Nonetheless, this introductory phase of Caribbean piracy was a formative experience for the English, during which traditional tactics, practices and forms of organization were tested under new and challenging conditions. Secrecy, subterfuge and surprise remained essential characteristics of piratical enterprise, though when opportunity arose they could be accompanied by displays of bold theatricality. As ‘becomes their calling’, noted one Spanish official about Drake’s attack on the mule train, ‘they did not arrive by the public entrance’.61 If surprise failed, the raiders would often withdraw, for fear of sustaining heavy casualties. On occasion pirates might herald their arrival with a trumpet call or appear with their faces daubed with charcoal and red dye. Much of their raiding was concentrated in the south-west corner of the Caribbean, around a key strategic and commercial region, though some pirate groups ranged further along the coast of the Main or cruised off the more accessible islands. In small, fast-sailing vessels, and armed with a variety of hand weapons, they raided along coasts, lying in wait around capes and headlands, while reconnoitring river systems with the assistance of local guides. In this way they played a part in the unintended and unrecorded exploration of the Caribbean, the results of which may have been widely shared, becoming part of an oral culture and inheritance that circulated among pirate bands as part of a rudimentary survival kit.
Caribbean depredation rapidly developed its own rhythm and mode of operation that newcomers were able to imitate or adapt. By 1569 French rovers had developed the practice of following fleets from Spain, awaiting an opportunity to pick off stray vessels. Geographical conditions enabled pirate groups to use small offshore islands or secure coastal areas as temporary bases, providing the English with their first real experiences of life in the New World. These habitations developed varying degrees of contact with the cimaroons and to a lesser extent with Indian groups, enabling pirates to develop tactics for raiding on land and at sea during extended stays in the Caribbean.62
In varying ways the pirate invasion of the isthmus region during the early 1570s depended on these cross-cultural relationships. For the cimaroons, whose war against the Spanish included night-time raids on settlements, such as Nombre de Dios, the arrival of the pirates created a potentially powerful force of allies who shared a common purpose in the acquisition of booty. In May 1573 Spanish officials in Panama reported that the cimaroons ‘advertise that they have allied and confederated themselves with the English and French to destroy this realm, a thing not until this year ever seen or imagined’.63 Yet Spanish reports also present a complex picture of relations between the English and the cimaroons which may reflect the uncertainty of short-term relations that were both local and transatlantic in character.
During the early 1570s the Spanish were alarmed that the cimaroons would teach English pirates the ‘methods and means to accomplish any evil design they may wish to carry out and execute’.64 Several years later, as colonial authorities sent out expeditions to attack their settlements, they were equally concerned that the cimaroons were trained by the English in military tactics. Under the leadership of men such as Juan Vaquero or Anton Mandinga, the cimaroons supported pirate groups in exchange for a share of their plunder, including supplies of wine and linen. In some circumstances, as the experience of Drake suggests, groups of cimaroons may have undergone a form of conversion. According to Spanish reports, the group who assisted Oxenham in the attack on the Pearl Islands were instructed in the doctrine of Lutheranism. When one of Oxenham’s men danced about wearing an alb, so delighted were the cimaroons that they uttered ‘I, English; pure Lutheran’.65 But the depth and extent of these conversions were problematic. In addition, the loyalty of the cimaroons to the English was stretched by the successes of Spanish military expeditions during the later 1570s. Many were reported to be unhappy with Mandinga for helping the survivors of Oxenham’s company. By 1579 several cimaroon communities were ready to make peace with the Spanish in exchange for written guarantees of their freedom. As a result Mandinga moved to the north coast to await the English, who he expected to return in greater numbers within two or three years. According to a statement by a cimaroon known as Pedro, ‘a black flag was the signal agreed upon between them, to be made from the sea, that they might be recognized’.66
The use of the black flag, which subsequently became a powerful sign and symbol for pirates, raises intriguing questions about the social organization of English piracy in the Caribbean during these years. Although English pirates and rovers were not part of a deviant sub-culture, of the kind which was to emerge within transatlantic piracy during the second half of the seventeenth century, they did form a loose fraternity, based on similar backgrounds and shared experiences, which was the focus of growing recognition, if not admiration, in England. Within the Caribbean, piracy found expression in adaptable forms and patterns of behaviour which ranged from the pathologically cruel and violent to the humorous and teasing. Such conditions created fertile ground for the emergence of that radical egalitarianism which flourished among later pirate groups and communities, though its development during the 1570s was constrained by the modest scale and extent of piratical activity. While estimates for the number of English pirates operating in the Caribbean must be treated cautiously, particularly as they were part of a broader pattern of depredation which included temporary alliances with other European rovers, at its height it may have involved seven or eight vessels, manned with crews that ranged in number from about thirty to eighty men and boys, giving an overall total of between 210 and 560 recruits.67 In some years the total may have been considerably less.
