The indefatigable Morton Abramowitz, my first boss, has been a steady compass. It was his advocacy on Bosnia, combined with the prescriptive genius of the late, great Frederick C. Cuny, that convinced me to move to the Balkans to see for myself what might be done. Several years later, as I began my first round of Washington interviews, my cell phone rang. Mort had something urgent he wished to impart. “As you begin interviewing people, you have to guard against two things,” he grumbled, “selective memory and absolute dishonesty.” I did not know then that he would pop up as a character in so many of the cases, but my reporting has only confirmed that his candor and conviction predated the Bosnia war. Sometime in the final month of my writing, he called again, this time with a question. “In all of your research,” he asked, “did any American official ever say to you, without going on about all the constraints they faced, ‘Boy, I really blew it!’” As I looked back through dozens of notebooks, I realized that only one had done so: Mort himself. I am honored to have worked with him. I know I have learned from him; I hope it shows.
Four individuals played pivotal roles six years ago in encouraging me to turn an amateur, sweeping survey of U.S. responses to genocide into a book. Miro Weinberger, my trusted friend for whom all things seem possible, pressed me to explain and not merely expose the gap between American promise and practice on genocide. Anthony Lewis, whose columns had helped keep Bosnia “on the map” in the United States even as it vanished from the maps of the Balkans, convinced me nothing like it had been done. Martin Peretz, whose New Republic had given me a voice during the Bosnia war and given U.S. policy-makers an appropriately difficult time, helped convince Basic Books to publish it. And Leon Wieseltier, the wisest man in Washington and the most stirring moralist around, offered cherished counsel from start to weary finish.
For their support from near and far, I thank Arthur Applbaum, Murat Armbruster, Amy Bach, Doreen Beinart, Peter Berkowitz, Tom Blanton, Julian Borger, Charlotte Bourke, Steven Bourke, Bina Breitner, Sally Brooks, Robert Brustein, Diane Caldwell, Gillian Caldwell, Jack Caldwell, Casey Cammann, Mark Casey, Lenore Cohen, Roger Cohen, Rebecca Dale, Romeo Dallaire, Owen Dawson, Debra Dickerson, Christine Dionne, Scott Faber, Gregg Farano, Helen Fein, Marshall Ganz, David Gelber, Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, Oren Harman, Lukas Haynes, Arnold Hiatt, Stanley Hoffman, Hrvoje Hranski, Swanee Hunt, Tom Keenan, Peter Kornbluh, Roy Kreitner, Kate Lowenstein, Victor Luftig, Jane Mansbridge, Pedro Martinez, Taddy McAllister, Erin McBreen, Jamie Metzl, Bob Mnookin, Katie Moore, Elizabeth Neuffer, Luis Ocampo, Frank Pearl, Ann Peretz, Stephen Power, Josh Prager, David Rieff, Ken Roth, Debra Ryan, Maurice Saah, Moshe Safdie, John Schumann, Alexis Sinduhije, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Mary Smart, Alison Smith, Chuck Sudetic, Stacy Sullivan, Doug Stone, Fred Strebeigh, Rebecca Symington, Margaret Talbot, Piotr Wandycz, Liz Wilcox, and Curt Wood.
I am especially indebted to those who took the time to read drafts, saving me from errors and steering me in new directions. Martha Minow taught me how to look at law with an eye to its political underpinnings and moral consequences. Nick Papandreou, the unlucky first reader of the first draft of the book, brought his novelist’s eye and crusader’s heart to a messy text. A wonderful range of friends and colleagues offered comments: Michael Barnett, Gary Jonathan Bass, Elizabeth Becker, Antonia Chayes, Ben Cohen, Chuck Cohen, Alison des Forges, Craig Etcheson, Kate Galbraith, Arkadi Gerney, Philip Gourevitch, Joost Hilterman, Jonathan Moore, Andy Moravscik, Aryeh Neier, Jennifer Pitts, Jonathan Randal, Frederick Wiseman, and Jay Winter. I am grateful to Mike Kelly, Cullen Murphy, and Yvonne Rolzhausen at the Atlantic Monthly for the phenomenal care they devoted to my Rwanda article, and to Ron Haviv, Susan Meiseles, and Gilles Peress who graced the book’s pages with their stunning photographs.
