Rulers, Religion, and Riches: Why the West Got Rich and the Middle East Did Not (Cambridge Studies in Economics, Choice, and Society)
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8 See Cameron (1991).
9 See Blickle (1984). Ekelund, Hébert, and Tollison (2002) suggest, in a similar manner, that civil authorities sought an alternative provider of legal services and a less costly path to salvation through the Reformation, as the Church (a monopolist) was overcharging. Their analysis highlights yet another necessary precondition of the Reformation, complementing the one proposed in this chapter.
10 See Scribner (1989).
11 See Holborn (1942) and Edwards (1994).
12 For more on the debate between papism and conciliarism, and especially the role played by Gerson, see Dolan (1965, ch. 4).
13 See Weber (1912).
14 See Wilhelm (1910).
15 A city is considered to have been part of the Holy Roman Empire if it were de facto subject to the Emperor and the empire’s institutions throughout the sixteenth century. This includes cities in present-day Germany, Austria, Czech Republic, Belgium, Luxembourg, eastern France, and western Poland. This excludes Switzerland, which de facto broke away from the Empire in 1499; the Netherlands, which revolted and broke away from the Holy Roman Empire in the 1570s; and northern Italy (e.g., the Duchies of Savoy and Milan), which was not de facto subject to the Emperor. All results are robust to different definitions of the Holy Roman Empire.
16 Becker and Wößmann (2008, 2009) and Cantoni (2012) find that proximity to Wittenberg was a key factor determining whether towns in the Holy Roman Empire adopted the Reformation.
17 Pfaff and Corcoran (2012) argue that there are numerous other supply-and-demand features that contributed to cities adopting the Reformation. Curuk and Smulders (2016) suggest that princes may have demanded the Reformation to remove the power of the Church, and this demand was highest in regions that did not realize their economic potential. Their study suffers from a limited sample size, and it is unclear that their mechanism could have possibly worked in the free imperial cities, but their intuition is consistent with the arguments made in this book. For an overview of recent works on the economic, sociological, and political causes and consequences of the Reformation, see Becker, Pfaff, and Rubin (2016).
18 The variables controlled for are: whether the city housed a university by 1450, whether the city housed a bishop or archbishop by 1517, whether the city was a member of the Hanseatic League, whether the city was an independent, Free Imperial city in 1517, whether a city belonged to a lay magnate (i.e., it was neither free nor subject to an ecclesiastical lord), a dummy for the presence of printing, whether the city was on water (ocean, sea, large lake, or river connected to another city), the city’s urban potential (i.e., the sum of the populations of all other cities weighted by their distance from the city in question), the city’s distance to Wittenberg, and the latitude, longitude, and interaction between the two. For more on these data, see Rubin (2014b).
19 Formally, Rubin (2014b) analyzes both a probit and a two-stage probit to control for endogeneity. The first-stage dependent variable is whether a city had a printing press by 1500, and the instrument used is the city’s distance to Mainz, the birthplace of printing. This variable correlates with the spread of printing but should not have had an independent effect on the spread of the Reformation. More details are available in Rubin (2014b).
20 For the relevant recent citations in the fiscal capacity literature, see Chapter 1. In many historical and present-day societies, the economic elite held the government’s purse strings and provided council to rulers, helping them solve information problems and problems associated with succession. For more, see Congleton (2011, chs. 2–5).
21 For much more on the incentive for rulers to maximize revenue through predation – and attempts at constraining this type of action by other players in society – see Brennan and Buchanan (1980), Levi (1988), North and Weingast (1989), Tilly (1990), and Irigoin and Grafe (2013).
22 Congleton (2011, ch. 5) has a nice discussion of how differing “king and council” arrangements affect policy outcomes in different situations. Congleton’s analysis is consistent with the one offered in this book, although the emphasis here is more on why differing arrangements arose in the first place. Also see van Zanden, Buringh, and Bosker (2012).