Many pirates, including leaders such as Drake, were young men from seafaring backgrounds. A significant proportion probably came from the maritime communities of south-west England, including Plymouth and Bristol and their wider hinterlands, though pirate companies undoubtedly were complemented by migratory recruits whose residence was either casual or temporary in nature. During his examination by Spanish officials, Oxenham admitted that his company of fifty Englishmen included ‘many youths and seamen, and second class seamen not fit for war’.68 Of the company of seventy-three men and boys who left Plymouth with Drake in May 1572, the eldest was aged fifty, the rest were under thirty.
Although the crews of pirate ships seem to have been predominantly English in origin, they included a handful of recruits from more diverse backgrounds. Among Andrew Barker’s company there were at least three Frenchmen, in addition to a Dutchman and Philip, a Welshman. One of Oxenham’s leading officers was an Irishman, John Butler, known as Chalona to the Spanish, who had lengthy experience of living in the Indies which enabled him to serve as an interpreter for the expedition. Among Oxenham’s company Chalona was described by a Spanish official as the ‘principal corsair of all, and the one, it is understood, who induced them to come to these parts, and led them into the bush’.69 Spanish reports indicate that Chalona spoke with a Portuguese accent, possibly to conceal his real identity.
Little is known of recruitment to pirate ships, or the terms and conditions under which recruits served. Oxenham stated that he bought a vessel, ‘and with his men he came to an understanding and signed them on for the voyage’, though he failed to elaborate on its nature. Drake’s company of 1572 were described as ‘all voluntarily assembled … [and] richly furnished, with victualles and apparel for a whole yeare’.70 As was customary among pirates or privateers sailing in European waters, these men served for a share in the plunder taken during the course of the voyage rather than for a wage. It was this prospect, of sharing in a rich prize laden with gold, silver, pearls and other valuable commodities, which lured young men into the Caribbean, despite the dangers of disease or death at the hands of the Spanish.
Evidence for the operation of this system is provided by the papers of Captain Barker, which were seized by the Spanish. They included several sheets described as a true note of all the gold, silver and jewels that were shared among the company.71 Individual rewards wer
e based on an allocation of shares. Accordingly, the captain and master were allotted eight and seven shares, the officers and surgeons were allocated four, the ordinary sailors were granted two or three, while the two boys were to receive a half-share each. A company of soldiers were awarded individual shares ranging from one to four.
The division of the plunder was undertaken by five representatives of the company, made up of the quartermasters and one of the boatswains, who were nominated or elected for that purpose. This system managed to present an image of cooperation and community, among a group of men who shared the dangers and rewards of the voyage, while reaffirming the traditional hierarchy of shipboard life. But the division of booty could be the source of festering suspicion and discontent. It may have been a serious issue among Barker’s crew, contributing to the mutiny off La Guanaja in 1577. After the captain’s death, a gold chain was found in his chest which was divided among the surviving members of the crew. In one of the earliest recorded notices of a practice that was to become commonplace among pirate crews operating in the Caribbean, Barker’s company also made provision for the allocation of shares for members of the company who died during the voyage.72
Although the practice of dividing plunder along an agreed or recognized system of shares was partly intended to promote harmony among unruly, potentially uncontrollable, groups of aggressive young men, it was possibly underpinned by popular and radical, though ultimately self-serving attitudes towards property and wealth. According to Spanish evidence, during the course of Oxenham’s raid on the Pearl Islands some of the company found a child’s school book which was read out by Chalona, enabling him to reinterpret one of the Ten Commandments in a revealing manner. Thus when ‘he came to the commandment: Thou shalt not steal, he laughed loudly at it, and said that all goods were common property; and all of them laughed and jeered at the commandments and remarked that one was missing, for there should be eleven commandments’.73
But the vision of good fellowship and commonalty, which the social organization of piracy was partly intended to promote, was difficult to realize in the Caribbean. Later accounts might portray the pirates, especially Drake and his men, as a community of gallants, but their conduct and lack of self-regulation points more towards a fraternity of angry and aggressive youths and young men, whose hatred of Catholicism and hostility towards Spain served to justify intimidation, terror and gratuitous violence. This was an ill-disciplined, irregular force that was difficult to control. During 1572 Drake faced mutterings of discontent against his leadership, though he was prepared to consult with his men, even to the extent of constructing a building for that purpose.74 Other pirate leaders faced more overt challenges to their authority and leadership. Even during this early stage of English transatlantic piracy, therefore, it appeared to contain the seeds of its own fragmentation and dissolution.