Two individuals got “A Problem from Hell” into print. Sarah Chalfant at the Wylie Agency took me on as a client when this book was no more than a gleam in an unemployed law-student’s eye. She never let the publishing world’s bouts of indifference shake her faith in the project’s value. Vanessa Mobley, my editor at Basic Books, fought for and promoted the book with a rare combination of zeal and grace. I was blessed to have such a committed, talented duo behind me. Gail Winston and Christine Walsh at HarperCollins trusted that the book could reach a wider audience and gave its message an energized new life in paperback. Jim Fussell delivered an index that has rendered the book and its lessons far more accessible to scholars and casual readers.
And finally, I must thank my dream team. Seven courageous friends—Holly Burkhalter, Sharon Dolovich, Laura Pitter, David Rohde, Elizabeth Rubin, Elliot Thomson, and the aforementioned Miro Weinberger—guided me by listening, by doing, and by being unashamed to don cocktail umbrellas in the rain. Anna Husarska, who shares more than a birthday and a homeland with Raphael Lemkin, taught me how to report war and observe people. Frederick Zollo introduced me to an America I had never seen, stocked my library, insisted this book mattered when it seemed it couldn’t, and became the voice inside my head that kept me honest. Michal Safdie offered comfort and passion at the most difficult times. She made her family my family and supplied daily sustenance and beauty. With their boundless generosity, Doris Kearns Goodwin and Dick Goodwin kept me off the disabled list. And with their insights into American politics and faith in America’s potential, they reminded me why it was worth hunting for the “better angels.” Sayres Rudy gave me his time, his critical mind, his wit, and his unswerving friendship. He left me dazed and the book changed.
And my parents, Vera Delaney and Edmund Bourke: When their twenty-three-year-old daughter told them she wanted to go and cover a war where innocent people were dying, they hoped it was a phase that would soon pass. When it didn’t, they reluctantly joined the charge, buying her an inaugural lap-top, neatly storing away a mound of Bosnia clips, and poring over every last word of every last draft of this book. Apart from being my parents, my teachers, and my closest friends, they are quite simply the two most extraordinary individuals I have ever met.
—Samantha J. Power
Index
“a problem from hell.” see Christopher, Warren
Abramowitz, Morton
Cambodian genocide, 122, 141
Iraqi atrocity evidence, 207, 209–210, 214, 239
military force in Bosnia, 428
Abrams, Morris, 159
Abzug, Rep. Bella, 103–104
Action and initiative against genocide by individuals, xviii–xx, 514–516. see also resignations
by journalists. see Becker, Gutman, Marshall, Pomfret, Vulliamy, Williams
by legislators and legislative staff. see Dole, Galbraith, Harris, McCloskey, McGovern, Proxmire
by private individuals, see Karski, Lemkin, Tehlirian, Zygielbojm
by researchers. see Burkhalter, Chhang, Des Forges, Kiernan, Stanton
by soldiers, see Clark, Dallaire, Eisenhower
by U.S. government employees. see Harris, Holbrooke, Hooper, Kenney, Menzies, Morgenthau, Quinn, Rankin, Twining, Walker, Western
Action Committee to Save Bosnia, 428
Ad Hoc Committee for the Ratification of Human Rights and Genocide Treaties, 156
Africa. see also Burundi, Rwanda
Belgian Congo, 9
Herreros, 54
Nigeria, civil war (Biafra), 81–82
agriculture, U.S.
