by Mark Curtis
It was recognised by the Foreign Office that the massacre of the Communists was an entirely offensive operation. It noted on 9 February, for example, that killings were occurring at 'a time when there is no indication of a Communist threat or of any effective opposition to the new government'.17
British officials in effect supported these massacres. Roger Allen told the Foreign Office a week after the coup that 'the process of winkling out Communists in Baghdad and the towns is continuing' but that 'a Communist problem will remain':
The present government is doing what it can, and therefore it is my belief that we should support it and help it in the long term to establish itself so that this communist threat may gradually diminish.
The new government, he wrote, 'probably suits our interests pretty well'. In a different despatch on the same day he wrote that since 'communist opposition is likely to continue' and that, in his view, there was no alternative to this government, 'it is therefore essential for it to get consolidated quickly'. It will 'need all the support and money it can get'.18
By this time the Foreign Office had already sent round a memo to various embassies explaining the British attitude to the coup. It said that the new regime 'has already taken strenuous action against local communists' and that 'repression of the local communists' will probably be maintained, while one of its other key problems will be 'the pacification of the Kurds'. 'We wish the new regime well', the memo stated, after referring to the deterioration of British relations with the previous Qasim regime.19
An internal Foreign Office brief also commented that the new rulers 'have shown courage and steadfastness in hatching and executing their plot' and that they should be 'somewhat friendlier to the West'.20
Allen met the Foreign Minister of the new military regime two days after the coup. There is no mention in his record of having raised the subject of the killings; the meeting is described as 'extremely friendly'.21 Indeed, there is no mention in any of the files that I have seen of any concern whatever about the killings – the only response they prompted from the British government was support for those conducting them.
Thus officials noted that they should 'examine all possible means of profiting from the present anti-communist climate in Iraq' and to make 'a major effort to establish links with the new rulers'. The Foreign Office recommended various ways 'to make gestures' to the new regime, including 'to be helpful over the supply of arms' and to 'provide military training courses if the Iraqis want them'. This memo was written on the same day that Allen sent the Foreign Office the radio transcripts urging Iraqis to 'kill the criminals'.22
The embassy in Baghdad similarly recommended 'some kind of warm-hearted gestures' to 'those who had suffered in the process of dismantling Communism in Iraq' – that is, to those who had suffered in overcoming the Communists, not those who were victims of the massacres. This would be done in 'appreciation of the anti-communist effort here'.23
London's policy was to provide diplomatic recognition to the new regime right away and to establish 'a business relationship' with it. It was also to 'make friendly contact as soon as possible with the Baathist and nationalist leaders' and to invite members of the National Guard (that is, the organisation which had helped to carry out the massacres) to London. But this needed to be done 'under some other heading' to keep it secret, so as to avoid being seen publicly to identify with any particular group. The policy was shared with the US, where a senior state department official told the Foreign Office that if the coup 'resulted in a regime of Baathist complexion its policies were more likely to be acceptable to the United States government'.24
It was hoped that one advantage of the new regime was 'a chance for a new period in the oil companies' relations with the government' and to replace Qasim's previous oil policies, which had clearly been threatening the Western oil corpora- tions' domination of the Iraq Petroleum Corporation.25
A week after the coup. Roger Allen was happily reporting that things are 'almost back to normal', hoping that the 'period of frustration' under Qasim was now over 'and that there will be scope for relatively constructive work here'. This was in full recognition that 'the problem of the communists and the slum dwellers is not yet, however, by any means removed' – therefore, the repression of Communists by the regime would presumably continue. By April, Allen could refer to 'our record of friendship for the new regime'.26
The Foreign Office also mentioned the need to 'keep track' of a new organisation set up by Labour MPs called the British Committee for the Defence of Human Rights in Iraq, which had the idea of visiting Iraq and investigating the killings. The embassy also 'warned' the Foreign Office of similar human- rights activities by Lord Bertrand Russell, described as a 'source of irritation' in Anglo-Iraqi relations.27
Another advantage to the British was the new regime's stance towards Kuwait. After Qasim was overthrown the British advised Kuwait to pre-empt any future threat to their independence by the new regime by bribing it. The Kuwaitis paid the new Baath government £50 million which, according to Said Aburish, goes a long way towards explaining Saddam's attempt to intimidate Kuwait in 1990-1991, before invading, and force it to pay him money to meet Iraq's financial needs.28
Arming aggression
British complicity in violence in Iraq goes well beyond the February coup, however. Also in 1963, Britain supported the same Iraqi government's aggression against the Kurds. The precedent set by this episode plays an important part in understanding how Saddam Hussein got away with a campaign of such horrific violence against the Kurds in the 1980s.
On ro June 1963, the Iraqi military began a vicious attack on the Kurds, whose struggle for autonomy against Baghdad had been stepped up in 1961. The Kurds were also calling for a share in Iraqi oil and the exclusion of Arab troops from Kurdistan, the northern region of Iraq.
