Under the Bloody Flag

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by John C Appleby


  In reality, trade and discovery concealed a deeper intention, aimed at the plunder of Spanish commerce and shipping in one of the most vulnerable regions of the Hispanic Empire. According to Drake’s version of the expedition, as subsequently reported by one of his company, this was a voyage of reprisal or revenge which grew out of discussions with Walsingham and the Queen. During the course of a speech to the company, which was intended to reinforce his authority at a difficult stage in the voyage, Drake indicated that the Queen had sought his advice on how she might ‘be revenged on the King of Spain … and said further that he was the only man that might do this exploit’.49 In addition, he claimed to have a commission from Elizabeth for the voyage, as well as a bill of adventure demonstrating her investment in it. Although the Queen was probably an investor in the venture, it seems unlikely that she provided Drake with a written commission for the voyage. Indeed, Drake was undoubtedly aware that if the expedition failed, it would be publicly disavowed by Elizabeth.

  Drake’s advice regarding the Queen’s desire for revenge against Philip II, that ‘the only way was to annoy him in his Indies’, was a strategic challenge and a beguiling prospect.50 But it emerged within a wider context of growing English interest in long-distance commercial expansion and vague, as yet unrealized, schemes for colonization in America. In these circumstances, the essentially predatory purpose of the voyage was linked with equally speculative ambitions which played some part in influencing its outcome. The flexibility of the venture thus created the opportunity for exploration along the eastern coast of North America, and for commercial reconnoitring in the East Indies, while not distracting from its primary goal. At the same time, however, it drew on Drake’s experience in the Caribbean. Among the company was a cimaroon, who aided Drake in 1572 and had since been in his service. It is possible that Drake was intending to return to the region around Panama, with the hope of renewing his alliance with the cimaroons and of establishing contact with Oxenham, who had departed on a plundering expedition to the isthmus eighteen months earlier. As such, the voyage has been seen from one perspective as a sequel to English raiding in the Caribbean during the mid-1570s.

  The supporters of the venture demonstrated the willingness of leading members of the regime to promote anti-Spanish enterprise across the Atlantic and beyond. In addition to the Queen, the investors included the Lord Admiral, Leicester, Walsingham and Sir Christopher Hatton, as well as Sir William and George Winter and Hawkins. While Drake’s subscription amounted to £1,000, the Winters and Hawkins invested £1,750 in the voyage.51 This range of support indicated a close community of interest between prominent courtiers and officials, including the navy, with one of the leading representatives of the predatory tendency in English maritime enterprise. Although the employment of redeemed pirates by the regime was neither unusual nor unprecedented, at least in European waters, the Queen’s support for Drake’s voyage was of a different order to her willingness to use men such as Strangeways or Callice. In political, diplomatic and financial terms this was a gamble with high stakes.

  With this backing Drake assembled a fleet of five vessels of modest size, the largest of which, the Pelican, subsequently renamed the Golden Hind, was of about 100 to 150 tons. The expedition was well armed and equipped for its purpose. Drake’s ship, the Pelican, itself carried medium-sized ordnance and a variety of hand weapons such as muskets, pikes and bows and arrows, as well as fire bombs, which were intended for use in the seizure of prizes rather than for sustained battle at sea. About 160 men sailed with the expedition, including Francis Fletcher – a minister and the author of an account of the voyage – and a group of about ten gentlemen. As a demonstration of sea power this was modest in scale; in reality it was more a projection of a well-established tradition of irregular, private depredation than of royal naval enterprise.

