Although they were neither as independent nor as coherent as subsequent pirate communities, the groups of pirates who operated during the 1570s were bound together by similar life cycles and backgrounds. Their sense of community was articulated through common practices, including an unwritten and informal code of conduct which was reinforced by a hierarchical structure, publicly acknowledged by the loyalty of pirate companies to their leaders. Loyalty and community were promoted by shipboard life. Both were recognized in the division of booty into shares, with captains and other officers receiving more than other members of the company. While the ownership of pirate ships remains obscure, vessels were granted by captains to loyal officers, spawning new groups as well as encouraging solidarity and bonds of association. Companionship and hospitality were deliberately promoted in pirate haunts along the coast, where crowds of men and women gathered for purposes of business and entertainment, or to secure employment. William Baylye, a sailor of Barnstaple, recounted how he was hired by the pirate captain, Stephen Haynes, in Studland Bay during October 1582, when he was unemployed and ‘in greate extreamitye for wante of raymente and moneye’.10 He was given a suit of clothing of green cotton by Haynes, whose company of about thirty wore a similar outfit.
Nevertheless, piracy was a serious crime which provoked a firm but uneven response from the Tudor regime. As a crime it was dealt with by the Lord Admiral and the High Court of Admiralty. Because of its potentially damaging international consequences, however, monarchs and their councillors retained a close interest in the problem. From the 1540s onwards the Privy Council was heavily involved in dealing with overseas complaints against English piracy and disorderly spoil. But this was a problem which taxed the resources and efficiency of Tudor rule. Although it encouraged administrative innovation during the 1560s and 1570s, with the appointment of commissioners for piracy in the maritime shires of England and Wales, the scale and nature of the problem encouraged an uneasy combination of coercion and compromise. The result was a fluctuating pattern of punishment and pardon, and the survival of lawlessness and violence at sea which flourished under the cover of ambivalent public attitudes and responses.11
By drawing upon a wealth of evidence, including the rich resources of the High Court of Admiralty, this book aims to provide a narrative of English piracy and sea roving from c.1485 to 1603. Because of the inherent ambiguity of the subject, it encompasses reprisal venturing and privateering, though its main focus is on charting the contours of illegal and disorderly enterprise. While examining the structure and organization of maritime plunder, it also surveys the changing character of piracy, at a time when the state was prepared to sanction, or to tolerate, certain forms of robbery at sea. As such, it provides a perspective on the broader development of English seafaring activity, and of the wider response to the growth of maritime lawlessness and disorder.
Notes
1. A. Corbin, The Lure of the Sea: The Discovery of the Seaside in the Western World 1750–1840 (London, 1994), pp. 1–15; N.A.M. Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain 660–1649 (London, 1997), pp. 79, 97.
2. S. Rose, The Medieval Sea (London, 2007), pp. 123–6; N.A.M. Rodger, ‘The New Atlantic: Naval Warfare in the Sixteenth Century’ in J.B. Hattendorf and R.W. Unger (eds.), War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (Woodbridge, 2003), pp. 237–47; K.R. Andrews, ‘The Elizabethan Seaman’, MM, 68 (1982), pp. 249–51; F. Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, 2 vols. (2nd edition, London, 1972), II, pp. 865–9.
3. Rodger, ‘The New Atlantic’, p. 240; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, pp. 115–28, 143–56. Elizabethan privateering, it has been argued, was a form of ‘government by licence’, see M.J. Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England c.1550–1700 (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 202–3.
4. J.E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State–Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, 1994), pp. 23, 67–8 argues that the activities of the so–called ‘sea dogs’ of the Elizabethan period amounted to ‘state–sponsored terrorism’. The navy’s war against piracy did not, of course, end the problem, see P. Earle, The Pirate Wars (London, 2003), pp. 209ff.
5. J.S. Brewer et al. (eds.), Calendar of the Carew Manuscripts 1515–1603, 4 vols. (London, 1867–70), I, p. 20.
6. K.R. Andrews, ‘The Expansion of English Privateering and Piracy in the Atlantic c.1540–1625’ in M. Mollat (ed.), Course et Piraterie, 2 vols. (Paris, 1975), I, pp. 196–230.
