Many of these pirate companies were composed of small groups of mariners, operating in ambiguous circumstances over short distances, and in vessels which were often weakly armed. Thomas Skye was at sea in the Mary Walsingham of 55 tons, with twelve mariners and one boy, six of whom were concealed under the hatches. The company was armed with two hand guns, four or five bows, twenty-four sheaves of arrows, two or three rusty bills, three swords and three cases of wild fire.43 Yet the activities of these rovers posed a serious threat to trade and shipping. During the later 1530s the Merchant Adventurers requested the use of one of the King’s ships to convoy their vessels across the Channel. The request was reinforced by a report from Sir Thomas Wriothesley to Cromwell, concerning the fears of English merchants about pirate attack. Although Wriothesley suggested that three or four of the King’s ships be sent out to scour the seas, another of Cromwell’s correspondents, while noting that small trading vessels were ‘fatt booty’, informed the merchants that ‘they should provide for themselves against pirates’.44
The prolonged nature of the disorder at sea encouraged more ruthless and violent methods among some pirates and rovers. William Swadell and his followers captured two small prizes off the Scilly Isles, the companies of which were thrown overboard with their hands bound behind their backs. In May 1539 the representative of the French King in London complained of the seizure of a Breton ship by English pirates, who drowned all of the company except one, ‘who, as if by a miracle, swam six miles to shore’.45 Within two weeks of the complaint, the pirates were captured and condemned: six were executed immediately, while another eight were kept in custody to be confronted by their alleged accomplices who had been recently arrested. The violence may have been the product of long-standing feuds and grievances across the Channel, but in some cases it was inflamed by incipient religious rivalry. Robert Reneger, a Southampton merchant who was to be heavily involved in privateering during the 1540s, complained of the spoil of one of his ships, returning from Spain, by a French man-of-war, claiming that his factors were cruelly treated and libelled, with the rest of the company, as ‘erronyouse lutheryans’.46
The demands of war: privateering and piracy during the 1540s
Endemic piracy and sea roving during the 1530s were superseded by the growth of organized privateering enterprise during the Anglo-French war from 1542 to 1545. Royal encouragement of private plunder on this scale represented a new departure for the early Tudor monarchy, though it was part of a wider re-shaping of English maritime enterprise in which the predatory dynamism of the seafaring community became more focused on Iberian trade and shipping. It was no accident that this shift was accompanied by radical religious change. During the 1540s and 1550s traditional cross-Channel competition was overlaid by inflammatory religious rivalries. In a deeply divided Europe, the combination of Protestantism and patriotism served to mobilize powerful forces in the pursuit of plunder. Under the cover of legitimate privateering against France, some English adventurers launched a piratical campaign against Spain, laying the foundations for a new pattern of maritime predation which ranged beyond the Channel into the eastern Atlantic.
Hostility towards Spain was manifest in the uneasy relationship between transatlantic trade and piracy, even though the English were only finding their way in a difficult and dangerous enterprise. The disorderly voyage of the Barbara of London in 1540, which was intended as a peaceful venture to Brazil to lade dyewood, ended with the seizure of a Spanish vessel off Santo Domingo in the Caribbean. The London merchants who promoted the venture instructed the company of the Barbara that ‘they shulde do no robbery but folowe ther voyage like honeste men’.47 Off Cape St Vincent, nonetheless, several vessels were spoiled, while another was plundered near the Canary Islands. Although the company acquired small amounts of dyewood and cotton wool, as well as parrots and monkeys, along the coast of Brazil, they faced hostility from rival French traders and the native inhabitants. The trading venture was abandoned following an attack by a group of natives, when at least one member of the company was killed, cut up, cooked and eaten. Many others died from sickness or a lack of provisions. The Barbara returned with thirteen healthy men, out of an original complement of ninety four, who were arrested to face charges of piracy before the High Court of Admiralty. The voyage may have discouraged and delayed interest in transatlantic depredation, at least until the later 1560s and 1570s. In any case, during the 1540s Anglo-French rivalry and conflict provided more secure prospects of plunder within the Channel.
