“This was indeed fortunate for us. Had Hoashi’s plane failed to confirm the results of the battle, our future operations would necessarily have been based on the assumption that the two mighty warships had not been destroyed. Our freedom of action would have been severely curtailed, for we dared not send surface units in an area in which the big guns of the British warships might destroy them.
“The great ability of our pilots to wrest every possible mile of range out of their bombers was soon made apparent in dramatic fashion. We feared that many of our planes would be compelled to make forced landings at Kota Bharu, since we had flown beyond our calculated ‘point of no return,’ and then engaged in fuel-consuming battle maneuvers. Actually, not a single plane was forced to make an emergency landing at Kota Bharu, and all bombers were able to return to their respective bases in Indo-China.
“Furthermore, only the three planes which fell in flames during the sinking of the enemy warships failed to return! And all three planes had managed to crash into the battleships. It was a great and glorious victory.”
Subsequent interrogation of pilots indicated that thirty-five torpedo bombers and eight level bombers had attacked the swift battle cruiser Repulse. The Genzan Air Corps released seven torpedoes against the Repulse, of which four struck the ship. Of the more than twenty torpedoes released against the Repulse by the Kanoya Air Corps, at least ten were seen to explode against the warship. Four of seven torpedoes released by the Mihoro Air Corps bombers went true to their target.
Sixteen 550-pound bombs were dropped against the Repulse by Mihoro Air Corps bombers; one scored a direct hit and two fell as near misses.
The Prince of Wales was attacked by fifteen torpedo bombers. The Genzan Air Corps released nine torpedoes, of which four struck the battleship. Each of six Kanoya Air Corps bombers dropped a torpedo, scoring four hits on the Prince of Wales and one hit on an escorting destroyer.
Eight level bombers of the Mihoro Air Corps dropped fourteen 1,100-pound bombs on the battleship; of these, two were direct hits. Nine other bombers of the same air corps dropped eighteen 1,100-pound bombs but failed to score any hits.
A total of forty-nine torpedoes were released in the attack. More than twenty-six of these struck the two battleships and one of the escorting destroyers. Of the sixteen 550-pound bombs dropped, only one scored a direct hit. Forty-one 1,100-pound bombs were released (eighteen were prematurely dropped) and two direct hits were obtained.
The Repulse was attacked initially by the Mihoro Air Corps under the command of Lieutenant Hachiro Shoji, who first dropped bombs on the Repulse at 12:45 P.M., The first torpedoes struck the Repulse at 1:22 P.M., The battle cruiser went down at 2:20 P.M.,
At 1:14 P.M., the first four torpedoes crashed into the Prince of Wales. The battleship sank at exactly 2:30 P.M.,
Our search aircraft, which had remained over the battle area to confirm the destruction of the two British warships, discovered eight approaching enemy fighters at 3:00 P.M., and immediately left the scene.
The Battle of Malaya was fruitful in more ways than only in the destruction of Britain’s two most powerful warships in this area. The lesson to be learned from the battle was different from that at Pearl Harbor, where an anchored and unsuspecting enemy fleet was surprised.
The British commanders were fully aware that a Japanese carrier task force had only recently assaulted Pearl Harbor with devastating results, and that surface ships did not actually participate in the destruction visited upon the American installations. It was a mistake leading to the most serious consequences that the British failed to heed this lesson and provide air protection for their prized battleships. This was the more surprising since it was most obvious from the moment our reconnaissance planes discovered the whereabouts of the British fleet, which seriously threatened Japanese surface operations, that we would launch an intensive aerial assault against the Prince of Wales and the Repulse.
It was completely incredible that the two warships should be left naked to attack from the skies. Interception of our level and torpedo bombers by British fighter aircraft might have seriously disrupted our attack and perhaps permitted the two warships to escape destruction.
The battle of Malaya illustrated in the most forcible manner that a surface fleet without fighter protection was helpless under enemy air attack. The battleship, long the ruler of the seas, had been toppled from its dominant position and was now just another warship to be destroyed by aerial assault.