7. For a typology distinguishing between officially sanctioned piracy, commercial piracy and deep-sea marauding (either organized or anarchic), see R.C. Ritchie, Captain Kidd and the War against the Pirates (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), pp. 11–26.
8. For a case of poachers wearing visors and with painted faces see CPR 1558–60, p. 44.
9. Monson’s Tracts, I, p. 130; J.K. Laughton (ed.), State Papers relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, 2 vols. (Navy Records Society, 1 & 2, 1894), II, p. 249. The Elizabeth Bonaventure formed part of Drake’s expedition to the Caribbean in 1585 and to Cadiz in 1587. During the sixteenth century many pirates used a variety of flags to disguise their activities. By 1700 the black flag was synonymous with ‘pyratical Colours’, D. Defoe, A General History of the Pyrates, ed. M. Schonhorn (London, 1972), pp. 68, 139, 143, 216, 299, 343 (though Defoe’s authorship of this work is now contested). Men–of–war and some pirates also used the red or ‘bloody flag’ as intimidation, Ibid., p. 101; W.S. Stallybrass (ed.), Esquemeling: The Buccaneers of America (London, n.d.), p. 400. On flags see M. Rediker, Villains of All Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age (London, 2004), pp. 4, 77, 121–2, 164–7, 202, and www.bonaventure.org.uk/ed/flags2.htm.
10. HCA 1/40, ff. 151–1v. For shares and pillage see Monson’s Tracts, IV, pp. 19–21.
11. For an exploration of law and legal attitudes see C. Harding, ‘“Hostis Humani Generis”– The Pirate as Outlaw in the Early Modern Law of the Sea’ in C. Jowitt (ed.), Pirates? The Politics of Plunder, 1550–1650 (Basingstoke, 2007), pp. 20–38.
1
War and Maritime Plunder from the 1480s to the 1540s
Like the trade off which it fed, piracy within the British Isles fluctuated widely in scale and intensity. Random and opportunistic spoil occurred almost anywhere and at any time during this period; however, more organized and business-like enterprise was closely associated with war and linked with lawful reprisals or privateering. Although rarely used by Henry VII, the exploitation of reprisal venturing for economic or strategic purposes became a feature of war at sea under the early Tudor monarchy. Henry VIII’s wars with France created a fertile breeding ground for the growth of maritime plunder in various guises. Indeed, the period from the 1520s to the 1540s was a transitional stage in the expansion of English seaborne plunder, during which well-established methods of depredation were revitalized and renovated by the opportunities presented by Anglo-French rivalry and conflict. The resurgence of piracy during these years drew on a long tradition of cross-Channel raiding, heavily focused on French targets, which also led to the increasing spoil of Spanish trade and shipping. In confusing and chaotic conditions, English depredation began to develop a pattern of activity that would profoundly influence its subsequent character and direction.
Later medieval traditions and contexts
The development of English piracy and other forms of depredation during this period grew out of varied traditions of maritime plunder which were maintained during the later Middle Ages. From an early date piracy was supported by members of local communities, including merchants and mariners as well as landowners, and sustained by aristocratic warlords or chieftains who possessed private fleets that were used for a variety of purposes. Furthermore, in exploiting and exposing the limitations of the medieval state, the growth of maritime depredation was assisted by conflicting and ambiguous attitudes, which continued to undermine attempts to deal with the problem of piracy well into the seventeenth cent
ury. Crucially such limitations were reflected in a lack of continuity in the development of a royal navy, and in an uncertain appreciation of its use at sea, reinforced by concern at the cost of deploying large numbers of warships. During the 1420s and 1430s, for example, Henry VI effectively sold off his navy at a time when the author of the Libel of English Policy was urging the King to secure lordship over the sea.1
In these circumstances two distinct traditions of depredation evolved within the British Isles, reflecting differences in geography and socio-economic structures that were mediated through local or regional political systems. Thus a crude, though fundamental distinction can be drawn between the commercialized seaborne plunder which was characteristic of much of England, Wales, lowland Scotland and the pale of Ireland, and the subsistence sea raiding that flourished in the north-west Gaelic regions of Scotland and Ireland.