The war with France was preceded by a spate of cross-Channel disputes over spoil and plunder, which to some extent both justified and shaped the maritime conflict. English complaints of rough and cruel justice in France were offset by French grievances over delays in securing relief or compensation in England. According to a report of 1540 one Breton merchant had spent six or seven years vainly suing for assistance across the Channel; his appeal for a commission of reprisal was rebuffed, apparently because the French King did not wish to antagonize Henry.
Such complaints and experiences were widespread, reflecting the deterioration in international relations within western Europe during these years. In September 1540 the council of Spain demanded compensation from Henry for the seizure of a Spanish carvel by an English rover. Spanish officials also warned that the owners of the vessel, a group of merchants of Seville, requested the right to recover their losses by reprisals on the English. About the same time, the Emperor demanded justice from the Scottish King, James V, for the piracies of Robert Fogo on fishermen of Ostend. He also complained bitterly about the activities of other Scottish rovers who were operating with letters of reprisal, demanding that James ‘put an end to these illicit and piratical exploits’.48 The Scottish King disowned Fogo’s actions, arresting him when he returned to Scotland, though he had already sold his booty in England. Several weeks later, James revived a long-standing complaint of the Barton family against the Portuguese, concerning a case of spoil that was more than fifty years old. Although the Bartons had been awarded a commission of reprisal, previous monarchs had suspended its execution. At the request of the family descendants, however, James intended to ratify the old commission, to the concern of the King of Portugal. James was likewise requesting justice from the Emperor, in a case of piracy on a Scottish vessel that occurred more than twenty years previously.49 By the early 1540s it seemed that rulers in north-west Europe were lining up to issue letters of reprisal on behalf of their subjects.
The activities of pirates and rovers thus intensified the international tension and insecurity at sea, provoking grievances that rival monarchs made use of for diplomatic or political purposes. As war between France and the Empire loomed, in August 1542 Henry prepared to send out ships-of-war to deal with the danger of French raiding in English waters. The French complained about the lack of English neutrality, claiming that the Flemish were able to use English ports at will. But the King’s actions were partly a response to the plunder of English shipping by French rovers, which included the recent seizure of a London vessel at the mouth of the Thames. By September 1542 the Emperor’s agent in London reported that Henry’s ships had almost cleared the coast of French men-of-war. For their part the French complained angrily about the ill-treatment of their mariners at the hands of the English, alleging that lawful men-of-war were treated like pirates, while objecting to the way in which Francis I was derided as a Turk by unruly crews of piratical Englishmen.50
The Anglo-French conflict coincided with widespread maritime disorder, and in circumstances which encouraged the Henrician regime to rely on private enterprise for supporting the war at sea. Even so, the war was a very costly business, involving large-scale expeditions to Scotland in 1542 and to France in 1544. It was also risky, exposing England to the dilemma of fighting on two fronts. The dangers were starkly revealed by the seizure of seven English vessels off the coast of Normandy, early in 1542, by Scottish warships manned with French seamen. Given the experience of the 15
30s the combatants resorted to reprisals, licensing private adventurers to plunder the trade and shipping of the enemy. In England the regime sought to channel the indiscriminate predatory activities of sea rovers into more effective and targeted raiding, with the intention of alleviating the pressure on the King’s Navy while weakening its opponents. The Privy Council noted during a meeting in 1544 that it was ‘over burdensome that the King should set ships to defend all parts of the realm, and keep the Narrow Seas’.51 Consequently, it was prepared to sanction a private war of plunder, which was to serve as an important precedent for the subsequent development of organized privateering.
