After March of 1945 more than half of our pilots resorted to Kamikaze attacks. American and British vessels in the waters off western Japan and Okinawa were subjected to repeated raids by the Third, Fifth, and Tenth Air Fleets in Kyushu, and the First Air Fleet in Formosa. We employed a variety of aircraft types for the suicide bombings; these were, in order of the number used, the Zero, Suisei (Judy), Ginga (Frances), Val, Shiragiku (a navigation and crew trainer), Kate, Betty, Nell, Tenzan (Jill), Type 96 carrier-based dive bomber, and various types of reconnaissance seaplanes.
An aggregate of 597 Zeros left their bases in Japan to raid the enemy ships; 330 of these planes actually made suicide dives. An aggregate of 865 planes of all other types took off on missions, and 516 of these bombed the enemy fleet. Thus, 846 planes out of an aggregate of 1,462 which left on missions actually completed the bombings. From the Formosa bases, an aggregate of 239 Zeros and 118 other-type planes flew against the enemy; thirty-four Zeros and forty-four other types completed their suicide dives. The majority of the Kamikaze missions flew from Japan simply because the Zero fighters, operating from Formosa, lacked the range necessary to search for and attack their targets.
Among the enemy warships damaged in these Kamikaze operations were the carriers Wasp, Franklin, Hancock, Intrepid, Bunker Hill, and Enterprise. During the same period of time, our planes damaged only a few enemy vessels through attacks other than suicide dives. Despite the frantic attempts to break up the American fleets, the enemy continued to invade the islands along our shrinking defense lines, and sent his carriers to smash any objective within the range of his airplanes, which, of course, meant the very heart of Japan. Even the desperate suicide measures could not halt the colossal war machine advancing against our country.
During these last-ditch defense measures, the Zero fighter again played the dominant role. A total of 2,363 Navy planes, including the Okas, took off on Kamikaze flights; 1,189 were Zero fighters. Of the 1,189 planes which actually completed their suicide missions, 530 were Zeros.
The Kamikaze suicide attacks took the lives of approximately 2,530 Navy pilots and air-crew members, and at least an equal number of Army pilots and air crew perished. On August 15, 1945, the day of our surrender, Vice-Admiral Matome Ugaki, who had commanded the suicide bombings from Kyushu, flew the last Kamikaze mission of the war and followed his men by diving against an enemy warship off Okinawa. Also in the war’s closing hour, Vice-Admiral Takijiro Onishi, Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff and the originator of the Kamikaze operations, chose death by hara-kiri rather than surrender.
Thus ended the Kamikazes.
CHAPTER 25
Air Raids and Earthquakes
BY SEPTEMBER OF 1939 the Zero fighter was a proven combat airplane, and its pilots had demonstrated their superiority over the best of the enemy’s fighters in China. The one-sided combat box scores attested dramatically to that fact. During this same month the Navy prepared for its great mass-production program, and discussed with Nakajima Airplane Corporation its role as the producer of the Mitsubishi-designed Zero fighter. Late in September, representatives from the Navy and the two companies drew up the final manufacturing agreements, and Mitsubishi’s director of design transferred to Nakajima the blueprints necessary to initiate the new production program. The two companies agreed further to exchange all data required for future fabrication techniques and modifications. The conference ended with the understanding that Nakajima would bear the greatest portion of Zero production, and that Mitsubishi would engage in design alteration, as well as in production in parallel, with the proviso that Nakajima be kept fully informed of all changes. Eventually Nakajima produced more than half (6,500 out of slightly more than 10,400 planes) of all Zero combat models built, including the Rufe seaplanes modified from the fighter. In June of 1944 the Navy ordered the Hitachi Corporation to prepare the industrial facilities needed to manufacture Zero fighters; the Hitachi program failed eventually to produce any fighters because of materials shortages and air raids.
Despite the tremendous production effort, the Zero fighter failed to meet the Navy’s fighter-plane requirements. This failure extended beyond the superiority later achieved by American fighters; the more than ten thousand fighters produced could not meet even the numerical demands of the Navy. Behind this failure lay the obvious reasons of a shortage in engineers, lack of sufficient skilled workers, lack of materials, and so on, but apart from these, other factors hampered our production activities.