23 See van Zanden, Buringh, and Bosker (2012, p. 838).
24 Monarchs also called parliaments to legitimize themselves early in their reign, establish laws affecting local commerce, and hear complaints from petitioners.
25 Not all parts of Bavaria were Catholic, but this was the least-Reformed German region. The figure does not look very different with Bavaria classified as Protestant. Also, I drop Russia from this figure, since it was primarily Orthodox.
26 van Zanden, Buringh, and Bosker (2012) argue that there was a “little divergence” in parliamentary development between northwestern Europe and southern Europe between 1500 and 1800, but they do not attribute this divergence to the Reformation. Their empirical observation is consistent with the argument proposed in this book; indeed, the present argument helps explain why this “little divergence” arose when and where it did.
27 See van Zanden, Buringh, and Bosker (2012).
28 Another important distinction between Christianity and Islam is that the former has more centralized institutions than the latter. This argument is highly complementary to the one proposed in this chapter, as explained in note 6. I do not discuss this argument in detail because doing so would necessitate at least two more chapters that would detract from the central focus of the book.
29 See İnalcık (1973, chs. 18–19).
30 Much of this section is from Coşgel, Miceli, and Rubin (2012a). I again thank Metin and Tom for their work and their permission to let me use these ideas we formulated together.
31 On wages, see Özmucur and Pamuk (2002). On literacy, see Quataert (2000, p. 167).
32 Calculated by Metin Coşgel from the information presented in Baysal (1968, pp. 40–2).
33 See Zilfi (1988, pp. 47–8).
34 See İnalcık (1973) and Hourani (1991, ch. 15).
35 See Hourani (1981), Özkaya (1994), and Karaman and Pamuk (2010).
36 Gill (1998, ch. 3) similarly notes, in the Latin American context, that one of the primary times in which states attack religious authority is when alternative sources of legitimacy arise. Gill focuses on the effects of alternative ideologies, such as nationalism or communism.
37 Quoted in Kurzman and Browers (2004, p. 5).
38 See Opwis (2004, pp. 30–3).
39 See Opwis (2004, p. 30). Opwis also notes that these events weakened the hold of religious authorities over the legal sphere as well.
40 See Kuran (2011) for an extensive analysis of the causes and consequences of the Ottoman capitulations.
41 Quoted in Kurzman and Browers (2004, p. 4). For more, also see Opwis (2004).
42 See Browers (2004).
43 See Opwis (2004, pp. 33–7).
44 Eickelman (1998) also points to mass education and communication as the impetus for an “Islamic Reformation,” but he places the timing in the latter half of the twentieth century.
45 See Opwis (2004, p. 35).
46 See Opwis (2004, p. 38) and Browers (2004, p. 56).
47 Quoted in Kurzman and Browers (2004, p. 6).
7 Success: England and the Dutch Republic
1 See, for instance, North and Thomas (1973).
2 For an excellent overview of the Malthusian model and its usefulness in economic history, see Clark (2007).
3 See van Zanden, Buringh, and Bosker (2012).
4 See Graves (1985, p. 39).
5 See Congleton (2011, ch. 12) for more consequences of this arrangement.
6 Quoted in Hunt (2008, p. 43).
7 24 Henry VIII c.12.
8 26 Henry VIII c.1.
9 On the last point, see Graves (1985).
10 27 Henry VIII c.10 and 32 Henry VIII c.1.
11 See Ives (1967).
12 See Ives (1967).
13 See Holdsworth (1912), Bordwell (1926), Ives (1967)
, and North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009, ch. 3).
14 Mary was declared a bastard in the First Succession Act of 1533 (25 Henry VIII c.22), and Elizabeth was declared a bastard in the Second Succession Act of 1536 (28 Henry VIII c. 7).
15 35 Henry VIII c.1.
16 1 Mary st.2 c.1 and 1 Eliz. I c.3.
17 Burgess (1992) overviews the Tudor’s and Stuart’s use of the “divine right of kings” doctrine and the limitations of this doctrine.