Although this strategy needed no justification, it raised questions regarding the control and direction of private enterprise. During the early stages of the war the regime attempted to regulate the issue of letters of reprisal, though in a manner which betrayed uncertainty or inexperience. While the Lord Admiral issued commissions to adventurers who claimed losses at the hands of the French or Scots, it was the council which took recognizances or bonds for good behaviour at sea. In April 1543, for example, Thomas Guillett, vintner, and George Doddes, fishmonger, acted as sureties for a group of adventurers in Rye, on condition that they would only plunder French or Scottish vessels. However, there appears to have been no attempt to restrict such seizures to a specified amount. Robert Borough was awarded a commission in March 1543 in response to the injuries he had received from the French, which allowed him to take as many French ships as he could. These regulations were relaxed further by a proclamation of December 1544 which authorized any of Henry’s subjects to send out vessels against the enemy. Officials in port towns were enjoined to ensure that it met with a favourable response.52
It is impossible to gauge the scale of English privateering from 1543 to 1546, though a cautious estimate for the annual number of vessels at sea on legitimate reprisal ventures probably lies between thirty and sixty. The number may have increased significantly after December 1544. The development of privateering during these years was facilitated by the strong tradition of predatory enterprise in the south and south-west. It was within this region, moreover, that the commercial consequences of the war with France were most damaging. Though the evidence is scrappy, it suggests that merchants and shipowners in provincial ports, such as Rye, Southampton and Plymouth, were prominent among those who received letters of reprisal prior to their replacement by the proclamation of December 1544.
Between 28 March and 28 April 1543 at least eleven or twelve commissions were issued to adventurers authorizing them to seize the ships of France or Scotland. They included John Ball of Winchilsea; John Fletcher, John Reynolds and Thomas Fugler of the neighbouring port of Rye; Robert Reneger of Southampton; and John Burgh of Devon.53 The most notable adventurer was Sir John Russell, 1st Earl of Bedford, a leading courtier who was appointed Lord Admiral in 1540 and Lord Privy Seal in 1542. Russell possessed considerable landed property in the West Country, which included 30,000 acres formerly owned by the monastery at Tavistock. He was also a shipowner with varied commercial interests. In this capacity he seems to have acted as a representative for a group of promoters in Plymouth and other ports, who were known as the adventurers in the west. Traders and shipowners in London and east-coast ports, particularly Hull, which were exposed to raids by Scottish rovers, were also among the recipients of commissions. During April 1543 the craft guilds of London were reported to be sending out several ships with a licence from the King. Later in the year Miles Myddleton, a yeoman of the guard, was authorized to go to sea with two vessels from Hull, to annoy the enemy and take prizes.54
The opening months of the war thus met with an encouraging response from private adventurers, though most of the vessels sent out were probably small, if heavily manned, non-specialized craft. The four vessels of Rye, which John Ball and John Reynolds intended to send out in April 1543, were of 20 tons burden. To a considerable extent, the tonnage of such shipping dictated tactics at sea, restricting most adventurers to hit-and-run raids over short distances. As Russell informed the council later in the conflict, most of the vessels from the south-west were ‘too small to encounter men-of-war, their usage being to keep along the shore and meddle only with merchants’.55 The bulk of the ships sent to Portsmouth in July 1545 by the adventurers in the west were between 30 and 40 tons; ten shallops from the West Country, employed in patrolling the Channel in March 1546, amounted to 450 tons burden, though they carried a total complement of 400 men.
Among merchants and shipowners, privateering was a business which developed a commercial infrastructure that was designed to share the cost of fitting out ships-of-war among a group of adventurers, while reducing the risks of an uncertain and dangerous enterprise. The uncertainty was also qualified by limiting the investment to a specific voyage, after which any captured prizes were shared out among the adventurers. Although it became commonplace for this to include shipowners, victuallers and crew, who usually served on the understanding that their wages were dependent on prizes taken during the voyage, there was room for flexibility. An agreement for a privateering voyage, based on a formal indenture of January 1544, between William Bulley (owner of the Martin Bulley of London), Sir John Gresham (merchant and alderman), and William More and William Hollande (the captain and master of the vessel respectively), demonstrates the structure of these ventures. According to the terms of the indenture, it was agreed that ‘with the fyrste good wynde and wether … [the ship] shall dyrectlie saile into the seas there to have warre of the Kinge’s enemyes at the onely adventure of … William Bulley’.56 The charge for victuals, powder and munitions was shared between Gresham (who was responsible for one-third of the total), More and Hollande (who were responsible for one-quarter), and Bulley (who accounted for the remainder). All prizes were to be divided between the adventurers in accordance with their investment in the voyage. Before the division of the prizes, however, the gunners were to receive a special reward of eighteen shares. Furthermore, the adventurers agreed that if any mariners were unwilling to serve for a share in the voyage, they were to be paid wages as in the King’s fleet.