CHAPTER 10
The Wake Island Operation
ON THE DAY FOLLOWING the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse one hundred miles from Singapore, our Navy was subjected to its only defeat in the opening months of the war. The dramatic victory of air power over sea power as demonstrated in the Malaya sea battle was still being jubilantly received in Japan when the invasion force which had attacked tiny Wake Island was soundly thrashed by small defending American forces and forced to flee for safety.
Considering the power accumulated for th invasion of Wake Island, and the meager forces of the defenders, it was one of the most humiliating defeats our Navy had ever suffered.
At the time of this operation, our Navy was hard-pressed for the services of every available aircraft carrier, and none could be spared for the invasion of Wake Island on December 11. The Navy did not have fighter aircraft capable of reaching the island from the nearest Japanese base on Kwajalein, six hundred nautical miles distant in the Marshall Islands.
The offensive action against the American garrison on Wake Island consisted of repeated bombing with some thirty attack bombers during the three days of December 8 to 10.
On December 11 the invasion forces moved in to take the island. Rear Admiral Sadamichi Kajioka, Commander of the 6th Destroyer Squadron, led the invading forces. At his disposal was the Wake Invasion Force composed of the light cruiser Yubari with six destroyers and accompanying vessels, and the light cruisers Tenryu and Tatsuta, commanded by Rear Admiral Kuninori Marumo.
The enemy guns on Wake Island resisted this attempted invasion so violently that the cruiser Yubari was damaged and the destroyer Hayate sunk, compelling the attack force to withdraw beyond range of the enemy defenses.
Also opposing the invasion force were about four Grumman F4F Wildcat fighters of the United States Marine Corps. Our fleet was at the mercy of these few fighter airplanes, which made consistent machinegun and bombing attacks upon our ships. Their persistent strafing and bombing caused considerable damage to the light cruisers Tenryu and Tatsuta, and sank our destroyer Kisaragi. The destroyer sinking resulted indirectly from bombing by the little American fighters, a bomb from which exploded amidst depth charges stored on deck, causing a greater explosion which tore the ship apart.
The Wildcats were among the few American fighters most active in the early days of the war. Their pilots were indeed gallant men.
His confidence in the invasion shaken by the fierce resistance of the enemy shore guns and the elusive Grumman fighter planes, Rear Admiral Kajioka withdrew his fleet to Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands, where he could reorganize his forces for another assault upon the enemy. Fully cognizant of the gravity of the situation, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet, ordered Admiral Chuichi Nagumo to assist Admiral Kajioka in the Wake Island invasion. Admiral Nagumo was at this time returning from his devastating attack upon Pearl Harbor.
On December 15 Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi’s 2nd Carrier Division, with the aircraft carriers Soryu and Hiryu, escorted by four destroyers, was ordered to proceed immediately to the area north of Wake Island. Accompanying the carrier force was Rear Admiral Hiroaki Abe’s 8th Cruiser Division, with the heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma.
Approximately five days were required for the aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers to assemble off Wake Island for the second invasion attempt. In the interim, our landbased attack bombers pounded the island constantly, but could do little to stop
the harassing attacks of the defending Grumman fighters.
By December 21 Yamaguchi’s 2nd Carrier Division was approximately two hundred nautical miles northwest of Wake Island. Yamaguchi dispatched eighteen Type 99 dive bombers (Vals), escorted by eighteen Zero fighters, to attack the island. Heavy clouds prevented the Zero fighters from engaging in combat with the enemy Wildcats.
The following day eighteen Type 97 bombers (Kates), escorted by eighteen Zeros, again bombed Wake Island. As the Zero fighters, under the command of Lieutenant Masaharu Suganami, could not see any enemy fighters in the air, they dropped down to strafe enemy ground positions. Their strafing runs were timed to hit the island simultaneously with the attack of the bombers.
As the fighters swept low over the island, Lieutenant Heijiro Abe’s bomber group was suddenly attacked by a single Grumman fighter. The enemy pilot had skillfully eluded our Zeros by remaining hidden in nearby clouds, diving in to attack the bombers as the Zeros made their strafing runs.
Before the Zeros could reach the scene, two bombers had been shot down. The Grumman was quickly destroyed by the Zeros; no further flights were made by the defending enemy planes.