Jiro Horikoshi fills in the rest of the picture:
“Soon after its introduction to combat we cut back the production of the Raiden interceptor plane; despite our plans that this fighter should replace the Zero, it suffered from poor pilot visibility and lacked the fight endurance necessary for Pacific operations. We invested our greatest hopes in the Reppu carrier-based fighter, the performance of which might well return to Japan its lost air superiority in carrier-vs.-carrier combat. The Reppu, true to my predictions of several years back, disappointed the Navy with poor performance caused by difficulties and power loss associated with the production-type Homare engine. Even frantic efforts to mass produce the Shiden-Mod interceptor were fruitless as an endless stream of ‘last-minute’ design changes and disorderly arranged blueprints drove the final production line crazy. As the confusion and bickering mounted to a crescendo, the Allies continued to increase their superiority in the air. The Navy had little choice but to depend upon the Zero as its major front-line airplane until the war’s end.
“Throughout the war Mitsubishi was responsible for the improvements and modifications to the Zero fighter, many of which were based upon front-line reports from our pilots. So frequently did the Navy forward these ‘Rush’ orders for modifications that it became impossible to maintain a steady production flow. Mitsubishi suffered especially from the Navy’s inability to crystallize its decisions regarding the Zero and Raiden fighters. We would receive orders to boost the output of the Zeros, with the Raiden taking second priority. A month later the Navy would reverse its order, and engineers would try frantically to unravel their new setups. Three months later, perhaps, a new change in policy would come through . . . it became an incredible see-saw game between the two fighters.
“Nakajima did not suffer from such frequent changes and, freed of the time-consuming necessity for changing assembly lines, maintained an average monthly production rate of over two hundred planes from the fall of 1943 to the spring of 1945; their peak was 270 planes in March of 1944. The average monthly production during the same period for Mitsubishi, however, was barely over one hundred planes, with a peak of 155, reached in October of 1944. Mitsubishi suffered not only from the policy tantrums of the Navy but, early in December of 1944, with the war nearing the critical stage, reeled from the shock of a severe earthquake (Tokai district earthquake) which rocked the city of Nagoya and its southeastern suburbs.
“The earthquake was only the beginning of a series of incredible misfortunes to befall the aircraft industry. The Nagoya Aircraft Works of the Mitsubishi company, a giant airframe production center, was built over a weak ground foundation of reclaimed land east of Nagoya Harbor. The quake so severely jolted the factory that gaping cracks and strains developed in the concrete floors. Every assembly jig was thrown out of line, and several of the important shop buildings on separate ground collapsed. Thus in a single blow the production of both Mitsubishi’s and Aichi’s giant planes ground to a halt. Both companies made frantic efforts to readjust the assembly jigs, working day and night to complete the job so that production could resume.
“Even as the plants returned slowly to normal operations, on December 13, 1944, B-29 bombers from Mariana Island bases ripped the Mitsubishi Engine Works at Daikocho, Nagoya, and, five days later, hurled their high-explosive and incendiary bombs at the Aircraft Works at Ohe-machi, Nagoya.
“Up to the time of this heavy raid the military authorities could not reach a final decision on the ma
tter of plant dispersal. Torn between the vital need for more and more airplanes and the knowledge that the American bombings would increase in severity and effectiveness, they hedged continually on the matter. After the attacks against the Mitsubishi plants, however, the government ordered immediate plant dispersal and Mitsubishi put into practice its long-standing plans. Its first move was to transfer the major part of its Engineering Division to the school buildings in Nagoya. The company separated its Airframe Production Division into three separate units, one Navy and two Army, and dispersed these to widely scattered areas; Navy facilities went to Suzuka, Ohmi, Nagoya, Nankai, Hokurika, and to Gakunan. Army installations were set up in Nagoya and its southeastern suburbs, and in Ohfu, Nagoya, Ueda, Gifu, Daimon, Toyama, and Kanazawa. These dispersed factory units remained within the central part of Honshu island. The company rented spinning and textile factory buildings to house its scattered machinery. Finally the Engineering Division, separated from the production units, transferred to a silk-manufacturing building and to schools on Matsumoto in Nagano Prefecture. The hasty move concentrated Zero fighter production in the Suzuka and Ohmi districts. Following these initial activities, factory dispersals coincided with the mass evacuation of city residents to rural areas. This latter move found little favor with the people; they felt it was certain to bring the B-29’s after them, even in the remote country districts.