Under the guise of such ventures the adventurers in the west, including William Hawkins, an enterprising merchant of Plymouth, seized the opportunity to conduct a private war of plunder at sea. This combined depredation with other duties. In September 1544 the council issued a commission to Hawkins and others, to send out between four and eight vessels at their own charge, to annoy the enemy and to assist in the defence of the realm. The adventurers were also authorized to levy mariners and soldiers, and to take up victuals and artillery in Devon, Cornwall, Somerset and Dorset.57
As a result of such arrangements the maritime conflict was characterized by an uneasy partnership between the regime and private enterprise. But the results were striking. In November 1544 the council reported that during the year the ports of the south-west had between twelve and sixteen ships-of-war at sea, which seized prizes worth at least £10,000. At the same time, adventurers in Rye had three or four vessels at sea ‘and gained much by it’.58 John Stow subsequently reported that 300 French prizes were taken during 1544. It seemed, therefore, that for a modest investment, the business of plunder was capable of yielding a profitable return.
The reliance on private enterprise by the state was as much defensive as it was offensive. In part it was intended to meet the twin threat of French and Scottish raiding in English waters. On the one hand, Scottish rovers were a serious menace to trade and fishing along the east coast. On the other hand, the presence of French men-of-war on the coast of Ireland provoked concern that the Bretons ‘will be lords between Brittany and Scotland’, without an adequate defensive force at sea.59 Although the regime managed to shift some of the costs of defence onto the shoulders of private adventurers in the south and south-west, it met with less success in the port towns of the east coast. In November 1544 the council rebuked Newcastle for not sending out vessels to defend its trade. Local leaders claimed th
at there were insufficient mariners in the port to send out ships; most were either employed in the King’s service or had fled to Norfolk and Suffolk to avoid a recent outbreak of sickness. Prominent northern magnates, such as Francis Talbot, 5th Earl of Shrewsbury, were also used to put pressure on port towns to support the war at sea. In response to promptings from Shrewsbury, who served on the Anglo-Scottish border during 1544 and 1545, officials in Hull insisted that most of their principal shipping was unavailable for service. Local merchants and shipowners had ‘been at importunate costs in manning three ships of war’ during the year.60 Two had guarded the north coast until they were driven off by a fleet of Scottish vessels, the third was forced into Dover by bad weather. Nonetheless, the Hull men offered to send out two ships if Shrewsbury granted them a commission to take prizes. Their neighbours in Scarborough agreed to send out two small vessels if they were supplied with guns, powder and shot. Further north, Whitby was in no position to respond to the urgings of Shrewsbury: following the decay of the harbour, local traders and shipowners had sold their vessels.
The proclamation of December 1544 was an attempt to deal with local recalcitrance by authorizing privateering without the need for letters of reprisal. This was a gamble, resting on the effectiveness of self-regulation among promoters, whose overriding concern with prize taking generated potential conflicts of interest in the conduct of the war at sea between their own priorities and the objectives of the regime. The dangers of disorderly activity at sea, by naval officers as much as by private adventurers, were self-evident. The previous year the council had been forced to reprimand a captain in the King’s Navy for stopping friendly vessels at sea. The King’s anger at this practice provoked a sharp letter from the council, with instructions to the captain to behave in such a way ‘as itt might nott appere that his Grace were in hostilitie wyth all the worlde’.61 But the proclamation of 1544 encouraged the growth of maritime disorder, including the spoil of neutral trade and shipping, which led to a storm of diplomatic protest. Within months of its publication, Henry was reported to be so annoyed at the English seizure of Spanish ships that he intended to recall all men-of-war.
Under the Bloody Flag Page 5