Once we had achieved command of the air over the island, the invasion became the responsibility of the surface force plus covering aircraft. The powerful enemy shore guns which had been so effective against the first invasion fleet could not manifest their full strength with our bombers and fighters waiting to attack the moment their positions were revealed.
With the aid of constant dive bombing by the planes of the carriers Soryu and Hiryu, our marines moved in to take the island on December 23. They were most anxious to vindicate themselves for the disgraceful failure of their first attempt, and succeeded in capturing the island on this date.
According to American military reports made available after the war, on December 21 Rear Admiral Fletcher’s aircraft carrier Saratoga was about six hundred nautical miles northeast of Wake Island. The Saratoga was racing to aid the beleaguered American garrison. Had Rear Admiral Yamaguchi’s 2nd Carrier Division not been hastily dispatched to Wake Island, or had the order to assist Rear Admiral Kajioka been delayed even a few days, the second landing operation might also have been shattered by the American aircraft carrier force.
Our humiliating defeat during the initial landing operation (and this was the only such defeat early in the war) and the valuable lessons obtained at such high price appeared to have been quickly forgotten. Japan was much too jubilant at the news of victory which rolled in from all corners of the Pacific to heed the bitter lesson of Wake Island.
In contrast to our failure fully to assimilate the lesson of this battle and that of the Malaya sea battle into our military organization, the United States frankly accepted the lessons of defeat in the early days of the war. Realizing that the war in the Pacific would be decided not on the ground or on the sea, but in the air, the United States mobilized all its resources and gave the highest priority to the mass production of military aircraft and the expansion of its air forces.
CHAPTER 11
The Indian Ocean Operation
WITH THE EXCEPTION OF Rear Admiral Yamaguchi’s 2nd Carrier Division, which joined the Wake Island Operation, all units of the victorious Nagumo Force on December 23 returned from Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima Bay, where Admiral Yamamoto awaited the fleet.
Refueled and reequipped, the task force under Vice-Admiral Nagumo’s command, with the aircraft carriers Akagi, Kaga, Shokaku, and Zuikaku, left Hiroshima Bay on January 5, 1942, for the main battle areas of the south Pacific. In late January our Army and Navy landing forces invaded Rabaul (New Britain) and Kavieng (New Ireland). Nagumo Task Force planes assisted the assault operations by raiding Rabaul, Kavieng, Lae, and Salamaua, the latter two objectives on the northeast coast of New Guinea, and quickly eliminated enemy air resistance.
In mid-February, with the invasion operations successfully concluded, Admiral Nagumo ordered Admiral Hara back to Japan with the 5th Carrier Division’s Shokaku and Zuikaku. These he replaced with the Soryu and Horyu of the 2nd Carrier Division, commanded by Rear Admiral Yamaguchi, thus maintaining his original strength of four large aircraft carriers.
On February 15 the reformed Nagumo Force left Palau Island and worked its way southward through the Dutch East Indies islands, moving toward Port Darwin, the powerful enemy stronghold on Australia’s northwest coast. On the nineteenth, Commander Fuchida led a mass formation of 190 planes against the enemy bastion, during which his fighters wiped out an opposing force of eight enemy fighter planes. We wrecked or set aflame an additional fifteen planes on the ground. Our bombers sank two destroyers and eight other vessels, some seven smaller ships received bomb hits or near misses, and low-level ground attacks set three aircraft hangers aflame.
The Port Darwin attack revealed to our pilots that they had little to fear in the way of enemy fighter-plane opposition. The Zero clearly outflew all of the enemy fighters encountered over Australia and, despite our advantage in numbers during this initial attack, our pilots felt no qualms about future engagements. Its mission accomplished in its first assault, the Nagumo Force swung about and anchored within Staring Bay, on the southeast coast of Celebes Island.
Simultaneously with the Port Darwin raid, our Navy land-based air forces under Vice-Admiral Tsukahara, operating from newly occupied fields in southern Borneo, repeatedly blasted enemy targets in the Java Sea area. On February 27 Tsukahara’s reconnaissance planes sighted the United States seaplane tender Langley on the open sea south of Java Island. Immediately Tsukahara dispatched six Zero fighters and nine Type 96 Nell bombers against the American ship, which they caught approximately seventy-five nautical miles south of Java’s Tjilatjap Port. The Nells turned in an outstanding performance for level bombers, hitting the enemy vessel directly with five bombs and scoring several near misses. Shattered and apparently without power, the Langley soon drifted helplessly. Later the crippled and abandoned hulk went under from torpedoes fired by an escorting American destroyer.