British officials noted the 'Iraqi intention to carry out terror campaign' [sic]. Within ten days of operations, they wrote: 'the army are now apparently engaged in the clearing out and destruction of Kurdish villages in the Kirkuk neighbourhood'. With two-thirds of the Iraqi army deployed in the north, the Foreign Office reported that 'the Iraq [sic] government is now clearly making an all-out effort to settle the Kurdish problem once and for all'. 'Ruthless tactics' were being employed by the Iraqi military, including air strikes.29
The British embassy in Baghdad reported to London on 22 June:
The brutality of the methods used by the army is likely to mar Arab/Kurdish relations for some time to come. The army has succeeded in clearing the Kurdish villages in lowland areas around vulnerable points . . . The method adopted is to take the villages one by one, shelling them from a safe distance with tank guns and field artillery, giving sometimes little or no warning to the inhabitants. After a safe interval the National Guard or government-paid Kurds move in to loot. . . In some cases, eg in the Kurdish quarters of Kirkuk, bulldozers have been used to knock down houses. The result is that the men take to the hills, women and children are often left to fend for themselves and the village is left abandoned and, for the time being, quiet.30
The Foreign Office recognised there were certain dangers in this campaign for British interests. These were: that 'unsuc- cessful hostilities could jeopardise the present Iraq regime'; that fighting might increase the opportunities for Russian trouble-making in Kurdistan; that the Kurdish unrest could spread to Turkey, Iran and Syria; and there was also a risk of damage to the IPC's oil installations and of interruptions in the flow of oil. Glaringly absent from this Foreign Office list was the effect the fighting would have on the Kurdish people.31 The files indicate that the ambassador encouraged Baghdad to negotiate a settlement with the Kurds, but once the campaign was launched, Britain provided outright support for the Iraqi government.
Before Baghdad began operations, Britain had already approved major arms exports which they knew would be used against the Kurds. Douglas-Home 'is anxious that in general Iraq's arms requirements should be met as quickly as possib
le', one file reads. On 11 April, ministers approved the export of 250 Saracen armoured personnel carriers which, it was recognised, were 'possibly for use if needed against the Kurds'. Also approved were exports of artillery ammunition, 22 Hunter fighter aircraft and rockets for Iraq's existing Hunters, 'again possibly for use against the Kurds'. 'There are considerable commercial advantages to be gained', a ministerial committee commented, and 'the scope for military exports is considerable' – the deal was worth £6 million.32
Officials decided to delay the supply of some of the rockets since:
We must give the Iraqis some of their requirements in order to enable them to hold their own vis-ô-vis the Kurds, but it may be inadvisable to give them too generous supplies, since this might only encourage them to be more intransigeant [sic] with the Kurds and, if fighting breaks out and there are indiscriminate rocket attacks, there might be parliamentary and public criticism.33
After Baghdad attacked Kurdistan, the British government further deliberated on whether to deliver the rockets, a 'sensitive item' since they 'are intended for use against the Kurds'. In the files, there is no consideration of the human- itarian consequences, merely the effect on public relations: "The news of the fighting may provoke public criticism of our decision to supply Iraq with arms', a briefing for the Cabinet reads.34
Two weeks into the campaign, the Foreign Office wrote that 'we are ready to do our best to meet Iraqi requirements in the field of arms and training', though ministers were still keen to delay the supply of rockets, for which the Iraqis were pressing. In July, ministers approved the export of 500 of these 'high explosive rockets'. A senior Iraqi air-force commander, Brigadier Hilmi, had told the British ambassador that he 'needed these weapons now in order to bring their war against the insurgents to a quick and successful conclusion'. When told that Britain would be delivering the rockets, Hilmi was 'genuinely grateful', according to the ambassador, who further commented that the commander 'would be delighted at our gesture'.35
A Foreign Office brief to embassies explaining British policy said that 'we have throughout thought it possible that any arms we supply might be used against the Kurds, but we have had to weigh this argument against other factors', which were to develop good relations with the new Iraqi rulers and to wean them away from Soviet military supplies.36
By the end of August 1963,the Iraqi air force had collected 500 Hunter rockets, a further 1,000 were to be delivered on 1 September and another 500 on 1 October. A further 18,000 were to be provided later. Following this, approvals were given to supply 280,000 rounds of ammunition for Saracen armoured cars, mortar bombs, 25-pounder shells, armed helicopters and sterling sub-machine guns.37
Britain also agreed to requests to send a team to Iraq to mend the guns on Centurion tanks which had been supplied by Britain. The 'one tricky political point', the Foreign Office observed, was the continuation of Iraqi operations against the Kurds. British officers could not be seen to be going near the areas of fighting; therefore, 'if tanks guns [sic] break down in the North, the tanks would simply have to be brought to Baghdad and repaired there'.38
There is no doubt that ministers knew exactly what they were authorising. In October, for example, a Foreign Office official approved the export of demolition slabs on the understanding that these 'will probably be used not only to destroy captured Kurdish strong points but also for the demolition of Kurdish villages'.39 This complicity in the destruction of Kurdish villages was the forebear of the same British policies with regard to Iraqi aggression in the 1980s and Turkish terror against Kurds in the 1990s.
