Then Southampton’s luck ran out. As soon as she and her accompanying three ships put the helm over, fire was let loose from the heavy guns of the German dreadnought line. It was going to be rough:
We knew the time of flight was twenty-three seconds, and the sub had a wristwatch with a prominent second hand – we almost agreed to throw it overboard after three-quarters of an hour shelling; at the twenty-third second the sub would make a grimace, and as if in reply a series of splitting reports and lugubrious moans announced that the salvo had arrived. Frequently they were so close that torrents of spray from the splashes splattered down on the boat deck. Each shell left a muddy pool in the water, and appeared to burst on impact.121
The crew compared notes and reckoned that in one hour around sixty shells ‘fell within 100 yards of the ship’,122 more than one impact every sixty seconds.
At 16:41 the flag signal was hauled down on Lions halyard and her orders became executive, but by ordering a turn in succession, Beatty gave the German gunners a much-appreciated gift – an unchanging aiming point. They simply had to concentrate their fire on one fixed point on the seas to be certain that a target would move into their guns’ fields of fire. The turning point became a hellish picture of towering shell splashes as the concentrated fire lashed the sea. So much so that when it came to New Zealand’s turn she did not wait; she turned early, before she had reached the designated point.
For the second time that day, Barham could read neither Lions signal nor that of Tiger (whose continued duty it was to pass signals on). At 16:48 a second signal by flags for Barham to change course was made but Seymour123 again did not make it executive for a further six minutes at 16:54.124 During the delay, the 5th Battle Squadron ships steamed 4,000yds closer to the German guns. It was unfortunate that even now Lion’s signal book was not able to provide an explanation of the delay:
4.55 – most of the records of the outgoing visual signals were lost and destroyed in the action. The records had been sent down to the port signal stations to be logged but, on account of bursting shells and smoke and fire, they got lost or destroyed. This log was preserved with difficulty, not before a hose had been turned on it.125
Even as esteemed a naval historian as Andrew Gordon was surprised.126
Given the earlier confusion that he had caused, it is odd that Beatty could even countenance Seymour’s continued service on Lion. Now that we see the 5th Battle Squadron repeating mistakes made earlier in the day, no matter where the source of the error lay, it is little short of incredible. Maybe Evan-Thomas was also somewhat to blame. He continued southward, passing Beatty coming north, not questioning anything. It was almost as if he were either in complete denial of Beatty’s command, or insisted on receiving specific orders. Nevertheless, this time he could see what was happening. While the first signals muddle seems more explainable, this time, Evan-Thomas’s continued steaming does not speak so well for the rear admiral.
With Lion steaming north at 25 knots, the battle-cruisers and the 5th Battle Squadron passed each other in opposite directions at 16:50, Barham still heading south at 24 knots; the effective speed of separation was nearly 50 knots. What is more, Beatty’s earlier signals also ordered him to repeat the same manoeuvre of turning in succession on the same point. There was real confusion on the British line. As the executive officer on Warspite commented:
I suddenly saw our battle-cruisers coming closer by about half a mile away, going in the opposite direction and I realised that they had turned back. I noticed that Queen Mary and Indefatigable were …[missing] but never realised that they had been sunk… X turret of Lion was askew and trained towards us (that is, away from the enemy), the guns at full elevation, several hits showing on her port side … Then we turned … Very soon after the turn, I saw on the starboard quarter the whole of the High Seas Fleet – masts, funnels and an endless ripple of orange flashes all down the line … I felt one or two very heavy shakes but it never occurred to me that we were being hit… I distinctly saw two of our salvos hit the leading German battleship … I know we hit her hard.127
Finally, at 16:55 Evan-Thomas hoisted the signal flags ‘T’ and ‘A’ (that warned of rapid turns in succession or changes of speed).