18 For more on this history of usury legislation, see Munro (2012). The reinstitution of usury laws brought back a statute passed under Henry VIII in 1545 that was struck down in 1552.
19 See North and Weingast (1989).
20 See Brenner (1993) for a fantastically detailed exposition of the “new merchant” and Parliamentary alliances that were the key to the Royalist opposition in the Civil War.
21 There is a large literature citing the seventeenth-century political conflicts between Parliament and the Crown as a key determinant of long-run economic success in England. Most famously, Douglass North and Barry Weingast (1989) suggest that the ultimate upshot of the conflicts, especially the Glorious Revolution settlement, was that the Crown could credibly commit to upholding the property rights of the economic elite, as Parliament showed they could remove a monarch. The constitutional structure resulting from the Settlement allowed action in times of crisis, but also gave wealth-holders in Parliament a greater say in the daily happenings of government. North and Weingast’s theory is not without its detractors, and the present book does not engage in this debate. See in particular Clark (1996), who argues that rates of return were stable well before the Glorious Revolution and did not spike around the Revolution, as would be expected if North and Weingast are correct. For other criticisms of North and Weingast’s theory, see Carruthers (1990), Wells and Wills (2000), Quinn (2001), and Sussman and Yafeh (2006). Pincus and Robinson (2014) argue that North and Weingast were correct to focus on institutional changes heralded by the Glorious Revolution, but that party politics were at the root of the changes, not credible commitment. Cox (2012) argues that North and Weingast were correct to focus on institutional changes, but their focus on property rights was misplaced. Cox suggests that the important changes were constitutional in nature, giving Parliament greater ability to grant tax revenues and issue debt.
22 For much more on the commercial policies of the Interregnum government, see Brenner (1993, ch. 12).
23 See de Vries and van der Woude (1997) and de Vries (2000) for numbers attesting to Dutch growth during the Golden Age.
24 See Israel (1995, ch. 6), de Vries and van der Woude (1997), van Zanden (2002a, 2002b), and van Bavel (2003). van Zanden (2002a, 2002b) attempts to pin the rise of the Dutch economy to an earlier period than de Vries and van der Woude. van Zanden (2002b) goes so far as to say that Dutch economic growth over the sixteenth–eighteenth centuries was “unspectacular.” I have no interest in entering into this argument; the only point made here is that the Dutch had a “head start” on much of the rest of Europe, a relatively uncontroversial point within this literature.
25 See Allen (2001) and van Zanden (2002a).
26 See van Zanden (2002b), van Bavel (2003), and van Zanden, Zuijderduijn, and de Moor (2012).
27 See North (1981, p. 152).
28 See Israel (1995, p. 106).
29 See de Vries and van der Woude (1997, ch. 5) and van Zanden, Zuijderduijn, and de Moor (2012). van Zanden (2002a) argues that the Dutch did indeed have a feudal past, and he cites a recent literature in support of this assertion. Regardless, it is clear that the feudal nobility were weaker relative to the urban classes in the Low Countries than they were elsewhere in Europe.
30 See van Zanden, Zuijderduijn, and de Moor (2012) for more on the accessibility of credit in late medieval Holland.
31 See Israel (1995, ch. 6).
32 See Parker (1977, p. 32), van Gelderen (1992, pp. 22–3), and van Zanden, Zuijderduijn, and de Moor (2012).
33 See Israel (1995, ch. 13).
34 See van Zanden and Prak (2006).
35 See Parker (1977, p. 179) and de Vries and van der Woude (1997, ch. 4).
36 van Gelderen (1992) gives an excellent overview of the political thought underlying the Dutch Revolt.
37 See Israel (1995, p. 79).
38 See Parker (1977, pp. 36–7).
39 See Parker (1977, ch. 2), van Gelderen (1992), and de Vries and van der Woude (1997, ch. 9).
40 See Parker (1977, p. 155). van Gelderen (1992, ch. 4) notes that by the mid-1570s, the Dutch made efforts to deny that the Revolt was religiously motivated, instead arguing that it was a fight for liberty.