  The voyage was marked by widespread plunder and punctuated by high drama and adventure. After leaving Plymouth the expedition cruised southward along the coast of Africa, seizing several Iberian prizes of limited value. Off the Cape Verde Islands a Portuguese vessel was taken. Its pilot, Nuño da Silva, was retained for service in navigating along the coast of Brazil, which the English reached in April 1578. In poor weather Drake scouted south before deciding to winter in Port St Julian, a safe harbour which Magellan had previously used. It was here that Drake faced down the mutinous discontent of the gentlemen, with the trial and execution of Thomas Doughty. Social rivalry and indiscipline were always a potential problem among unruly groups of mariners serving on long voyages, but they were intensified by the presence of gentlemen volunteers whose expectations of an easy life at sea were a provocation to most seamen. Drake complained to his company after the execution of Doughty that there was ‘such controversy betwixt the sailors and the gentlemen, and such stomaching between the gentlemen and the sailors, that it doth even make me mad to hear it’.52 In an impassioned exhortation, which was both popular and radical in implication, Drake demanded that ‘the gentleman … haul and draw with the mariner, and the mariner with the gentleman’, for the sake of the unity of the company and the success of the venture. But it was an awkward and short-term solution to a problem that was to become more overt after the outbreak of the war with Spain in 1585, as growing numbers of gentlemen were attracted into service at sea by the appeal of privateering.

  The expedition, now reduced to three vessels, passed through Magellan’s Strait during August 1578. In bad weather the fleet separated: one ship was lost at sea, another returned for England. Drake continued the voyage in the Golden Hind, sailing north along the coast of Peru. By December he had reached and ransacked the small coastal settlement of Valparaiso. A ship laden with wine and gold was seized in the harbour. Sailing further north, he captured another valuable prize and raided the harbour at Callao, where he heard about the recent departure of a richly laden vessel, the Nuestra Señora de la Concepcion, also known as the Cacafuego, for Panama. Drake gave chase and seized the vessel, laden with a cargo of gold and silver worth 360,000 pesos, close to Cape San Francisco. Though he continued sailing north, taking several smaller prizes and raiding the small harbour of Guatulco along the coast of Mexico, Drake’s main aim was to return to England with this rich haul of plunder. Fortunately, he had acquired two Spanish pilots from one of the prizes, who were experienced in sailing to the Philippines.53

  During an extended cruise along the west coast of North America, which may possibly have been linked with the search for the Northwest Passage, Drake landed in the vicinity of San Francisco, where he was ceremoniously welcomed by the native people who treated the English as gods. In naming the region Nova Albion, he also claimed it for the Queen. At the end of July the expedition began the Pacific crossing, reaching the island of Ternate, the ruler of which was apparently keen to establish commercial relations with Europeans other than the Portuguese. After a brief stay, and the acquisition of six tons of cloves, Drake departed, hoping to reach the Moluccas. But the Golden Hind was nearly shipwrecked along the coast of Celebes. In perilous circumstances Fletcher, the minister, ‘made them a sermon and they received communion all together and then every thief reconciled himself to his fellow thief’.54 The ship was saved by a change in the wind, and the jettisoning of some of the cargo of spices and several pieces of ordnance. However, bad weather drove the vessel past the Moluccas to Java, from whence the Golden Hind returned to England by way of the Cape of Good Hope. After a voyage of nearly three years, Drake sailed into Plymouth harbour towards the end of September 1580.

  Drake’s success provoked a clamour of complaint from the Spanish. The Queen failed to respond to repeated demands for the restoration of the booty. Indeed, the survivors of the voyage were allowed to keep £20,000, half of which was for Drake’s personal use. The following year, in April 1581, he was knighted by Elizabeth aboard the Golden Hind. Though the acclaim was far from universal, the response to the voyage began the transformation of Drake into a folk hero, exploiting and embellishing
the image of the pirate as a righteous outlaw. The growth of Anglo-Spanish suspicion and tension was also a vital element in the wider reaction to Drake’s success, particularly as it provided an opportunity to portray the piratical assault on Spanish shipping as a lawful means of reprisal. Reports of May 1582 that the King of Spain had offered 20,000 ducats for Drake’s head only served to confirm his status as a patriotic leader, who inspired emulation among a small host of Protestant champions eager to win renown and honour at sea while sharing in the spoil of the Spanish empire.55

  If Drake’s voyage caught the popular imagination, contributing to a new-found sense of confidence in Elizabethan England, it also encouraged a variety of schemes for commercial and colonial expansion which were linked with plunder. Across the Atlantic these ranged from the Straits of Magellan, where a naval station was proposed for the purpose of intercepting Spanish trade, to Newfoundland, the focus for several proposals in favour of the seizure of Iberian fishing vessels. They also included plans for the settlement of North America, which a small group of adventurers was beginning to promote, though there was an unresolved tension between an overtly aggressive and more pacific approach. In addition, projects were put forward for the capture of Spanish fleets returning from the Caribbean or for raiding along the coast of Spain.56

  In practice many of these schemes were unrealistic. Additionally, the Queen’s determination to avoid open war with Spain left them in the hands of private adventurers, who were unable to provide clear direction to largely uncoordinated ambitions for Atlantic depredation. Nonetheless, these circumstances provided an opportunity for the proponents of westward expansion, such as Richard Hakluyt the younger, to present imaginative proposals for the employment of pirates to advance English interests in America.57

  The arrival of Don Antonio in England had the potential to lend greater shape to these schemes. He soon became a focal point for the ambitions of a mixed group of anti-Spanish adventurers which included courtiers, naval officials and maritime entrepreneurs, as well as pirates. The Queen was concerned that the presence of Don Antonio would provoke Philip II, though the Portuguese pretender was reportedly so poor in 1581 that he lacked clothing. However, Elizabeth did not prevent him from issuing commissions against the Spanish to his English supporters, nor did she stand in the way of an ambitious plan for an expedition to the Azores during 1581, which was supported by leading members of the regime and involved Drake. Although the expedition failed to proceed as intended, a small fleet of four vessels, under the command of Captain Henry Roberts of Bristol, was despatched to Angra, and may have played a vital role in conserving the island for Don Antonio. Failing to get more effective assistance from the Queen, he moved to France, where he gained sufficient support for an expedition to the Azores in 1582, though it was heavily defeated by the Spanish.58

  Under the camouflage of commissions from Don Antonio, a motley and disorderly force of privateers was involved in the plunder of Spanish and other shipping during the early 1580s, anticipating to some extent the rapid expansion of English privateering after 1585. While these commissions were justified as legitimate reprisals against Spain, they were also an implicit claim to sovereignty by the pretender to the throne of Portugal, even if in practice many of the recipients behaved in a piratical manner. Their activities provoked grievances not only from the Spanish, but also from the Dutch. Spanish complaints against Henry Knollys, who was cruising with the ships of Don Antonio off the Isle of Wight during 1581, forced the latter to apologise to Walsingham, though he insisted that the Englishman was disregarding his orders. In November 1581 the Dutch complained that ships fitted out in England, under the pretext of aiding Don Antonio, were spoiling vessels sailing to the Low Countries.59

  While the Dutch demanded that those involved in these attacks should be dealt with as pirates, there seemed to be genuine uncertainty in England regarding the status and legality of vessels operating under Don Antonio’s commission. The seizure of a Spanish ship returning from Santo Domingo, which was brought into an English port, provoked discussion about its adjudication as lawful prize. In September 1582 the Spanish ambassador complained of Roberts’ seizure of two Portuguese caravels returning from Brazil with cargoes of sugar, though he expected that the matter would not be favourably resolved. Indeed, it was reported in April that the Queen ‘intends not to meddle in Roberts’ sugars’, though one of the prizes was subsequently restored.60

  At least eleven English captains were sailing with commissions from Don Antonio during 1581 and 1582. Such was the apparent appeal of serving under the Portuguese pretender that in July 1582 it was reported that forty ships were expected to be sent out by English adventurers in his support. Earlier in the year, a German adventurer offered to aid him, leading an expedition against Spain to the Indies, if he was supported by the Queen. The prospect of Don Antonio becoming a figurehead for pan-Protestant adventurers, including French Huguenots sailing with commissions from the King of Navarre, who were intent on pursuing a war of plunder against the Spanish and Portuguese, receded following the failure of the expedition to the Azores in which several English captains served. In July he left Tours and went to sea, though he was forced to sail without any of his captains, who were in prison for debt. According to one report, ‘no man can tell whether he needs not be afraid to be robbed, for he has not a penny more than the poor grey friar’.61

  About the same time, the cause of the Portuguese pretender among Protestants was discredited by reports that he had issued a declaration promising protection to merchants trading with Spain under his licence. Early in 1584 he was allowed to return to England, but on condition that he would not reside near the coast. He was reported to be in such difficult circumstances that he wanted to move to Guernsey. By September he was in the Netherlands, issuing letters of marque or reprisal to Dutch adventurers. Evidently he hoped to mobilize a force of twelve ships. Through agents in England he continued to issue similar commissions to his English supporters, who included the Fenners and their new associate Callice.62

  Although the legality of English depredation under the auspices of Don Antonio remained uncertain, it provided the regime with an opportunity to maintain the pressure on Spain at sea, while denying any hostile intent. Under these conditions privateering served as an instrument of policy, albeit one that was inherently hazardous. At the same time it provided an outlet for the activities of pirates and the aggressive propagandists of overseas expansion. While it was recognized in February 1583 that the Queen could not assist Don Antonio with 2,000 men without risking conflict with Spain, the case for continuing to support him with men-of-war seemed to go unchallenged. For some this was an irresistible opportunity to penetrate the Portuguese and Spanish seaborne empires through a combination of trade and plunder.63

  While there was a danger that such irregular privateering would degenerate into piracy, it strengthened English venturing into the Atlantic during the early 1580s. English captains were involved in expeditions to the Azores during 1581 and 1582, either with others or on their own. They included Captain Kenne of Bristol, who seized several prizes off Terceira which were brought into Southampton. In 1582 William Hawkins and his brother, John, received a commission for a voyage of discovery to Africa and America, authorizing them to assist the Portuguese pretender against his enemies. With the benefit of this authority Hawkins led an expedition, which included two ships owned by Drake, to west Africa with the intention of trading thence to Brazil. Faced with hostility at the Cape Verde Islands, and learning of an increased Spanish presence along the coast of Brazil, the fleet sailed for the Caribbean, where a profitable cargo of commodities was acquired. Further north, adventurers turned their attention to the vulnerable fishing fleets off Newfoundland. In November 1582 the Spanish complained of the spoil of more than twenty ships at the fishery by Henry Oughtred of Southampton.64

  But the growth of deep-sea plunder endangered peaceful plans for commercial expansion within neglected regions of the Iberia
n empires. The ambitious, but unsuccessful voyage of Captain Edward Fenton during 1582 and 1583 underlined the dangers, particularly with expeditions which suffered from weak or divided leadership. Ostensibly the purpose of the voyage was to establish a trading outpost in the East Indies as a means of exploiting Drake’s contact with the Moluccas. To some extent, however, it was a legacy of the abortive expedition to the Azores of 1581. It attracted a similar range of investors, as well as arousing the interest of a group of merchants who were prominent figures in the Muscovy Company. Leicester was the leading promoter of the venture, purchasing the Galleon Oughtred from Henry Oughtred at a cost of £2,800 for the voyage. Of this amount, £800 represented Oughtred’s share in the voyage. According to the terms of the sale, Leicester was to procure a commission from Don Antonio authorizing the plunder of Spanish and Portuguese shipping. Drake was among the other investors, who included Walsingham and his son-in-law, Christopher Carleill.65

  Fenton, the leader of the expedition, was an experienced soldier who served with Frobisher on the ill-fated Northwest Passage ventures during the later 1570s. He harboured grandiose visions of wealth that turned the voyage into a disorderly and unsuccessful quest for Iberian prizes. He commanded a fleet of four vessels and a company of more than 230 men. Oughtred’s ship, renamed the Galleon Leicester, a large vessel of about 400 or 500 tons, armed with forty-two pieces of ordnance, served as the Admiral for the voyage. The officers included William Hawkins the younger, a nephew of John Hawkins, though Carleill pulled out of the voyage after clashing with the former. John Drake, one of Drake’s cousins, was in charge of a pinnace, the Bark Francis. In addition Simon Fernandes, who was accused of bragging about his piracies during the course of the voyage, served as chief pilot. The expedition sailed with two clergymen, John Walker and Richard Madox. Neither survived the voyage, but both of them kept diaries that reveal their mounting concern at the piratical inclinations of members of the company.66

 

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