Clinton’s always awkward relations with the military were deteriorating further because the U.S. intervention in Somalia staged by Bush before he left the White House had begun spiraling out of control. In March 1993 the time had seemed ripe for U.S. troops deployed in December 1992 to slip away. UN peacekeeping forces would remain to preserve the peace and continue the relief operation. But just as the bulk of U.S. forces were withdrawing, the Security Council, at the urging of the United States, expanded the peacekeepers’ mandate to include disarming the militias and restoring law and order. On June 5 the faction headed by Mohammed Farah Aideed ambushed lightly armed Pakistani peacekeepers, killing two dozen of them. The Americans lobbied for and U.S. special forces carried out a manhunt aimed at tracking down and punishing the Pakistanis’ assailants. On October 3, 1993, U.S. Army rangers and Delta special forces attempted to seize several of Aideed’s top advisers. Somali militia retaliated, killing eighteen U.S. Soldiers, wounding seventy-three, and kidnapping one Black Hawk helicopter pilot.138 The American networks broadcast a video interview with the trembling, disoriented pilot and a gory procession in which the naked corpse of a U.S. ranger was dragged through a Mogadishu street.
On receiving word of these events, President Clinton cut short a trip to California and convened an urgent crisis-management meeting at the White House. When an aide began recapping the situation, an angry president interrupted him. “Cut the bullshit,” Clinton snapped. “Let’s work this out.” “Work it out” meant walk out. Republican congressional pressure was intense. Clinton appeared on television the next day, called off the manhunt for Aideed, and announced that all U.S. forces would be home within six months. Bosnian Serb television gleefully replayed the footage of the U.S. humiliation, knowing that it made U.S. intervention in Bosnia even less likely. A week after the Mogadishu firefight, U.S. forces suffered further humiliation in Haiti, as angry anti-American demonstrators deterred the USS Harlan County from landing troops to join a UN mission there. The Pentagon concluded that the president would not stand by them when U.S. forces got into trouble. Multilateral humanitarian missions seemed to bring all risk and no gain.
Although a U.S. ground invasion of the Balkans was never proposed even by the most hawkish Bosnia defenders, the Pentagon feared that what began as a limited U.S. involvement in Bosnia would end up as a large, messy one. The “active measures” proposed to punish ethnic cleansing would send the United States “headlong down a slippery slope,” Defense Secretary Perry said. “At the bottom of that slope will be American troops in ground combat.”139
The combination of the departures of three internal (if junior) advocates and the persistence of the ineffectual U.S. policy left the department far more hopeless and cynical than it had been before. The junior officers who replaced the resignees worked around the clock as their predecessors had done, but in the words of one, they were not “emotionally involved, only morally involved.” It is hard to know what this distinction means exactly, except that it hints at the way the three resignees were branded after they took their leave. They were publicly hailed as honorable men, but a whisper campaign blasphemed them for their unprofessional stands.
The State Department quieted down. The longer Clinton served in office, the greater the distance that grew between him and his campaign promises and the less sensible it seemed to continue to contest what appeared to be an entrenched policy of noninvolvement. The use of the Holocaust analogy diminished. “The State Department wanted professionals who would not think what Warren Christopher was doing was the equivalent of not bombing the railroads to Auschwitz,” says one Balkan desk officer. The State Department Balkan team was there to do “damage control” for the administration. They were not there to kick up a fuss.
Defeat on All Fronts
Not everyone quieted down. Like a broken record, Congressman McCloskey continued to seize every opportunity to badger administration officials. When Christopher blamed all sides as a way of explaining the weak U.S. policy, McCloskey pounced, slamming Christopher’s attempt to posit “moral equivalency.” In what was becoming a ritual between the two men, the Indiana congressman asked again for the State Department’s position on the term “genocide.” “I know—you know that my request is still pending right now,” McCloskey said. A skilled lawyer, Christopher agreed that the Serbs were aggressors, which was irrefutable, but again seized the opportunity to obfuscate. Christopher responded:
Mr. McCloskey, thank you for the question and for giving me an opportunity to say that I share your feeling that the principal fault lies with the Bosnian Serbs, and I’ve said that several times before. They are the most at fault of the three parties. But there is considerable fault on all three sides, and . . . atrocities abound in this area as we have seen in the last several days and weeks. But I agree that the aggression coming from Serbia is the . . . principal perpetrator of the problem in the area.
With respect to genocide, the definition of genocide is a fairly technical definition. Let me just get it for you here. I think I can get it in just a moment.
Christopher paused, read from the convention, and then said:
I would say that some of the acts that have been committed by various parties in Bosnia, principally by the Serbians, could constitute genocide under the 1948 convention, if their purpose was to destroy the religious or ethnic group in whole or in part. And that seems to me to be a standard that may well have been reached in some of the aspects of Bosnia. Certainly some of the conduct there is tantamount to genocide.140
As he had done in March, Christopher called the atrocities “tantamount to genocide” but refused to deliver a formal finding to that effect. Other U.S. officials were thus left to squirm for themselves.
During a September 15, 1993, hearing of the House Europe and Middle East Subcommittee, McCloskey pressed Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Stephen Oxman, who stuck to the qualifier of “tantamount”:
Rep. McCloskey: As you know, since April, I’ve been trying to get an answer from State as to whether these activities by the Bosnian Serbs and Serbs constitute genocide. Will I get a reply on that today?
Mr. Oxman: I learned, just today, that you hadn’t had your response. And the first thing I’m going to do when I get back to the Department is find out where that is. We’ll get you that response as soon as we possibly can. But to give you my personal view, I think that acts tantamount to genocide have been committed. Whether the technical definition of genocide—I think this is what the letter that you’re asking for needs to address.
Rep. McCloskey: Right.
Mr. Oxman: And I think you’re entitled to an answer.
Rep. McCloskey: This word tantamount floats about. I haven’t looked it up in a dictionary, though. I’m derelict on that. I don’t know how—I guess I have a subjective view as to how to define it, but it’s an intriguing word. But I’ll look forward to your reply.141
Behind the scenes soon thereafter, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (INR) Toby Gati sent Secretary Christopher classified guidance on the genocide question. Although Gati’s memo left Christopher some wiggle room, its overall message was clear: Undoubtedly, the analysis stated, the Serbs had carried out many of the acts listed in the convention—killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction, imposing measures to prevent births—against Bosnia’s Muslims because they were Muslims. What proved challenging, as always, was determining whether the Serbs possessed the requisite intent to “destroy, in whole or in part,” the Muslim group. The memo noted that proving such intent without intercepting written policies or orders was difficult, but it suggested that intention could be “inferred from the circumstances.” It noted several of the circumstances present in Bosnia:
• the expressed intent of individual Serb perpetrators to eradicate the Muslims
• the publicly stated Serb political objective of creating an ethnical
ly homogeneous state
• the wholesale purging of Muslims from Serb-held territory, with the aim of ensuring ethnic homogeneity
• the systematic fashion in which Muslims, Muslim men, or Muslim leaders are singled out for killing
The “overall factual situation,” the memo said, provided “a strong basis to conclude that killings and other listed acts have been undertaken with the intent of destroying the Muslim group as such.” The secretary was informed that one of the understandings the U.S. Senate attached to its ratification of the genocide convention required an intent to destroy a “substantial” part of a group. The Senate had defined “substantial” to mean a sufficient number to “cause the destruction of the group as a viable entity.” In Bosnia, the memo concluded, the “numbers of Muslims subjected to killings and other listed acts . . . can readily be considered substantial.”142
Responding to the widespread perception that a finding of genocide would carry severe consequences for U.S. policymakers, the INR analysis observed that the convention’s enforcement requirements were in fact weak. It relayed the legal adviser’s judgment that a genocide finding would carry no “particular legal benefits (or, for that matter, legally adverse consequences)”:
Some have argued that . . . the United States is obligated to take further measures in order to “prevent” genocide in Bosnia, once and if it is determined to be genocide. In our view, however, this general undertaking . . . cannot be read as imposing an obligation on outside states to take all measures whatsoever as may prove necessary—including the use of armed force—in order to “prevent” genocide.143