Commodity Credit Corp. and, 173, 204, 236
sanctions against Iraq and, xix, 221–222, 236
Ahmad, Taimour Abdullah, 197–198
Akashi, Yasushi, 398, 403, 405
Akayesu, Jean-Paul, 485–486
al-Anbari, Abdul-Amir, 212
al-Askari, Abdel-Qadir, 189–190
Albanians, Kosovo. see also Kosovo
abuses by returning, 463–464
autonomy of, 445
estimated killed by Serbs, 469–472
history with Serbs, 444–445
mass deportation of, 452–453
massacre at Racak of, 446–447
&n
bsp; NATO bombings and, 448–454
persecution of, 253–254
rise of KLA, 445
Albright, Madeleine
Bosnian safe areas and, 393
Kosovo intervention and, 447
Office of War Crimes Analysis and, 467, 469–470
Rwanda and, 341 357, 367, 369
Srebrenica and, 408–409, 419–420
war crime tribunal support for, 326, 414
Allied War Crimes Commission, 80, 204, 482
al-Majid, Ali Hassan
Anfal campaign led by, 171–173, 186–187, 195–198
chemical warfare and, 188–190, 200–201
as governor of Kuwait, 236
investigation into atrocities of, 244
mass executions ordered by, 195–198
self-reflections of, 232
al-Sadr, Ayotallah Muhammad Bakr, 176
Amanpour, Christianne, 450
American Bar Association (ABA), 66, 157
Amnesty International
growth of, 72, 229
Iraqi atrocities and, 194, 215, 229
Khmer Rouge atrocities and, 113–114, 123, 131–132
war crime tribunals and, 493
analogy to the Holocaust
Bosnia, 236, 272, 274–279, 297–298, 318, 326, 432–434
Cambodia, 103, 117, 128–130, 154
contemporary genocide, 503–504
Iraq, 203, 216–219
Kosovo, 449, 483–484
Rwanda, 357
Srebrenica, 432–434
“ancient hatreds,” perception of
Bosnia, xx, Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts 302 statements by Cheney 282, Clinton 327, Christopher xii, Gore 327, Powell 285
Rwanda, 351, 355
Anderson, Jack, 108, 129
Anfal campaign, 171–173, 187–190, 195–198, 231–232, 242–245. see also al-Majid, Ali Hassan
Annan, Kofi, 341, 344
anti-Semitism
genocide convention opponents and, 155–156
Hitler’s atrocities and, 35
Lemkin and, 68, 72
Arbour, Louise, 458
Armenians, persecution and killing of, 1–16
day of remembrance for, 229
effort to stage war crimes trials, 14–16
Henry Morgenthau and, 6–14
international awareness of, 4–6
Mehmed Talaat’s assassination, 1
Tehlirian’s trial, 17
Turkey’s entrance into World War I and, 1–4
Turkish denial of, 9–10
U.S. policy toward, xix
Arusha Accords
Dallaire and, 340–341
faith in, 345–348, 381–382
Hutu reaction to, 337
terms of, 336
Auschwitz and the Allies (Gilbert), 279
avoiding the “g-word.” see genocide, U.S. response
Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Lemkin), 38–42
Aziz, Tariq, 199, 211, 220
Bacon, Kenneth, 469
Bagosora, Col. Théoneste
campaign vs. Tutsi, 330, 350
false assurances of, 348
imprisonment of, 485, 486, 495
prosecution of, 499–502
Baker, James
perspective on Bosnia, 259, 262, 286
role in Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq, 240–241
unseating of Khmer Rouge in UN, 154
view of sanctions vs. Iraq, 221, 233
Balkan Ghosts (Kaplan), 302
Balkans. see Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Slovenia, Yugoslavia
Bangladesh
1971 genocide, 82
peacekeepers in Rwanda, 349, 353
Baratta, Mira, 254
Barzani, Massoud, 174
Barzani, Mullah Mustafa, 175, 177–178, 193
Basra, 184
Bassiouni, Cherif, 483
Beardsley, Brent, 329–330, 368
Beck, Joseph, 22
Becker, Elizabeth
Khmer Rouge allows visit of, 137–140
reporting on Khmer Rouge, 97–99, 104, 120
on U.S. disengagement after Vietnam, 122
Belgian peacekeepers, 332, 366–367
Berger, Sandy, 408, 436, 459
Berman, Howard, 229, 236
Bermuda Conference (1943), 36
Bey, Kemal, 15
Biafra (Nigeria), 81–82
Biden, Sen. Joseph, 301–302
Bilbray, James, 217
Bitburg Cemetery (Germany), 161–163
Bitker, Bruno, 78–79
Bizimungu, Augustin, 370
Blair, Tony, 447, 458–459
Blaskic, Tihomir, 494
Blewitt, Graham, 494
Blood, Archer, 82
Bosnia, warning 252, recognition 264, response 293
ethnic cleansing in, 247–251
links to radical Islam, 395, 513
