Muhammad and are considered among the most reliable of all the hadith literature. Of importance are the following two hadiths:8
The Prophet said, “It is obligatory for one to listen to and obey (the ruler’s orders) unless these orders involve one disobedience (to Allah); but if an act of disobedience (to Allah) is imposed, he should not listen to or obey it.” (Vol. 4, Book 52, No. 203)
The Prophet said, “A Muslim has to listen to and obey (the order of his ruler) whether he likes it or not, as long as his orders involve not one in disobedience (to Allah), but if an act of disobedience (to Allah) is imposed one should not listen to it or obey it. (Vol. 9, Book 89, No. 258)
From its inception, Islamic doctrine provided a mechanism to legitimize rulers: it commanded Muslims to follow the laws and policies of rulers who acted in accordance with Islamic dictates and to not follow those who did not.
The circumstances under which Christianity was born were quite different than those found in the seventh-century Middle East. Unlike Islam, which coevolved with a growing empire, Christianity was born in the Roman Empire, where well-functioning legal and political institutions already existed. Hence, there was not an opportunity for Christianity to spread in the manner that Islam did in its first century. There were already established institutional means for propagating Roman rule, such as the mili
tary, Senate, and Roman ideology.
For these reasons, Christianity did not legitimize political rule in its first three centuries. Early Church leaders were not concerned with legitimizing political rule because, quite simply, the Church was not in a position to legitimize. In order for an agent to have the capacity to legitimize, it must be able to augment subjects’ beliefs regarding the ruler’s right to rule. Religious authorities can do this when they are able to claim moral authority, but this is only useful if the religion is widespread, its institutions are entrenched deeply enough in society, or if the political or economic elite ascribe to them. The early Christian Church was neither widespread nor had it infiltrated the elite. Prior to the fourth century, Christianity consisted primarily of individuals willing to take on great risk of persecution and social ostracism, and it consequently was a religion of the “middling” classes. Although some of the elite were attracted to the fledgling religion, most churches owned little to no land and the clergy largely came from lower social classes.9
In the first three Christian centuries, the Church sought to survive and expand within an empire that was sometimes hostile to it, as large polities often are toward groups of non-privileged citizens who meet regularly and in private. Indeed, the Romans occasionally charged early Christians with cannibalism, as word spread of their eating the “body of Christ” during the sacrament. The Church could not confront the empire and hope to survive, and so early Church leaders advocated a separation between political and religious institutions.10 The most famous support for this position came from Jesus: “Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s” (Matthew 22:21). The early Christian writer Tertullian (c. 200), who was among the most important Christian thinkers of the first three centuries, made this position much clearer:
