14 Brigante, “The Feasibility Dispute,”116. This unpublished dissertation is the only detailed account of the particulars of the feasibility dispute. However, while Brigante’s work details the actual dispute, he never researched or wrote about any of the massive strategic implications resulting from the dispute’s resolution. Additionally, the author’s research indicates that many of his comments on the motivations of the key players are not correct and that his analysis of how events unfolded prior to the dispute reaching a climax is very skimpy on details. Finally, Brigante did not document any of his assertions. To the best of his ability, the author tried to document as much of Brigante’s story as possible from still existing records.
15 Brigante, “The Feasibility Dispute,” 25.
16 Ibid., 27.
17 In early January OPM and SPAB would be combined into the WPB with Donald Nelson in overall charge.
18 Brigante, “The Feasibility Dispute,” 29.
19 A copy of Beaverbrook’s memorandum for Roosevelt dealing with this and other proposed increases can be found in Roosevelt’s Safe Files in Box 2, Beaverbrook Folder, FDR Library, Hyde Park, NY.
20 Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy, 185.
21 Brigante, “The Feasibility Dispute,” 31.
22 Woolley and Peters, The American Presidency Project.
23 Minutes of the Planning Committee, 27 January 1942, National Archives, RG 179.2.2.
24 Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Industrial Mobilization for War (1947), 275.
Chapter 8. The Great Feasibility Debate
1 Although what the concept of feasibility involves has been touched on in earlier chapters and will be again outlined in this chapter, some readers may profit from a deeper understanding of how the concept was viewed by the participants in this dispute. In that regard, a memorandum written by Simon Kuznets detailing the intricacies of the feasibility concept can be found in Appendix 1, this volume.
2 Brigante’s study is full of personal and first-person details and is considered authoritative by economic historians who have reviewed it. However, it suffers from the major flaw that he did not document any of his claims and left no papers behind to help future historians check his facts.
3 Minutes of the Planning Committee, 26 February 1942, National Archives, RG 179, Box 4.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Minutes of the Planning Committee, 13 March 1942, National Archives, RG 179, Box 4.
7 Ibid.
8 Planning Committee Document 31, 14 March 1942, National Archives, RG 179, Box. 4. Because this is the baseline document that remained little changed in following feasibility studies, future historians will find it a valuable resource. The entire report is reproduced in Appendix 2, this volume. Note that although this book focuses on the relationship between GDP and feasibility, the report goes into great depth on other important areas dealing with overall feasibility: raw materials, industrial facilities (plant), and labor.
9 Brigante, “The Feasibility Dispute,” 34.
10 Minutes of the Planning Committee, 16 March 1942, National Archives, RG 179, Box 4.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 What is not mentioned in any of the works on this topic and is not adequately covered in either Kuznets’ or May’s studies (although Kuznets covers it in his later book, National Product in Wartime) is the effect of productivity increases. For instance, the cost per foot of aircraft had fallen by more than 80 percent by the end of 1944, so it was possible to limit spending to $72 billion annually and still count on a substantial increase in the amount of munitions delivered.
14 The letter can be found at Minutes of the Planning Committee, 16 March 1942, National Archives, RG 179, Box 4.
15 Minutes of the Planning Committee, 25 March 1942, National Archives, RG 179, Box 4.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Brigante, “The Feasibility Dispute,” 48.
19 Minutes of the Planning Committee, 31 March 1942, National Archives, RG 179, Box 4.
20 This letter can be found in Roosevelt’s Safe Files at the FDR Library, Hyde Park, NY. The letter has recently been placed on line and can be found at http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu./psf/box3/a43kk01.html (accessed 1 January 2009).
21 This note can be found in Roosevelt’s Safe Files at the FDR Library, Hyde Park, NY. The letter has recently been placed on line and can be found at http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu./psf/box3/a43mm02.html (accessed 1 January 2009).