Despite some superficial similarities, there were profound differences between these traditions. Within the maritime economy of Gaelic Scotland and Ireland piracy was part of a wider, regular and socially accepted form of raiding. In the western highlands the Halloween raid was seen as an appropriate time to acquire additional provisions to get through the winter. Among poor highland and island communities, where economic opportunity was restricted by the barrenness of the environment, raiding may have been an inherent feature of the life cycle for most males. It was undertaken in fleets of galleys, small vessels with sails and oars, which grew out of the Viking longboat tradition of shipbuilding; and it was endemic in parts of the western islands, and northern and western Ireland. Under the leadership of clan chiefs, sea raids resembled subsistence expeditions, during which much-needed supplies of cattle or clothing were plundered from rival groups or from vulnerable ships sailing along the coast or crossing the Irish Sea. These economic purposes reflected the needs of remote and isolated regions. But raiding also fulfilled various social and cultural functions. It provided the opportunity for leaders to win glory and renown, while maintaining loyalty among followers through feasting and the re-distribution of booty as gifts. At the same time it provided an outlet for male aggression and revenge among feuding clans. The violence was sanctioned by Gaelic rulers, and its leading protagonists were subsequently celebrated in stories and verse. Gaelic sea raiding persisted into the sixteenth century. In 1545, for example, Donald Dubh reportedly led an expedition to Ireland made up of 180 galleys which were manned with 4,000 men from the Hebrides.2 But its continued survival was threatened by the centralizing and civilizing ambitions of the English and Scottish monarchies, which came to identify its participants and supporters as outlaws and rebels, as well as pirates.
St Mawes Castle and Falmouth Bay, Cornwall. Favoured by geography and local tradition, Falmouth and its neighbouring ports were notorious havens for pirates and rovers. The distant harbour of Helford was known as Stealford for its reputation in supporting piracy. (Author’s collection)
Elsewhere in the British Isles a different tradition of plunder developed, as expressed in the growth of piracy and legitimate reprisals. Although there were local differences of emphasis in the scale and structure of such enterprise, and wide fluctuations in its intensity over time, it tended to be commercialized in nature, becoming more so partly as a result of international rivalry and conflict. Much of it was small scale, short distance and often highly localized, based on opportunistic depredation in the Channel by heavily manned small sailing ships, operating alone or in association with another vessel. At its most basic, it resembled indiscriminate petty robbery by loosely organized bands of thugs. While war encouraged an increase in lawlessness at sea, it also generated more organized forms of enterprise. At times of intense activity, nonetheless, widespread confusion prevailed: cross-Channel hostility cut across local feuds along the south coast, in both cases initiating disputes that could last for generations. In the south-west, Plymouth and Dartmouth built up a mixed reputation for their promotion of maritime plunder; Fowey earned notoriety as a pirate haven, while the harbour of Helford was widely known as Stealford as a result of local involvement in maritime robbery. But across the south coast, ports and havens were heavily involved in the spoil of shipping in the Channel. As well as the seizure of ships at sea, moreover, this activity included the robbery of vessels within English harbours, the cargoes of which were often disposed locally. 3
Medieval monarchs met with limited success as they struggled to control maritime plunder and violence. Lacking the means, if not the will, to maintain the law and custom of the sea, rulers tended to adopt inconsistent, short-term policies that were qualified by an overt recognition of the value of sea rovers during periods of war. As a result maritime plunder and policy were increasingly entangled. Officially-sanctioned depredation was, in any case, a long-standing and widely acknowledged practice through the use of reprisals, which enabled merchants and shipowners to recoup losses or damages suffered at the hands of foreigners. The issue of commissions by sovereigns or their representatives, authorizing voyages of reprisal, was an accepted means of redress, which may have contained potentially aggressive commercial disputes. But without strict regulation, which was beyond the means of medieval monarchies, it was also open to abuse. During the Hundred Years’ War between England and France, monarchs repeatedly authorized private venturing of this nature, with little or no control, as a way of damaging enemy trade and shipping.