41 See Fritschy (2003).
42 See de Vries and van der Woude (1997, ch. 4), Fritschy (2003), and van Zanden and Prak (2006).
43 See Israel (1995, ch. 14).
44 See Gelderblom and Jonker (2004).
45 See Gelderblom and Jonker (2005).
46 See de Vries and van der Woude (1997, chs. 2, 5, 9).
47 See Israel (1995, ch. 15).
48 See de Vries and van der Woude (1997, chs. 11, 12).
49 See Israel (1995, ch. 6).
50 See de Vries and van der Woude (1997, chs. 3, 11, 13).
51 See Israel (1995, ch. 14), de Vries and van der Woude (1997, chs. 3, 8), and van Bavel (2003).
52 See Israel (1995, ch. 12).
53 See de Vries and van der Woude (1997, chs. 5, 8). Priest (2006) gives an excellent overview of laws regarding the alienability of land in English history.
54 See de Vries and van der Woude (1997, ch. 4).
55 Cameron and Neal (2003) give a nice overview of the order in which the European countries industrialized.
56 See de Vries and van der Woude (1997, chs. 8, 11, 14).
57 See de Vries (2000).
8 Stagnation: Spain and the Ottoman Empire
1 See Kamen (2003).
2 The exact number of people expelled has long been the subject of debate. For example, Elliott (1961) claims that Hamilton (1938) vastly underestimated the number of expulsions and thus underestimated their economic impact. It is not my purpose to enter into this debate, only to note that the expulsions affected the Spanish Crown’s basis for legitimacy.
3 See Simpson (1956) and Lynch (1991, ch. 1).
4 See Lynch (1991, ch. 1). The police forces (hermandades) also brought the nobility to heel, as they were able to force contributions from both the nobility and the Church.
5 See Lynch (1991, p. 154).
6 See Dunn (1979, ch. 1), Kamen (1988, ch. 5), and Lynch (1991, ch. 8). Kamen in particular argues that the Spanish history of squashing nonorthodox thought gave the Reformation little it could build on in Spain. Another possibility, which I do not wish to push too far, is that publishing never became a big business in Spain prior to the Reformation (Kamen 1988, p. 69). This is consistent with the argument made in Chapter 6, which notes the importance of printing to the propaganda efforts of the Reformers.
7 See Lynch (1991, ch. 2).
8 See Lynch (1991, ch. 2).
9 Quote from Drelichman (2005a). For more on the effect of the comuneros revolt, see Drelichman (2005a), Lynch (1991, ch. 2), and Simpson (1956). Kamen (1988) argues that the “rubber stamp” view of the Cortes is untenable, but he points to the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as evidence. This may be true in the period Kamen is considering, but it is not the object of discussion here.
10 Quote from Lynch (1991, p. 64).
11 See Kamen (2003, ch. 2).
12 See Lynch (1991, ch. 9).
13 See Parker (1973) and Lynch (1991, ch. 9). Parker (1973) gives an overview of the repeated mutinies of the Spanish army in the late sixteenth century, all of which occurred due to lack of payment.
14 See Dunn (1979, ch. 1) and Lynch (1991, ch. 7).
15 See Lynch (1991, ch. 7).
16 See Drelichman and Voth (2011).
17 See Lynch (1991, ch. 2).
18 See Drelichman (
2005a). Drelichman (2005b) argues that the import of precious metals from America created a “Dutch disease” that undermined Spanish long-run economic growth. Irigoin and Grafe (2008) and Grafe and Irigoin (2012) note that the Crown was able to extract significant revenue despite having almost no fiscal apparatus by outsourcing fiscal functions to private individuals.
19 See Drelichman (2005a) and Drelichman and Voth (2011).
20 See Drelichman and Voth (2011).
21 See Drelichman (2005a).