Indeed, British officials were aware that the Iraqi aggression they were supporting may have constituted genocide. The Foreign Office noted in a minute in September that 'Iraq's methods have been brutal and might sustain a charge of attempting to destroy or reduce the Kurds as a racial minority'. The British embassy in Baghdad had told the Foreign Office on 6 July that:
the Kurds tend to be shot rather than taken prisoner. We have had some indications from officials that this may be deliberate policy. . . We have since heard reports of an intention drastically to reduce the Kurdish population in the North and to resettle the area with Arabs and of at least one Arab officer's disgust with the methods employed as inhuman and ill-advised in the long term. There is no doubt at all of the government's deliberate destruction of villages . . . The government of Iraq . . . have resorted to the use of force without the normal civilised safeguards against undue loss of civilian life and perhaps even with some intention of reducing the size of the Kurdish minority in Iraq, or at least cowing it permanently.40
The date of this memo is important: most of the British arms exports to Iraq for use against Kurds were approved after this date; policy was thus similar to the increased British support given to the Saddam regime after the chemical-warfare attacks on Kurdistan in March 1988.
Another similarity between 1963 and 1988 was British attempts to ensure there would be no international action taken against Iraq. In 1963, British officials worked to ensure that the UN would not discuss allegations of genocide in Iraq. A draft Foreign Office brief dated 12 September 1963 is entitled: 'The policy of genocide carried out by the government of the republic of Iraq against the Kurdish people: Reasons for opposing inscription'. This brief provides instructions for Britain's delegation to the UN, saying: 'it is obviously HMG's wish to get rid of this item as quickly as possible'.41
Foreign Office official William Morris suggested that if the question of genocide did come up at the UN 'our best line would be to abstain from voting' and to 'avoid saying anything at all if we possibly can'. Morris also explained that raising the charge of genocide meant the UN concerning itself with the internal affairs of member states, which was contrary to its charter and 'would be most unwelcome to us in the context of any trouble in our dependent territories'.42
British arms exports and training could also help in 'internal security', i.e., supporting the military regime in domestic repression. British help in mending Iraq's Centurion tanks was acknowledged to be specifically for this purpose: 'the two Centurion regiments form the backbone of their internal security in Baghdad'. The supply of Hunter aircraft went ahead in the knowledge that 'it may strengthen the ability of Iraqis to be masters in their own house (the Iraqi air force played an important part in overthrowing Qasim and achieving control of Baghdad)'.43
Indeed, during the February coup British-supplied Hunter aircraft had been used to attack the Ministry of Defence building where Qasim had taken refuge, a scenario repeated ten years later in Chile when British-supplied Hunters were also used successfully to attack the palace where democratically elected president Salvador Allende was holding out (see Chapter 14).
The offensive against the Kurds continued throughout 1963, before in effect reaching a stalemate. In April 1965, the Iraqis resumed what was to be another year-long offensive with similar levels of brutality, until an agreement was signed in June 1966 giving the Kurds some autonomy. The British embassy noted in July 19S5 that 'Kurdish casualties have been mainly among the civilian population who are again being subjected to considerable suffering through indiscriminate air attack'; indiscriminate air attack, that is, from the Iraqi air force's 27 Hawker Hunters, thousands of rockets and other ammunition supplied by the Douglas-Home and Wilson governments. It was also known that napalm was being 'evidently dropped from the Iraqi Hunters'. Villages continued to be razed to the ground along with 'the forcible de-Kurdisation' of some areas in Kurdistan.44
British arms exports continued to flow with the change from the Conservative to the Labour government in 1964. The latter defied a mid-1965 call in parliament to stop arms exports to Baghdad while noting that 'Her Majesty's Government had no intention of withholding normal assistance to the Iraq government in the form of arms supplies'.45 Huge orders were by then in the pipeline, including 17,000 Hunter rockets to be delivered from July, again in the knowledge that they would be used against Kurds. The Wilson government also
agreed to supply the Iraqis with 40 Lightning fighter aircraft.
A June 1965 Foreign Office brief noted that 'we have maintained our arms supplies to Iraq, even during periods of Kurdish fighting' for the reasons of maintaining links with the military, described as 'the Iraqi governing class', to reduce Iraqi arms supplies from the Soviet Union and Nasser's Egypt, and since 'they bring us considerable commercial benefit'. Meanwhile, 'we have no official dealings with the Kurds and give them no assistance'.46
The declassified files also reveal that the Wilson government provided a more terrifying precedent to the rulers in Baghdad: Saddam Hussein was not the first Iraqi leader to use chemical weapons against the Kurds. This had also occurred in the middle 1960s.47