22 Minutes of the Planning Committee, 6 April 1942, RG 179, Box 4.
23 Minutes of the Planning Committee, 8 April 1942, National Archives, RG 179, Box 4.
24 Brigante, “The Feasibility Dispute,” 53.
25 Ibid.
26 Kuznets’ full explanation of this concept can be found in Appendix 1, this volume. An example-based explanation is provided by Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy, 380–82.
27 Somervell Desk Files, National Archives, Record Group 160, Box 6. Shipbuilding goals, for instance, were increased by more than a million tons.
28 Koistinen, Arsenal of World War II, 307.
29 The author was unable to find a copy of Kuznets’ original report in any of the archive files. However, in the WPB records stored at the National Archives, there is a lengthy memorandum written by Robert Nathan that summarizes all of the key points of the Kuznets’ study and that was used as the basis of discussion for the climactic feasibility meetings of 6 and 13 October. It is reproduced in Appendix 4, this volume. A copy can be found in the National Archives, RG 179, Box 1.
30 Ibid.
31 See Nathan’s 6 October 1942 memorandum to the WPB (Appendix 4, this volume).
32 Brigante, “The Feasibility Dispute,” 52; and Koistinen, Arsenal of World War II, 308. See Appendix 4, this volume.
33 Brigante, “The Feasibility Dispute,” 60.
34 Ibid., 69.
35 Ibid., 70.
36 Ibid., 69.
37 Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Industrial Mobilization for War (1947), 287.
38 Brigante, “The Feasibility Dispute,” 84.
39 As reproduced in Brigante, “The Feasibility Dispute.”This letter is reproduced in its entirety in Appendix 5, this volume.
40 Ibid.
41 Somervell Desk Files, National Archives, Record Group 160, Box 6. This letter is reproduced in its entirety in Appendix 6, this volume.
42 Influential syndicated columnist Drew Pearson portrayed the dispute as a struggle to the finish in a series of columns from September through December 1942. These columns have been digitized and are available at http://www.aladin.wrlc.org/gsdl/collect/pearson/pearson.shtml (accessed 30 January 2008).
43 Koistinen, Arsenal of World War II, 311.
44 Brigante has written the most complete and accessible version of this meeting. Because he was able to interview persons who attended the meeting, his version must be taken as authoritative. The minutes of the meeting corroborate most of what Brigante says, although without the color. The minutes can be found in the National Archives, Minutes of War Production Board (6 October 1942; National Archives, RG 179.2.2, Box 3. The author was unable to find a copy of the Marshall letter either in the records of the WPB or in Somervell’s files.
45 See Joel R. Davidson, The Unsinkable Fleet: The Politics of U.S. Navy Expansion in World War II (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1996), 36–40. Major naval procurement was mandated by law and Congress had already approved several million tons worth of production in July of 1942 (HR 7184).The WPB could not effect this procurement without the consent of Congress, although when the overall production cuts were made, the Navy took a small portion of the hit. However, the reductions in Navy procurement were far below those of the Army and did not affect the construction of major combat ships.
46 Brigante, “The Feasibility Dispute,” 30.
47 Ibid.
48 Memorandum from Simon Kuznets to the Planning Committee, “Proposals for Adjustment of the P
rogram,” 8 October 1942, Minutes of the Planning Committee, 8 April 1942, National Archives, RG 179, Box 4.
49 Brigante, “The Feasibility Dispute,” 97.
50 Minutes of the WPB, 6 October 1942. See Appendix 8, this volume.
51 Somervell Desk Files, National Archives, Record Group 160, Box 6.
52 Ibid. A copy of this letter is at Appendix 7, this volume.
53 Minutes of the WPB, 13 October 1942, National Archives, RG 179, Box 3.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Minutes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 20 October 1942, National Archives, Record Group 218.
57 Somervell Desk Files, National Archives, Record Group 160, Box 6.
58 A copy of this letter can be found in National Archives, records of the JCS, Record Group 218.2.1.
59 “U.S. War Production Objective, 1943,” A Report by the Joint Staff Planners, with annexes, 26 November 1942, National Archives, records of the JCS, Record Group 218.2.1.