The United States was already meeting its obligations under the convention: “The United States and other parties are attempting to ‘prevent and punish’ such actions,” the memo said, adding sheepishly, “even though such measures may not be immediately wholly effective.”144
On October 13, 1993, a year and a half after the conflict began, Christopher finally approved the drafting of a letter by the assistant secretary for congressional relations acknowledging “acts of genocide.” But Christopher pulled his approval several days later when Congressman McCloskey published an editorial in the New York Times calling for his resignation.145 Upon reading the editorial, Christopher reportedly picked up the memo authorizing a finding of genocide and wrote in large letters “O.B.E.,” for “overtaken by events.” In the culmination of a series of exchanges, the pair traded bitter words in a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing the following month.146 With the behind-the-scenes help of his new staffer, Marshall Harris, who had been uncorked to vent his frustration, McCloskey prepared a statement summing up the collapse of the administration’s Balkan policy:
On February 10th, three weeks after President Clinton took office, Secretary Christopher stated that this administration had to address the circumstances as it found them in Bosnia. He further stated that the administration was resolved to do so. Just last month, however, he stated that the administration “inherited” the problem. Also on February 10th, Secretary Christopher stated that the United States [had] “direct strategic concerns in Bosnia.” . . . When I heard those remarks, I was proud of my president, proud of this administration, proud and grateful to Mr. Christopher and proud of my country. Unfortunately, the administration began an about-face soon after that was . . . abysmally shameful.
. . . It acquiesced to European objections to allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves, it signed on to . . . a meaningless plan which called for safe areas that we all know—we all know—and two weeks ago I was in Sarajevo—we all know that Sarajevo and the other so-called safe enclaves to this day are still not safe. In fact, 50 years after Buchenwald and Auschwitz, there are giant concentration camps in the heart of Europe.
. . . On July 21st, Secretary Christopher said this administration was doing all it could in Bosnia consistent with our national interests. The very next day, consistent with that statement, the Serbs launched one of their largest attacks ever in the 17-month-old siege of Sarajevo. Last month, the Serbs resumed their shelling of Sarajevo and killed dozens more innocent civilians. Bosnian Serb terrorist leaders . . . were quoted in the New York Times as saying that they renewed their bloody attacks because they knew after American fiascoes in Haiti and Somalia the Clinton administration would not respond. They were right. Our only response was another warning to Milosevic.
We’ve been warning these people, Mr. Secretary, for nearly two years, and I guess I appreciate your warnings, but I’d like to see some effect at some point. Unlike the shells raining down on innocent men, women and children in the Bosnian capital, these warnings ring absolutely hollow. Even now, we won’t lift the sieges [of the safe areas], and I think this is very important.
. . . All these things happened or are happening on the Secretary’s watch. The situation in Bosnia stopped being an inherited problem in January ’93. Since then, several hundred thousand Bosnians have been driven out of the country or into internal exile, thousands of innocent civilians have been murdered, tens of thousands of ill-equipped Bosnian soldiers have been killed because we won’t arm them, thousands more women have been raped as a systematic campaign by the Bosnian Serbs.
The administration continues to profess . . . that it wants a negotiated solution to this war of aggression even if it means dismembering the sovereign U.N.-member state of Bosnia. It also says this is a tragic, complex situation with no easy answers. We all want a negotiated solution. We all know perfectly well that it’s tragic and that nothing will come easily in addressing the crisis, but these are empty posturings in the administration’s grievously inadequate foreign policy. Hundreds of thousands of lives hang in the balance as we say we support the enlargement of democracies and do little more.