For Hipper, however, the sands were shifting. Of his five ships, only four were now in fighting order. Von der Tann s only functioning waist turret was thus useless, since it was on her disengaged starboard side, but Kapitän Zenker bravely decided to keep her in the line: ‘In spite of this failure, I decided to keep with my division to prevent the enemy from noticing anything and re-distributing fire so that the other ships would not come in for worse punishment.’128
The weather also started to deteriorate, adding another looming issue to Hipper’s balance of power. According to Waldeyer-Hartz, Hipper was becoming increasingly unsure of the conditions once the run to the north had started. He felt that there could be hidden surprises in the mists that would now work in favour of the British: ‘Mark my words, Harder, there’s something nasty brewing. It would be better not to get ourselves in too deep.’129 Scheer himself now also felt a victim to the increasingly difficult weather conditions:
Meanwhile, the previously clear weather had become less clear; the wind had changed from north-west to south-west. Powder fumes and smoke from the funnels hung over the sea and cut off all view from north and east. Only now and then could we see our own reconnaissance forces … The cessation of firing at the head of the line could only be ascribed to the increasing difficulty of observation with the sun so low on the horizon, until it finallybecame impossible.130
Even after Goodenough delayed the implementation of the signal to turn back north because of wanting to confirm more details about the composition of Scheers force, he also hoped to deliver a torpedo attack ‘on the long crescent-shaped line of heavy ships that was stretched round on our port bow’.131 After signalling back more intelligence at 16:45, Goodenough turned his ships at the same time as signalling Jellicoe. All throughout, his small light cruiser squadron was being massively straddled by German fire that was only around 14,000yds (12,800m) off to his port.132
Urgent. Priority. Course of Enemy’s battle fleet, north, single line ahead. Composition of van Kaiser class. Bearing of centre, east. Destroyers on both wings and ahead. Enemy’s battle-cruisers joining battle fleet from northward. My position lat. 56 degrees 29 minutes north, long. 6 degrees 14 minutes east.
Three minutes after receiving Goodenough’s vital information Jellicoe signalled the Admiralty at 16:51 with the warning: ‘Fleet action is imminent’.
All the fire from the German battle fleet was now focused in a deadly hot stream of steel against Southampton and the 5th Battle Squadron, but she somehow managed to escape.133 One officer commented on their luck: ‘I can truthfully say that I thought each moment would be our last… How we escaped amazes everyone from the commodore downwards.’134
The helmsman ‘chased the splash’ to avoid getting hit, a practice that involved guessing the enemy’s range corrections and steering a course to the last shell splash on the basis that the next fire would be corrected from that spot. Southampton’s gunnery officer, Lieutenant (later Admiral Sir) Harold Burrough, described the sensation of being the sole target of Scheers massed guns: ‘half drowned by spray from shots falling in the water alongside the ship. The spray rises about eighty or one hundred feet and then we steam through the column of falling water. We seemed to have a charmed life.’135
The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron now brought up the rear on the port quarter as Beatty’s Battle Cruiser Fleet pulled out ahead, steaming north-northwest at 25 knots, not slowing for any reason. After 16:46 Beatty’s ships also came into range of Scheers guns on König, Großer Kurfürst and Markgraf, all successfully straddling Tiger and Princess Royal. Lion raced north as fast as she could, parallel to Lützow, and continued to receive more hits.
The other British ships also began to take punishment. Between 16:58 and 17:02 Barham was hit four times
, all by Derfflinger. Until now she had been lucky, the only hit registering at long distance at 16:23 on the run south from Von der Tann. At 16:58 she was hit first on the no. 2 starboard 6in gun, then again three minutes later on the superstructure; the third was at 17:08 on the aft side, and the fourth at 17:10 was almost a repeat of the 16:58 hit, landing within 20ft (6m).
I saw all four rounds of the salvo which hit Barham in mid-air as they came. One hit penetrated the deck six feet from where I stood. It went on to explode below without doing too much harm. Another hit below the water line and blew a hole in the opposite side of the ship, causing jagged edges which may have slowed us up. It wiped out a torpedo detachment.136
Warspite also took three hits (probably also from Derfflinger) at around 16:58. The turret officer of Malaya witnessed the scene:
When we turned I saw our battle-cruisers proceeding north at full speed, already 7,000 or 8,000 yards ahead of us. I then realised that just the four of us of the battle squadron would have to entertain the High Seas Fleet – four against perhaps twenty.137
At this point, the light was still definitely to the Germans’ advantage (as opposed to what Hipper immediately feared). A bridge officer from Southampton described it: ‘our ships were silhouetted against a bright western sky, but the sun being hidden, there was no glare, whereas to the eastward there was still a dark cloudy background, against which the German ships’ outlines were not clearly visible’.138 From Valiant the impression was the same: ‘We had great difficulty seeing them but they could easily see us against the setting sun. It was not unadulterated bliss seeing the flash of their guns and wondering whether the shell would touch you or not.’139
In Beatty’s line, Lion and Tiger were hit by Seydlitz and Lützow simultaneously, a minute before 17:00. Seydlitz had expended a large amount of ammunition – around three hundred 11in shells (from 15:48 to 17:10) – and she continued to throw more at Tiger. One shell caused a cordite fire in the aft 4in battery, while two other shells landed in and near the sick bay. Even if Seydlitz was low in the stern and the ship appeared to leave the line, Beatty turned Lion away in an attempt to throw the German gunners off. He was also trying to buy some time for much-needed repairs to Lions turrets, to get fires under control and the decks cleared of the debris of shrapnel and torn metal, and, most urgently, to treat the wounded. Gradually, Lion, at 24 knots, bent her course away from German fire. Tiger switched fire to Derfflinger.
By this point Lion had been hit thirteen times and Tiger, third in line, seventeen. The Princess Royal had also been hit heavily. Only New Zealand seemed to have been unscathed. Queen Mary and Indefatigable were, of course, gone.
The 5th Battle Squadron divided the tasks between the four ships. Barham and Valiant targeted the five leading German battle-cruisers ahead of them, Warspite and Malaya the four König-type battleships that were chasing them. At the head of the German dreadnought line, Rear Admiral Paul Behncke led the König-class battleships: the name-ship, Großer Kurfürst, Kronprinz and Markgraf.
Malaya, in the rear, was the prime target for these dreadnoughts. She turned 16 points to starboard and followed her sister ships north, at 16:59:
When it was time for the Malaya to turn, the turning point was a very ‘hot corner’ as the enemy had, of course, concentrated on that point. The shells were pouring in very fast, and it is doubtful whether we, the last ship of the line, could have got through without a very severe hammering if the captain had not used his initiative and turned the ship early.140
Initially, Malaya was being targeted by two dreadnoughts, Prinzregent Luitpold and Kronprinz. After a further quarter of an hour, the salvos started to ‘arrive thick and fast round us at a rate of six, eight or nine a minute’.141 From 17:17 Malaya was under constant threat for twenty minutes and was hit nine times. König at the head of the line was the first successfully to score a hit at 17:17 on Malaya’s forward turret.
Almost immediately, after Barham turned to follow Beatty, the rest of the German 3rd Squadron turned its guns on Malaya. She was hit at the lower edge of the armour belt, below the water line, abreast of B turret. As the loading cages were jammed, the guns were temporarily out of action. The hit also broke the steam pipe feeding the siren and the noise from the steam escaping at high pressure made effective communication with the fore control top almost impossible.