60 A good summary of the new munitions program can be found in Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Industrial Mobilization for War (1947), 290–93.
61 Brigante, “The Feasibility Dispute,” 98.
62 Henderson, it should be noted, was fired or left his position as the head of the OPA when Roosevelt decided that the political cost of keeping him outweighed his obvious ability to keep inflation in check. Henderson had made too many enemies in business and in Congress.
63 Author interview with David Ginsberg on 11 October 2007. Nathan was later assigned to the Office of Strategic Services, but was medically released after a stay of several months at Walter Reed Army hospital for a back injury. Ginsberg left the Army in 1946 with the rank of major.
Chapter 9. Marshall’s Commitment to a 1943 Invasion of Europe
1 Stewart, American Military History, 140.This quote is lifted directly from Maurice Matloff’s American Military History, Vol. 2, 1902–1996 (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 1973), 419.
2 Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943–1944 (Washington, DC: OCMH, Department of the Army, 1958), 21–22.
3 Minutes of the meeting held at Anfa Camp, 16 January 1943, are available in digital form from the Joint Chiefs of Staff History Office (Pentagon, Alexandria, VA). This resource has not been placed online, but is available on CD.
4 Some historians, notably Sir Michael Howard, noted that Marshall’s commitment to a 1943 invasion was uncertain. However, while some—but by no means all—early World War II historians addressed this issue correctly, their position does not dominate the historical record.
5 For a brilliant explosion of the fallacy that there was a rift between British and American grand strategic conception on the wisdom of a cross-Channel invasion, see Richard M. Leighton, “Overlord Revisited: An Interpretation of American Strategy in the European War, 1942–1944,” American Historical Review 68, no. 4 (July 1963): 919–37.
6 “Minutes and formal agreements,” Arcadia Conference, Washington DC, 22 December 1941–14 January 1942. A copy of the minutes for all wartime conferences can be procured from the Joint Chiefs of Staff History Office (Pentagon, Alexandria, VA). Although these files have been digitized, they have not as of yet been posted to the Internet.
7 Winston S. Churchill, Hinge of Fate: The Second World War, Vol. IV (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), 287.
8 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 515. In a letter to Secretary of War Stimson, 15 April 1942, Marshall said, “Our proposal was formally accepted after an oral presentation by me and by Hopkins followed by general comments by members and Chief of Staff. PM in impressive pronouncement declared complete agreement.” See Larry Bland, The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. III (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 162. Marshall reiterated this comment in a letter to the president on 18 April 1942 (Marshall Papers, 164).
9 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 535.
10 Guyer, “The Joint Chiefs and the War Against Germany,” Section 4,17.
11 A copy of this memo is available in FDR’s Safe files and has been placed online at http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box4/a44f02.html (accessed 1 January 2009).
12 Ibid. See online copy at http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box4/a44f01.html (accessed 1 January 2009).
13 Hayes, “The Joint Chiefs and the War Against Japan.”The British official history of World War II confirms this British position and how the British chiefs came to accept them. See J. M. A. Gwyer and J. R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy, Volume III: June 1941–August 1942 (London: Her Majerty’s Stationery Office, 1964), 617–24.
14 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 565.
15 Ibid., 567.
16 Guyer, “The Joint Chiefs and the War Against Germany,” Section 5,11. See Gwyer and Butler, Grand Strategy, 624–31 for a full account of these meetings.