Our intelligence reported that the Langley had entered the Java Sea to assist the beleaguered Dutch East Indies forces, especially those on Java Island, by ferrying thirty-two Curtiss P-40 Tomahawk fighter planes and their pilots from Australia. We could only conclude that the Americans risked the Langley in an area known to be under constant surveillance by our planes because the Dutch need for fighters was so desperate and because the Allies lacked a fighter plane capable of flying nonstop between Australia and Java.
Again we took satisfaction from the excellent long-range characteristics of the Zero fighter. The strategic significance of the Zero’s ability to fly long distances was clearly demonstrated by this incident. Because of the Zero’s long range, our Navy “gained” at the war’s outset three aircraft carriers which were relieved of their original Philippines attack assignment; conversely, the United States Navy lost its seaplane tender Langley simply because of the inferior performance of the early-1942 American fighter planes.
The following day, February 28, we capped the destruction of the American ship with another severe blow at the enemy’s dwindling sea power. Our land-based attack bombers caught the British cruiser Exeter, damaged on the twenty-seventh in a running sea battle, and sent it to the bottom. Also destroyed in the bombing attack were the British destroyer Encounter and the American destroyer Pope.
Early in March the Nagumo Force left Staring Bay and steamed for the open sea south of Java Island. On March 5 its planes raided Tjilatjap, catching a large number of enemy vessels. Our planes swarmed over the assembled enemy ships, sinking two American destroyers and many other small vessels. This action literally cut off the escape route of the Allied forces then in Java which, pressed by our advancing troops, now stood on the edge of total collapse. Without further targets to occupy it in southern Java waters, the Nagumo Force returned to Staring Bay.
Vice-Admiral Nagumo now increased his aircraft carrier strength. He dispat
ched the Kaga to Japan for repairs and supplies, and added to his force the 5th Carrier Division under Rear Admiral Hara, bringing his strength to five carriers: the Akagi, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku, and Zuikaku.
On March 26 the Nagumo Force left Staring Bay and steamed at full speed for the Bay of Bengal, where our intelligence reported powerful units of the British fleet. Vice-Admiral Nagumo fully appreciated the tremendous enemy strength which would face him in his attempt to destroy British sea power, for the English had steadily reinforced their original fleet units of two aircraft carriers, two battleships, three heavy cruisers, and several light cruisers and destroyers. The Indian Ocean was fast becoming a “British lake,” and Nagumo’s orders were to smash this enemy strength. His intelligence reported to Nagumo that he might also face more than three hundred British warplanes, then based on Ceylon Island and on fields along the Bay of Bengal.
On the evening of April 4 a British flying-boat patrol sighted the Nagumo Force sailing under full steam for Colombo on Ceylon, hoping to catch unawares the British warships. It was only twenty-four hours before the first scheduled raid against Colombo. Zero fighters hastily launched from the carriers destroyed the enemy plane, but we feared the plane might have reported by radio its discovery of our fleet. This made it imperative that the initial Colombo attack be a maximum-strength aerial assault.
The following morning our carriers launched their planes: thirty-six Zeros, thirty-six Type 99 Val dive bombers, and fifty-three Type 97 Kate attack bombers. We discovered all too quickly that the British patrol bomber had managed to get out a sighting report on our fleet, for a swarm of enemy fighter planes plunged from the sky against our air formations. Again the inferior performance of the Allied fighter airplanes and the superior skill of our pilots paid handsome dividends. The ensuing air battle between the approximately sixty enemy planes and our Zero fighters resulted in the destruction of almost all the enemy aircraft, which the Zeros prevented from disrupting the bomber formations. Even as the fighter planes swirled over the ocean, bombs hurtled down toward the British port. We sank one British destroyer, one large merchant ship and ten smaller vessels, and heavily damaged land installations.
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