By the later 1570s it seemed to some observers that the Spanish were winning the war against piracy in the Caribbean. According to Lopez Vaz the provision of two galleys along the coast of the Main had an almost immediate effect on improving the defence of the region, with the seizure of six or seven French ships during their first year of service. Once ‘this was knowen’, indeed, ‘there were no more Englishmen or Frenchmen of warre that durst adventure to approach the coast’, until Drake returned under very different conditions in 1586.75
The challenge of overseas privateering and piracy
The faltering development of English depredation in the Caribbean contrasted with the underlying strength of piracy and other forms of plunder across the Atlantic, though a subtle shift in focus appears to have been in progress during the mid-1570s. In the face of repeated provocation, the spoil of English shipping by foreign privateers or pirates became a serious problem, arousing widespread anger which did little to weaken support for localized piracy or sea roving, particularly by adventurers who portrayed their activities as unofficial retaliation or reprisals against overseas attack. At the same time the growing practice of English adventurers serving with foreign commissions or men-of-war presented the regime with a potentially dangerous and divisive problem.
Despite the restoration of trading relations with Spain and Portugal, and a treaty with France designed to improve Anglo-French trade, the revival of English overseas commerce, especially with the Low Countries, was severely disrupted by the activities of men-of-war operating from Flushing, Dunkirk, La Rochelle and the Channel ports of France. In January 1575 warships from Flushing seized an English ship bound for Ostend, laden with a cargo of cloth, which was justified as a necessity of war, ‘without any intention of injuring the English’.76 Following further attacks on shipping, in June the Queen sent a mission, led by Daniel Rogers, to the rebel leader, William of Orange, remonstrating against the activities of Flushing privateers in English waters. Rogers’ purpose was not only to complain of the disruption to trade, but also about the damage to the Queen’s honour. In September he provided a report on his attempts to secure the restitution of English plunder in the Low Countries, which included the spoil of vessels sailing along the coast between Rye and Dover as well as from London to Weymouth.
Furthermore, English shipping was exposed to attack by French men-of-war. Negotiations for an Anglo-French commercial treaty during 1575 were threatened by the grievances of English merchants who were the victims of French depredation, for which it was claimed that they were unable to obtain redress. The French countered with their own complaints, and a request that Elizabeth send out ships to suppress rebel pirates or rovers, serving under commissions issued by Huguenot leaders, who were operating in English waters. Although draft articles for the treaty contained provision for the abolition of the use of letters of reprisal, in June 1575 the Queen was reported to have granted commissions against France, in response to the continued plunder of English merchants. The companies of French men-of-war also faced arrest and legal action in England. During August members of the company of the Crescent of La Rochelle were indicted before a court held in Padstow, for unlawfully attacking a ship of the Isle of Man. More Frenchmen were detained for piracy during September. Others, who were condemned for piracy in October, were executed.77
While the Queen and her councillors resorted to diplomacy to try and recover English vessels and cargoes taken by foreign privateers and rovers, the activities of the French in particular provoked unofficial retaliation which was easily confused with piracy. During 1575 William Michelot of St Malo was arrested, apparently as a reprisal action by Captain Courtenay of Dover. Although Michelot was released, he was subsequently apprehended at the suit of merchants of Chester, in retaliation for the spoil of two local ships by men-of-war from the French port. A ship of St Malo also was seized off Ireland by the Castle of Comfort, whose owners now included Hawkins. Such actions revived long-standing, cross-Channel rivalries, creating a breeding ground in which a younger generation of pirates and rovers, like John Callice, could flourish.78
The problem of overseas depredation was complicated by the practice of English recruits serving aboard Dutch, French and Flemish men-of-war. The regime was acutely concerned about the number of seamen and soldiers serving overseas in ‘troublesome times of civil wars, some on the one side and some on the other’, because of the divisive domestic and damaging international consequences.79 Volunteers for Spanish service provoked particular concern. The adventurers who served at sea included William Cotton and Henry Carey, who were granted letters of marque or reprisal, in April 1575, by officials in Castile and Flanders. Both men were authorized to capture Dutch shipping; in addition, they were promised a bounty of six crowns for every rebel they seized. English prisoners in Spain were offered pardons on condition that they served aboard the vessels of Cotton and Carey. The Queen complained to the Spanish of the practice, claiming that the ‘worst sort of her people … [were] secretly enticed on both parts to serve on the seas, under colour of which … most become common pirates’.80 The dangers were underlined by the plunder of several shi
ps off the coast of Essex by a man-of-war operating from Dunkirk in the service of the Spanish monarchy, and manned by Englishmen.
In an effort to suppress the practice, during October 1575 the Queen issued a proclamation prohibiting her subjects from serving overseas. The prohibition was justified by the increase in spoil and robbery in English ports, as a result of which ‘a great number of … mariners and fishermen be turned from good subjects to appear rather to be pirates and sea rovers’.81 English recruits employed by foreign princes, without licence from the Queen, were commanded to return home to their customary occupations or trades. Those who refused would be considered as rebels. Admiralty officers and local officials were instructed to apprehend and imprison anyone who ignored the proclamation. Office holders who failed to implement the instructions faced dismissal and severe punishment. These measures appeared draconian on paper. In practice they were probably unworkable, if only because they rested on a degree of local cooperation and administrative efficiency that was, at best, sporadic. In any case the regime lacked either the persuasive power or compulsive force to prevent volunteers from serving overseas, whether for mercenary or ideological motives.
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