17 Ibid., 8.
18 Harrison Gordon, Cross Channel Attack (Washington, DC: GPO, Department of the Army, 1951), 26.
19 Ibid., 14.
20 Twenty-fourth meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 July 1942, National Archives, Record Group 218. In On Active Service in Peace and War, Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy began a long-standing debate as to whether this was a serious proposal on Marshall and King’s part. According to Bundy’s interpretation of Secretary of War Stimson’s biography, the proposal “was designed mainly as a plan to bring the British into agreement with Bolero.” However, the actual quote from the Stimson Diary (p. 424) gives no indication that this was a ploy. As the Diary records, “I found Marshall very stirred up and emphatic over it [the British memo rejecting Bolero]. . . . As the British won’t go through with what they agreed to, we will turn our backs on them and take up the war with Japan.” A person planning a ploy is normally not as agitated as Marshall comes across. Moreover, if this plan was a ploy it would be critical to involve Stimson in it before it went to the president. However, there is no indication in the record of this proposal being a ploy. In fact, in the Minutes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff where this is discussed a ploy is never mentioned. The discussion revolves entirely around why this is a sound proposal and does not mention that it was not a real proposal but instead a method to pressure the British. This event is covered in the Marshall Papers in detail, without any indication it was a ploy (Bland, The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Vol. III, 269–73). Moreover, when the president pushed back on this proposal, Marshall at first made an effort to defend his and King’s position. This is an unusual approach to take for a ploy. One would assume that instead of defending his position Marshall would just inform Roosevelt that it was designed to force Britain’s hand and was not a serious proposal. One would also assume that the joint chiefs would have brought the president into their thinking before forwarding such a radical proposal. Because Roosevelt’s reply makes it obvious he was not so informed, both Marshall and King were taking a severe risk the president would lose faith in their ability and judgment. One should also note that at this level of leadership this kind of game is not played, at least not in this way. Anyway, it would have been just as effective a scare tactic, if that is what it was supposed to be, to bring in General Dill and tell him what Marshall and King were thinking, and let him back-channel it to the British chiefs. This could have been done without involving the president and risking his wrath. While the debate continues, all contemporary accounts indicate that both Marshall and King were serious about it. In fact, Marshall’s deputy, General Handy, would return to this idea in November 1942. His unpublished memoirs (Handy File, Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA) demonstrate that this was a serious proposal on the eve of the Casablanca Conference, as was the early proposal discussed here. Andrew Roberts in his new book, Masters and Commanders (London: Harper, 2008, 230–33), addresses this debate at some length and concludes that this was a serious threat and not a bluff.
21 Guyer, “The Joint Chiefs and the War Against Germany,” Section 5, 15.
22 Ibid.
23 Hayes,
“The Joint Chiefs and the War Against Japan.”
24 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 576.
25 Ibid., 582.
26 Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope 1939–1942 (New York: Viking Press, 1966), 343.
27 Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman, War Diaries: Field Marshall Lord Alan Brooke (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 280.
28 Memorandum from General Marshall to Field Marshall Sir John Dill, 14 August 1942; Bland, The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Vol. III, 302.
29 British operations in Salonika, Greece, consumed enormous numbers of people and materiel for two years without significant result. The Germans, and later Allied critics, referred to it as the war’s “largest self-sustaining prison camp.”
30 Twenty-seventh meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 July 1942, National Archives, Record Group 218.
31 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 630.
32 Marshall, The War Reports of General George C. Marshall, 155–60.
33 Notes Taken at the Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, 25 November 1942, Minutes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Archives, Record Group 218.
34 Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941–1942.
35 Guyer, “The Joint Chiefs and the War Against Germany,” Section 5, 18.
36 Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941–1942 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1953), 363. See also Guyer, “The Joint Chiefs and the War Against Germany,” and Hayes, “The Joint Chiefs and the War Against Japan.”
37 Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941–1942, 365–66.
38 According to the “Determination of Army Supply Requirements” (National Defense University, Washington, DC). This document also demonstrates that the planners were now putting feasibility at the forefront of their considerations: “Before publication of this program, computed requirements were reviewed carefully with procurement and production representatives. . . . In some cases total requirements were modified in accordance with production capabilities. The program, as published, was considered to be capable with the facilities available as of 1 January 1943 and generally within anticipated allocations of critical raw materials by the War Production Board.
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