The blurring of legal distinctions, especially during periods of conflict, created opportunities that adventurers in the south-west readily seized. During the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries merchants like John Hawley of Dartmouth turned maritime depredation into a profitable and patriotic business. The attraction of earning profit and honour at sea encouraged the participation of gentry and aristocratic adventurers, notably among those who were owners or part-owners of shipping. The scale of activity, and the basis for mutual cooperation between commercial and landed interests, increased dramatically during the civil wars of the 1450s and 1460s. Political crisis, the decay of good lordship and the collapse of sea-keeping led to widespread and endemic disorder. Powerful magnates and aristocratic families pursued rivalries and vendettas at sea, creating a cover for indiscriminate plunder and piracy. The successes of experienced rovers, including John Mixtow of Fowey or William Kyd of Exmouth, attracted the attention of prominent members of the Cornish gentry. Men such as Thomas Bodulgate or Richard Penpons, who were deeply implicated in piracy, used their local power and influence to shelter themselves from investigation or legal proceedings. Members of the Courtenay family, the head of which was the Earl of Devon, were also regularly involved in piratical venturing from bases in the south-west. With a fleet of men-of-war operating from Calais under the auspices of Richard Neville, Earl of Warwick, the Channel became dangerously infested with pirates and rovers of uncertain legality.4
Despite the recovery of royal authority and the revival of the King’s Navy, varied forms of maritime depredation persisted into the later fifteenth century. The records of the central government, though based on cases which provoked complaint, indicate that English, Welsh and Irish pirates were operating during the 1470s and 1480s at locations in southern Ireland, Devon, Cornwall, Sussex, Hampshire and Essex. In February 1479 the Crown ordered an investigation into complaints that a Breton vessel had been seized by pirates at the entrance to the River Thames and subsequently taken north. Although much of this activity appears to be irregular, and random in its targets, some ports, such as Fowey, were repeatedly engaged in more purposeful piratical enterprise. The persistence of what seems to have been an unofficial little war of plunder against Breton and Iberian vessels was sustained by small-scale entrepreneurs, including ship masters and owners, who probably combined commerce with plunder in short voyages into the Channel. During 1483 John Davy and Stephen Bull, with a company of pirates aboard the Nicholas of Fowey, seized several Iberian vessels. The following year Captain Tege Smale, in the Kateryne of Fowey, captured a French ship, and in 1485
John Morys, master and part-owner of the Little Anne, described as a ship-of-war of Fowey, seized a Breton vessel laden with wines and salt in the port of Southampton. 5
The social and economic dimensions of piratical enterprise were equally varied. The essential concern of most sea rovers was all too evident from their behaviour: captured ships and crews were ransacked of their possessions. An English vessel seized off Bearhaven in Ireland during 1477 was spoiled of goods worth £60. The pirates, led by one Pykerd from Minehead, stripped the company ‘and put them naked ashore at Kinsale’.6 During the 1470s the Mary London, a large vessel of 320 tons which had transported a large party of 400 pilgrims from Ross in Ireland to Santiago in northern Spain, to celebrate the jubilee of St James, was seized on its return voyage by three ships owned by Nicholas Devereux and others of Waterford, which were reportedly manned with a force of 800 men. The Mary London and its passengers were taken into Youghal and plundered. The owner of the vessel was robbed of 140 marks and allegedly imprisoned for three years. As this unusual case suggests, pirates and other sea rovers were prepared to use extortion and ransoming when it served their purpose. In May 1483 Mathew Cradock of Swansea, captain of a ship-of-war, seized a Breton vessel off Ilfracombe with the assistance of local pirates. The vessel and its cargo were then put to ransom for £50. Collectively these cases demonstrate the localized and opportunistic nature of piratical activity which was encouraged by the prospect of securing profitable captures, such as the Spanish ship laden with a cargo of cloth valued at 40,000 crowns, seized along the coast of Hampshire during 1483 by Sir John Arundell.7
Under the Bloody Flag Page 2