Genocide is taking place in Bosnia, and I think it’s very important—Mr. Christopher knows this, but Secretary Christopher won’t say so. On at least two occasions of which I am aware, State Department lawyers and representatives of other relevant bureaus have recommended that he state this publicly, but we still do not have an answer. That request was first made publicly and in writing about 200 days ago.
Mr. Chairman, I won’t go on. I appreciate the time. But when the history books are written, we cannot say that we allowed genocide because health care was a priority. We cannot say that we allowed genocide because the American people were more concerned with domestic issues. History will record, Mr. Secretary, that this happened on our watch, on your watch, that you and the administration could and should have done more. I plead to you, there are hundreds of thousands of people that still can die. . . . I plead for you and the administration to make a more aggressive—to take a more aggressive interest in this.
Secretary Christopher responded to McCloskey’s assault with a rare burst of anger. He faulted McCloskey for proposing a massive U.S. ground invasion, which in fact the congressman had never recommended. Christopher said:
At rock bottom, you would be willing to put hundreds of thousands of American troops into Bosnia to compel a settlement satisfactory to the Bosnian government. I would not do so. I don’t think our vital interests are sufficiently involved to do so. I don’t see any point in our debating this subject further. You and I have discussed it several times in this forum. We have got fundamental differences of opinion. I do not believe that we should put hundreds of thousands of troops into Bosnia in order to compel a settlement. I’d go on to say, Mr. McCloskey, that it seems to me that your very strong feelings on this subject have affected adversely your judgment.147
McCloskey’s concerns about the wars in the Balkans, sparked in 1991, had only deepened with time. Indeed, the congressman was so haunted by the carnage that in at least fifteen hearings he raised questions about U.S. policy in Bosnia.148 To some, McCloskey’s hawkish Bosnia fervor seemed at odds with his leftist politics, his outspoken opposition to the war in Vietnam in the early 1970s, and his vote in Congress against the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Others were surprised to see him take on
fellow Democrats. Indeed, he voted for Clinton’s programs 86 percent of the time, the highest rating within the Indiana congressional delegation. But during the Bosnian war, the man the Almanac of American Politics described as “a man of earnest, plodding demeanor” metamorphosed into the unlikely conscience of the U.S. House of Representatives.149
The Clinton team had been much more forceful than the Bush team about condemning the Serbs as aggressors. When sixty-eight Muslim shoppers and vendors were killed in a Sarajevo marketplace massacre in February 1994, for instance, Clinton denounced the “murder of innocents.” In a transient interlude, Clinton even took the lead in issuing a NATO ultimatum that banned Serb heavy weapons from around the capital. “The United States,” he said, “will not stand idly by in the face of a conflict that affects our interests, offends our consciences, and disrupts the peace.” The risks entailed in NATO bombing, he assured the American people, were “minimal.” “If we can stop the slaughter of civilians,” Clinton said, “we ought to try it.”150
Because Clinton warned, “No one should doubt NATO’s resolve,” initially nobody did. For several months, Sarajevans lived free of artillery and sniper fire. But when the Serbs resumed shelling the safe areas, the president’s attention had drifted elsewhere and NATO did not bomb.
Beginning in April 1994, the allies did occasionally launch what became known as “pinprick” air strikes—usually a single strike against aged Serb military hardware delivered with plenty of advanced warning. But whenever the Serbs answered by intensifying attacks on Muslim civilians or rounding up UN peacekeepers as hostages (as they did in November 1994 and May and June 1995), the United States, along with its allies, caved. U.S. policymakers spent endless hours working to devise a solution for Bosnia, but they never took charge of the diplomatic process. They could not admit either to the Muslims or to themselves the limits of what they were willing to risk on behalf of their moral commitments. And they were not prepared to barrel ahead with a strategy or to invest the political capital that would have been needed to get international support for military action. Instead, they wrung their hands. “The Europeans were waiting for American leadership,” says Holbrooke, “but they didn’t get it for three years.”
A Problem From Hell Page 42