prosecution and, 475, 479, 481–484, 491–502
turning to West for help, 248–249
U.S. knowledge of genocide, 264–269, 505
U.S. policy of disapproval, 258–263
U.S. warnings about brutality, 252–255
war crimes tribunal and, 495–499
Bosnia, Bush administration, 269–293
concentration camps, 269–274, 279–281
genocide question, 288–293, 318–323
Holocaust analogy, 274–279, 318
national interests and, 287–288
public opinion, 276, 281–282, 289
resignation from, 286
Serbs exploit U.S. military anxiety, 284
Somalia intervention, 285–286, 293
Vietnam analogy, 283–285
Bosnia, Clinton administration, 293–327
concentration camps, 482
domestic focus of, 306–307
“dual key” arrangement, 406
genocide proof and, 319–321
genocide question, 296–300
Holocaust analogy, 297–298, 326, 432–434, 483–484
ideology of, 260–262
“lift and strike” proposal, 302
lifting arms embargo, 423–430, 437
national interests and, 310–312
NATO involvement, xi–xii, 324–325, 327
options, 263
prosecuting war criminals, 291–292, 482–483
public opinion, 294, 304–305
resignations from, 312–318
Somalia intervention, 317
summary of policy, 321–324
Boucher, Richard, 272–273
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 403
Brand, Joel, 276–277
Breaux, Sen. John, 221
Bricker, Sen. John, 69–70, 76
Britain
Armenian persecution and, 5
Bush’s reluctance to intervene in northern Iraq and, 240
Cambodian human rights and, 125–126
Clinton’s passivity in Bosnia and, 301, 436
knowledge of Nazi atrocities, 34–35
Bryce, Viscount, 9
Buckley, William F., Jr., 134
Bucyana, Martin, 345
Burkhalter, Holly, 376–377, 434–435, 455
Burns, Nicholas, 404, 406, 409, 421, 431–432
Burundi, 82–83, 347, 349, 511
Bush, Pres. George H.W. see also Bosnia, Bush administration
Iraq and, 232, 237, 241
Kurdish uprising and, 237–241
pledge to prevent genocide, xxi
prosecution of Hussein, 480–481
statements on Bosnian War, 263, 273, 279, 282–283, 287
Vietnam syndrome and, 261
Bush, Pres. George W., on genocide prevention, 511
Bushnell, Prudence
diplomacy of, 330, 345–346, 368, 370
radio jamming proposals, 371–372
U.S. citizens and, 351
Byrd, Sen. Robert, 204
bystander attitudes. see also analogy to the Holocaust; “anc
ient hatreds”; “Holocaust standard”; perpetrators, bystander aid to
“between knowing and not knowing,” 34–36, 115, 121, 208, 264–269, 505
denial, 10, 225, 231
disbelief, 33–36, 39, 115, 265, 415
“evenhandedness,” by journalists, 268
lessons of history, overapplying the, 36, 122, 392, 409
neutrality, clinging to, 34, 268, 352, 396, 406, 504
“peace process” as source of inaction, 260, 296, 310, 345–347
skepticism and incredulity, 27, 36, 101–102, 111–115, 190–195, 212–216, 224–226, 505
solace from mini-victories, 384
wishful thinking, 255, 384, 392, 398, 403, 506
Caldwell, Malcolm, 137–140
Cambodia, warning 96, recognition 104, response 121, aftermath 140
evacuation of foreigners, 104–107
overview of U.S. response to genocide in, xvii, 90
proof of genocide, 142–145
propaganda and, 111–115
refugee reports, 115–121
seizure of Phnom Penh, 87–90
setting up a tribunal for, 486–490
toll of civil war, 100–101
Tuol Sleng, 143–145
UN Credentials Committee decision, 149–154
U.S. dismissal of atrocities, 100–104
U.S. impressions of Khmer Rouge, 95–100
U.S. intelligence credibility, 107–111
U.S. policy after Vietnamese overthrow, 146–149
U.S. policy before Pol Pot, 90–95
Vietnamese invasion, 140–142
Cambodia Genocide Program (Yale Univ.), 488
Cambodia: Starvation and Resolution (Hide-brand and Porter), 112–113
Cambodia, U.S. policy during genocide, 121–140
appeal for military action, 132–136
Holocaust analogy, 127–132
Khmer Rouge allows visitors, 136–140
Cambodian Genocide Justice Act (1994), 487
Carter, Pres. Jimmy
genocide convention and, 156
policy after Vietnamese victory, 146–149
relations with China, 126–127
response to Khmer Rouge, 127, 129, 131
Cassese, Antonio, 492
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