“Even as the Mitsubishi company began its complicated dispersal program, the B-29s returned. Again and again they showered bombs on Nagoya, with the result that traffic and communications became hopelessly entangled in a snarl of raging fires, blocked streets, and destroyed telephone lines. The well-laid dispersal plans went up in smoke with the flaming buildings. We found it impossible to maintain adequate communications among our scattered workshops. Production control vanished, and the manufacturing schedules became worthless scraps of paper. From March of 1945, Nagoya reeled beneath an unbelievable cascade of high explosives and incendiaries from the B-29 fleets. So effective was this aerial interdiction that, despite every effort, the Mitsubishi company managed to produce during the entire month of July the ridiculously small total of fifteen fighter airplanes.
“Nagoya and Tokyo became the two most frequently bombed cities in Japan. The Americans chose their targets wisely, for the two cities were the most critical centers of the entire nation. Nagoya was Japan’s aircraft manufacturing center; one great factory at Daiko-cho alone produced 40 per cent of all our aircraft engines, and the sprawling plant at Ohe-machi assembled 25 per cent of our aircraft. Tokyo, of course, was our military and political center. The incessant raids rapidly disorganized internal functions, and government activities nearly reached a standstill.
“The Nakajima Company spread its airframe factories through the northern section of the Kanto Province and, fortunately, escaped the brunt of the earlier enemy bombing attacks. Despite the dispersal program, which ruins manufacturing schedules, Nakajima produced 138 Zero fighters in June of 1945. All did not go well, however, with the great Nakajima firm. The company dispersed the critical engine plants which produced the Zero’s Sakae power plant to the Tokyo suburbs. The move failed to hide the factories from the B-29s, and the resulting torrent of bombs so severely shattered machinery and assembly lines that engine production dropped well behind the airframe program.
“In September of 1943 the sprawling airframe factory at Mizushima in Okayama Prefecture, in western Honshu, was separated from the Nagoya Aircraft Works; the former single combine now was broken into two separate manufacturing centers. In January of 1944 Mitsubishi again divided another large plant, this time the Kumamoto Aircraft Works in Kyushu’s Kumamoto Prefecture. The former factory produced the Type 1 land-based attack bomber (Betty) for the Navy, and the latter turned out the Ki-67 bomber (Peggy) for the Army. Mitsubishi divorced the activities of the two factories from its primary concern, which was increased Zero fighter production. In February and March of 1945 the two plants dispersed throughout nearby suburban areas; they failed, however, to escape the B-29s, and by July their production lines were almost still.
“The fate of these vital factories, despite their high target priority to the enemy, was not at all different from that of other production centers. By May of 1945 munitions plants and the most important civilian goods factories were reduced to shattered remnants of once-efficient industries.
“Many a factory which went through the time-consuming steps of dispersing its most important machine and assembly lines now found itself no better off than before dispersal. The B-29s relentlessly and literally tracked down every move; no sooner had the new factory sections settled down in their new locations than the bombs showered down. The plant managers searched frantically for new sites, and sought refuge in factory buildings surrounded by steep mountains, or placed their vital machines within emergency caves drilled into the sides of hills. Eventually the dispersal plan proved to be a complete failure. At the time when we most desperately needed production, our industrial personnel scrabbled in the hills for new machine sites. Devastation in Japan mounted daily, as the B-29s were joined in the daily assaults against the homeland by long-distance land-based fighters and swarms of carrier-based fighters and bombers.