Ten minutes in, Malaya was bracketed for another ten, during which six separate hits were registered; all came from the 3rd Squadron. The first of these landed on the aft X turret, putting the range-finders out of action. Malaya was firmly in the enemy’s sights:
A German battleship took up position on our right and let us have it broadside on with everything she had. Shells ripped through the armour plating like a knife through cheese. One shell dropped amidships, came down through the deck head and exploded. It ignited our ammunition charges throwing every man off his feet. We lay half stunned …It was soon roaring like a furnace and we were trapped by watertight doors.142
The order was given to depress and fire the 6in guns close by the ship so as to obscure her profile and confuse enemy spotters. She would have surrounded herself with close-in shell hits and spray. But even before this could be done, two more hits landed, putting the whole starboard battery out of action, and killing 102 men and officers. It was a terrible scene: ‘Everything was dark chaos. Most of the wounded had been taken away but several of the killed were still there [and] the smell of burnt human flesh remained in the ship for weeks giving everybody a sickly nauseous feeling.’143
Minutes later, there were another two shells. This time they hit below the waterline, by the forward boiler room. Fifty feet of compartments were flooded and the Malaya listed 4 degrees starboard, reducing the effective elevation against her enemy targets. Finally, ten minutes after the start of this ordeal came a hit on her 6in side armour. The dread feeling of being left at the back was overwhelming: ‘During this time we never had less [sic] than three ships firing at us and sometimes more.’144
For those whose duty lay below decks it must, in many ways, have been much worse, a dark terror mounting in each man as the ship shuddered from hits, never knowing when the bulkheads would come crashing in. It must have felt like slowly being buried alive.
The salvos fell at very irregular distances from our ships. Nevertheless, we suffered bad hits, two or three heavy shells striking us during this phase. When a heavy shell hit the armour of our ship, the terrific crash of the explosion was followed by a vibration of the whole ship, affecting even our conning tower. The shells which exploded in the interior of the ship caused rather a dull roar, which was transmitted all over the ship by voice pipes and telephones.145
From the start of the run to the north, the volume of firepower aimed at Malaya was heavy. In the first two minutes (after 17:10), König fired seven salvos and Kaiser, while checking fire at 17:35, had by that point expended twenty-seven salvos in twenty-five minutes. König actually hung on for another five minutes. Kronprinz was one of the first to drop out (at 17:21), claiming the range had become too extended for her guns, only coming back for around six minutes at about half-past five. The last two shells that could have done some serious damage just passed over and landed near the port-side 6in battery at 17:36. Then the pressure eased.
By now, however, the Queen Elizabeths were starting to hit back. From 17:00 Seydlitz, Großer Kurfürst and Markgraf were all struck, Seydlitz three times by Valiant, hitting her a number of times on her forecastle. With Barham, Valiant had mauled Großer Kurfürst (17:09) and Markgraf (17:10). But, as fire from the German battle-cruisers lessened against Beatty’s line at around 17:10, the guns were retrained. Barham and Valiant took on the German battle-cruisers, while Malaya and Warspite focused on the German dreadnoughts, especially the 5th Division. Effectively, Evan-Thomas’s four Queen Elizabeths were outnumbered two to one and holding their own against nine German aggressors.
As Beatty continued to drive his force north as fast as he could, fire
on his line started to die out. His turn north-northwest and fast run at 24 or 25 knots seemed to have worked, but had left some of his forces behind struggling to regain position.
Lützow and Derfflinger were hit heavily at 17:30, as was Markgraf at the end of the line. On Lützow, with no WT, searchlight now became the sole means of communication. The only German ships to have escaped damage during this phase were Moltke and Von der Tann.
Beatty ordered Evan-Thomas to ‘prolong the line by taking stations astern. For the 23½-knot, slower-moving 5th Battle Squadron to catch up was no easy task. Nevertheless, at 17:10 Evan-Thomas ordered 25 knots.146 Barham was around 4,000yds (3,600m) behind New Zealand, the last ship in the battle-cruiser fleet line. The 5th Battle Squadron turned 3–4 degrees to the starboard and ran a course of 0°: true north. The squadron had to pass over Beatty’s wake onto his engaged side, thus to form a protective screen, falling in behind New Zealand, whose 12in guns were now out of range, although there is some disagreement on this.
The courage of Evan-Thomas’s act went unrecognised in Beatty’s dispatches. Evan-Thomas’s version has been discounted by a few commentators, but Gordon strongly believes that Evan-Thomas was on the starboard, engaged side, stating that those who felt otherwise were simply ‘wrong’. Andrew Gordon cites Marder’s charts. John Campbell, Stephen Roskill and Julian Corbett all put Evan-Thomas on Beatty’s disengaged side.147 However, both Evan-Thomas himself and the German official account support the assertion that Beatty’s force was shielded by the 5th Battle Squadron:
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