“This loss of fighter-plane production directly weakened our defensive tactics against the enemy fighters and bombers. This was especially applicable in the battle against the great fleets of four-engined B-29s. During the earliest Superfortress attacks our fighters inflicted heavy damage against the enemy planes; by May we were so short of fighter airplanes that the B-29s, constantly increasing in number, roamed the skies almost at will. As a result of both the enemy air attacks and our own chaotic plant dispersal, our aircraft production dropped alarmingly, as indicated in the following tables:”
MONTHLY AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION
(All Companies)
1944 Navy Planes Army Planes
August 1,249 (367) 1,228
September 1,005 (244) 1,320
October 1,167 (339) 1,146
November 1,260 (360) 1,297
December 958 (268) 1,096
1945
January 992 (251) 951
February 812 (167) 450
March 990 (247) 965
April 1,001 (267) 815
May 713 (285) 894
June 628 (208) 784
July 480 (153) 523
(The figures in parenthesis indicate the number of Zero fighters produced.)
MONTHLY AIRCRAFT ENGINE PRODUCTION
(Mitsubishi Only)
1944 For Navy Planes For Army Planes
August 961 861
September 818 980
October 780 790
November 626 713
December 279 437
1945
January 182 269
February 386 211
1945
March 244 263
April 170 158
May 207 57
June 157 199
July 111 234
The peak of monthly airframe production for the Army was reached in July of 1944 with 1,331 aircraft completed, and for the Navy in November of 1944 with a total of 1,260 airplanes. Mitsubishi’s aircraft engine production peak for the Army was reached in September of 1944 with 980 engines. One month previously the company hit its Navy aircraft engine top with 961 units. These figures do not include those airframes produced by the Hitachi Aircraft Company (which manufactured a small percentage of Navy aircraft, or those of the Manchurian Airplane Manufacturing Company, which produced from 10 to 15 per cent of all Army airframes).
The severe production losses sustained in late 1944 and in 1945 greatly hindered our defense against the approaching enemy and our interception of the enemy fighters and bombers which ranged over Japan. The greatest causes for this sudden production failure were, of course, the severe damage inflicted by the B-29s and the effects of the Tokai district earthquake. By no means, however, were these the only two causes, fo
r many other factors indirectly affected aircraft production, even before the first B-29 raids against the homeland. Perhaps the greatest cause other than the B-29 attacks and the Tokai earthquake was the difficulty in obtaining certain types of critical materials, notably aviation gasoline. Once the enemy submarines, mine-laying planes, patrol bombers, carrier task forces, and surface warships had effectively sealed off the sea routes to the southern area of resources on which we depended, the end was in sight. This “resource isolation” of Japan both directly and indirectly contributed to our losing air superiority over the vital arterial route to the south. Eventually enemy pressure through direct bombing and air attack became so severe that our air forces found themselves helpless against the activities of the American submarines and carrier-based planes, as well as against the B-29s.
This paralysis of the sea routes upon which Japan depended for its very existence brought about the virtual isolation of the country. The air-raid damage and the frantic reshuffling of supplies available directly within Japan threw our internal transportation facilities into chaos. The hindrance of transportation and the loss of raw materials reduced aircraft-factory assembly lines to a meaningless crawl. Further, those aircraft which we did manage to produce under these difficulties were less effective than usual, for the inferior materials employed in their manufacture reduced flight performance and increased the time spent in maintenance and overhaul. Vital equipment failed all too often, and our pilots cursed the planes which consistently failed them just as they attacked the great enemy air fleets.
Before we could realize the confusion into which our aircraft production had descended, our industry had disintegrated to an extent where recovery seemed impossible. Not only were our raw materials cut off from the factories, but we struggled under the heartbreaking hardships of earthquakes, severe bombings, factory dispersal, and, later, of incompetent workers dragged off the streets through resort to the conscription laws. Even as the industry became lost in this sea of hopeless chaos the military services demanded modifications in a steady stream. We could hardly produce even the basic model; to say nothing of altering partially completed planes.
Zero Page 33
